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China’s official media are nearly a decade into a global expansion programme to 
challenge the dominance of Anglo-American news organisations and their framing of 
world events. This research tackles the questions of whether Chinese media abroad 
deserve to be dismissed as channels for Communist Party propaganda, whether their 
output has journalistic merit, and whether Chinese journalism has a different 
character from that of the Anglosphere. The focus is on CCTV-News in English, whose 
‘hard news’ output is compared with that of BBC World News TV between 2014 and 
2016: previous studies of the channel have concentrated on single regions or events, 
political strategy or current affairs. Comparative quantitative content analysis of five 
constructed weeks of news is followed by frame analysis of selected events with a 
framework adapted to accommodate Chinese political and cultural proclivities. 
Subconscious editorial judgements are made manifest through a pioneering 
experimental technique, ‘cross-editing’, in which journalists from Britain and China 
swap broadcast news scripts and re-edit them as if for output on their own channel. 
Topics of strategic importance to Beijing are the focus of the research: news about 
China, and coverage of Africa including China in Africa. The empirical analysis 
confirms that these politically sensitive areas are handled by CCTV-News mainly in 
ways that are alien to editorial principles in the Anglosphere, either through lack of 
journalistic rigour (partial reporting and ‘positive news’) or through differences in 
framing such as solution-focused reporting and aversion to conflict. The analysis 
demonstrates the uneven editorial imperatives across CCTV-News and the 
improvised nature of journalistic professionalism, including how far Chinese 
reporters dare push the boundaries of information control. In the BBC World News 
output, the comparative methods reveal weaknesses in the Corporation’s professed 
tenets of balance and impartiality, and highlight the difficulties of telling nuanced, 
non-pictorial stories from distant countries while shackled by Anglo-American 
television ‘grammar’. The research confirms the considerable impediments to 
credibility occasioned by political control over CCTV’s English news output: however, 
it also indicates that the journalism of the Anglosphere, in the form of BBC World 
News, is not the universal standard many believed it to be. 
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Preface and acknowledgements 
The origins of this research lie not in China but in Berlin in February 1989 where, 
while deputising for the BBC's German Service correspondent, I read a death notice in 
one of Communist East Germany's main newspapers, the Berliner Zeitung, that under 
censorship rules should never have made it into print. It was for Chris Gueffroy, 20 
years old and the last person to be shot dead by East German border guards while 
trying to cross the Berlin Wall. The notice spoke of the pain of relatives and friends 
occasioned by his 'tragic accident'.1 How it evaded the authorities’ attention and came 
to be published was never clear, but it sensitised me to further unexplained 
anomalies in the news output of nominally closed or controlled societies. Omissions 
were always significant, but so too was what was not left out.  
I became increasingly frustrated by Westerners' practice of dismissing the 
news output of authoritarian countries out of hand because it was 'not journalism' as 
they understood it – as if there were nothing to be gained from reading it, and nothing 
to be learned about the country from how its media spoke. When I later travelled in 
China, and specialised in Asia-Pacific news for the BBC World Service, I became 
fascinated by how state news organisations such as Xinhua and CCTV portrayed China 
in English as it opened up to the world. What at first sight appeared to be a uniform 
message sometimes fractured on closer inspection. Why did CCTV’s English-language 
Twitter accounts carry two very different reports of the death of the imprisoned 
dissident writer Liu Xiaobo, CCTV America referring to him as 'Nobel Peace Prize 
laureate'2 and CCTV Beijing accusing him of having engaged in ‘activities designed to 
overthrow the Chinese government'3? Why were they using Twitter, which is banned 
in China? As Beijing viewed Liu Xiaobo as a criminal, why was CCTV English reporting 
his death at all? 
This study, which compares CCTV’s Anglophone news output with that of BBC 
World News TV, is for anyone in journalism or public affairs who is interested in the 
way official China presents itself as it assumes a more assertive international role in 
                                                        
1 : Sources: (1) Goldmann, S. (2014). Er wollte zur Golden Gate Bridge. Tagesspiegel news website, 5 
February. Retrieved from http://www.tagesspiegel.de/berlin/gedenken-an-den-letzten-an-der-
mauer-erschossenen-er-wollte-zur-golden-gate-bridge/9432424-all.html.  (2) Nooke, M. (2009). Die 
Todesopfer an der Berliner Mauer 1961-1989: ein biographisches Handbuch (page 431). Berlin: 
Christoph Links. 
2 Tweet from CGTN America @cgtnamerica, 1432 BST 13 July 2017. 
3 Tweet from CGTN Beijing @cgtnofficial, 1629 BST 13 July 2017. 
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Xi Jinping's second five-year term in power. It reveals that Chinese state television 
news in English does not see the world outside China from a uniform perspective or 
sometimes even speak with a single voice on China itself. Among slick Anglo-
American-style news features and slabs of state media rhetoric can be discerned 
journalistic elements that are different from both Marxist-Leninist theory and the 
liberal-democratic ideal of ‘free’ media espoused in the West. The comparison also 
permits a critical light to be shed on the BBC's editorial assumptions, and in particular 
whether a declared commitment to ‘democratic values’ prevents it from viewing 
world events with detachment. 
My thanks go firstly to my supervision team – Prof Hugo de Burgh and Prof 
Daya Thussu – for their advice, encouragement and suggestions, and to Dr Jerry Pepin 
for motivating and putting up with me while I researched and wrote. Thanks go too to 
Alja Kranjec and Chang Yiru at Westminster’s China Media Centre for their practical 
help, Dr Iginio Gagliardone and Ian Richardson for constructive comments on chapter 
drafts, and Prof Helge Rønning, Prof Jiang Fei and Dr Li Shubo for their 
encouragement with my early Africa content analysis that resulted in a published 
paper. I am also grateful to a small band of Westminster PhD colleagues for their 
camaraderie during 'Shut Up And Write' sessions, and the postgraduate students who 
valiantly co-coded for me.  
Several parts of the work on CCTV Africa included in Chapter 7 and referred to 
in Chapters 1, 3 and 4 have already been published. I am grateful to Routledge (Taylor 
& Francis) for permission to reproduce the following.  
 Early quantitative analysis of African news programmes and framing of the conflict in 
South Sudan: in Marsh, V. (2016). ‘Mixed messages, partial pictures? – discourses 
under construction in CCTV’s Africa Live, compared with the BBC.’ Chinese Journal of 
Communication special issue, The Voice of China in Africa: Media, Communication 
Technologies and Image Building (eds. H. Rønning, E. Tjønneland, F. Jiang & G. 
Nassanga), 9(1), 56-70. 
 Frame analysis of three African news topics and explanation of the framework: in 
Marsh, V. (2016). ‘Africa through Chinese eyes: new frames or the same old lens?’  In 
Africa’s media image in the 21st century: From the ‘Heart of Darkness’ to ‘Africa Rising’ 
(eds. M. Bunce, S. Franks & C. Paterson). London: Routledge, 177-189. 
 Interviews with CCTV Africa staff in Nairobi: from Marsh, V. (2018). ‘Tian gao or 
tianxia? The ambiguities of CCTV’s English-language news for Africa.’ In China’s Media 




This research would never have been possible without the participation of 
several dozen anonymous serving and former CCTV and BBC journalists. They gave 
up their time for my interviews, took part in my experimental method of ‘cross-
editing’, fielded my emailed questions and challenged my assumptions throughout my 
research. I hope you enjoy reading at least some of what they helped create. 
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1 
1 Changing world, changing news: the purpose of the study 
The discipline of verification is what separates journalism from 
entertainment, propaganda, fiction, or art... Journalism alone is focused first 
on getting what happened down right. 
Bill Kovach, Tom Rosenstiel1 
 
Reality exists objectively, but any attempt to record the truth about it 
always and everywhere necessarily involves selection... In this sense, all 
news is artifice. 
Nick Davies2 
1.1 A dragon in the newsfeed 
From China Daily supplements in the Daily Telegraph in London to stacks of China 
Report magazines in airport newsagents, from Xinhua news agency's Twitter feed to 
the advance of StarTimes in Africa's pay-TV industry, Chinese media are everywhere. 
State-run China Central Television is at the forefront of an ambitious multilingual 
overseas expansion aimed at ensuring that China's voice is heard in the world, and 
providing a counterweight to frequently unflattering Western framing of China and 
Chinese affairs. Closer inspection provides reason to believe that Chinese media 
should not be written off so easily, or described simply as polar opposites to 'free' 
media in the Anglosphere. Those in the West who dismiss Chinese media as out-and-
out propaganda are, at the very least, passing up the chance to explore how this 
emerging great power sees itself and its place in the world.  
The overall aim of this research is to contribute to understanding of whether 
Chinese media are legitimate news providers, whether their principles are different 
from their Western and particularly Anglo-American counterparts and, if so, whether 
they have good reason to tread a different path. These questions will be answered by 
comparing the news output of CCTV's 24-hour English-language information channel, 
CCTV-News, with that of BBC World News Television between 2014 and 2016. 
Quantitative 'scoping' of general news is fleshed out through analysis of generic news 
frames in the coverage of specific events, followed by interviews with journalists and 
managers. Finally, the pioneering technique of 'cross-editing' uncovers some of the 
                                                        
1 Kovach, B. & Rosenstiel, T. (2001). The essence of journalism is a discipline of verification. Excerpt 
from The Elements Of Journalism. Available at http://niemanreports.org/articles/the-essence-of-
journalism-is-a-discipline-of-verification/ [Retrieved 20 March 2018]. 
2 Davies, N. (2009). Flat Earth News: an award-winning reporter exposes falsehood, distortion and 
propaganda in the global media. London: Vintage/Random House, 111. 
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subconscious assumptions behind editorial decision-making in both China and 
Britain.  
This chapter sets out the background for the study by describing the 
significance of China's promotion of its media around the world. It also lays out the 
basis for the comparison of the two channels, indicates the material to be found in 
each part of the thesis, and explains the wider relevance of the research at a time 
when the concept of 'news' is being questioned and reinterpreted on many sides.  
Using a dragon as visual shorthand for a 'China threat' is a cliché of Western 
framing, and illustrates one of the differences in world-view that are illuminated 
through this research. While mediaeval European legend stresses the dragon’s fire-
breathing, maiden-chomping tendencies, a dragon in China is often benign and 
inspirational, bringing harmony or refreshing rain. The dragon here is Trojan because 
CCTV, by its own admission3, aims to spread an alternative perspective from China 
while adopting a format designed to appeal to an audience abroad.  
1.2 Rising China, static narrative 
The economic reform and opening-up policy developed under Deng Xiaoping 
accelerated after the turn of the century, providing the impetus for China's wish to tell 
its own stories to the world. However, the global media expansion that was widely 
viewed a decade ago as an attempt to accrue 'soft power' for China to improve its 
image, as in Kurlantzick’s ‘charm offensive’ (2007), may have more complex motives. 
Another, equally plausible, aim is that of securing a foothold in international 
broadcasting in order to explain the Chinese government's policies.  
1.2.1 Economical with the popularity 
IMF and World Bank figures show that since 2014, China has been the world's largest 
economy in terms of purchasing power. It is the second biggest economy overall, 
behind the United States. The statistics do not tell the whole story: spending power 
per capita in the world’s most populous country is less than a quarter of that in the 
United States and lags behind even Turkmenistan (BBC News 2014). However, 
China’s elevation has put an end to 140 years of US global economic dominance.  
                                                        
3 See section 3.1.3. 
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China’s combination of economic growth and authoritarian government also 
offers a model for developing countries (Thussu 2014:18). Drawing on Kurlantzick’s 
‘charm offensive’, Shi posits a ‘charm defensive’ (2015:138) in which China engages 
with rather than triumphs over the developing world as its power grows. Picking up 
the Confucian concept of 和 he (harmony, union, peace), Chinese scholars sum up this 
stance as 和而不同 he er bu tong, harmony without homogeneity (Cao 2011:16). 
Some Western scholars take issue with China’s view of its own influence: Shambaugh, 
for one, sees the elements of China’s global power as ‘surprisingly weak and very 
uneven’ (2013:x), with its diplomacy skewed in favour of defensive nationalism and a 
superficial respect for its leaders.   
China may be respected internationally for its economic prowess but it is not 
universally liked, and public opinion surveys indicate that it has been making little 
headway in polishing its image in regions where perceptions of it are negative. Two 
global polls released in 2017, for Pew Research and the BBC World Service, revealed 
approval ratings for China of 48% and 41% respectively, slightly lower than in 2014. 
The most positive evaluations of China were to be found in sub-Saharan Africa and 
Latin America, with a mostly negative image in Europe and the United States (Pew 
2017; GlobeScan 2017). An official Chinese survey of the G20 member states (People's 
Daily 2016; Beijing Review 2016) concluded that China’s national image was 
improving and that its economic influence was widely acknowledged,  but it admitted 
that developing countries were more positive about China than was the industrialised 
world. 
 Just as relevant here may be the precipitate decline in positive perceptions of 
the United States and Britain between the 2014 survey and that of 2017, a period that 
encompassed the Brexit referendum and the start of the Trump presidency. In the 
2017 Pew survey, the United States was just two percentage points ahead of China in 
average popularity ratings among 33 countries. This raises the question of whether 
China needs the aforementioned 'charm offensive' now that it has more or less 
achieved parity with its biggest economic rival, albeit in relative unfavourability. The 
balance of world power has tilted a long way since Fukuyama (1989:4) raised the 
prospect of 'the end of history… the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as 
the final form of human government' after the implosion of the Soviet Union. That 
notwithstanding, in the West at least, persistent negative portrayals of China have 
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deep roots and the Western media image of China has been dominated by the 
question of human rights (Cao 2007:446) since the bloody suppression of the 1989 
Tiananmen protests.  
1.2.2 Tibet and the Chinese media’s ‘going out’ policy 
The incentive for an acceleration in China's media presence overseas came in March 
2008 when there was a wave of riots, protests and inter-ethnic killings in the Tibetan 
capital, Lhasa. The violent scenes shown around the world overshadowed the run-up 
to the Beijing summer Olympic Games in 2008, an event which Chinese leaders had 
hoped would boost China's international standing and promote it as a peace-loving 
'harmonious society'. The Chinese government accused Tibetan separatists led by the 
Dalai Lama of fomenting the unrest. Western media generally viewed the violence, 
much of it directed against the majority ethnic group in China, the Han, as resulting 
from decades of cultural oppression of ethnic Tibetans by the Chinese state.  
In this 'asymmetric media war', the West dominated the discourse (Li 2009:63) 
while China's counter-arguments were not heard. The coverage of the violence 
prompted anti-China protests in numerous countries during the Olympic torch relay. 
This was followed by an upsurge of nationalist indignation among Chinese 'netizens'. 
They, backed by the Chinese media, accused the West not only of anti-China bias but 
of getting the Tibet story wrong. Western journalists countered that they had been 
barred from visiting Tibetan areas. Beijing’s rage at the international reporting may 
have been as much about domestic prestige, in an increasingly interconnected world, 
as about outward image. Chinese scholars underline the importance, in this context, 
of 'face' (面子 mianzi), arguing that any mis-steps on the world stage could 
undermine leadership at home (Wang 2011:2).  
A year after the Tibetan unrest, under the leadership of Hu Jintao, the Chinese 
authorities committed an estimated $6 billion to their media expansion plan, known 
as ‘going global’ or ‘going-out’ (走出去,zou chu qu). Its declared aim was to 'foster a 
much friendlier atmosphere for global media coverage of China’s ongoing 
modernisation and development agenda without creating ideological tensions or 
disputes' (Hu & Ji 2012:33), and it built on a plan dating from 2001 (Jirik 2009, Zhao 
2013), the year in which China joined the World Trade Organisation. CCTV was one of 
six central state media beneficiaries of the 2009 ‘going-out’ project, which also 
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involved expansion of the Xinhua news agency and English-language newspapers, and 
the creation of several hundred Confucius Institutes to teach Chinese language and 
culture around the world. CCTV’s ambitious vision for its foreign-language 
broadcasting involved a projected tenfold increase in its overseas staff between 2011 
and 2016 (Branigan 2011), delivery of news in five major foreign languages, and a big 
expansion of its English-language 24-hour news service that included the 
establishment of broadcast centres in Washington (CCTV America) and Nairobi 
(CCTV Africa). The African news programmes of CCTV Africa, as well as those from 
CCTV headquarters in Beijing, are part of this research: the idea of this is to reflect 
how China sees the world in which it has become an important actor through the 
‘going out’ mission, as well as how it represents itself to foreign viewers. 
After the 2009 funding boost, China's foreign-language news outlets gradually 
increased their presence on Western social media. Chinese state news organisations 
actively pushed their content on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, despite Beijing's 
decision to block those websites in China itself. In 2016 state media shifted more 
emphasis to the digital realm, including the development of mobile phone apps to 
receive their content.4 An internet-only English-language startup, Sixth Tone, was 
launched under the aegis of the Shanghai United Media Group, and promoted on 
Twitter and Facebook, to provide foreigners with engaging news features about China. 
In November 2015, a Reuters investigation uncovered what it said was a network of 
at least 33 radio stations in 14 countries, covertly controlled by state-run China Radio 
International (CRI) and broadcasting news about China aligned with Beijing's official 
views (Qing & Shiffman 2015). Chinese media acknowledged that one of the stations, 
in the United States, aired programmes made by CRI but described this as co-
operation and accused the West of paranoia (Global Times 2015). 
The Tibetan unrest of 2008 may have led to a boost in funding for China's 
overseas-facing state media, but the global financial crisis that began in the same year 
had the opposite effect on many news organisations in the West. Austerity measures 
imposed by Western governments throttled the budgets of public service 
broadcasters, among them the BBC, prompting cuts in the numbers of editorial staff 
and a scaling-back of foreign newsgathering. The effects of this on BBC News are 
noted in Chapter 3. 
                                                        
4 The digital relaunch of CCTV-News as part of CGTN on 31 December 2016 does not form part of this 
research but is dealt with in section 3.1.1. 
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1.3 Soft power or sharp power? 
Ten years after President Hu Jintao laid the foundations for China's foreign media 
expansion in a speech referring to 'soft power', Beijing's intentions can be re-
evaluated. Firstly, the Chinese interpretation of soft power has proved itself to be 
different from Joseph Nye's original concept. Secondly, it is not clear whether news 
organisations can be vessels of soft power in any case. Thirdly, no matter how the 
Chinese media's going-out project is described, analyses of China’s rise in Western 
media have shifted from vague admiration to something closer to alarm. 
1.3.1 China’s interpretation of soft power 
Initially, China's soft power strategy was seen as broadly in line with Nye’s original 
definition of it as a way of achieving outcomes through attraction and persuasion 
rather than coercion or payments (Nye 2004:x). In his keynote speech to the 17th 
national Communist Party Congress in October 2007, Hu Jintao referred to the 'great 
rejuvenation of the Chinese nation' and spoke of the need to 'enhance culture as part 
of the soft power of our country to better guarantee the people's basic cultural rights 
and interests'. Culture, he said, was 'a more and more important source of national 
cohesion and creativity and a factor of growing significance in the competition in 
overall national strength' (State Council 2007). Hu made it clear that China's vision of 
soft power had domestic as well as international implications (Wang 2011:8), 
possibly for reasons of internal stability (Barr 2015:188-90).  
Both American and Chinese soft power concepts envisaged a role for the 
media. International broadcasting was part of China's public diplomacy toolkit (Wang 
2011:3), meaning that CCTV-News would be expected to deliver soft power. In the 
United States, Nye described soft power in 2011 as 'the ability to affect others 
through the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuading, and eliciting positive 
attraction in order to obtain preferred outcomes.' (Nye 2011:20-21). Nye insisted that 
his concept was not specifically American, and that the ancient Chinese understood it 
well: the philosopher Laozi had proclaimed that a leader was best when people barely 
knew he (sic) existed (Nye 2012:151). Indeed, China had been studying soft power 
since the early 1990s, shortly after Nye coined the phrase (Lee 2016:104). 
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China's view of soft power did not stop at culture, however, and appeared to 
have a harder edge and a more active strategy. Whereas Nye saw it as arising 'from 
the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals and policies' (2004:x), China's 
vision also drew on its economic and technological power – missing from Nye's 
definition – and its pragmatic foreign policy (Lee 2016:104, d'Hooghe 2011:25-26), 
illustrated by participation in multilateral peacekeeping and investment in 
developing countries. Close focus on the actions of government also brought risks: 
d’Hooghe observed that many of China's domestic values and policies were ‘liabilities 
for public diplomacy’ (2011:25). Nevertheless, the strategy was commensurate with 
China’s greater assertiveness under Xi Jinping. Instead of simply assuring the rest of 
the world about the peaceful nature of its rise, China was 'competing for discursive 
power on the global stage' (Lee 2016:102).  
1.3.2 New order, new news? 
While the link between soft power and broadcasting is clear, that between soft power 
and news is not. A state broadcaster in an authoritarian country may be an 
instrument of public diplomacy but, especially in an era of commercialisation, it also 
depends for its success on supplying a trustworthy news service (Rawnsley 
2015a:274). The twin roles need not necessarily be untenable: Chinese policymakers 
have long believed that other countries’ knowledge of China is biased and wrong (Hu 
& Ji 2012:32) and that this can be rectified if China has a forum in which to explain its 
actions. However, the role of official Chinese media as 'tongue and throat' of the 
Communist Party risks blurring the distinction between propaganda, public 
diplomacy and news storytelling, leading to a credibility gap (Rawnsley 2015a:274). 
Jirik (2016:3548) has suggested that CCTV-News would best be able to attract an 
audience and accrue influence by dropping anything that a foreign audience would 
see as propaganda and becoming indistinguishable from its international rivals. The 
aims of the Chinese leadership, however, appeared to lead in the opposite direction. 
Xi Jinping's first five-year term in power was characterised by a tightening of 
information control to accompany a more assertive national image. An early sign of 
the Communist Party's intention to pull more progressive state-backed newsrooms 
into line was the Southern Weekend (南方周末 Nanfang Zhoumo) Incident of 2012-13. 
Journalists there briefly went on strike in protest at Guangdong propaganda officials 
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altering the paper's New Year message, which had appealed for the safeguarding of 
constitutional rights. In February 2016 Xi visited China's top three media outlets, 
CCTV, Xinhua and the People's Daily newspaper, emphasising that journalists there 
must be loyal to the leadership, report positively but critically 'in the right direction' 
and, as he put it, have the Party 'as their family name' (Xinhua 2016, Zhuang 2016). 
At the same time, China created alternative multilateral institutions to those 
founded by Western nations, launching the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013 and the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank two years later. These were added to the 
Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, the political, economic and security body set up 
in 2001 which includes China’s central and south Asian neighbours. Although these 
projects often involved countries whose political systems were different from China’s, 
analysts noted that China was setting an agenda on its own terms, testing the 
dominance of the US and the institutions that grew out of the Second World War 
(Chen & Hodzi 2017:6; Lee 2016:113). Hand in hand with these initiatives came Xi's 
idea of the China Dream (zhongguo meng, 中国梦), its wording reminiscent of, and 
perhaps deliberately challenging, the American Dream of the previous 80 years. 
By 'going out' into the world at this juncture, China's state media are certainly 
helping to broaden the terms of debate in international communication (Thussu 
2015a:257). That notwithstanding, a stream of information from an economic giant, 
albeit one outside the West, may represent not a contraflow in news terms but a 
reaffirmation of the global power structure, and the antithesis of what proponents of 
the stalled NWICO (New World Information and Communication Order) process had 
hoped for. In any case the Chinese leadership’s drive to re-shape world 
communications appears to have wider ambitions. In the eyes of Chinese scholars, it 
is consistent with the traditional philosophy of 天下 tianxia, translated as 'the world' 
or 'all under heaven' (Zhang & Hu 2017:198). This recently revived concept has been 
framed in literature in China as an ideal post-hegemonic world order characterised by 
supra-national compromise and accommodation (Shi 2018:36). Nonetheless, at its 
centre is a national entity, in the form of a rising China. Hu et al. (2018:75) explicitly 
link CCTV’s overseas expansion with the extension of China’s influence in the world. 
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1.3.3 ‘Weaponised’ information 
Since the Trump presidency in the United States gave new currency to the idea of 
'fake news', some Western scholars and commentators have viewed the output of 
state-backed broadcasters in authoritarian countries with renewed suspicion. They 
accuse Russia and China of exploiting the freedom of communication opened up by 
globalisation to 'inject disinformation into society' (Pomerantsev & Weiss 2014:6). 
Such accusations reflected the confounding of Western assumptions that, as countries 
grew richer, political liberalisation would inevitably follow. 
Picking up on the idea of 'weaponised' information (Pomerantsev & Weiss 
ibid.:4), Walker (2016:51) accuses authoritarian governments of 'hijacking the 
concept of soft power'. He brackets China together with Russia and Iran, saying they 
are not interested in being liked and understood in the West, and accusing them 
instead of fashioning an 'anti-democratic toolkit' including news media to project 
their values and convert others to their cause. The US National Endowment for 
Democracy calls this 'sharp power' (2017:6) that 'centres on distraction and 
manipulation' of facts, rather than Nye's attraction or persuasion. Its report sees 
developing countries as being particularly vulnerable to Chinese or Russian influence 
of this kind (ibid:10). The warning does, however, assume that someone is watching 
the output: audience surveys of CCTV-News are currently in short supply5. 
Furthermore, the sharpest points of this ‘sharp power’ are observed in Chinese 
political pressure on foreign universities and Chinese students abroad (Economist 
2017), rather than in Chinese news. 
The United States is taking few chances. A US government-appointed 
commission has urged Congress to require workers at CCTV and other Chinese media 
to register as foreign agents 'given that Chinese intelligence gathering and 
information warfare efforts are known to involve staff of Chinese state-run media 
organisations' (USCC 2017:600-01). It did so days after RT America bowed to 
demands that it comply with the Foreign Agents Registration Act (Barrett & Filipov 
2017), a measure reciprocated almost immediately by Russia against foreign media 
firms there (Tass 2017).  
                                                        
5 See 3.2.3. 
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The idea of delivering soft or sharp power through broadcasting is not only the 
preserve of China or Russia. BBC documentary and entertainment programmes and 
formats, from David Attenbrough's Blue Planet series to Strictly Come Dancing, are 
known and admired around the world: the authors of the Soft Power 30 specifically 
mention the boost to Britain's standing in their index from international trust in the 
BBC's global news (Portland/USC 2017:44)6. Analysts told a House of Lords 
committee on soft power (2014:42) that the greater the perceived distance between 
the news provider and the government, the greater its credibility abroad. This 
potentially made the BBC, according to Mirchandani (2014:8), an unwitting tool of 
Britain's public diplomacy through its ‘very independence’. The BBC itself warned the 
government in 2015 that budget cuts would reduce Britain's global soft power (BBC 
2015:45). The distinction between Chinese and British official views of soft power in 
relation to news appears to be that the former views journalism as a conduit for state 
messages (whether propaganda, public diplomacy or plain politics) that, if properly 
framed, will generate soft power; while the latter prefers at least outwardly to watch 
soft power emanate from broadcast news of its own accord. However, there are 
pressing reasons to argue that comparing BBC news with that of CCTV is not false 
equivalence but a matter of legitimate interest. 
1.4 News in peril 
Western politicians’ and commentators’ fulminations about perceived malign intent 
in the overseas expansion of Russian and Chinese media, as detailed in 1.3.3, may also 
reflect unease about the performance of news organisations in the Anglosphere. The 
populist revolutions of 2016, the Brexit referendum and Donald Trump’s victory in 
the US presidential election, represented – in the eyes of campaigners – the ‘end of 
the authoritative filter of journalism’ (Tambini 2016) in that automated message-
targeting through social media bypassed mainstream editorial scrutiny. Lurid claims 
gained traction regardless of whether they were true, and irrespective of efforts by 
the established media to expose falsehood through retrospective fact-checking. 
The problems for Anglophone mainstream media went deeper: their coverage 
of Trump and Brexit exposed them to charges that they had failed to live up to the 
ideals of impartiality and balance that they had set themselves. In both cases, British 
                                                        
6 Britain is second in the 2017 Soft Power 30, and China 25th. 
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broadcast media appeared to have been taken by surprise by the result. What was 
perceived as a liberal metropolitan perspective that denigrated populism aroused 
hostility in the 'real world' (Beckett 2016:7) outside the elitist bubble – a world that 
felt itself disrespected by mainstream media. In the EU referendum campaign, 
Cushion & Lewis (2017:208) adjudged the BBC hamstrung by its own impartiality 
rules: it had succeeded in balancing two sides of the debate but without adequately 
exploring the veracity of competing claims, as a result of which experts were 'sucked 
into the partisan binary' between Leave and Remain. For Beckett (2016:9), the BBC 
'struggled to combine impartiality with the need for critical, robust journalism that 
tackled mistruths and evasion'. Journalists in traditional media organisations 
retreated into circumlocutions, loath to accuse politicians outright of having lied. 
Decades of narrowing of political debate in the media in Britain also laid 
mainstream broadcasters open to the charge of marginalising and demonising even 
established, elected politicians if they were perceived to be outside the establishment 
position. Philo (2016:4) takes the BBC to task for failing to report Jeremy Corbyn's 
election to the Labour Party leadership in a balanced manner, commenting that 'what 
is legitimate and acceptable has moved substantially to the right' in recent years, with 
political strategies such as the free market and austerity accepted largely without 
question. The consequence of this has been a fall in trust in news and social media. A 
Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism report (Newman & Fletcher 2017:5) in 
eight Western countries and Australia found a widespread public belief that powerful 
people manipulated the media for their own ends, with Anglo-American media 
accused of 'creating a false equivalence of partisan opinions that are obscuring facts 
and understanding'. Crucially, most respondents did not see a clear distinction 
between 'real' and 'fake' news – the difference being perceived as one of degree.  
These are but the latest in a stream of concerns voiced by Anglo-American 
commentators about the decline in standards and accountability of journalism in 
Western democracies, and the influences that are brought to bear on a profession that 
likes to consider itself independent and detached. Chapter 2 looks more closely at 
criticisms made by journalist-academics along with the 'propaganda model' of 
Herman & Chomsky, and compares the history and position of Anglo-American 
journalism with that in China. Through this, the argument will be made that a 
comparison of Chinese and British television news is not necessarily invidious, that 
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reporting restrictions are not all on one side, and that each contains journalistic 
attributes from which the other could learn. 
What once seemed a straightforward definition of 'news' involving normative 
prerequisites of novelty, immediacy and interest is now in question both inside and 
outside the profession. Some broadcasters have begun to explore the concept of 
constructive journalism and other, more upbeat or original, ways of telling people's 
stories. In this situation, it is logical to find out whether China can contribute to the 
debate on different forms of credible reporting, and whether the news values instilled 
in Western journalists over decades also hold true, despite restrictions, in the East. At 
the same time, news from state media in China needs to be evaluated through 
rigorous content analysis to establish where its narratives are fallible. 
1.5 Research outline 
1.5.1 Research questions and defining factors 
The research questions below are in line with Esser & Strömbäck’s characterisation of 
cross-national comparisons of news (2012:314). Accordingly, they address two 
questions: how news performance is measured against normative expectations, and 
how news performance across countries is similar or different. 
RQ1: Did CCTV's English-language news output 2014-16 resemble news as it is 
understood in the Anglophone world – and if not, what were the main differences and 
how can it be described? 
RQ2: Did CCTV-News cover Chinese and African news in a similar fashion to BBC 
World News TV in this period – and if not, how could the differences be explained? 
The research draws on sequential mixed methods, reflecting both the ontological 
approach of critical realism and the social constructivist epistemological standpoint. 
After broad scoping through comparative quantitative content analysis of news 
programmes from BBC World News TV and CCTV-News, selected events are 
compared qualitatively through framing. This extends a generic framework 
constructed for Western political news through the addition of two novel China-
focused frames. The aim here is to establish how journalists at the BBC and CCTV 
construct their versions of reality. Finally, news scripts from two specific events are 
subjected to a pioneering micro-level comparative method in which journalists from 
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the two news organisations re-edit their rivals' scripts as if for broadcast in their own 
output. 
The analysis is restricted to news programmes, not documentaries, talk shows 
or features. Furthermore, although BBC World News TV and CCTV-News are 24-hour 
news channels, this analysis does not cover ‘rolling’, open-ended news coverage. 
News-writing and reporting contain the simplest yet most exacting expressions of 
editorial values in a news organisation, particularly within scheduled bulletins. They 
are therefore a particularly fruitful source of data for content analysis.  
The findings primarily concern news culture, which ‘differs from research into 
media systems or journalistic cultures in that it does not focus the attention on 
institutional arrangements or attitudinal profiles but on content features' (Esser 
2008:406). This dovetails with the third part of Hanitzsch’s definition of culture, 
including journalism culture, which he splits into ideas (values and attitudes), 
practices (routines and role perceptions) and artifacts such as news stories 
(Hanitzsch 2007:369). The explanatory interviews then broaden the research to 
reflect on the meaning of the ‘artifacts’ in relation to the journalistic cultures and 
media systems in which they reside. 
There is no attempt at audience research. It is increasingly important in the ‘fake 
news’ era to look at news content in isolation and without prejudice, inasmuch as this 
is possible given the position of the researcher, outlined in Chapter 4. In 
presentations during this research, numerous Masters classes and conference 
audiences who were shown unbranded extracts of international news reports 
identified them, variously and wrongly, as BBC, CNN or Al Jazeera output. Their 
surprise on being told the channel was CCTV-News vindicated the decision to study 
content rather than reception. 
1.5.2 The value of comparison 
The purposes of comparative media research are to describe, explain and predict 
(Esser 2013:116-117). Predicting events in China is notoriously unreliable: this thesis 
therefore begins with description and explanation. However, as the research reflects 
how information control under Xi Jinping in his first five-year term of office played 
out in English-language state media, it is evaluated in the light of similar research in 
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the Hu Jintao era and can also be used for comparison with any future study of media 
in Xi's second term that began in late 2017. 
This work was inspired in part by Jirik's longitudinal study of the ethnography 
and content of CCTV-International, the precursor to CCTV-News, in the early 2000s, in 
which he suggested that comparative analysis involving another international 
broadcaster could be fruitful (Jirik 2008:460-1). The few works so far to compare 
CCTV-News with foreign rivals have been concerned with their organisational 
structure or geopolitical stance (Geniets 2013, Xie & Boyd-Barrett 2015), or have 
surveyed a limited amount of content predicated on single issues (Liu 2014, Wang 
2015). Since the English-language channel was rebranded as CCTV-News in 2010, 
single-broadcaster studies have concentrated on its operations in Africa (Gagliardone 
2013, Lefkowitz 2017, Madrid-Morales 2017, Wekesa & Zhang 2014, Zhang 2013), 
much of it based on current affairs or features rather than news, or the political and 
strategic significance of CCTV's 'going out' in foreign languages (Dong & Shi 2007, Hu 
& Ji 2012, Jirik 2016).  
This research, in contrast with the above, compares journalism rooted in 
Chinese and Anglo-American traditions over time and multiple events to establish if 
CCTV employs a consistently distinctive way of relating world news. It takes account 
of the language and strategies of Chinese political communication (Brady 2008, 
Hearns-Branaman 2015) and establishes if, when and how these are represented in 
CCTV's Anglophone news output. Finally, it follows up suggestions by Zhang (2013) 
and Gagliardone (2013) that CCTV Africa might be a testing-ground for new Chinese 
thinking about broadcasting, in that it compares the news produced by CCTV in 
Nairobi with that in Beijing.  
It is necessary here to view CCTV-News as, simultaneously, an international 
news channel with global recruitment and a very specifically Chinese channel of a 
state that views journalists as tools of the party.  Mitter's observation (2013) that 
CCTV-News might represent little more than a rather anodyne placeholder on the 
international broadcasting spectrum, reserving space for future Chinese media 
initiatives, may be wide of the mark. Qian and Bandurski (2010:44) point out that the 
Communist Party loses its ability to guide public opinion if the people do not believe 
what state media say. The effort that Xi Jinping put into denigrating Mikhail 
Gorbachev's reforms, because they precipitated the fall of the Soviet Union (Buckley 
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2013, China Digital Times 2013), makes the case for his wish to use state 
broadcasting to cement his hold on power. 
While this work aims to identify differences and similarities between CCTV-
News and BBC World News TV, it should not be seen as a case of a newcomer 
measuring up to a static ideal. BBC journalism, as indicated above, is not an ideal. It is 
not static either: over the past 20 to 30 years, and particularly over the last decade, 
there has been an enormous change in what is considered 'news'. This is partly due to 
commercialisation, partly changing social attitudes and diminution of deference to 
the 'ruling classes', and partly the changes occasioned by the digital era and the 
advent of social media.  
CCTV-News, too, has evolved since the research began. At the end of 2016 it 
was re-branded as CGTN (2017a), but its 'digital-first' strategy had little immediate 
bearing on televised output that could be categorised as news. Despite the rising 
importance of the internet, the television element of CCTV-News is the main driver in 
the channel’s attempts at media convergence and remains worthy of scrutiny. This is 
echoed in CGTN’s name, which stands for China Global Television Network. 
1.5.3 Thesis overview 
At the 5-yearly national Communist Party Congress in 2017, Xi Jinping laid out his 
vision for China to become 'a global leader of composite national strength and 
international influence' by 2050. This research analyses the beginnings of how CCTV-
News has tried to generate that influence, and compares its world-view with that of 
one of its main Anglo-American rivals. The results shed light not only upon 
journalistic practices at China's main English-language television news outlet but also 
upon those at the BBC. 
How did this attempt to deliver an alternative view of China and the world 
manifest itself on CCTV-News when the Chinese authorities could set the agenda? 
Chapter 5 delivers an overview of the two broadcasters' news output over five 
constructed weeks between 2014 and 2016, in terms of topics and regions covered 
and the nature of the coverage. It seeks to establish whether editorial differences 
between the two channels legitimised the boost in state funding that enabled CCTV to 
'go out' in style in English and work from a palette of news that was different from 
16 
 
that of its Anglo-American rivals. The chapter also focuses on the two broadcasters' 
reporting of news specifically about China over the same period, and hears from the 
journalists involved about the difficulties of telling China's stories. The main part of 
the chapter is a comparison of the 2015 coverage of two annual 'diary' events – the 
lunar new year holiday in China or 春节 chunjie, which sees several hundred million 
Chinese workers return to their family homes for traditional celebrations, and the 
two big annual political meetings in Beijing known as the Two Sessions or 两会 
lianghui which are platforms for controlled debate about some of China's pressing 
problems. For the BBC, the challenge of China news involved trying to ‘sell’ stories 
that were potentially either predictable, mining established narrative seams, or too 
nuanced for London-based editors catering for non-Chinese audiences. For CCTV-
News, the question was whether storytelling would inevitably focus on the Chinese 
government as universal provider and planner, or whether 'people stories' with a 
messier narrative arc, not necessarily in line with state policy, would be given some 
room. 
What happened to storytelling on CCTV-News when – in contrast to the 'diary' 
items of Chapter 5 – the channel was confronted with sudden, unscheduled and 
potentially very negative news about China? In Chapter 6, coverage of the 2014 Hong 
Kong protests and the 2015 Yangtze cruise ship disaster on CCTV-News is contrasted 
with that on BBC World News TV, with particular attention paid to how the nature of 
the narrative changed over time on each channel. CCTV's role as a state broadcaster 
meant it delivered the authorities' message in both events, although not always as 
prescriptively and uniformly as might have been expected. For the BBC, analysis of 
the Hong Kong protests in particular provided an opportunity to gauge whether the 
corporation took sides when dealing with what it perceived as a fight for democratic 
principles. While it goes without saying that CCTV-News and BBC World News TV 
covered the two events very differently, a key factor was what each broadcaster left 
out. All journalists make editorial selections, but this chapter evaluates whether the 
decisions made in these stories resulted in partial narratives. 
How does China portray itself in its news programmes when it interacts with 
other countries, and how does it view events in a part of the world in which it has a 
long history of developmental engagement? Chapter 7 compares the reporting of 
CCTV-News in its daily African news programme, broadcast from Nairobi, with a 
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similar programme on BBC World News TV. A quantitative overview of the topics and 
parts of Africa favoured by each channel is followed by frame analysis of prominent 
African news themes. The reporting of China's interactions with African nations is 
also evaluated. An attempt is made to gauge the extent to which CCTV-News in Africa 
shapes the African narrative to coincide with China's interests. Also investigated is 
the use, by both broadcasters, of more upbeat or forward-looking news narratives 
than the Anglo-American norm, and the question of whether 'positive' or 
'constructive' reporting methods are both appropriate for developing nations and 
consistent with established journalistic principles. 
Whereas the findings from the chapters outlined above were obtained by 
research from outside the editorial process, Chapter 8 uses a pioneering method – the 
researcher's own concept of 'cross-editing' – to allow the journalists themselves to 
challenge one another's conceptions of what constitutes dispassionate, factual news. 
Several desk editors from CCTV-News and a similar number of BBC global news 
journalists were given transcripts of each other's coverage of two events, the Hong 
Kong protests of 2014 and the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in 2015, and were asked 
to re-edit them to render them acceptable for broadcast on their own news channel. 
The results reveal subconscious assumptions by journalists from both broadcasters 
that are challenged by their rivals, and also consonances in viewpoint that shed light 
on the limits of any 'alternative' worldview at CCTV-News. 
Before these results, the theoretical framework of the research is laid out. 
Chapter 3 charts the genesis of CCTV-News within its parent organisation, considers 
how its objectives have altered as it developed, and compares this trajectory with the 
growth of BBC World News TV. Chapter 4 outlines the methods used to investigate 
the two networks' news output, and explains how the researcher has adapted an 
existing Western framework for investigating political news in order to take the 
possible presence of Chinese state leitmotifs into account. Before that, Chapter 2 
provides an overview of the literature on how journalism, and particularly news, has 
evolved in China and the Anglosphere. It evaluates how external factors can place 
restrictions on the journalistic product, and questions the continued value placed on 
impartiality in the era of global, multi-channel news.
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2 News and journalism in China and the Anglosphere 
2.1 Defining news 
Is news the product of an industry, a social institution, or an individual journalist's 
view of 'the facts'? Identifying with any one of these options can determine whether 
news is studied through political economy, textual analysis or a variety of other 
approaches. As indicated in 1.5.1, this research focuses in the first instance on news 
as textual construct rather than on the broader field of journalism as practice (Esser 
2008:406). Having said this, any textual or narrative study of news can reveal wider 
social and cultural meanings (Buozis & Creech 2017:1) because journalists share 
certain professional norms and news values. Indeed, as this chapter makes clear, 
news writers ‘approach events with stories already in mind... they come to the news 
story with stories’ (Lule 2001:29). 
 The roots of British and Chinese journalism are not as different as their 
current societal backgrounds might indicate, but it is not easy to locate common 
ground for a study. Many Chinese officials assume that the BBC is the mouthpiece of 
the British government, while British journalists routinely dismiss much of CCTV's 
output as state propaganda. For all the principles espoused by early exponents of 
journalism, as this chapter explains, news as a product has become restricted in China 
and the Anglosphere, both in cultural or ritual terms and through the pressures of 
political information control or conformity to establishment norms. The digital, multi-
channel age and the entry of state-backed media from authoritarian countries into the 
Anglophone news market have raised questions about whether much-vaunted 
editorial aspirations to objectivity and impartiality have any real meaning.  
 As outlined in 1.5.2, published empirical comparisons of CCTV and 
international competitors in the Anglosphere have been confined thus far to single 
issues or programmes, or the output of individual regional hubs. By dealing with a 
range of news topics over three years, this research aims to accord a similar depth of 
critical attention to CCTV-News as has been given to Al Jazeera English since its 
counter-hegemonic entry into the Anglophone news market (Barkho 2010, 
Figenschou 2014, Painter 2008). It is in these gaps, encompassing the nature of news 
and journalism in different cultures along with comparative methods, that this 
contribution to the literature will be made.  
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This chapter will cover the components of news and how it has been studied; 
whether Chinese and British journalists are very different from one another; where 
propaganda and news intersect, if at all; and where news is changing in the 21st 
century. 
2.1.1 A note on the literature 
The literature search was conducted mostly in English, or other European languages 
where necessary. Academic research in Chinese was conducted through the full CNKI 
database on visits to China and the overseas CNKI database from Britain. CCTV 
yearbooks in Chinese were accessed via the National Library in Beijing. The Chinese 
searches revealed only one recent empirical comparative study of BBC and CCTV 
news: here the source material was CCTV Mandarin rather than English (Zhang & 
Wan 2017). Conversations with Chinese scholars confirmed assertions (Shi-Xu 
2014:3) that key communication theory in published Chinese work to date is often 
derived from Western precepts. Chinese scholars are now encouraged to publish 
more of their work in English. 
 
2.1.2 The analogy of Carey’s map 
Carey's analogy of the map is a better measure of journalism than absolutes such as 
truth and impartiality, which are unattainable in practice. While the information that 
goes into a map is only a small part of what is available, 'different maps bring the 
same environment alive in different ways; they produce quite different realities' 
(Carey 2009:22). It follows from Carey's symbolic example that one traveller's 'news 
map' might take him or her on a different route from another. The alternative routes 
might be equally accurate, or the traveller might have to consult more than one map 
to be sure of her or his safety and surroundings. If there is only one map, can the 
traveller proceed with confidence and arrive on time? A good 'news map' is one that 
will do the job on its own – the equivalent of the Watergate journalist Carl Bernstein's 
'best obtainable version of the truth' (PBS Frontline 2006). 
 With maps and news, the skill lies in selection and therefore also in omission. 
A senior news editor and former colleague of this researcher was wont to say that he 
was paid not for what he wrote, but for what he left out. Without comparative study, 
omissions cannot be detected and evaluated. 
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2.1.3 News as ritual 
If news is, as McNair suggests, a 'sampled version of reality' (2005:31) rather than the 
unadorned truth, it is prudent to enquire how real such reality can be. Add Carey to 
the mixture and the entire news-making enterprise turns into a hall of mirrors, in 
which human beings 'first produce the world by symbolic work and then take up 
residence in the world we have produced' (2009:23). This world must not only be 
created: it must then, according to Carey, be constantly reaffirmed, repaired or rebuilt 
for the benefit of future generations. Parallels with Chinese state media are clear, but 
those with Western media are no less significant. We are what we write: in its 
selectivity, journalism 'has always been ideological, and deeply political' (McNair 
2005:35).   
Two views of communication, transmission and ritual, may help explain some 
of the differences between Western and Chinese news-making. The transmission 
view is more visible in Western cultures (Carey 2009:12) and involves information 
being moved as quickly as possible from one person to another, giving priority to 
what is original or unknown. Carey traces this back to the dissemination of religion 
and scientific ideas as a means of asserting control over territory or people. 
Nowadays speed is imperative for most journalism, particularly in 24-hour television 
news. The ritual view of communication, by contrast, contends that media are 
operating to hold a society together through the reaffirmation of shared practices and 
beliefs and the construction and maintenance of an 'ordered, meaningful cultural 
world' (ibid.:15). Tuchman (1972) takes this analogy into the newsroom itself, 
arguing that the very routines that journalists use to make themselves appear 
objective betray their distinct cultural origins. News is not just a mirror of society, she 
observes, but helps shape it by defining and confirming what is normative or deviant 
(Tuchman 1978: 184) 
The transmission and ritual views of communication are not mutually 
exclusive, but their relevance to international television news is striking. A 
transmission view of communication pits a channel against its rivals in a race to 
break news: a ritual view sees the channel project a culturally acquired perspective 
on the world to an audience from other countries. In this sense, the broadcaster is not 
seeking to reaffirm shared beliefs but to highlight and export its own. Anglo-American 
journalists are quick to identify the characteristics of the ritual view of 
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communication in Chinese media, and less likely to see it in their own output. 
Comparative analysis of news values and storytelling applies scientific rigour to such 
judgements. 
2.2 News hinterlands 
Do British and Chinese journalists have, in essence, the same idea of news? Certainly, 
the organisations being studied in this research, CCTV and the BBC, would appear to 
come from completely different journalistic traditions. In its modern-day incarnation, 
the Chinese state broadcaster is still of necessity bound up with its Communist Party 
role in the guidance of public opinion, a process that flows from the leaders to the 
people. The watchdog function of the public-service BBC is intended to work in the 
opposite direction. While CCTV’s news has been derided by Western critics for doing 
the bidding of the state, the BBC’s news has attracted praise around the globe: the 
former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan described the BBC World Service as 
'perhaps Britain’s greatest gift to the world' in the 20th century (BBC Press Office 
2008). However, all is not as clear-cut as it seems. The liberal ideals of Anglo-
American journalism are contested. There are also similarities between the British 
and Chinese journalistic traditions, and some Chinese principles dating from before 
the Communist era are still relevant today. 
2.2.1 The functions of journalism in the Anglosphere 
For every doughty doorstepper, for every investigative reporter holding power to 
account, there are dozens of journalists in Anglo-American news organisations 
performing less heroic roles but with identical principles. Studies of journalism in the 
Anglosphere underline the bonds between responsible journalism and democracy. 
That notwithstanding, professional detachment and representation of reality in 
Anglo-American journalism are observed to be circumscribed.  
For McNair (2005:28), journalism has at least three functions. The first is as a 
provider of information – a role that McQuail characterises as 'monitor and 
messenger' (2013:98), having discarded his earlier categorisation of it as a 
surveillance function.  McNair’s second category is as a resource for and participant in 
public life and debate, akin to Habermas’ public sphere, and his third a medium of 
'education, enlightenment and entertainment', close to the BBC’s Reithian mission to 
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inform, educate and entertain. Carey discerns an 'eternal' role for news and reporting, 
positing that no society can survive without 'some kind of a monitoring and signalling 
system' (2007:5).  
None of the above, however, requires journalists to be completely detached 
from their environments in the way that many Western practitioners consider 
themselves to be. For Carey, journalism and democracy are mutually dependent: 
without one, the other cannot survive (2007:13). He admits that such an affiliation 
would prevent journalists from being non-partisan and turn them into standard-
bearers for democracy. Indeed, the BBC does not require its journalists to be 
detached from 'fundamental democratic principles' (BBC Editorial Guidelines 2018). 
To pursue Carey’s notion to its logical conclusion, journalism in China – a non-
democratic society – could not exist: nonetheless, it patently does, as the next section 
of this chapter makes clear. 
For Tuchman, news is a constructed reality in that news media set the frame 
and provide the information for public debate (1978:ix). McNair sees even such 
constructed reality as in need of qualification. For him, journalism has value only if it 
is recognised as 'at least an acceptable approximation of the truth' (2005:30): he 
admits that journalism is not what actually happened, or even what other people saw 
happen, but only what is reported as having happened. This demonstrates the extent 
to which, even in a society that prides itself on its (self-defined) journalistic standards, 
the field of debate and reporting is filtered and constrained. 
2.2.2 The functions of journalism in China 
All the precepts of official journalism in China make clear how little notional power 
journalists within state media possess. A fine mesh of Communist Party and 
government departments, along with regulations and ad hoc advisory notices, are 
intended to ensure that the state has ultimate authority over news output and that 
journalists take a subordinate role. In 2011 the head of CCTV, Hu Zhanfan, said that 
journalists who thought of themselves as independent professionals rather than 
propaganda workers were making a 'fundamental mistake about identity' and that 
they should concentrate on being a 'good mouthpiece' of the Party and government 
(Moore 2011). The Party's embrace of the media has tightened still further under Xi 
Jinping: he likened state propaganda reports to tentacles or feelers (chujiao 触角) that 
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should be extended wherever consumers of media were to be found (Bandurski 
2016). As in the West, however, the position of journalists in China is nuanced and 
subject to change. 
China Central Television, the subject of this research, is a main conduit for 
political thought work and 'the most heavily censored tool of mass communication in 
China' (Brady 2012:194). It is true that little has changed in practical terms since 
Zhao wrote in 1998 that commercialisation had left the Communist Party’s control of 
the media and their editors intact. For several years from 2010, however, state media 
had to contend with an explosive rise in the uptake of social media for the 
dissemination of news. Users of 微博 Weibo and 微信 Weixin, the approximate 
Chinese equivalents of Twitter and WhatsApp, registered a string of successes in 
bringing authority to account, most notably after the 2011 Wenzhou train crash (Wu 
2012). The flowering of Weibo was short-lived, with hundreds of thousands of users 
deserting it (Tejada 2015) after controls on the service were tightened under Xi 
Jinping. Nonetheless, the idea of a virtual public space, however circumscribed, 
remains. Publications such as Caixin still push boundaries on business reporting, and 
robust coverage of selected issues such as the environment and corruption is often 
possible, albeit only as far as the state allows.  
Creemers (2015) points out that actual freedom of expression, while present 
in the Chinese constitution, is not legally enforceable and that media are explicitly 
ordered in the regulatory framework to observe their role of spreading correct public 
opinion. From the point of view of liberal democracy, he argues, 'these rules 
fundamentally conflict with the role that the media should play in society.'(2015:48). 
Yet the historical background of journalism in China and the Anglosphere reveals 
some similarities of purpose, as the next section of this chapter explains. 
2.2.3 Cultural parallels before 1949 
As far as Britain is concerned, the idea of a free press can be said to date back to the 
scholar, poet and polemicist John Milton and Areopagitica (1644), his impassioned 
appeal against parliament’s decision to reinstate censorship before publication. 
Milton argued that people must be free to exercise choice in matters of good and evil 
so that virtue was constantly tested. His intervention against censorship failed, but 
English journalism began to flourish in the 18th century, albeit initially more as a 
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vehicle for debate than in a watchdog role. The rise of the merchant class prompted 
British culture to become imbued with a 'hunger for experience' (Carey 2007:6) 
which ranked the original or surprising above the lessons of the past. By the 1860s, 
with newspapers becoming relatively independent of politicians (de Burgh 2003:201), 
the scope of the ‘public sphere’ was extended, with journalistic professionalisation 
and industrialisation of the press growing side by side. The economist and social 
theorist John Stuart Mill saw the press as the representative of the people (Tumber & 
Prentoulis 2005:62). 
In China, a country shaken by a succession of wars and rebellions, journalism 
developed later than in Britain. However, in the second half of the 19th century it 
underwent an awakening similar to that of British journalism, prompted by the 
efforts of European missionaries to start papers that provided merchants with the 
timely information they needed (de Burgh 2003:196). It was a 'process of learning 
from the West to defend against the West' (Hu et al. 2015:167) which, in its own way, 
prefigured the tenor of the present-day expansion of China’s media abroad. 
While British journalists saw it as their duty to relay facts to their traders, in 
China military reverses led the media to become increasingly preoccupied with issues 
of sovereignty and a sense of victimhood (Hu et al. 2015:169). Nonetheless at the 
start of the 20th century, China’s foremost early journalist, Liang Qichao,  drawing 
inspiration from the West, published a series of newspapers that embodied 
responsible journalism and aimed to enlighten and influence their readers (Lee 
2005:110). The resemblance to the Western press was limited: Liang regarded 
democracy as less important than unity and success, and saw it as his newspapers’ 
task to explain government policies and the reasons for China’s weakness abroad (de 
Burgh 2003:197). This mobilisation of public opinion was predicated on the 
maintenance of harmony.   
Journalism flourished in China for several brief periods after the overthrow of 
the monarchy in 1911: at one stage, in 1930, freedom of the press was backed by the 
government (de Burgh 2003:203), and in the 1940s a movement favouring Anglo-
American-style political liberty drew its inspiration from the newspaper Da Gong Bao, 
published by Zhang Jiluan (Lee 2005:111). Its editorial principles were derived from 
Confucian moral responsibility: bu dang, bu mai, bu si, bu mang 不党,不卖,不私,不盲 
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('don’t align politically, don’t accept favours, serve the public rather than selfish 
interests, and don’t let emotion or ideology hold sway'), and traces of them survive in 
Chinese media today. 
2.2.4 Divergence since 1949 
Since 1949 journalists in China have grappled with a constant identity problem: are 
they watchdogs for the public good, or enforcers of the official narrative? Jirik 
(2010:283) says Chinese journalism under Communism is rooted both in 'the 
Confucian concept of the intellectual as a servant and critic of power and the Leninist 
concept of the journalist as a revolutionary agent and mouthpiece for the vanguard 
party.' Two attempts to revive some liberation of thought, in the 1950s and 1970s, 
were suppressed when criticism became too much for the Party (Creemers 2015:51). 
Ideological journalism, pushing out a mass-line message, became the norm under Mao 
(Lee 2005:114). Deng’s market reforms prompted the tension that still exists in the 
media in trying to reconcile market and political imperatives, known as the party line 
or the bottom line (Zhao 1998). Any public sphere for China remained elusive until 
social media gave some people a limited voice for a while. 
In the post-Deng era, the leadership in Beijing instituted media concepts that 
entrenched top-down power, their nomenclature ranging from the constructive to the 
combative. The most liberal task for the media was supervision by public opinion, 
yulun jiandu 舆论监督, a type of state-defined investigative or watchdog journalism 
promoted in 1987 by the then Chinese premier, Zhao Ziyang. He was building on 
ideas that emerged after the Great Leap Forward, under which media would be 
allowed to investigate, report and criticise in order to help China's development. After 
the bloody suppression of the protests in and around Tiananmen Square in 1989, a 
counterbalance to yulun jiandu was brought in for reasons of stability maintenance: 
the guidance of public opinion, yulun daoxiang 舆论导向, backed by Jiang Zemin 
(Stockmann 2013). The idea was to match public opinion to that of the elite so that 
media content did not militate against Party objectives. This yoked China’s state 
media still more firmly to the Communist Party, confounding predictions that 
marketisation might allow a measure of democracy (Jirik 2010:282). The wording 
softened slightly in the more permissive years of the early 21st century under Hu 
Jintao: he tasked the media with yulun yindao 舆论引导, the 'channelling of public 
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opinion'. Under Xi Jinping, however, a new and tougher-sounding form of media 
guidance cropped up in Party speeches: yulun douzheng 舆论斗争, or 'public opinion 
struggle' (Bandurski 2017). Xi reminded the media in 2016 that positive propaganda 
and public opinion supervision were unified, 'strongly suggesting that monitoring the 
power holders was out of fashion again.’ (de Burgh 2017:62). 
While media in the West had no overt role in enforcing a narrative of the 
governing elite after the end of the Second World War, they were still very much part 
of political life. Even notionally independent news organisations – particularly in 
western Europe – are associated with political parallelism, in which certain news 
outlets cleave to different shades of political opinion (Hallin & Mancini 2004:28). In 
Britain, regulation of domestic broadcasters including the BBC prohibits any overt 
political affiliation. Inevitably, however, the broadcasters end up reacting to the 
politically-influenced domestic news agenda that newspapers project. In general, 
CCTV and the BBC are both product and shaper of their respective societies. There is 
also good reason to argue that they are constrained and moulded by them, as the next 
section makes clear. 
2.3 Limiting and liberating factors 
2.3.1 The beginnings of political propaganda 
Modern-day propaganda and monopolistic broadcasting started, not in China, but in 
the west. In 1922 the then British Broadcasting Company was set up as a single entity 
for the United Kingdom despite a host of rival applications (Briggs 1995). Its 1927 
Royal Charter made no mention of such notions as impartial reporting. It said only 
that the company, then renamed the British Broadcasting Corporation, could 'collect 
news and information relating to current events in any part of the world and in any 
manner that may be thought fit' (BBC 1927:3), a form of words that persisted in the 
Charter documents until 2006 (BBC Trust 2007). The BBC was born in the decade in 
which Lippmann and Lasswell’s writings on propaganda came to prominence, 
including Lippmann’s assertion that news and truth were not the same (1922:194). 
Lippmann argued that only a small part of a journalist’s job involved recounting the 
facts: everything else was interpretation. Elite rule could thus be perpetuated through 
what Lippmann called the manufacture of consent, underlining Taylor's querying of 
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the notion that propaganda was 'something done by other, less scrupulous people' 
(2003:2).   
Under its first director-general, John Reith, the fledgling BBC was used as an 
instrument of propaganda during the 1926 General Strike (Cull et al. 2003:37), when 
the government blocked opposition voices from its airwaves (Curran & Seaton 
2010:111). However, the corporation subsequently built up a reputation for accuracy 
and detached reporting, overseas as well as at home. The former World Service 
managing director John Tusa wrote that the international radio service, though 'born 
as an instrument for linking the British Empire... soon found itself at the heart of the 
struggle with fascism during which it discovered that telling the truth was an 
essential commodity in the engagement with out-and-out propaganda' (2012:167). 
Webb concludes that the BBC’s overseas wartime broadcasting showed the value of 
objectivity and accuracy in establishing credibility with an audience (2014:7). Here, 
however, objectivity may have become confused with detachment: Higgins (2015:190) 
says that while truth was the BBC's 'great weapon' in the war, it was 'not a monolithic 
thing, but elastic and flexible, capable of being moulded through selection and tone 
and language.'   
‘Propaganda’ was initially a neutral word, derived from the 17th-century 
Congregatio de Propaganda Fide, the Catholic church’s council dealing with 
'propagating the faith' (Partridge 2006). The nearest Chinese equivalent, 宣传 
xuanchuan, is often rather hopefully translated by the authorities in Beijing as 
‘publicity’. For Chinese scholars it has more positive connotations: Lin (2017:451) 
terms it a cultural practice that long predates Communism and means 'disseminating 
purposeful information', by word of mouth as well as mass media.  
Propaganda acquired negative connotations in the English-speaking world 
once it became associated with politics. It was there that Lasswell’s behaviourist 
model of communication (1927) foresaw a unidirectional flow of information in 
which rulers conveyed their messages to the people without need or expectation of 
any reply. More subtly, Lippmann envisaged propaganda creating what he called a 
‘pseudo-environment’ between human beings and their surroundings to stimulate the 
desired responses in the real world. His assertion that there 'must be some barrier 
between the public and the event' (1922:23) would be difficult to carry through today, 
under the lenses of a million smartphone cameras. 
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2.3.2 Propaganda and the Anglosphere 
Establishing where propaganda ends and news begins has become more, rather than 
less, difficult since the Second World War. For Allan (2010:23), propaganda and news 
should not be conflated, because only a propagandist has the intention to deceive. 
This idea of propaganda as deception, as distinct from its original sense of a simple 
spreading of ideas, is applicable to journalists when they have pretensions to 
detachment. In this sense, Allan acknowledges that the information 'filters' of Herman 
and Chomsky's Propaganda Model (1988) are important influences on the news.  
 Herman and Chomsky considered US media to be shackled by five information 
filters, covering organisational structure and the influence of officialdom, which 
restricted coverage to a narrow range of views that did not threaten the established 
order. Their fifth original filter, anti-Communism, was later extended to cover the 
‘almost religious faith in the [free] market’ (Herman 2000:109), and refined again to 
include the ideology of a ‘war on terror’ that had produced an amorphous 'Face of 
Evil' (Mullen 2009:15). Herman and Chomsky concluded that the 'societal purpose’ of 
the media was to embody and defend the economic, social and political agendas of 
dominant privileged groups (1988:298), even if democratic societies permit a 
multiplicity of competing elite forces. Despite their detailing of exogenous influences, 
the authors ascribed much of the propaganda effect to self-censorship by journalists 
wishing to fit in with what they had internalised as their organisations’ norms. They 
observed: 'It is much more difficult to see a propaganda system at work where the 
media are private and formal censorship is absent.' (ibid.:1).  
While Barnett (2011) argues that, at least in Britain, television journalism was 
robust enough to rebuff any replica of the Propaganda Model until the late 1980s, 
Seaton (2017) details what amounts to a barrage of 'flak' – the fourth filter – against 
the BBC, as prime ministers from Margaret Thatcher onwards sought to tame the 
corporation's reporting. The BBC's refusal to call soldiers sent to the Falklands 'our' 
troops angered Conservative politicians, as did British broadcasters' use of actors to 
circumvent the short-lived ban on broadcasting the voices of supporters of 
paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
in which British troops took part, saw the authorities attempt to control the narrative 
of the conflict by 'embedding' correspondents with army units. This did not, however, 
avert one of the worst crises between the BBC and the government: a London-based 
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correspondent's report accusing Tony Blair's administration of having embellished 
the case for war was followed by furious and repeated denials from Downing Street, 
the suicide of the report's source, Dr David Kelly, and the resignations of the BBC's 
chairman and director-general. Opinions varied as to whether the episode had cowed 
the BBC's journalists (Barnett 2005:338, Mills 2016:74).  In a comprehensive 
mapping of the Propaganda Model to the BBC's circumstances, Doherty (2004) also 
listed the corporation's primary focus on official sources, its 'anti-terror' discourse 
and the government's use of the licence fee funding mechanism as a form of control. 
The idea that Anglo-American media are more biddable, less resilient and 
independent than they claim is backed up by scholars who blame marketisation and 
the erosion of traditional journalistic routines. Bennett (2007) says mass media are 
driven by the profit motive to present news in a personalised, dramatised and 
fragmented fashion which does little to advance democratic ideals. Bell laments the 
dearth of foreign news on television because of budget cuts, along with the 
‘stupidification’ of the news agenda (2008:228), while Davies lambasts the British 
media for lazy deskbound ‘churnalism’ limited to the recycling of others’ copy 
(2009:56). 
2.3.3 Propaganda and China 
Herman and Chomsky’s definition of the 'societal purpose' of the media as defender of 
an economic, social and political agenda of dominant elites can be applied to media in 
China today, even though the Chinese media function according to different rules 
from those in the West. Hearns-Branaman, who has applied the Propaganda Model to 
China, contends that instead of being set up to manufacture consent, Chinese media 
are expected to manufacture harmony, which is viewed as more important than any 
validation of the leadership at the ballot-box (2015:36). Apart from that, however, 
Hearns-Branaman finds that Chinese and Anglophone media work in very similar 
ways, with a dialogue of elites producing a narrow range of permissible debate: this, 
he says, is the effect of the capitalist market (30). 
Hearns-Branaman's transposition of the Propaganda Model to China provides 
a more complete theorisation than previous scholars have found. Early normative 
theory (Siebert et al.1956) had no framework for the Chinese media in its 
categorisation of the press into Soviet Communist, authoritarian, libertarian and 
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social responsibility models. The closest parallel at the time was to the Communist 
theory, categorising the media as 'instruments of propaganda and agitation' (121) 
with no responsibility for forming public opinion or shaping policy. Hallin and 
Mancini’s three-model stratification of media according to their connections with 
politics (2004) was confined to western countries. As the authors later readily 
admitted, 'to try to fit China onto the triangle defined by our three models would 
simply be silly' (2012:5).  
As China opened up to the world after Deng Xiaoping's market reforms, two 
studies aimed at categorising Chinese media reached slightly different conclusions. 
Winfield & Peng saw a 'market authoritarianism' developing as the media reconciled 
competing demands from the Communist Party and the commercial world 
(2005:256). Zhao, meanwhile, concluded that a 'major mutation' of the Soviet 
Communist model was still thriving in China under a resilient one-party system, 
although she described Siebert’s Four Theories of the Press as 'Cold War-tainted 
theoretical modelling' (2012:143). She attributed the persistence of China’s media 
system partly to the success of peasant-based revolutions in Asia, with state media 
assigned a role in national development, and partly to similarities between Confucian 
and Communist ‘contracts’ that sought to bind together the people and the state.  
In her investigation of propaganda and thought work in China, Brady argues 
that these activities form 'the very life-blood of the [Chinese] Party-State' (2008:1) 
while serving a superficially capitalist agenda of consumerism and market reform. 
The Chinese authorities still describe the media as 喉舌 houshe, the ‘tongue and 
throat’ of the Communist Party. However, in a conclusion that brings her close to 
Hearns-Branaman's work, Brady points out that the goal of propaganda in China is no 
longer Maoist revolution, but the perpetuation of the Communist Party’s power in a 
hybrid system which she describes as 'Popular Authoritarianism' (2008:191). 
The position of the Chinese media within the system certainly hobbles their 
potential as an investigative force, at least in matters for which a solution or positive 
outcome is not guaranteed. Edney points out that in the view of most cadres and 
bureaucrats, 'information should be restricted unless there is a good reason to release 
it' (2014:84-5). Having said that, controls on China's multiplicity of media outlets vary 
widely, with national organisations such as CCTV on the tightest leash. Increasing 
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professionalisation of journalism in China has been accompanied by calls for media to 
be allowed a greater distance from politics – paradoxically, in order to present a 
convincing case for the Communist Party’s hold on power (Zhang 2011a:112-113). 
Dong and Shi (2007:170-1) advocate negotiation between partisanship and 
professionalism in the Chinese media, characterising this by the phrase, 帮忙不添乱 
bangmang bu tianluan, ‘helping (the public) but not making trouble (for the Party 
leadership)’.  
Brady lists common propaganda guidelines issued covertly by the Chinese 
authorities to official media (2008:95-104) whose aim is to suffocate negative news 
or diminish its impact.  However, she does not explain why some guidelines are 
inconsistently applied, or indeed never applied because the mere threat of them is 
enough to intimidate journalists into self-censorship. For Shirk (2010:44), however, 
the media environment is now one of consumer choice, and the gap between party 
and commercial media is opening 'a corresponding divide in public trust and 
credibility' with direct implications for the party’s ability to control public opinion.  
It is this dichotomy that may have prompted a tactical switch in the social 
media era – Bandurski’s ‘Control 2.0’ (Shirk 2010:36) under which information 
removal has to a great extent been replaced with agenda-setting techniques. Under 
these, for example, all media are instructed to use CCTV or Xinhua coverage of a 
controversial event: this means that an internet search will turn up an authorised 
version rather than a blank that might prompt the enquirer to consult foreign media 
(Edney 2014:127). The effect on Chinese journalists of ad hoc information control, 
however, is that their decision-making becomes fragmented and pertains to single 
events, denying them the chance of building a normative model of professionalism 
(Pan & Lu 2003:230).  
The Chinese leadership, along with its media, may have departed somewhat 
from its ideological roots but its central propaganda apparatus appears intact.  
However, in this welter of regulations, Creemers (2015:60) sees a system under 
strain, and a risk that the Chinese leadership might face 'an increasing 
delegitimisation of their positions'. In his diatribe against the Communist system 
(1957), the leading Yugoslav Communist turned dissident, Milovan Djilas, argued that, 
while in theory Communism contained some genuine universal aspirations, in 
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practice it served only a new ruling class bent on using all means at its disposal to 
remain in power.  
2.3.4 The Establishment 
While the political economy of media has been shown to affect gatekeeping and 
agenda-setting, it is not the sole such influence. Other shapers of news are social 
rather than political or economic, including the notion of a media class whose 
'groupthink' determines news priorities.  
 Hallin's 'Spheres of Influence' (1986:116-118) provide the best way of 
describing the impact of social forces and collective opinion on news. Although Hallin 
was writing about the United States and the Vietnam war, the three concentric circles 
of his diagram demonstrate how journalists' adherence to 'objectivity' varies 
according to their topics. He argues that they are attempting to be objective in only 
one of the spheres, that covering matters of 'legitimate controversy': other matters 
are deemed to be either outside the mainstream and thus unworthy of considered 
treatment (the 'sphere of deviance') or in an uncontested area that demands no 
balance (the 'sphere of consensus').  
In any application of Hallin's Spheres to the British media, a candidate for the 
'sphere of deviance' is Jeremy Corbyn's leadership of the Labour Party, as seen in the 
delegitimising and incredulous tone of UK coverage and particularly that of the BBC 
(Cammaerts et al. 2016, Piazza & Lashmar 2017). The fact that Corbyn is a 
parliamentarian of long standing, and not an Establishment outsider in the wider 
sense of the word, demonstrates how small is the space for legitimate debate afforded 
by mainstream media in the 21st century. The former senior BBC journalist Roger 
Mosey denied that party politics skewed the agenda at the Corporation, but admitted 
the existence of what he termed 'groupthink' – a set of assumptions seen as 
reasonable by everyone in a certain community – that could lead to unconscious bias 
in news (Mosey 2015:160). The difficulty in forcing items onto the news agenda if 
they do not tally with such assumptions was illustrated by the BBC's failure to 
acknowledge the rise of Corbyn and predict (or at least take seriously) the Leave vote 
in the EU referendum and the victory of Donald Trump. Such weaknesses in Western 
media have been detected by observers in China: the deputy president of CCTV, Sun 
Yusheng, was quoted as saying in 2011 that Western news organisations often 
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betrayed ‘a bias in selection [of stories to cover], even when they are excellent at 
reporting’ (de Burgh 2017:27). Sun indicated at the same time that Asian news 
organisations would have their own priorities that would, equally, affect their story 
selection. 
2.3.5 The individual 
Ranked against the influence of the system and the Establishment is the contested 
notion of an individual journalist's ability to shape the news agenda. Some leading 
comparative media theorists do not consider individual journalists to be very 
important in the overall news structure (Esser, de Vreese & Hopmann 2017:28, 
Hanitzsch & Mellado 2011:410): indeed, Hanitzsch & Mellado deem them to be at the 
'lowest level of the newsroom hierarchy'. Other scholars differ: Polumbaum has 
written an entire book chronicling the ways in which individual Chinese journalists 
function within and test the parameters of state control: she sees 'degrees of 
independence' from the state which, 'depending on circumstances and personalities, 
can be leveraged into greater opportunities' (2008:6). 
 Writing specifically about CCTV's English-language news in the early 21st 
century, Jirik (2008:22-23) goes further than Polumbaum, utilising Certeau's account 
of the practice of everyday life (1984) to support his contention that individuals can 
work within or around established organisational structures to suit their own 
purposes. In an echo of Carey's map, Certeau uses an analogy of a street-grid (ibid:93) 
on which 'ordinary practitioners' tell their own story through walking, rather than 
following a scheme imposed from above which in any case they cannot read. This is 
commensurate with Pan & Lu's study of Chinese journalists (2003:215) in which they 
adjudge them to be using 'diverse and often conflicting ideas of journalism through 
their improvised and situated practices'. In other words, journalists act in individual 
situations, 'based on opportunistic calculations' (ibid.:217). 
 The bad news for professionalism as defined by the above practices is that 
China's 'going-out' project is steered politically, not journalistically. Nyíri, in his study 
of Chinese foreign correspondents, remarks that while the task of agenda-setting and 
remodelling China's image is deemed important in the media's global expansion, it is 
not seen as a task for reporters (2017:22). This led, he says, to some journalists 
accusing their colleagues of using a lack of freedom to excuse a lack of initiative: but it 
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also explained the absence of a truly journalistic alternative to Western news agendas. 
However, Repnikova points out that even in the ideologically-loaded training of 
journalism in China, the Party line mutates subtly as it is actively reinterpreted by 
students and teachers (2017:399). She concludes that 'the adherence to official 
ideology by educators, and especially by students... appears to be more on the surface 
than in substance' (ibid.:415). Furthermore, media policy itself changes over time. 
2.4 Dissecting news 
What makes a news item? The BBC manager who complained to a colleague, 'we do 
too many stories just because they're interesting', might have benefited from 
unpicking the textual components and attributes of the news bulletin at issue. This 
section explains how journalists choose their facts according to news values that have 
been instilled in them, and then make sense of those facts as best they can by 
dropping them into a familiar frame. The comparative analysis of BBC and CCTV-
News output in this thesis is intended to establish whether news values are universal 
or culturally specific. 
2.4.1 News values 
A superficial analysis of what journalists mean by 'news', at least as far as its textual 
attributes are concerned, can be made through a classification of news values. Such a 
taxonomy lends itself well to quantitative content analysis, and provides insight into 
the first four Ws – the who-where-when-what – of the classic 'five Ws and an H' of 
newswriting. 
 Galtung and Ruge's 1965 foundation study of news values was long regarded 
as the authoritative model. In a study of international crises reported in the 
Norwegian press, Galtung and Ruge found that short, significant and unambiguous 
events were most likely to be recorded: they should ideally be culturally proximate, 
and either unexpected but meaningful or consonant with expectations. News, they 
found, was often about elite nations and people. It was frequently characterised by 
negativity, as if peace had provided the industrialised world with a need to pick over 
trauma elsewhere.  
 Galtung and Ruge's study was criticised for concentrating on foreign crises 
rather than being representative of routine news, and for refraining from 
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investigating more profound matters such as ideology. In 2001 Harcup and O'Neill re-
worked the Norwegian study with a broader range of topics in a British context. They 
proposed categorising news as worthy of reporting if it featured the elite, celebrities, 
entertainment, surprise, bad news or good news, and if it had magnitude and 
relevance or was consistent with a newspaper's agenda. Harcup and O'Neill revisited 
their findings in 2017 in the context of rise of social media, this time adding the 
variables of exclusivity, shareability and drama. It can be seen that the categories 
have become more abstract with each iteration of the classification system, indicating 
that newsworthiness may increasingly be deemed to respond to emotions rather than 
the need for facts. 
Among a number of close-focus studies comparing Chinese and American 
news values, Guo (2012:32) found a higher incidence of political framing in the 
Chinese reports, consistent with orientation towards a nationally-steered agenda. 
Several news values – timeliness, proximity, significance and audience interest – were 
shared by the Chinese and US reports. Conflict and negativity were found primarily in 
the US news, with the Chinese media taking a less confrontational approach. 
2.4.2 News frames 
Less quantifiable ways of interpreting the narration of news stories can be extracted 
from frame analysis. If quantitative content analysis responds to the first 4 Ws of 
journalism, framing could represent the 5th W – Why – and the H – How. Shoemaker 
and Reese regard framing as a routine performed ‘ritualistically, in a predictably 
structured way' (2014:176) by journalists who want the facts to make sense. The 
concept of framing has the advantage, for cross-cultural work, of paradigmatic 
flexibility and theoretical diversity (Reese 2010:17). Most useful for a protracted 
comparative study is a 'framework of frames' that encompasses generic ways of 
telling stories, such as human interest, conflict or morality (Semetko & Valkenburg 
2000): this will be elaborated upon in Chapter 4.  
 Propp's morphology of the Russian folk tale (1968[1928]) has become highly 
influential in Western narrative theory for its categorisation of the functions of 
protagonists and its seven generic characters. In comparative context, however, it 
may suffer from the fact that familiar narrative arcs are predicated on shared culture 
(Phillips 2007:8-9): for example, societies that value individual freedom will tell 
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stories differently from those in which selflessness is highly prized, and a story about 
corrupt officials in the West will concentrate on their weaknesses whereas a Chinese 
report will praise the authorities for catching them. There is a strong narrative 
tradition in Anglo-American television news (Montgomery 2007:90, Shoemaker & 
Reese 2014:175) which often deploys the perspective of a single person to tell a much 
wider story, but this is not necessarily the natural way of reporting news in cultures 
in which the collective takes precedence over the individual.   
Frames and stories include images as well as words, and intersemiotic 
relationships (overlap, displacement and dichotomy) can be identified and analysed 
in news output (Bednarek & Caple 2012:121). Caution is needed here, however, as 
the results chapters make clear: intent can easily be confused with both inexperience 
in television production and a shortage of resources. Picture-driven output is a staple 
of today's Anglo-American broadcast news, but Chinese journalists have made it clear 
in private conversation that they structure news reports in Mandarin very 
differently.1 
2.4.3 News attitudes 
Other news values are more oblique, less tangible and therefore harder to isolate and 
analyse, particularly in comparative context. De Vreese, Esser and Hopmann's 
Comparing Political Journalism (2017) tackles cross-national content analysis through 
a range of attitudinal categories such as strategy and game framing, interpretive 
journalism, negativity and personalisation. Although the authors point out that their 
work is based on democratic societies and perceptions of deteriorating news 
performance there (ibid.:1), some of their categories are also suitable for the study of 
authoritarian media and are reflected in this research. 
Other scholars have carried out wide-ranging international studies of news 
values that rely primarily on interviews with newswriters. An 18-country survey of 
journalists’ roles (Hanitzsch et al. 2011) indicates that detachment and the ‘watchdog’ 
function are considered essential values around the world, that impartiality and 
ethics are also deemed important, but that there is a bigger variation among countries 
on the principles of interventionism and separating fact from opinion. For Waisbord 
(2013), it is news values and reporting formats rather than professional ethics that 
                                                        
1 More on this is in Chapter 3. 
37 
 
are being globalised. Mellado et al. (2017) specifically investigate how far journalistic 
cultures have become ‘hybridised’ by analysing the content of national news in the 
publications of 19 countries for the presence of six types of journalistic role. They do, 
indeed, find that journalism is dynamic and frequently defies both classification and 
assumptions. However, they are investigating only hybridity of approach without 
concomitant hybridity of staffing such as is found in the international newsrooms 
studied here. 
2.5 News in the time of globalisation 
Globalisation and social media have certainly changed the face of journalism. The 
reactive, procedure-bound broadcast newsroom of a decade ago has become a cross-
platform hub of ideas that stream in from a multiplicity of sources. Data mining, and 
verification of user-generated content, are now key skills. Some news organisations 
are experimenting with alternative reporting strategies such as constructive 
journalism. This section examines accepted principles of journalism in the 
Anglosphere that are being questioned in the digital age. 
2.5.1 Alternative forms of journalism 
Social media may have opened news consumers’ minds to different modes of 
journalistic enquiry, but even before Twitter it was clear that Anglo-American-style 
conflict- and negativity-based journalism might not be appropriate for all parts of the 
world. The widespread assumption of the Anglosphere that journalism is bound up 
with the principles of democracy is not universally shared (Wright 2014:71). Over the 
past few decades, journalisms of peace, attachment and development have challenged 
the standard notion of the detached journalist outside the story. 
Supporters of development journalism rebel against the imposition of 
impartiality and objectivity. For them, developing countries are engaged in a war 
against poverty and lack of infrastructure, and journalists should be instrumental in 
agitating for change. In much of Africa, the liberal democratic ideals innate in most 
Anglo-American journalism are held not to sit well (Nyamnjoh 2005). Zakaria 
(2004:23), questions in any case the notion of linking liberalism with democracy, 
arguing that over-democratisation has turned the elites that previously served the 
public into 'anxious hustlers', always running to keep up with the popular will. 
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Journalism of attachment found new advocates through the Yugoslav wars of 
secession in the 1990s. Martin Bell, then a BBC correspondent, argued forcefully for a 
method of reporting that involved moral judgement, one that did not pretend to be 
neutral between victim and assailant, good and evil (Williams 2011:13). Separately, 
Galtung evolved a theoretical structure of peace journalism in the 1970s (2003), 
believing that journalists could help cultivate peace by re-orienting their reporting 
away from conflict and towards truth, individuals and solutions. This was taken up 
after the 1991 Gulf War by a group of journalists who believed that reporters as 
neutral observers were not contributing effectively to society (Williams 2011:14; 
McGoldrick & Lynch n.d.). Detractors argue that forms of ‘engaged’ journalism risk 
subjectivity, and burden journalists with problems that should be for politicians to 
solve (Hanitzsch 2004). Loyn (2007) adds that, far from homing in on violence, 
journalists tend to under-report conflict in any case. Nonetheless, a version of 
solution-oriented reporting in the form of constructive journalism has been gaining 
academic and journalistic attention. 
 The main proponents of constructive journalism, McIntyre & Gyldensted, 
define it as 'an emerging form of journalism that involves applying positive 
psychology techniques to news processes and production in an effort to create 
productive and engaging coverage, while holding true to journalism's core functions' 
(2017:23). They argue that an agenda of unremitting gloom alienates people from the 
news and causes compassion fatigue: a reporter practising constructive journalism, 
on the other hand, is more of a participant, concerned about the effect of the report 
and what might happen next. What is conveyed through such a report is how people 
are responding to problems, what works and what does not. Instead of reporting on a 
dispute in terms of how politicians differed (ibid.:28), a reporter employing 
constructive journalism techniques could focus on where they agreed and might be 
able to work together. Principles akin to those of constructive journalism are being 
tried out, to a limited extent, in a number of Anglo-American newsrooms. The BBC 
calls it 'solutions-focused journalism' (Johnston 2017): it does not try to make the 
world better, but it uses rigorous journalistic methods to make people better 
informed about it by giving them 'information, possibilities and evidence'. 
Constructive journalism has recently been attracting attention in China, whose 
media have long been accused of purveying unremittingly 'positive' news. Scholars in 
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China have suggested that constructive journalism might suit Chinese media's 
reporting in Africa (Wekesa & Zhang 2014). Zhang (2014) defines it as reporting that 
stimulates discussion of a solution while displaying positivity and engagement. In 
China such definitions have echoes: Mao Zedong is said to have advised journalists to 
'not only pose questions but also produce solutions' (Lee 2005:116). The Chinese 
journalism scholar Li Xiguang retorts that stories about problems may embarrass the 
authorities, but they contribute to maintaining stability through serving as ‘social 
safety valves’ (2001:398). 
2.5.2 Something to rely on? 
The 'fake news' debate is as much a crisis for established broadcasters who pride 
themselves on truth-telling as it is about shameless politicians or allegedly 
'weaponised information' from authoritarian countries. Barber (2017) defines fake 
news as 'the deliberate presentation of falsehood as fact', as opposed to lazy 
journalism or making mistakes. The fake news debate has gained currency because 
politicians such as Donald Trump have been able to spread disinformation with little 
challenge and, in the process, popularise the accusation that mainstream media in the 
Anglosphere are 'fake news'. According to a former BBC executive, the era of post-
truth politics has confounded journalism and threatens democracy by undermining 
the consensus on basic facts that enables useful debate (Harding 2017:17). It has 
wrong-footed many established journalists: former colleagues of this researcher have 
admitted finding it hard to state baldly in news programmes that a politician has 'lied'. 
Tandoc et al. (2017), reviewing the literature on fake news, suggest grading it 
as news satire, news parody, fabrication, manipulation, advertising, or propaganda, 
and evaluating two levels of deception – facticity and intention (for example, satire 
uses facts but makes no attempt to deceive). Wardle (2017) takes this further with 
her emerging typology of mis- and disinformation. To the categories of satire or 
parody she adds false connection (when headlines or visuals do not support the 
content); misleading content through framing; false context given to genuine content; 
and impersonation, manipulation or fabrication. It is noteworthy that four 
backgrounds she supplies for fake news – propaganda, political influence, 
partisanship and poor journalism – are all mapped against the same two attributes: 
misleading content and false context. 
40 
 
2.5.3 Impartiality versus transparency 
News journalists often proclaim adherence to ideals of objectivity and impartiality 
that media scholars argue do not exist. When Schudson wrote, 'the belief in 
objectivity is a faith in "facts", a distrust of "values", and a commitment to their 
segregation' (1978:6), he was speaking of an ideal. He defines facts as 'assertions 
about the world open to independent validation' (ibid.:5), but then admits that this 
‘world’ is constructed in the human mind and through people’s acceptance of 
conventional views which are not necessarily ‘true’. The distinction between 
objectivity and impartiality is not always observed in the same way in academic 
writing. Sambrook (2012) sums up impartiality as journalistic detachment and the 
removal of bias, and objectivity as the isolation of evidence and facts. According to 
Tumber and Prentoulis (2005:64), the norms related to objectivity are truthfulness, 
factuality, completeness and accuracy. All of these are impossible to measure 
empirically in absolute terms, although the absence of completeness – at least – can 
be established through comparative study.  
The BBC describes impartiality as 'the basis of the public’s trust' and its 
'defining quality', albeit one that needs to be reassessed in a more diverse society 
shorn of old certainties and assumptions (BBC Trust 2007:5). Bennett (2007:195) 
counsels caution in assuming that objectivity is attainable, however genuine the 
attempt: for journalists, 'as one reality comes to dominate all others, that dominant 
reality begins to seem objective'. Notions of impartiality and balance may operate 
within existing political and cultural contexts, succeeding only in reproducing the 
existing framework for debate (Dencik 2013). Referring to the BBC’s output nearly 
forty ago, Schlesinger termed this the 'myth of value-freedom' (1978:204). 
The continued need for impartiality and objectivity in broadcast news has 
been questioned in the era of instant access to multiple news sources and the two-
way flow of information afforded by social media. Geniets sees these traditional 
values as 'less and less relevant', arguing that transparency and trust between 
international broadcasters and their audiences are more sustainable qualities 
(2013:110-111). Sambrook (2012) agrees that transparency is an important principle 
for the future of broadcasting, but prioritises facts and evidence-led reporting, along 
with diversity to guard against the risks that come from sheltering in familiar opinion. 
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One of the peculiarities of impartiality and objectivity is that they are required 
of broadcast news organisations but not of the print media in Britain (Waisbord 
2013).  The availability to British viewers of a panoply of international news channels 
has caused dilemmas for national regulators (Barnett 2011), who must interpret the 
intentions of a host of broadcasters from cultures outside Britain and adjudge 
whether their news has attained ‘due’ impartiality.  
Impartiality itself means not favouring one side over another. 'Due' means adequate 
or appropriate to the subject and nature of the programme… The approach to due 
impartiality may vary according to the nature of the subject, the type of programme 
and channel, the likely expectation of the audience as to content, and the extent to 
which the content and approach is signalled to the audience. Context… is important. 
(UK regulator Ofcom 2013:23) 
Impartiality and objectivity are distinct from balance, which would allocate 
equal space to opposing views. This, as outlined in 1.4, can deliver bogus equivalence 
between fact and fiction, right and wrong, aggressor and victim (Davies 2011, Bell 
2014). In December 2017, the UK regulator Ofcom started investigating allegations 
that a BBC Radio 4 Today programme interview had broken broadcasting rules by 
giving undue weight to the views of the climate change sceptic and former Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson (BBC News 2017). In a separate problem of BBC 
balance, Seaton points out that in the 1970s the Corporation was caught between a 
cross-parliamentary consensus on the Northern Ireland conflict and rising extra-
parliamentary disagreement on the ground, and found it hard to report without being 
seen to be encouraging trouble. She says the BBC 'was always in difficulty when an 
issue concerns the integrity of the British state, which the Troubles precisely did' 
(2017:62). This suggests that the BBC's notions of balance and impartiality usually 
reflect the binary oppositions in parliament: if these are unclear, as indeed they also 
were with the 2016 Brexit referendum, it may find it difficult to know how to pitch its 
news.  
McNair (2017) argues that in a post-fact mediascape pockmarked by fake 
news, those journalists and news organisations that strive to produce objective 
reporting are more important than ever, because they can at least provide a measure 
of validity. He nods towards greater procedural transparency and journalistic self-
reflection (ibid.:14) as a way of helping people decide whom to believe. In what 
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Hillary Clinton famously called an information war (C-Span Video 2011), the global 
battle-lines have been drawn. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on the nature of news, its textual attributes, 
how journalism has evolved in Britain and China, and the impact of external 
constraints on news production. It has also explored the idea of different conceptions 
of news in a multi-channel era, including 'constructive journalism', and has 
summarised current thinking on whether news must be seen as impartial if it is to be 
credible. 
 Chapter 4 draws on this literature review to construct the methods for a 
comparison of the news content of CCTV-News and BBC World News. Before that, it is 
necessary to provide an account of how these two international Anglophone channels 
came about and how they fit into the structures of their parent broadcasters. That is 




3 Growing news cultures: CCTV-News and BBC World News 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Overview 
CCTV-News in English and BBC World News TV may seem at first glance to come from 
very different organisational structures and journalistic backgrounds. However, more 
unites them than their cosmetic similarities. Indeed, even the Westernised look of 
CCTV-News is significant when contrasted with the television 'grammar' of Chinese-
language CCTV, as this chapter will show. Both BBC World News TV and CCTV-News 
were built up slowly from unprepossessing origins, bankrolled during their 
development by the more powerful parts of their wider organisations, with 
concomitant influence on their output. Both underwent changes of editorial direction: 
CCTV-News gradually became less China-focused and superficially more Anglo-
American in presentation and perspective, while BBC World News ditched the 
picture-poor, cerebral elements of its forerunner World Service TV News to emerge 
as an outright competitor to CNN. 
This chapter charts the development of CCTV-News in English and BBC World 
News TV up to the point at which content analysis ended in 2016. This cut-off point 
also marked a natural conclusion for CCTV-News, which was rebranded as CGTN 
(China Global Television Network) on the last day of 2016. Also dealt with here is the 
evolution of regionally targeted programming by both broadcasters, and the rationale 
for concentrating in this research project on news output about China and Africa. 
Comments from journalistic interviewees and previously unused archive documents 
flesh out the story of the transformation of the channels. 
3.1.2 CCTV-News in the global information order 
Although CCTV-News and BBC World News sprang from different social and political 
systems, they came from the same part of those systems: the Establishment. As 
McChesney points out (2010), global media are in essence politically conservative in 
that news corporations are supported by the international social structure. Indeed, 
the term ‘global media’ still often denotes a collection of national media institutions 
(Flew & Waisbord 2015). Dencik has observed that news practices and routines at 
BBC World News are steeped in a nation-state-centred order (2013). This does not 
mean that the balance of world media is static: the rise of Al Jazeera and other non-
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Western news organisations has challenged the assumption that Western interests 
and values are universal (Mahbubani 2008:115). The recent coming-together of the 
BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) has revived interest in 
the long-stalled idea of a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) 
to demonopolise and decolonise media flows (Thussu 2015b).  
3.1.3 Image use and eyebrow-flashing: the look of BBC and CCTV news 
Chinese and British TV news, in their native-language forms, represent two very 
different types of news discourse (Feng 2016, Montgomery & Shen 2017). The former 
favours the studio presenter-delivered monologue, and the latter the multi-voice 
approach (reporter, presenter, witness, interviewee) with confrontational voices 
juxtaposed. Before the news content of CCTV-News in English and BBC World News 
Television can be compared, it should therefore be acknowledged how far CCTV’s 
English-language channel has moved from the formality and conventions of Chinese 
state TV news programmes in order to enter the international Anglophone news 
market. As one CCTV journalist put it, CCTV-News aimed to ‘interpret China to the 
world, learn from the West… use their way to report stories so they accept China’s 
image.’1 To do so, the Chinese broadcaster reduced the leading narrative role of the 
studio presenter for its English service, and introduced live links and reporter pieces-
to-camera with attention-grabbing ‘top lines’. 
A series of screen-shots (Figure 3-1) of the first three minutes of BBC World’s 
GMT, News Desk on CCTV-News and the daily prime CCTV-1 Mandarin newscast, 
Xinwen Lianbo, shows that the BBC’s visual branding concentrates on establishing its 
studio, presenter and correspondent on location with the help of short headline 
videos about the news itself, while CCTV-News opts for a more traditional headline 
sequence favouring shots of politicians and other elites. Both of these are in the 
Anglo-American tradition of TV news grammar. Xinwen Lianbo‘s use of images is 
completely different. For the first two minutes of the programme the camera does not 
deviate from the two studio presenters, there are no visual cues for programme 
content, and the camera cuts to video reports only after the presenters’ authority has 
been established. 
                                                        
1 Speaker at China Media Centre seminar, University of Westminster, March 2015. 
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Figure 3-1 The 'look' of news programmes on three channels - BBC World News, CCTV-News and CCTV-1 
Mandarin – recorded simultaneously at 1100 GMT on 7 September 2015:, one screengrab every 10 




Montgomery and Shen (2017:36-37) place CCTV's Chinese news at the 'neutral, 
restrained' end of an arc of formality in television news presentation, with US news 
channels at the 'expressive' end and UK television in the middle. Illustrative of an 
expressive style of newsreading, they say, is the 'eyebrow flash' that communicates 
directly with the viewer, imbuing the news script with a sense of the reader's 
personality. Montgomery and Shen note that eyebrow-flashing was rare in CCTV's 
Chinese news, especially before the recent rejuvenation of the presenter team, but it 
is seen to be prevalent on CCTV-News in English. While these observations concern 
style rather than substance, the differences revealed are striking. They prefigure the 
journalistic tensions that have permeated CCTV-News's evolution and the arguments 
over what it should be – arguments which, as reported in 3.2.3 and subsequent 
chapters, have left members of its own workforce unclear or frustrated about their 
purpose. 
The debate about the mission of CCTV news in English is outlined in the 
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following sections, along with the impact of politics on the funding of international 
services of both CCTV and the BBC. As will be explained, recent cuts in funding to the 
BBC have given rise to greater uniformity of news across the corporation but also the 
potential for a change of tone away from traditional 'Britishness' because of more 
global recruitment. At CCTV’s English news operation, by contrast, more money from 
the 'going-out' project delivered more disparate output and more nationalities 
producing it, but with questions about how state oversight of media would function in 
CCTV's bases overseas. Complicating all of these factors, as will be seen, was the 
involvement of Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation in the fates of both the BBC and 
CCTV international TV channels in their early days. 
3.2 CCTV-News in English 
3.2.1 The parent station: CCTV in Chinese 
As an offspring of China Central Television, the national broadcaster of an 
authoritarian state, CCTV-News might not have had the most internationally 
marketable journalistic heritage for a 24-hour global news network. Its parent is, 
however, certainly a television giant: the primary state media outlet was founded in 
1958 and at the time of writing boasted 15 free-to-air channels in Chinese, numerous 
specialist pay-TV channels, and 5 free-to-air channels in foreign languages including 
English.2 In its domestic incarnation, CCTV has been widely criticised inside and 
outside China in recent years for dullness, slowness and inaccuracy (Miao 2010:107), 
pilloried overseas for broadcasting pre-trial 'confessions' (Lee 2016:111, Leung 
2017:94), and ridiculed for delaying reporting on a fire in its own building in 2009 
(Cooper-Chen & Scotton 2010:98). CCTV possesses a formidable Mandarin 
newsgathering machine, managed separately from that of channels in other languages, 
which supplies both domestic and international news including a 24-hour stream. In 
the early 2000s CCTV's investigative programmes, although limited, garnered some 
praise: their scope has since been restricted further (Tong 2011:61). As an 
instrument of state and prime source of public information, CCTV remains the most 
tightly-controlled form of media in China (Miao 2010:96). Nonetheless, its national 
evening news programme Xinwen Lianbo 'still has more viewers than any other TV 
news on Earth' (The Economist 2016). 
                                                        
2 CCTV also broadcasts programming in Uyghur, Tibetan and other languages of minorities in China. 
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3.2.2 Towards CCTV-9 in English and CCTV-International, 1986-2010 
Although it is nine years the junior of the BBC's international TV news, CCTV's 
Anglophone channel has already been through several names and incarnations. The 
present-day news stream grew out of CCTV-9, a 24-hour general channel launched on 
25 September 2000 (CCTV 2010), aimed at foreigners in China and abroad. The idea 
of English-language news broadcasting, however, goes back to 1986 when a quarter-
hour bulletin translated from the previous night's Xinwen Lianbo kept Anglophone 
viewers informed about China (Jirik 2008:82). CCTV-English was founded a decade 
later (Zhu 2012:171) and delivered a three-times-daily opt-in to the international 
Mandarin channel, CCTV-4, until the advent of the 24-hour English stream. 
The September 2000 launch of CCTV-9 came just a year before the deputy 
head of the central propaganda/publicity department3 and head of the Chinese 
broadcasting regulator SARFT, Xu Guangchun, began the 'going-out' project of China's 
media. The project was initiated by the then Communist Party general secretary and 
Chinese president Jiang Zemin, who instructed the media to convey China's voice to 
the world (Zhu 2012:169). Zhang (2011b:60) saw this shift as part of a new drive by 
Beijing to target Americans and Europeans for soft power and propaganda efforts in 
foreign languages. Which types of news would be disseminated, and by whom, 
became a highly contested area. 
China's voice as delivered via CCTV-9 was evidently not loud enough for the 
authorities in Beijing, precipitating another re-launch and re-brand. In preparation 
for this, the channel's managers took far-reaching decisions on how Chinese it should 
appear and how much of the world outside China, if any, it should report. A decisive 
intervention is reported to have come from the Politburo Standing Committee 
member responsible for propaganda, Li Changchun, who was quoted in 2003 as 
saying that CCTV in English should act like a Chinese CNN (Jirik 2008:9, Zhu 2012:172) 
and report a Chinese perspective on the world. Key to the understanding of this 
statement was the assumption in Chinese official circles that CNN was a propaganda 
tool actively wielded by the US government (Rawnsley 2015b:466, Jirik 2008:10). It 
may be inferred that Mr Li wished simply to avail himself of the media's intangible 
powers of persuasion. Jirik (2008:11-12), who worked at CCTV at this time, reports 
                                                        
3 Brady (2008:73) notes that the department’s official name was changed in 1998 from ‘propaganda’ to 
‘publicity’ although the Chinese title, including the word 宣传 xuanchuan, remained unchanged. 
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that journalists there were unwilling to harness themselves to any initiative that 
would further restrict their autonomy. CCTV's English news department, however, 
had reason to aspire to rival CNN in another respect: that of professional standards. 
CCTV-9 was aided in its quest for Western-style news production values by its 
then director Jiang Heping, who had completed a masters degree in journalism in 
Britain, and by a senior US media executive, employed not by CNN but by Rupert 
Murdoch's News Corporation. The executive, US television producer John Terenzio, 
was seconded to CCTV several times in the early 2000s with the aim of lifting 
standards of reporting and production after News Corporation struck a deal for 
limited cable access in China that also aimed to put CCTV's English news on air in the 
United States. According to Terenzio, CCTV-9 in English at that time was 'as 
rudimentary a channel as, quite frankly, you can imagine'4, with its video content 
taken straight from the CCTV Mandarin news and presented as 'voiceover of 
continuous streams of video with no sound up.'  Terenzio worked with the CCTV 
journalists on news-writing, attribution of facts and Western-style television 
grammar. However, there was one issue on which he told managers that CCTV should 
not compromise: 
You've got to focus on China, and China only. I'm a Western viewer: I could care less 
(sic) about your reportage from South America, and certainly not from the United 
States… My point to them [CCTV] was: China is huge… You be the window on China: 
you be the people who report first: you be the people who report with exclusivity. 
The Chinese-ness of the channel, however, was diluted for reasons of intelligibility. 
Terenzio advocated employing non-Chinese broadcasters as a matter of pragmatism 
rather than overt policy, arguing that 'there weren't enough Chinese broadcasters 
whose English was adequate.' Among the first on-air foreigners was the New Zealand-
born former weather presenter Edwin Maher, who joined in 2004 and would go on to 
read the news on CCTV for 12 years. Jiang Heping described this as 'putting Chinese 
wine into a foreign bottle' (in Cui 2004). 
CCTV-9 was re-launched on 3 May 2004 as a 24-hour English-language news 
channel, CCTV International or CCTV-I, with the slogan, 'Your window on China and 
the world'. In the same year, CCTV began broadcasting in Spanish and French. CCTV-I 
proclaimed two mutually incompatible objectives for a news organisation: a 
                                                        
4 Personal interview (CGPG11). 
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commitment to accuracy and objectivity, and a promise to speak for the Chinese state 
in a multi-polar environment (Jirik 2009:3). The primacy of the latter objective was 
underlined in 2005 when senior journalists were made to write self-criticisms after 
the government complained about the channel's factual reporting of Chinese coal 
mine disasters (Brady 2008:167). Jirik points out that journalists at CCTV-I had been 
‘uncomfortable’ with the authorities’ wish that the relaunched channel function 
primarily as an instrument of publicity (2008:244). 
Despite Terenzio's advice that it should concentrate on China, CCTV-I 
continued to report on international affairs without necessarily injecting a Chinese 
perspective. While Jiang Heping insisted that China’s opinion of the world was very 
different from that of CNN or the BBC (Cui 2004), Jirik’s observation of news 
production processes revealed the widespread uncritical use of western agency 
material in covering foreign news (Jirik 2009:17-18). CCTV would default to Chinese 
sources if Chinese interests were involved. The use of non-Chinese correspondents 
and the scope of foreign news reporting would increase further with the channel's re-
launch as CCTV-News in 2010. 
3.2.3 CCTV-News and the ‘going-out’ project, 2010-16 and beyond 
As described in Chapter 1, the mauling of China's image in 2008 through Western 
media coverage, in which Tibetan unrest overshadowed the Beijing Olympics, 
prompted a boost in state funding for CCTV's international channels and other parts 
of China's overseas-facing media. CCTV's allocation of funding was reportedly the 
equivalent of 2.2 billion US dollars (Sambrook 2010). CCTV's English news output 
was re-branded on 26 April 2010 as CCTV-News, available free-to-air on satellite, 
cable and some terrestrial channels (CCTV 2010). Three months later, CCTV-News 
became one of five constituents of a newly-created department for foreign-language 
channels, Russian and Arabic having been added to French and Spanish in 2009.5 The 
declared goal of the foreign-language department was to bring China closer to the 
outside world and allow the world to tune into China (CCTV Yearbook 2013:138).6 
                                                        
5 A Portuguese news channel scheduled for 2010 (Zhang 2011b:59) was delayed. 
6 Unusually for state media, in July 2010 CCTV-News acquired an English-language rival from mainland 
China: CNC World, the television arm of the state news agency, Xinhua. According to Zhao (2013:23), 
Xinhua achieved this expansion of its empire by obtaining direct permission for the launch from the 
central leadership, thereby avoiding head-on domestic competition with CCTV while sidestepping 
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 The extra funding propelled CCTV-News firmly into the global marketplace 
while still fulfilling its role of Chinese state broadcaster, presenting it with a difficult 
but now familiar balancing act between party and commercial interests. Analysts 
have contended that, as an English-language outlet, CCTV-News profited from the 
application of the Chinese idiom 内外有别 nei wai you bie – insiders and outsiders are 
different – giving it greater leeway to adopt Western journalistic practices (Liang 
2011:453, Zhu 2012:174). However, anecdotal evidence from employees also 
suggests that nei wai you bie permitted the exercise of a more subtle method of 
editorial control: the passing of instructions to Chinese staff in the English newsroom, 
in Chinese. It was never clear whether these directives came from inside or outside 
CCTV, but what is certain is that they were unavailable and mostly unintelligible to 
the foreigners working there. 
 The distinction between Chinese and foreign employees in the Beijing 
newsroom was also contractual, organisational and professional. Several CCTV-News 
contacts confirmed that foreigners were employed through a different system from 
Chinese nationals and were not included in any of the training on Marxist journalism 
values introduced under Xi Jinping. In the newsroom at least, foreigners were 
recruited for studio presenting, new media and copy-editing roles. However, this was 
not a hard-and-fast rule: one British man was employed in the news team and copy-
editors occasionally filled in as writers. One non-Chinese woman was a member of the 
CCTV-News domestic reporting team. All news output producers at the time of this 
research were Chinese. 
 The policy of recruiting foreign journalists might appear to jar with the 宣传
xuanchuan (propaganda/publicity) obligations of Chinese state media, but in practice 
nei wai you bie at CCTV-News gave rise to 'one news channel, two reporting systems'. 
Many of the inexperienced young Chinese producers employed in CCTV's English 
newsroom in Beijing had linguistic rather than journalistic qualifications (Brady 
2008:167). Outside China, CCTV-News contracted a number of experienced television 
journalists schooled in Western newsgathering procedures to report on routine 
foreign news in which, for the most part, China was not involved. After the 
                                                                                                                                                                        
television regulators. However, as of late 2017 CNC World was becalmed both visually and editorially 
at a very early stage of development: its news bulletins drew on agency footage and invisible, 




Westerners came an increasing number of other foreigners – TV journalists local to 
the countries from which they reported, and likewise retained on freelance contracts. 
The model [CCTV-News has] got for the foreign reporting is, we’ll hire good local 
talent, and that gives you that insider’s perspective on the story that is missing from 
the parachute journalism model as practised by, for example, CNN or the BBC – shoot 
Lyse Doucet or Anderson Cooper to every warzone...  Now, if you start to replace local 
knowledge with parachute journalism, which is effectively what you get if you replace 
the foreigners with Chinese on a foreign story, then you end up with something no 
different from BBC/CNN but not done as well, because [of] their language.  
(Former international employee at CCTV-News, CGPG10.) 
The localisation of news content and image, through the employment of journalists 
native to the countries from which they report, is not unique to CCTV-News: as 
explained later in this chapter, BBC World News is among several international 
television channels to take up the trend. The jury is out, in any case, on whether this is 
'glocalised' in the sense of  local elements feeding back into a truly global media 
product (Robertson 2012:205) or 'desi globalisation' (Thussu 2007:597) in which a 
foreign corporation acquires local characteristics and local expertise primarily to give 
it credibility with its target consumer base. 
Accurate audience figures for CCTV-News were impossible for outsiders to 
come by, and the target viewership appeared to be a mystery to newsroom 
journalists too. 
From the first day I was on the channel, there was mention of the target audience, but 
I never figured out who it is. (Former producer, CCTV-News: CGPC13.) 
I don’t know what our mission statement is – sorry, I’m not even aware of it. 
(International employee, CCTV-News: CGPG15.) 
 CCTV itself said in 2014 that the English channel could be seen in more than 85 
million homes across 100 countries, that it was in nearly 30 million households in the 
United States via cable, and that it was available to nearly 7.8 million people in Britain, 
France and Ireland on satellite (CCTV 2014). However, the figure of 85 million homes 
in 100 countries also featured in publicity material four years previously (CCTV 
2010).  The figures denoted in any case potential reach and not actual viewers. Nelson 
(2013:23) asserted, by extrapolating from channel availability nationwide, that most 
of CCTV’s English-speaking audience was actually in China. 
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 In addition to the expansion and revamping of its central programming 
steered from Beijing, CCTV News (English) began developing network centres 
overseas, which, unlike standard newsgathering bureaux, assumed editorial and 
broadcast responsibility for entire sections of the 24-hour schedule. CCTV Africa 
launched on 11 January 2012 in Nairobi, and CCTV America in Washington on 6 
February 2012 (Zhang 2013:83, CCTV 2014). Their missions are analysed in 3.4. 
3.3 BBC international TV news in English 
3.3.1 World Service Television News, 1991-95 
For all the assumptions in China that BBC World News TV is an instrument of state, 
the low-key launch on 11 March 1991 of what was then called World Service 
Television News was untouched by government funding – or indeed, virtually any 
kind of funding. To quote WSTVN’s managing editor, John Exelby, ‘We had no money, 
we had no staff, we had no studios... They said, we want you on the air with half an 
hour in the middle of March. We said, OK we’ll go for it’ (Hanrahan 2006). The launch 
staff for the initial daily half-hour programme for Europe consisted of twelve editors 
and producers (including this researcher), half from each of two ‘mutually suspicious 
newsrooms’ (Hanrahan ibid.) in World Service radio and domestic television. They 
worked long shifts in teams of just six. WSTVN was to become the first BBC 24-hour 
news operation, and the first BBC channel to carry commercial advertising. As at 
CCTV, what became the international news channel began with news bulletin inserts 
into a general channel. 
The launch of World Service Television News came five years after the first 
tentative run of piloting for a global television service. Again as with CCTV’s English 
news operation, at the BBC the spectre or perhaps example of CNN loomed large – 
indeed, Figenschou (2014:4) says WSTVN was ‘inspired by the CNN model’ after the 
latter’s much-praised coverage of the 1991 Gulf War. In fact the WSTVN team was 
already preparing for its launch when war broke out. The project for World Service 
Television News was supported by the managing director of the World Service, John 
Tusa, against ‘strong opposition from some at the highest levels of BBC management’ 
(Exelby 2006). In those days, the World Service was ‘frequently overlooked, under-
appreciated, even patronised’ (Tusa 2012) by the domestic BBC, and the channel’s 
improvised appearance – it went to air with a hand-painted world map as a backdrop 
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– did little to persuade some executives that it was there to stay. However, within 
months a deal in Asia meant an expansion to 80 staff, a new set, and output covering 
20 hours a day. 
The BBC’s marketing arm sought to promote the fledgling channel by linking it 
with its illustrious radio counterpart: a marketing video from 1992 speaks of WSTVN 
as ‘a World Service of unparalleled influence’. However, promotion of the BBC as the 
world’s most objective, trusted broadcaster did not serve WSTVN as well as might 
have been hoped. In 1993 Rupert Murdoch dropped the channel from Star TV Asia, 
which he had acquired for News Corporation, to mollify the Chinese leadership in 
Beijing who had complained about BBC output (Atkins 2002:123) and to introduce 
more commercial programming on the northern footprint of AsiaSat (White 
2005:200). WSTVN found other transmission deals and kept going around the clock – 
as one former senior employee put it, ‘mostly funded by sleight-of-hand by BBC 
Worldwide, Bush House [World Service] and domestic television’7.  Specially-shot 
news features apart, however, WSTVN bulletins were characterised by (and mocked 
within the corporation for) a surfeit of over-analytical telephone interviews and 
telephone-quality reporter tracks, and a shortage of on-the day news footage. 
3.3.2 Rebrand as BBC World/BBC World News, 1995-2008 
In 1995 the channel acquired a larger budget and a new name, BBC World, as it re-
launched with slicker production and new programmes designed to appeal to 
European opinion-formers. It started to gain recognition, including, belatedly, from 
other BBC journalists in London and abroad. Yet the BBC’s reputation for editorial 
independence still did not always sit comfortably with its commercial aims. The BBC’s 
original Arabic-language television channel was switched off abruptly by its backers, 
the Saudi-owned Orbit Television, in 1996 less than two years after it launched and at 
a cost of 150 jobs, after relations between Orbit and the BBC broke down over 
editorial freedom (Richardson 2005). Many of the BBC’s Arabic-speaking journalists 
then made redundant went on to found Al-Jazeera. 
BBC World was renamed BBC World News in 2008, by which time it had 
achieved more security both commercially and inside the corporation. Its main 
operation moved in 2013 from Television Centre in west London to the BBC’s new 
                                                        
7 Personal email communication, June 2015. 
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giant 24-hour multimedia newsroom in the basement of New Broadcasting House in 
London, a building that now houses all of the BBC’s London-based global news 
journalists including the World Service language sections. Several hours of BBC World 
News’ daily output is broadcast from studios in Washington and Singapore. 
3.3.3 Cuts, ‘bilinguals’ and glocal programming, 2008-16 and beyond 
Cuts prompted by the global economic crisis hit the BBC just as CCTV-News received 
the ‘going global’ funding boost that allowed it to broaden its reporting and establish 
its overseas network centres. At first glance BBC World News Television, as a 
commercial concern funded by subscription and advertising and operated by BBC 
Global News, might have been expected to be shielded from government austerity 
measures. However, World News TV is an organisational enigma: it exists inside a 
public service broadcaster paid for via the British state through the licence fee. In its 
early days, it also harboured journalists seconded from World Service radio, an 
institution then funded through the government’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
by grant-in-aid. Nowadays the journalistic staff of BBC World News TV are recruited 
in the same way as the BBC’s other global news journalists and can move to and from 
other news departments. Newsgathering for World News TV, in terms of both intake 
and output, is likewise part of the BBC’s overall news operation: World News TV both 
funds its own reports from the BBC’s correspondents and picks up material 
commissioned by other areas of news.  
The World Service was particularly badly hit by the cuts in spending, as was 
global newsgathering. These measures were significant for World News Television in 
that they diminished its reserves of foreign affairs expertise both in London and 
overseas. One of the BBC World Service executives who announced the cuts to staff, 
the controller of English, Craig Oliver, resigned a week later to become director of 
government communications for the prime minister, David Cameron (BBC News 
website 2011a). Separate, substantial reductions in the foreign newsgathering budget 
had the effect of concentrating reporting effort on fewer events with less individual 
tailoring for foreign or British audiences. 
The flipside of the cuts was new thinking about coping with constrained 
resources , encapsulated in the ‘Becoming More Global’ strategy for the corporation’s 
international services (Horrocks 2011). This involved incorporating the journalistic 
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effort from the BBC’s remaining vernacular language services into the general 
newsgathering operation, which had the effect of giving BBC World News TV a 
broader palette of stories beyond the remit of Western news agencies and a less 
British, more globally representative ‘look’. Part of the strategy involved encouraging 
‘bilingual’ journalism8 in which reporters for language services, stationed around the 
world, were trained to file for the English service as well.  According to Horrocks9, the 
rise of bilingual journalists reflected a multicultural, modern Britain, more open to 
world influence (in Higgins 2015:193). 
Resources were re-focused on specific sections of the market (Geniets 
2013:81), most notably Africa, where the BBC had long had substantial radio 
audiences. Among the initiatives stemming from this was the half-hour daily Focus on 
Africa, the television companion programme of the long-running World Service radio 
programme of the same name10. Focus on Africa was launched on BBC World News TV 
in June 2012, five months after CCTV’s Africa Live, to bring African news from African 
journalists to African (and global) viewers. The budget cuts came shortly before the 
co-siting of all the BBC’s London-based international journalists in the city centre in 
2012-13. The upheavals prompted an exodus of experienced, mainly British, global 
news staff but also opened up new areas of collaboration and co-commissioning in 
international news.  
In 2013, the BBC Director-General Tony Hall set the corporation the target of 
doubling its ‘global audience reach’ (an elliptical and potentially meaningless phrase) 
to half a billion people a week by 2022. The contribution made by BBC World News 
TV to that target was difficult to ascertain. The BBC said in 2017 that World News TV 
was ‘available’ in more than 200 countries and territories, more than 433 million 
households and 3 million hotel rooms (BBC Media Centre 2017a), but did not count 
actual viewers. 
The operating licence for the BBC World Service (BBC Trust 2016:1) says its 
editorial agenda ‘should provide a global perspective on the world, not one based 
upon any national or commercial interest’: while no similar document is available for 
                                                        
8 ‘Bilingual’ journalism was common practice for years on an ad hoc basis in global radio and television, 
without such high-profile managerial backing or resources. 
9 Interviewed, admittedly, before Britain voted to leave the European Union. 
10 To avoid confusion with its radio sibling and forerunner, the television programme will be referred 
to where necessary here as Focus on Africa TV. 
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BBC World News TV, the channel draws on the same newsgathering and staffing pool. 
In the mid-2000s, when the then director of BBC Global News, Richard Sambrook, 
called BBC News ‘objective’, his counterpart on the French channel France 24, Alain 
de Pouzilhac, described this as ‘bullshit. Nobody's objective. In international news 
you're linked with your religion, with your nation, with your education... you have to 
be honest, you have to be impartial, you have to be independent, but no one is 
objective.’ (Byrne 2007: online). Indeed, journalists from the BBC’s global news teams, 
interviewed for this research, described their values, variously, as ‘liberal’, 
‘democratic’ or ‘liberal-democratic’. However, one editor firmly denied that there was 
any ‘western agenda in the sense of a pro-western purpose’, while another referred to 
colleagues as ‘decent, intelligent people’ who were not driven by any specific political 
views.11  
Continued tweaking of state funding has made it difficult for the BBC to 
distance itself from the notion that the government meddles in its editorial affairs. 
Less than two years elapsed between the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee’s assertion that the Foreign Office had demonstrated ‘a greater 
detachment’ from the BBC World Service by not insisting that it start a Korean service 
(House of Commons 2014:9), and an unexpected $400m increase in World Service 
funding announced as part of the Strategic Defence and Security Review in 2015 for 
services in new languages including programming for North Korea (BBC News 
website 2015a: HM Government 2015:49).12 Higgins (2015:185) describes the BBC as 
'a crucial carrier of British identity... it is perhaps also the greatest British export 
brand, instantly associated with the UK and admired throughout the world.' 
Launching the expansion of language services, the BBC’s director-general Tony Hall 
concurred, mentioning global anxieties about fake news and calling the World Service 
‘one of the UK’s most important cultural exports’ (BBC Media Centre 2017b). These 
assertions do, however, bring BBC management into line with those spearheading the 
global expansion of Chinese television in at least one respect: that of believing that 
‘soft power’ can at least be arranged if not bought. 
                                                        
11 BBC interviews ref. BGPB37, BGPB41, BGPB42, BGMB40 and BGPB45 respectively. 
12 The BBC Korean news service was eventually launched in September 2017. 
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3.4 Into Africa and America 
CCTV’s Washington and Nairobi hubs were launched in 2012 to respond to very 
different needs. CCTV America sought to provide an alternative voice on world issues 
and to fill in gaps in coverage in the established Western media market (Liu 2014:32-
33), whereas in Africa China hoped to build influence and promote China-Africa 
relations (Li & Rønning 2013:118). Local journalistic recruitment in the network 
centres had changed the ‘face’ of CCTV-News: CCTV Africa was presented and 
reported almost exclusively by Africans, while CCTV America assumed a more global 
look with an American tinge and slick transatlantic production. As control passed 
from Beijing to Nairobi to Washington around the clock, CCTV-News mutated before 
the viewers’ eyes. 
BBC World News Television also offered regionalisation of programming for 
Africa and North America, but only in Africa was there significant glocalisation of 
appearance and content. BBC World News America consisted of three one-hour 
programmes on weekday evenings, Washington time (two programmes on Fridays) 
covering the main international and US news of the day: the lead presenter was the 
British journalist Katty Kay. In Africa, however, BBC Focus on Africa TV, although only 
30 minutes long, represented a departure from the BBC’s normal tone and aims in 
that it used primarily African reporters and presenters and drew on the corporation’s 
vernacular language services to enhance its palette of news. The following section 
looks at the two television channels’ African ambitions in more detail. 
3.4.1 Africa: experiment or exception? 
In essence, when CCTV-News and BBC World News launched their African daily 
programmes in 2012, they were both attempting to change the way in which events 
in that continent were reported to a global audience. They did this from opposite 
sides of the post-colonial divide. The BBC carried some of Britain’s ‘baggage of 
colonial domination’ (Mirchandani 2014:32) but profited also from its public 
diplomacy work. CCTV, meanwhile, was cleaving to Deng Xiaoping’s ‘three worlds’ 
theory, according to which China viewed Asians and Africans as emerging together 
from exploitation by colonial powers (Taylor 2006:43) – a reconfiguration of the 
world order with China at its heart.  
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 Although under the aegis of international rather than African broadcasters, 
Focus on Africa and Africa Live speak of challenging stereotypes of reporting on Africa. 
They are edited and produced separately from their channels’ world TV news in a 
conscious drive for a more ‘African’ narrative, and with good reason. Scholars from 
Hawk (1992) to Bunce (2015) have chronicled a history of distorted reporting of 
Africa by dominant Western, mainly US and British, news organisations. They accuse 
Western correspondents and ‘parachute journalists’ (reporters who fly in for short 
visits) of having helped reduce most news about the continent to a succession of wars, 
famines, coups and disease. Bunce points out that international news coverage has 
been changing: cuts in foreign news budgets in the West have prompted the 
replacement of many correspondents in Africa by local reporters. However, 
stereotypes are hard to erase, and the dehumanising colonialist depictions of African 
people in Conrad's Heart of Darkness (1902) have left a long shadow. In 2015 a China-
Africa specialist organised a petition to the American broadcaster CBS from 200 
writers and scholars, criticising it for repeatedly portraying Africans as victims 
devoid of agency and in need of salvation from the West (French 2015).  
Stereotyping of Africans is not unique to Western journalism: China's populist 
English-language daily newspaper, the Global Times, caused an outcry in July 2015 
with the publication of a cartoon marking President Obama's visit to East Africa by 
portraying him as a spear-carrying tribesman surveying a herd of camels (Liu 2015). 
More recently, CCTV’s 2018 lunar new year gala was pilloried abroad for featuring a 
Chinese actress wearing blackface and fake buttocks playing the part of an African 
woman (Wilkinson 2018). CCTV’s veteran English-language presenter Yang Rui 
ascribed this to racial ignorance in China rather than prejudice (CGTN 2018). 
CCTV’s operation in Nairobi had been small in scale until a visit in April 2011 
by Li Changchun, the party’s propaganda chief, turned it into the 'largest initiative of 
an international broadcaster on African soil' (Gagliardone 2013:30). CCTV’s Africa 
Live was launched in January 2012, tapping into China’s long political and 
developmental engagement with Africa as well as Beijing's investment strategy and 
need for the continent's resources. As CCTV expanded into Africa, China Radio 
International and the Xinhua news agency also enhanced their African presence, the 
English-language China Daily launched a weekly African edition, and China built 
telecommunications facilities in Africa and began training African journalists.  
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Wasserman et al. (2015:228) described China's deepening involvement in Africa's 
media environment as 'perhaps the most visible (and most controversial)' of all the 
transnational media flows between BRICS countries. 
By mid-2015 CCTV Africa provided twice-daily African news (Africa Live), a 
daily African-oriented business programme (under the Global Business banner), and 
weekly current affairs, features and specialist sports programming (Talk Africa, Faces 
of Africa and Match Point).13 The broadcasting centre in Nairobi, Kenya, was the first 
of CCTV’s network hubs outside China to begin operations. By mid-2016, 90% of 
CCTV Africa's staff were non-Chinese, mainly African: the 10% who were Chinese 
were mostly in managerial positions.14 At the BBC, Focus on Africa TV, launched in 
June 2012, brought together journalists from BBC World News TV and the 
corporation’s African Service at its London headquarters and throughout Africa. The 
half-hour, weekday TV programme, broadcast from London, built on the longstanding 
success of its World Service radio namesake and the BBC’s traditionally strong 
African audience. The BBC estimated in 2016 that its global news services reached 
111 million people a week in Africa, then making up more than a third of the total 
projected global audience for the BBC's news services (BBC Media Centre 2016).15 
There are no comparable figures for CCTV Africa. 
Early scholarly impressions of CCTV Africa's journalism were mixed. Some 
observers detected a lack of clarity about its intended audience, noting that 
programme framing depicted Africa as an exotic 'other' (Gorfinkel et al. 2014).  Zhu 
pointed out that CCTV had ‘yet to be the international authority on China, let alone... 
on world affairs' (2012:194), whereas Gagliardone (2013:26) argued that China was 
attempting to address negative perceptions of its media by offering comprehensive 
coverage of a different agenda in Africa, rather than through accurate reporting of 
China itself. Content analysis of CCTV’s overall African output (Zhang 2013:99) 
indicated that it was diverging somewhat from standard Chinese editorial practices, 
perhaps as part of an experimental alternative international discourse. Chapter 7 
tests these observations through broader comparative content analysis.  
                                                        
13 After the switch to CGTN at the end of 2016, Nairobi also supplied a daily live insert into the tri-
location news programme, The Link. 
14 Interview with CCTV Africa’s managing editor (ref. CAMC35). 
15 The figure for Africa comprised BBC World News TV, BBC World Service, bbc.com and the activities 
of the corporation's international development arm, BBC Media Action. 
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3.4.2 CCTV’s Washington operation 
There is a less compelling case to be made for CCTV's foray into American news than 
for its operation in Nairobi. Al Jazeera America notably failed to make its mark on US 
audiences, lasting less than 3 years and closing in 2016. Even the BBC, which has a 
well-developed market for general television output in North America, accords the US 
just a daily rolling one-hour programme of news on World News TV. At CCTV, 
managers did not heed the production consultant John Terenzio's advice to capitalise 
on content about China rather than international news: CCTV set about building its 
Washington network centre and went on air there a month after CCTV Africa in 
February 2012. Employing the same initial strategy as in Nairobi, CCTV America 
acquired instant expertise by buying up established journalists with experience of the 
region.  
From its initial one hour a day of broadcasting, CCTV America expanded to five 
hours a day by mid-2014 (Liu 2014:5), taking over responsibility for CCTV-News 
output during much of the Chinese night and providing a mixture of general news 
bulletins, business news, cultural and talk shows. The Washington hub, which staff 
referred to as 'DC', is larger than the Nairobi operation, employing between 150 and 
300 people by 2014 (CCTV 2014, Liu 2014:7).16 Some 70 per cent of staff at this stage 
were non-Chinese (Nelson 2013:10), including a sizeable number of Anglo-American 
reporters. New recruits included five former BBC Latin America correspondents and 
stringers17. 
They'd plucked us all from Latin America: none of us had ever met the bosses. None of 
us knew what we were feeding into. People from CNN, Al Jazeera, Beijing, all of us 
with different ways of working. And I think the service that you see suffers as a result 
– it doesn't have a clear identity… It looks a bit like CNN, a bit like the BBC. 
(Former CCTV America correspondent, ref. CGFG05) 
Indeed, it was not altogether clear whether CCTV America was broadcasting 
primarily to US or Latin American audiences, or how it aimed to fulfil its objective of 
pushing back against Western news agendas having employed so many Western 
journalists. Initial content analysis revealed that the Washington hub tended to 
prioritise international news while giving sensitive China stories, where possible, 
                                                        
16 It is unclear whether the figures refer to the Washington newsroom or the entire operation including 
management and correspondents, which could account for the discrepancy. 
17 Stephen Gibbs, Daniel Schweimler, Michael Voss, Dan Collyns and Paulo Cabral. 
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only cursory attention. In a study of CCTV America, Liu noted that the presence of 
conflicting statist and neoliberal news narratives gave the channel an 'ambivalent 
position' in the global media system which mirrored internal political and ideological 
tensions in China itself (2014:30). Xie and Boyd-Barrett (2015:77) concluded that 
reliance on western news sources hobbled CCTV America’s wish to carve out a 
distinctive agenda, and that the channel’s heavy recruitment of Western journalists 
implied a degree of acceptance of Anglo-American journalistic standards.  
Interviewed for this research, a senior Chinese journalist at CCTV America18 
stressed that the channel had a distinctive character in that it emphasised under-
reported regions of the world, with more than 40 correspondents across Central and 
South America. The journalist also pointed out that CCTV America had been 
recognised internationally for its reporting. Its output won three awards at the New 
York Festivals international TV and film awards, in 2015, 2016 and 2017, and a 
feature in the CCTV America strand Full Frame won an Emmy in 2016. Production 
standards in Washington have been regarded with envy by many employees in 
CCTV's English newsroom in Beijing, but a senior editorial figure19 denied that the 
Washington output was journalistically influential.  
3.4.3 Postscript on CCTV’s global Anglophone ambitions 
Half a decade after the initial 'going-out' expansion of CCTV-News and the opening of 
network centres in Nairobi and Washington, there were signs that CCTV's overseas 
growth might have slowed: the conversion of the London operation into a 
Mandarin/English broadcast centre, planned for late 2014, was still in preparation 
more than three years later. Initially, between three and six Anglophone overseas 
broadcast centres were reportedly envisaged (Branigan 2011; Garrahan & Hille 
2011). It was inferred from conversations with CCTV staff that the ‘going-out’ project 
had not advanced significantly in Xi Jinping’s first five-year term, during which the 
Chinese leadership had focused on tackling corruption and the economic slowdown.  
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has described how CCTV’s Anglophone news gradually acquired Anglo-
American presentation styles and staffing while remaining ideologically close to its 
                                                        
18 Interview ref. CGFC18. 
19 Interview ref. CCFC07. 
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parent Mandarin station, at least where news about China was concerned. In Britain, 
the BBC’s international TV news channel rose from underfunded and inauspicious 
beginnings to a position of global prominence alongside CNN. While CCTV-News and 
BBC World News retain characteristics of their respective nations, both are 
increasingly employing journalists from other countries in an attempt to make their 
output regionally more relevant. However, non-Chinese correspondents at CCTV-
News report, almost without exception, only on events outside China. The state 
funding that enabled Chinese media to ‘go out’ into the world and make China’s voice 
heard after the 2008 Beijing Olympics came just as BBC News suffered a series of cuts 
prompted by the global financial crisis. Despite their unequal resources, CCTV-News 
and BBC World News both launched specialist daily news programmes for Africa in 
2012 featuring journalists recruited specifically from the continent. The intention of 
the programme teams was to smash stereotypes and change Africa’s international 
image by featuring Africans telling their own stories. Having said this, overall 
editorial control remained firmly with two national broadcasters from outside Africa.  
The scope of CCTV's foreign-language ambitions is too extensive for a single 
piece of research, even one that focuses only on 'hard news' output. This work 
therefore does not attempt to evaluate in any great detail CCTV's Anglophone news 
from Washington or that of its global reporters outside China and Africa. The focus 
here is on the aspects of news coverage where the difference from Western channels 
in the message that CCTV is trying to spread is most pronounced – namely, in its 





4 Comparing news across cultures: methodology and methods 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Truth and facts 
At the heart of this chapter is the half-serious journalistic maxim, 'Don't let the facts 
get in the way of a good story'. Journalism, as its practitioners readily admit, strives to 
present both facts and 'good stories', and people turn to news hoping to discover facts 
along with a diverting yarn. News organisations gain in stature if they are perceived 
to provide reliable facts, a practice popularly equated with 'telling the truth', and 
governments may hope that what they view as 'soft power' associated with a well-
regarded national news provider rubs off on them. Yet any desire to measure 'truth' 
in news presents the researcher with a metaphysical problem. The question of what 
makes a 'good' story is equally fraught with caveats and value judgements. Even the 
identity of the author of the quotation at the beginning of this paragraph is contested. 
Facts and storytelling are the basis of journalism, yet there is no single effective way 
of analysing both.  
 The ontological standpoint of this research project, critical realism, is 
technically at variance with its epistemological position, social constructivism. The 
research does not deal head-on with the nature of 'truth', but attempts, through 
comparative study of the output of BBC World News TV and CCTV-News, to 
investigate how 'facts' in news are presented and manipulated. Taking a sequential 
mixed methods approach, it employs both quantitative content analysis and a 
qualitative interpretation of frame analysis, along with interviews with practitioners. 
It adds two new categories to an established generic North European news framing 
‘framework’ in an attempt to detect specifically Chinese values in the media texts 
being studied. Finally, it draws out further cultural and professional commonalities 
and differences through an experimental method in which Chinese and British 
journalists edit one another's television scripts. The rationale behind the choice of 
approaches will be explained in this chapter. 
 News texts, comprising both scripts and visual material, are at the heart of the 
project, but interaction with the journalists being studied is also vital. This raises 
ethical issues which are elaborated upon in this chapter. The position of the 
researcher herself is clarified, in relation both to the participants and to her 
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professional background as an experienced former (and relatively recent) BBC world 
news journalist. Details of the data generated in this research are also presented, 
including how they were chosen, gathered, stored, verified and analysed.  
4.1.2 Research Aims 
This research project compares the English-language international news output of the 
Chinese state broadcaster, CCTV, and BBC World News Television. Its theoretical 
perspective is derived from the nature of the material it investigates: news. News is 
partly an account of incontrovertible facts: the Twin Towers of the World Trade 
Centre are no longer standing, the Soviet Union has ceased to exist, and much of 
Indonesia was in darkness on 9 March 2016 during a total solar eclipse. How that 
news is reported, however, is always less than a complete account of what happened. 
'Facts' are selected, framed, ignored or sometimes misrepresented. The two research 
questions are:  
RQ1: Did CCTV's English-language news output 2014-16 resemble news as it is 
understood in the Anglophone world – and if not, what were the main differences and 
how can it be described? 
RQ2: Did CCTV-News cover Chinese and African news in a similar fashion to BBC 
World News TV in this period – and if not, how could the differences be explained? 
4.2 Theoretical Perspective 
This research has been conducted from a social constructivist perspective but is 
ontologically rooted in critical realism. That is to say, it is informed by a relativist 
view of how knowledge is built, while accepting that there is also a world 
independent of human perception. This duality is reflected in the research methods. 
Comparative quantitative content analysis performed a subsidiary scoping function 
with no attempt to test hypotheses: it was simply an attempt to collect data about 
each broadcaster's conception of news. After this, as a main method, the framing of 
selected news was investigated qualitatively and followed up with semi-structured 
interviews. These methods aimed to build an interpretivist understanding of how and 
why the news from the two broadcasters ended up as it did. 
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4.2.1 Ontological position 
It would not be possible to carry out research on what journalists describe as 'hard 
news' – day-to-day, moment-by-moment events – without reflecting on what 
constitutes reality.  A researcher must declare a stance on whether reality can be said 
to exist and, if it does, to what extent it can be described. In A Realist Theory of Science, 
Roy Bhaskar makes the link between perception and reality, arguing that humans can 
only interpret that which exists independently in the first place. In a reference to two 
celebrated astronomers in Hanson’s Patterns of Discovery, Bhaskar writes (2008:21): 
‘For Kepler to see the rim of the earth drop away, while Tycho Brahe watches the sun 
rise, we must suppose that there is something that they both see (in different ways).’  
Maxwell and Mittapalli (2010:150) argue that, in accepting that alternative 
accounts of a phenomenon are possible, Bhaskar’s critical realism is consistent with a 
constructivist epistemological stance in which ‘all knowledge is partial, incomplete, 
and fallible.’  This is echoed by Madill et al. (2000:3), for whom critical realism 
‘admits an inherent subjectivity in the production of knowledge.' Bhaskar's critical 
realism is also useful for the study of news content in that, in its separation of events 
from experiences, it encompasses the possibility of 'a world of events without 
experiences' (Bhaskar 2008:22). This could refer to news that for a variety of reasons 
goes unreported: the absence as well as the presence of information. 
4.2.2 Epistemological position 
While much (though not all) news is founded on some physical reality as outlined 
above, news 'values' are not. When editors in broadcast news organisations decide 
what to include, omit and emphasise in their programmes, they are defining what 
they consider to be valid knowledge. Epistemologically, therefore, the study of news 
content lends itself in general to a social constructivist standpoint. This views 
knowledge, and indeed the social world, as constructed subjectively by humans 
through interaction, interpretation and actions which over time become 
institutionalised (Berger & Luckmann 1966:13, Hammersley 1992:44, Lincoln et al. 
2011:101). These ideas and values are then passed on to subsequent generations, 
divorced from the context in which they were created, becoming fixed notions about 
how things 'are', at least in that specific culture.  
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A constructivist epistemological approach is appropriate when comparing 
news cultures in different parts of the world. National news media in Britain and 
China are by their very definition products of their specific societies and values.  
When Berger and Luckmann point out that people can inhabit and maintain 'symbolic 
universes' that protect institutional order without feeling the need to reflect on the 
meaning of such constructs (1966:122), they are creating the conditions under which 
diverse standpoints can flourish, which the journalists from those cultures will 
consider to have been arrived at dispassionately. 
Social constructivism covers not only the perspective of the investigation but 
also how this research project is conducted. However realistically a researcher aims 
to represent the subjects of study, worlds of lived experience can best be understood 
in a relativist manner through the viewpoints of those who inhabit them 
(Hammersley 1992:46-47, Lincoln et al. 2011:102). If taken to its furthest extreme, a 
social constructivist approach could result in as many different versions of 
constructivism as there are researchers, with relativist research having meaning only 
for the researcher who carried it out. Burr (1995:86), however, reveals the illogicality 
of an extreme relativist position that insists that things exist only through discourse: 
she points out that this would end up denying agency to individuals, as they would 
essentially be products of language themselves (ibid.:89). More pragmatic positions 
include Hammersley's 'subtle realism' (1992:52), in which scholars accept that they 
are investigating independent phenomena but admit at the same time that they can 
be viewed only through a prism that is culturally formed. The element of human 
participation in this research is explored in section 4.7.   
The fusion of critical realism and social constructivism is mirrored in the 
mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods in the research design – a 
combination that is necessary if the research questions are to be answered fully. The 
following section examines the 'paradigm wars' (Maxwell & Mittapalli 2010:146) that 
have made integrating qualitative and quantitative methods theoretically problematic, 
and sets out how and why both can or should be used. 
4.2.3 The qualitative-quantitative divide 
Qualitative and quantitative methods are not as distinct as they may seem. The 
debate about their degree of separation and philosophical basis has lasted half a 
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century (Mackenzie & Knipe 2006). It is undeniable that certain research methods 
have links with ontological and epistemological assumptions, for example about the 
status of statistically-acquired ‘knowledge’ about the world (Maxwell & Mittapalli 
2010:146). Traditional theoretical consistency would be achieved by linking a 
relativist ontological position with a constructivist epistemological stance (Lincoln et 
al. 2011:100), giving rise to qualitative methods of enquiry, or by yoking a realist 
theoretical framework to quantitative methods of data-collection and analysis. This is 
not always the case, and it does not apply to this project.  
History, if not traditional practice, is on the side of a mixture of methods. 
Fieldwork in the social sciences in the early 1900s was multi-method (Hunter & 
Brewer 2015:617-8), diversifying only later into specialist quantitative and 
qualitative approaches, and with no single paradigm having an irrefutable claim to 
the ownership of specific real-world observations or data. Researchers in the social 
sciences are not locked forever into one theoretical standpoint: Clough & Nutbrown 
(2012:21) say they 'adopt research stances as they are appropriate to our work', 
indicating that methods can be regarded as specific tools for a specific job. 
The idea of mixed methods as a research design in its own right with attendant 
philosophical assumptions (Creswell & Plano Clark 2011:5) has gained traction in the 
academy (Morgan 2014) but is not universally welcomed. Symonds and Gorard 
(2010:125,133), for instance, argue that the mixed methods design routinely adopts 
qualitative and quantitative approaches for certain types of data and processes, 
thereby endorsing the very separation that 'mixed methods' as a concept appeared to 
reject. Morgan favours linking mixed methods paradigmatically with pragmatism, in 
which action is the central concept and 'the meaning of actions and beliefs is found in 
their consequences' (2014:25-6). The pragmatic approach emphasises and 
interrogates experience rather than reality, and the outcomes of action rather than 
the nature of truth. It does not address the dual nature of news as a repository of both 
facts and 'spin' and is therefore unsuited to this particular research project.  
Other academic work supports the notion of a blurred distinction between 
qualitative and quantitative approaches that enables them to be used more creatively 
and non-paradigmatically. The research design for this project draws on these 
conclusions.  Qualitative and quantitative methods do not necessarily have to be 
divided cleanly according to whether they deal with words or numbers (Miles & 
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Huberman 1994:1). Qualitative researchers make quantitative assumptions when 
they use words such as 'generally' and 'sometimes' (Hammersley 1992:161). 
Symonds & Gorard term this 'disguised' numeric references (2010:127) and point out 
that, in turn, numerical data can be analysed thematically. Hammersley adds that 
social scientists should be only as precise as they need to be, which will rarely be to 
the sixth decimal place.  
Mixed methods are widely viewed as helpful in triangulating data and 
producing rounded and strengthened outcomes from dual or multiple approaches 
(Creswell & Plano Clark 2011:5, Hunter & Brewer op.cit.:622, Symonds & Gorard 
2010:129). These involve the evaluation of qualitative and quantitative methods in 
what Blumler and Gurevitch describe as a spirit of 'critical pluralism' (1987:20). If a 
blurred distinction between approaches is employed, multiple paradigms can be 
linked in different stages of the research design (Creswell 2011:275). A qualitative 
supplement to quantitative analysis can render data more sensitive to hidden 
meanings (Jensen 2012:2). Bryman (2008:592) cites an instance in which 
quantitative content analysis helped delineate the social construction of breast cancer 
– a theme that would generally be associated with a qualitative approach – by putting 
a percentage figure on women aged under 50 who were featured in photographs and 
case studies. Equally, data analysis software such as NVivo can inject a small degree of 
quantification into qualitative findings through the grouping of similar utterances or 
happenings under coding nodes. Limited quantification can combat anecdotalism in 
qualitative research (Bryman op.cit.:598), giving readers more idea of how often a 
certain phenomenon occurs than would be the case if a single direct quotation were 
used. Serendipitous discoveries through one research method can prompt the 
generation or extension of theory through another (Hunter & Brewer op.cit.:620). The 
research design of this particular project was influenced by precisely such a discovery, 
as the next section of this chapter explains. 
4.3 Research Design 
Multiple methods were always envisaged for this project, although it began with only 
one. The research topic was relatively new: the post-Olympics expansion of CCTV-
News had not started to take shape until 2012, when its overseas network centres in 
Nairobi and Washington went live. Exploratory 'scoping' work was therefore deemed 
appropriate before any further decisions on the research design.  
69 
 
4.3.1 Exploratory beginnings 
As the research questions (4.1.2) dealt with news content and comparison, 
comparative quantitative content analysis of the news bulletins of CCTV-News and 
BBC World News TV was piloted at an early stage. The approach was open-ended, 
inductive and descriptive (Babbie 2013:90-92): the aim was to establish patterns. To 
analyse the news output of all three CCTV Anglophone network centres would have 
been too great a task in the time available, so attention was focused on world news 
bulletins produced at the BBC’s headquarters in London and CCTV’s in Beijing. 
However, as both CCTV and the BBC had launched TV news programmes for Africa in 
2012, content from these programmes was also analysed. The African data would add 
depth to the evaluation of CCTV-News as a vehicle for China’s ‘soft power’, and would 
indicate whether the Chinese broadcaster’s editorial values were uniform across the 
output. Figenschou’s quantitative analysis of news content at Al Jazeera (2010) 
indicates that this method is effective in revealing editorial priorities in topics, 
regions and source selection. 
It was always assumed that a second, more qualitative, method of textual 
analysis would be necessary: since both critical realists and constructivists admit that 
acquired knowledge is fallible, triangulation and multiple methods were the best fit 
for the research design. This approach was adopted by the Glasgow Media Group in 
its work on British television news, in which it added depth to its quantitative 
analysis through detailed qualitative discourse work. The GMG also analysed 
audience responses, which this research does not: firstly, it was felt that viewers 
might react unfavourably to the idea of a state broadcaster before watching CCTV’s 
output, thus prejudicing the outcome, and secondly, given the lack of public audience 
research into CCTV-News, it was not clear what a representative audience would be. 
The nature of the second method became clear only after a serendipitous 
discovery during the piloting of the quantitative content analysis – namely, that the 
share of CCTV-News' African bulletins occupied by South Sudan in the pilot period 
was three times as great as in the BBC's African programme. This gave rise to more 
detailed evaluation of the coverage of the civil war in South Sudan, which revealed 
that CCTV's news was primarily about mediation and solutions, whereas the BBC's 
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was broadly about the fighting1. These substantially different approaches to the same 
news events suggested that frame analysis was suitable as the main qualitative 
method for this study. Questions arising from the quantitative content and frame 
analysis could then be put to journalists from the two organisations during interviews.  
As discussed in more detail in 4.5, frame analysis can encompass elements of 
discourse analysis without the latter being employed as a main method. Discourse 
analysis is a powerful tool but it can be used here only with caution because of the 
increasingly globalised nature of the staffing at CCTV-News and the BBC's world-
facing news outlets. While some non-native English-speakers are lexically and 
semantically just as punctilious as their native Anglophone colleagues (sometimes 
more so), the majority are not, and their 'news vocabulary' is relatively narrow. This 
trait is exacerbated by the widespread use of Western news agencies at both BBC 
World News and CCTV-News: in some instances it cannot be clear whether a word 
has been chosen independently by the journalist or via 'copy-and-paste' from agency 
material. Furthermore, language is – in both senses – only part of the picture here: 
words and images act as 'simultaneous signifiers' which 'modify or reinforce each 
other's signification' (Hartley 1982:31). Assertions can sometimes be difficult to 
substantiate or contextualise without recourse to information external to the text 
(Philo 2007:187). Critical discourse analysis would nonetheless be appropriate if the 
primary purpose of this thesis was to interrogate the construction of hegemony, but 
its main aim is to compare journalistic products and principles. 
Ethnographic observation in newsrooms was also excluded from the research 
design. Since the late 1970s, when a wave of landmark ethnographic studies 
illuminated news practices (Gans 1979, Schlesinger 1978, Tuchman 1978), 
researchers have tended to spend less and less time in newsrooms before writing up 
their findings, possibly in part because increasing commercialisation has prompted 
institutional caution about the presence of researchers (Ryfe 2016). Newsroom 
ethnography is too intensive a method for deployment in short- to medium-term 
comparative study. Jirik's analysis of the early days of CCTV's English news service 
(2008) benefited from his long-term immersion as a newsroom employee, and was 
confined to a single organisation.  
                                                        
1 Explained in full in 7.3.1. 
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The theoretical discussion here should not obscure the actual material being 
analysed. The research questions urge reflection on whether the programmes being 
studied contain news or something else: therefore, it is imperative not to shrink from 
saying if the content is factually wrong or incomplete. In this thesis there are 
occasions on which two completely different accounts of an event stand as 'news' in 
their own right, but this is not always the case. It is not enough to describe such 
reports as a certain 'discourse' or way of seeing the world if there are weaknesses in 
the journalism or important omissions in the narrative – an attitude described by 
Philo as 'a form of intellectual quiescence' (2007:195). A comparative approach 
provides the best chance of highlighting editorial failings with scientific rigour. 
4.3.2 Sequential mixed methods 
Kaplan (1964:55-57) divides the nature of scientific measurement into three 
categories – things that can be observed directly; 'indirect observables' such as 
extracts from interviews or documents; and constructs, which are theoretical 
creations. These three categories correspond to the three methods used throughout 
this research: quantitative content analysis, interviews and frame analysis 
respectively. They are combined here in a qualitatively-driven sequential mixed 
methods design that contains both probability and purposive sampling, as shown in 
Figure 4-1. 
Sequential mixed methods, as a research design, are separate methods with 
closely-linked purposes (Morgan 2014:10). The quantitative content analysis reveals 
the topics and areas covered by the two news organisations and establishes how 
these coincide or differ. The function of the quantitative analysis here is to ask 
subsidiary questions that help clarify or elaborate on the main research questions 
(Hesse-Biber et al. 2015:6). The frame analysis, which is the principal method, reveals 
how topics and events are covered in relation to a generic 'framework of frames' 
encompassing issues such as attribution of responsibility and human interest, 
potentially highlighting different conceptions of news and news values. Comparing 
the independent datasets from these two methods gives a more rounded 
understanding (Hesse-Biber et al. ibid.:8) of how the news ended up as it did. The 
interviews, as a subsidiary qualitative method, cover professional and structural 
issues in news-making and elaborate on discoveries from the content analysis, 
providing triangulation. The iterative nature of the research process can also be seen 
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in Figure 4-1. The mixture of qualitative and quantitative processes is reflected not 
only in the gathering of data but also in the analysis, as the sections dealing with each 
method in detail explain. 
Figure 4-1 Simplified diagram of theoretical framework, showing iterative application of methods and 
information flow. Main method in capital letters. 
 
The research design has limitations. The integration of multiple methods can 
be lengthy and problematic, and the addition of a method does not automatically lead 
to new theoretical insights (Hall & Preissle 2015:368). Television news is to a great 
extent resource-driven, meaning coverage can be episodic, so the outcome of any 
sampled analysis cannot be viewed as completely generalisable. Finally, there is a risk 
with content analysis that, in creating the research design, an investigator might 
‘impose a meaning system rather than discovering it in the content’ (McQuail 
2010:363), although it is possible to guard against this by adopting and then adapting 
other scholars' models. 
4.3.3 Acquiring the material 
CCTV-News is available free-to-air in the UK by satellite and can be recorded from a 
satbox. BBC World News TV is not intended for UK viewers because it is part of a 
commercial enterprise not covered by the licence fee, but it is available on satellite in 
Europe (although not in UK-specific transponder bandwidths). At the time of the 
content analysis, BBC World News was also live-streamed on the internet through the 
subscription service, Livestation. The researcher subscribed to Livestation 
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throughout the study period and also recorded BBC World News direct by satellite in 
Ireland. The UK night-time output of BBC World News, including the breakfast-time 
programme for Asian viewers, Newsday, was also broadcast on the UK-facing BBC 
News Channel. This was available on Freeview, and was duly recorded and used. 
Because of her long BBC career, the researcher was granted access to the BBC 
newsroom in London when needed and interviews with BBC journalists were on the 
whole unproblematic to arrange, although one senior editor in particular was elusive. 
In Beijing, by contrast, the researcher was told at an early stage by a CCTV-News 
editor, or 主编 zhubian, that she would not be granted access to CCTV-News in the 
Chinese capital and that CCTV managers would do nothing to help. What had been 
possible two years earlier (in 2012), she was given to understand, was not possible 
any longer. Contacts at CCTV in Beijing were therefore made unofficially via the 
'snowball' method2. These strictures did not apply at CCTV Africa in Nairobi, where 
managers and journalists co-operated readily with requests for interviews. 
4.3.4 A note about cross-editing 
The search for comparative analytical methods that would allow journalistic as well 
as academic evaluation of news material led the researcher to invent a method of 
content analysis: ‘cross-editing’. In this experiment, a small number of journalist 
volunteers drawn from the two news organisations were asked to edit news scripts 
generated by the outlet they did not work for, as if preparing them for broadcast on 
their own station. Cross-editing was carried out individually rather than as groups, 
replicating the editing procedure in broadcast newsrooms. The method was 
experimental and required detailed piloting and subsequent amendments. It was also 
very labour-intensive, both in terms of cross-editors’ time and in assembling the 
personnel in the first place. The results, however, produced a comparative view of the 
material from inside the editorial process rather than an external academic 
evaluation, thereby aiding triangulation. Insights unique to this method were also 
revealed. A detailed account of the evolution and application of cross-editing, along 
with the results that complement or extend those arrived at by more conventional 
methods, appear as a separate chapter. 
                                                        
2 Details in 4.6.1. 
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4.4 Quantitative content analysis 
Riffe et al. (2014:3) describe quantitative content analysis as 'the systematic 
assignment of communication content to categories according to rules, and the 
analysis of relationships involving those categories using statistical methods.' While 
the first part of their definition is an accurate description of the content analysis for 
this project, the relationships between variables referred to in the second part are in 
this instance mainly external and comparative.  
In her discourse analysis of CCTV Africa programmes, Zhang (2013:83) 
compiles three constructed weeks of content (i.e. with all days of the week equally 
represented) by sampling every fifth day of output. The principle of constructed 
weeks was retained here but the sampling frequency was shortened to every third 
day: this was sufficient to reflect the 'churn' of content, as only the biggest news 
events run for more than two days in the fickle and episodic world of television news. 
As a pilot exercise, from 12-30 January 2014, one world news programme and one 
African news programme each from CCTV-News and BBC World News were recorded 
on the same day, every third day, until one constructed week had been created. After 
amendments to the codebook as detailed in 4.4.2, two more constructed weeks were 
recorded between 15 May and 23 June 2014, and another two between 31 January 
and 10 March 2016. The dates were chosen randomly by submitting a three-month 
date range to an online date-generator. The two-year gap between first and last 
offered a limited longitudinal comparison. The programmes analysed were: 
CCTV global news: for the 2014 analyses, News Update: 30 minutes at 1600 GMT 
daily. For the 2016 analysis, News Desk: (which replaced News Update in a relaunch 
that accompanied the move to a new building in late 2014): 30 minutes at 1500 GMT 
daily.  
CCTV African news: Africa Live: 60 minutes on weekdays, 30 minutes at weekends,  
1700 GMT daily.  
BBC global news: for the January 2014 pilot, World News: 30 minutes at 1700 GMT 
daily. For the May-June 2014 and the 2016 analyses (because the 1700 World News 
disappeared in a schedule change), Impact: 60 minutes at 1300 GMT on weekdays, of 
which the first 30 minutes was used3. At weekends the 1400 GMT 30-minute World 
News bulletin was sampled. 
BBC African news: Focus on Africa TV: 30 minutes at 1730 GMT on weekdays. 
                                                        
3 The switch to BBC Impact also provided more China news as the programme focused on Asia. During 
analysis, however, the last 30 minutes of each hourly programme was discarded in order to 
concentrate on the ‘hard news’ section. While this risked omitting interesting down-programme items, 
it was deemed less disruptive than including the back half-hour’s trademark discursive packages and 
lengthy interviews that would have distended the overall sample. 
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4.4.1 Codebook construction 
This section outlines the range of variables that became the quantitative codebook for 
the project as a result of piloting in January 2014.4 The first tranche of quantitative 
content analysis as piloted was over-ambitious, both in the complexity of categories 
to be analysed and in the range of programmes and outlets to be covered. The 
amendments made as a result of the pilot are detailed in section 4.4.2. 
The technique used in the quantitative content analysis was systematic 
stratified random sampling (Teddlie & Yu 2007:79). The analysis was intended to 
investigate manifest or surface content (Babbie 2013:310) rather than any 
underlying meaning, and the unit of analysis was the news story. Each unit of analysis 
included the presenter’s introduction and any subsequent video report, narration or 
caption material until the camera returned to the presenter. All units were timed. The 
aim was to generate data that were valid and replicable (Neuendorf 2002), attributes 
that could be tested through co-coding. The third traditional expectation of 
quantitative content analysis, that data be generalisable, is less applicable because of 
the ever-changing agenda and deployments of news. 
The construction of the content analysis grid was based loosely on Jirik's 
'survey of content' of CCTV's English news output (2008:155), although he derived 
his data from scripts and running-orders rather than from programmes as broadcast 
including video. Headlines and trailers were not included. Discrete business and 
sports slots were disregarded because, as specialist sections, they skewed the 
sampling of 'hard' news.  Jirik counted people who were 'referred to' (2008:183) in a 
news item as well as those who spoke: this has not been attempted here. Jirik did not 
attempt to quantify deployment of reporters or proximity to the story, which is part 
of this analysis. Otherwise, significant coding categories included: 
1. the countries or regions of the world covered by a news item (UN definitions); 
2. the topic of the item. 17 initial categories chosen by the researcher were combined 
into seven for analysis, as shown in Table 4-1.  
3. how the news was presented (reporter package, live interview, presenter-read 
narrative under pictures) and whether the reporter was demonstrably at the scene of 
the story, or in a bureau or the newsroom; 
4. the specificity of the video used – whether it was on-the-day material or library/file; 
                                                        
4 The full codebook is in Appendix 4A. 
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5. the nature of those chosen to speak in the report, whether official, other ‘elite’ such as 
academics or experts, or members of the public; and  
6. whether China was mentioned in the report: this was to permit subsequent 
qualitative analysis. 
Table 4-1 Content analysis - refinement of topic categories 
2014 PILOT CATEGORIES AMENDED CATEGORIES 
Security, war, insurgency, serious civil 
disorder 
Security, war, insurgency, serious civil 
disorder 
Global politics 
Politics, summits, elections, political 
opposition, demonstrations (but not riots) 
Government or ruling party, elections 
Political opposition, dissent 
Economy, business, trade 
Economy, aid, development Development, aid 
Migration 
Society, health (not epidemics) 
Society, crime 
Crime, legal 
Accidents, disasters, epidemics Accidents, disasters, epidemics 
Environment, weather (not disasters) 
Environment, science, medicine, nature 
Science, technology, nature, space 
Religion, ideology 
Culture, sport, religion, offbeat 
Sport 
Culture (high art) 
Celebrity, mass entertainment, internet 
Offbeat 
 
4.4.2 Piloting and amendments 
The initial aim was to analyse not only the CCTV-News and BBC World News bulletins, 
but also those of CNC-World and BBC World Service radio, and to tabulate front-page 
data from BBC News Online and Xinhua. This quickly proved unnecessary, and 
unworkable in terms of volume. The other media sources were included as a type of 
control group in order to establish whether BBC World News and CCTV-News had 
omitted important news developments and to assess timeliness of the news. However, 
they over-complicated the straight comparison without adding significant value. 
Timeliness could be measured by a simple online search but did not, in any case, 
appear to deliver useful findings. The data field was therefore refined to cover only 
CCTV-News and BBC World News TV. Other categories eliminated after piloting and 
initial co-coding included the number of viewpoints reflected in the story and the 
source of the first line of the news item, both of which proved too difficult for co-
coders to quantify. Also abandoned were coding categories aimed at evaluating 
whether coverage of the West, China and Japan was positive, negative or neutral, 
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because they were qualitative and very subjective in nature. The data from the pilot 
were re-coded to align with the new codebook. 
The BBC World News 1700 GMT bulletin contained virtually no news about 
China, resulting in insufficient data to answer RQ2. Target audiences for BBC world 
news bulletins change throughout the day: the main outlets for Asian news were the 
0000-0100 GMT Asian morning programme, Newsday, and the 1300-1430 GMT 
programme, Impact. The next tranche of content analysis in May-June 2014 included 
the first edition of Impact instead of the 1700 World News. The latter had in any case 
been replaced by a programme (Outside Source) that used raw feeds and social media 
and was therefore unsuitable for a straight comparison. It also became clear after 
piloting that randomised, stratified constructed-week sampling had disadvantages 
ascribed to the picture-led nature of television news. A news organisation that 
wanted to cover a story using its own correspondent and crew rather than agency 
footage might be a day behind its competitors: this would prevent a straight 
comparison in a constructed week5. 
4.4.3 Co-coding 
The programmes were all coded by the researcher and approximately 10% of the 
output was also assigned to 9 volunteer co-coders. Each co-coder was given the 
coding manual along with a verbal explanation of the research and had an 
opportunity to ask questions: each then watched and coded one or two news bulletins 
from random dates corresponding to the overall numbers of CCTV and BBC world 
news and African news programmes in each content analysis period. 
Intercoder reliability coefficients were calculated for each variable (or selected 
variables in the pilot analysis) using not only simple percentages – a method that 
makes no adjustment for the likelihood of chance agreement (Neuendorf 2002, 
Freelon 2010) – but also a second index, in this case Krippendorff’s alpha, which does 
make this adjustment and is rated as among the most reliable for use in media 
content analysis (Macnamara 2005). There is no perfect method of calculating 
intercoder reliability: according to Lombard, Snyder-Duch and Bracken (2002:593), 
                                                        
5 Purposive, total-population sampling, such as was eventually used for the China news, proved a 
better fit in this sense. 
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'there is general agreement that indices that do not account for chance agreement are 
too liberal while those that do are too conservative.’   
Krippendorff's alpha proved particularly cruel in reporting intercoder reliability 
on the speakers in a news report. Although there were only three categories of 
speaker – official, elite and general public – Kɑ made no allowance for the 
comparatively fine distinction between the first two categories, and penalised these 
coding discrepancies just as heavily as the much graver error of mistaking a 
government spokesman for a bystander. Most of the co-coding anomalies here 
concerned the confusion of officials and elites. Fully one-third of the mismatches in 
co-coding of topics were due to the confusion of ‘politics’ with ‘conflict/security’, 
especially when the item dealt with political talks about conflict or security. These 
two categories were often conflated during analysis in any case. Furthermore, Kɑ and 
other complex reliability coefficients are known to produce aberrant results when 
categories are skewed: in other words, when the majority of results belong to just one 
of several categories (Lovejoy et al. 2016). Krippendorff, in turn, describes percentage 
agreement statistics as meaningless because high figures become more unlikely as 
more categories are added for comparison (2004:413); and it is possible to achieve 
high percentage scores through coincident absences of data without a single 
concurrence being recorded (2004:425). Krippendorff does acknowledge the validity 
of percentage agreement for pairs of coders, which is the method used in this 
research. The results appear in Table 4-2. 
Table 4-2 Intercoder reliability coefficients 
CATEGORY PERCENTAGE AGREEMENT KRIPPENDORFF’S ALPHA 
Topic 82.1 0.765 
Speakers 92.4 0.806 
Immediacy of pictures 86.1 0.735 
Involvement of China 91.7 0.779 
 
Intercoder reliability was within the spectrum deemed acceptable by 
Krippendorff (2004:429) – optimally α ≥ .800 or, for more tentative results, at least α 
≥ .667. These figures were arrived at after difficulties experienced by co-coders in the 
pilot stage had been overcome: the codebook was rewritten for clarity and several 
unreliable variables were rejected, leading to some re-coding and re-co-coding. Chief 
among errant variables were those governing sources: the identification of the 
primary source for a news item and the number of different viewpoints featured in a 
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report both proved too elusive for reliable coding. It was also difficult for co-coders to 
ascertain when reporters were on location and when they were reporting from 
elsewhere, such as their capital city or office, but this was primarily because the 
coding manual did not explain the distinction clearly enough. 
Co-coding, conducted mainly by PhD and MA students at the University of 
Westminster, revealed that the researcher's background in television production was 
something of a double-edged sword. Someone with television journalism experience 
can easily isolate the elements of a news item for analysis, but this advantage is 
meaningless if co-coders from outside broadcasting do not understand what they 
should be looking for. It transpired during co-coding of the pilot that the unit of 
analysis, the news story, was understood in different ways. In stratified newsroom 
running-orders, a news story generally begins with the studio presenter’s 
introduction and ends when the presenter begins the next introduction. In the pilot, 
by contrast, some co-coders saw two news reports on the same issue as a single news 
item, rendering their completed co-coding forms incompatible with the original 
coding sheets. As the in- and out-times of individual news items were important yet 
uncontentious parts of the content analysis, the researcher filled them in for the co-
coders in subsequent tranches of analysis. The attribution of co-coding errors to lack 
of broadcasting experience was borne out by the performance of a television 
journalist co-coder, whose intercoder agreement indices were consistently high. 
Other co-coding mishaps stemmed from general inexperience of coding, or the 
world, or both: one Chinese co-coder neglected to mark an item about Xinjiang as one 
that involved China, which was in itself an interesting occurrence. Co-coding was 
voluntary and unpaid, although sometimes reciprocal. It would have benefited from 
more coding time and more co-coder training, especially in a department that leans 
towards qualitative research. 
4.4.4 Data analysis 
The feasibility of using SPSS software to analyse the quantitative content analysis 
data was assessed. It was discovered that the faculty had ended SPSS training but did 
still run Excel sessions, and that Excel was adequate for the task. The Excel training 
also revealed better ways of organising and processing data, resulting in yet more re-
coding of the pilot. A generic Excel sheet containing the coding categories was used 
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as a template6: each edition of a programme had its own coding sheet, and at the end 
of each recording period (pilot, summer 2014 and early 2016) the coding was 
consolidated onto two separate sheets per channel, for world and African news. The 
numbers of news items appear in Table 4-3, covering a total of 87 hours 30 minutes 
of programming.7 
Table 4-3 Data collection: numbers of news items 
 PILOT JAN 2014 MAY-JUNE 2014 JAN-MAR 2016 TOTAL 
CCTV NEWS UPDATE 104 214 - 
543 
CCTV NEWS DESK - - 225 
CCTV AFRICA LIVE 78 177 197 452 
BBC WORLD NEWS 82 48 48 
423 
BBC IMPACT - 126 119 
BBC FOCUS ON AFRICA 52 99 92 243 
TOTALS 316 664 681 1661 
 
Questions remain about how far the data can be compared over time. The 
replacement of the BBC's World News programme by the Asia-friendly Impact after 
the 2014 pilot had an obvious bearing on the geographical data. Other programmes 
have mutated in more subtle ways: for example, CCTV's Africa Live contained less 
business news in 2016 than in 2014 because of the launch of a separate African 
business programme that ran in the following hour. 
4.5 Frame analysis 
Framing, as defined by Entman (1993:52), selects ‘some aspects of a perceived reality 
and make(s) them more salient … in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation’.  As indicated in 4.3.1, the use of framing in this research came 
about after early quantitative content analysis drew attention to the very different 
coverage of South Sudan by the African programmes of BBC World News and CCTV-
News.  This section explains how framing is defined in this project, how an existing 
'framework' of frames was adapted to take account of different cultures, and the 
details and limitations of working with frames. 
                                                        
6 An example is in Appendix 4C. 
7 Table shows total number of news items (i.e. units of analysis) collected in the period specified, 
separated into the individual programmes being studied. Totals for similar programmes on the same 
channel (CCTV News Update and News Desk, and BBC World News and Impact) have been combined for 




4.5.1 What’s in a frame? 
Despite Entman's definition, or maybe because of it, there is 'an immense variety of 
theoretical and operational understandings of frames' (Matthes 2009:349). Opinions 
vary on whether they are simple questions of emphasis or overt themes; whether 
they include or are divorced from the subject-matter of the text; whether they can 
include images or are purely language-based; and whether a unit of analysis can 
contain more than one frame. McQuail (2010:380) points out that ‘framing’, although 
an important element in attempting to codify the social construction of reality, is 
often used very loosely to mean such things as context, news angle or theme. 
Goffman conceived framing in the broadest of terms, observing that people 
group and sort information in order to make sense of their lives (1974:21). Tuchman 
subsequently applied framing to news production, saying the media fashioned 
nebulous happenings into events and that they 'set the frame in which citizens 
discuss public events... the quality of civic debate necessarily depends on the 
information available' (1978:ix.). This view is consistent with Gamson & Modigliani's 
assertion that a frame is a 'central organising idea' in an 'interpretive package' that, 
along with public opinion, helps shape meaning in society (1989:2-3). In other words, 
framing – as distinct from agenda-setting – is seen as influencing how rather than 
what people think. 
Framing is, unsurprisingly, widely viewed as having particular value in the 
study of news processes (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). For Scheufele (2004:405), 
cognitive frames germinate in newsrooms and among media practitioners before 
they turn into media frames in the output. McQuail (2010:381) extends the impact of 
framing to geopolitics, saying that the practice 'reflects both the sources that are 
chosen and the national context in which news is produced, thus also the foreign 
policies of countries concerned.'  
Considering that framing is often operationalised through quantitative 
methods8, it is noteworthy that scholars tend to view the concept in interpretive 
terms. Pan & Kosicki (1993:55,62) describe framing as a constructivist approach that 
examines news discourse through syntactical, thematic and rhetorical structures 
filled with 'lexical choices' such as whether to call a leader a 'dictator'. This news 
                                                        
8 Discussed in 4.5.5. 
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discourse, they say, relies on 'shared beliefs about a society' (ibid.:57) that are often 
taken for granted.  
Frames can be generic or bespoke, devised for every individual theme that is 
analysed (Matthes 2009:350). Despite the individuality of methods, there is 
remarkable consensus about the way framing works in the construction of meaning. 
Among early adopters of generic framing categories were Neuman, Just & Crigler 
(1992), who identified frames including conflict, powerlessness, human impact and 
morality. They concluded (ibid.:117) that the framing data reinforced 'culturalist 
theories of news – that is, that news is grounded in and moulds social values.' 
4.5.2 The Semetko & Valkenburg model 
The approach taken to framing in this thesis is part-inductive and part-deductive. It is 
deductive in that it adapts and streamlines an existing framing 'framework', 
conceived by Semetko & Valkenburg (2000:100), which had arisen from framing 
categories previously identified in the literature. It is inductive in that, after 
observation of news content specific to the BBC/CCTV project, two frames were 
added by this researcher and an existing frame split into two.  
In his survey of works on media framing, Matthes (2009:356) reveals that 78% 
of studies employ issue-specific frames rather than generic frames (22%). Issue-
specific frames make it difficult to compare output over time and different outlets. 
The advantages of a framing framework are that it can be replicated and that it can 
detect differences in framing between media (Semetko & Valkenburg 2000:95). It is 
therefore well suited to a comparative analysis, especially over a range of news 
events. 
Semetko & Valkenburg use their generic framing categories, based on a review 
of frames identified in earlier studies, to analyse European political coverage in Dutch 
national news (2000:100). Their five news frames are conflict, economic 
consequences, human interest, attribution of responsibility, and morality. Of these, 
the responsibility frame deals with news that ascribes responsibility for causing or 
solving a problem to authorities or individuals. The economic consequences frame 
tells the news in terms of its likely cost or economic benefit. The conflict frame is not 
intended to be used literally, but is invoked when news events are portrayed as 
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struggles between opposing forces9. The human interest frame refers to news 
presented with a 'human face'. The morality frame is less concerned with siting news 
in a religious context than with trying to advance prescriptions for how to behave – 
even indirectly, by quoting other people. The following two sections explain how 
Semetko & Valkenburg's framework was altered for this research. 
4.5.3 The ‘attribution of responsibility’ frame 
As indicated above, as a consequence of the Chinese academic interest in constructive 
journalism10, Semetko & Valkenburg's single frame governing the attribution of 
responsibility was divided in two. The aim here was to distinguish the blame for a 
problem from the drive for a solution. This frame relates in particular to RQ1, which 
deals with the nature of reporting at CCTV-News compared with the Anglosphere. 
The division of the frame derives from Iyengar's notion of a split between the 
attribution of responsibility for the creation of problems or situations (causal 
responsibility) and for resolving, or stopping the resolution of, such problems 
(treatment responsibility) (1991:3). Treatment responsibility will be referred to here 
as solution-oriented responsibility, in order not to confuse treatment with lack of 
treatment. Iyengar observes (ibid.:9) that people’s responses to responsibility are 
instinctive, giving it particular psychological power in matters of public opinion. A 
high score on the solution-oriented responsibility index should correlate to some 
extent with adherence to the principles of constructive journalism, which is 
predicated on stimulating debate aimed at achieving positive outcomes to situations11. 
Conversely, a high incidence of the causal responsibility or 'blame frame' would imply 
a retrospective, event-centred narrative and possibly an attempt to hold people to 
account. The comparative element in the study enables omissions to be highlighted 
when the two narratives are inspected side by side. 
4.5.4 New frames: harmony and stability 
A constructivist work that deals with Chinese media should be sensitive to alternative 
ways of seeing the world. Both Shi-Xu (2014) and Liu (2011) rail against Western 
dominance over social science theory which, they argue, has imposed structures of 
                                                        
9 This is possibly, the authors argue, in order to attract an audience (2000:95). 
10 Examined in more detail in 2.5.1. 
11 See 2.5.1 for more discussion of this. 
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Western thought worldwide – although Liu says Asia's economic rise has allowed 
Asian epistemologies to surface that 'emphasise cultural differences with the West 
rather than imitation' (ibid.:213). Framing, although a Western method, is well suited 
to highlighting variations in news storytelling in Britain and China, as frames in news 
tend to have cultural resonance emanating from their institutionalisation in different 
cultures (Van Gorp 2010). Van Gorp defines culture in this context as 'an organised 
set of beliefs, codes, myths, stereotypes, values, norms, frames and so forth that are 
shared in the collective memory of a group or society' (ibid.:62). Journalists may 
invoke frames pertaining to their home culture, which then dictate how the news 
story is covered. Through framing, an attempt is also made here to take account of 
Chinese perspectives that have worked their way into state media parlance. This is 
brought about by adding two categories, harmony and stability, to Semetko & 
Valkenburg's framing framework. 
4.5.4.1 Harmony 
It was under the leadership of Hu Jintao that the Chinese objective of a harmonious 
society (和谐社会hexie shehui) and its foreign policy offshoot, harmonious world (和
谐世界 hexie shijie), came to the fore (Delury 2008, Zheng & Tok 2007). This was 
partly a political response to discord caused by social divisions in China, but the 
external application of ‘harmony’ also signalled the emergence of a more assertive 
and focused China abroad. For Alvaro (2013:147), 'harmonious society' belongs to a 
'distinctly Chinese type of politicised English' as the Chinese Communist Party tries to 
instil harmony in the social order. He notes that the intent to control ideological 
vocabulary remains in place even as China opens up to the outside world.  
‘Harmonious society’ has faded from official pronouncements since Xi Jinping 
took power (Qian 2014). However, the concept of harmony has a long tradition in 
China, with roots in ancient eastern philosophies including Confucianism: the Chinese 
worldview is often described as holistic and harmony-oriented rather than 
competitive (Shi-xu 2014:46, Lee 2010). The presence of harmony is a much stronger 
frame evocation than a simple absence of conflict. China’s harmony also has links 
with the South African concept of ubuntu, or 'humanness through connections with 
others' (Shi-Xu ibid., Gagliardone et al. 2010) along with other traditions across Africa 
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that place the community ahead of the individual12. 
4.5.4.2 Stability 
Stability has long featured in official Chinese parlance. In 21st-century China, stability 
preservation or maintenance (维稳weiwen) alludes to social disorder which the 
authorities have made it their priority to avoid. This is accompanied by increasing 
sensitivity to any negative representation of the Party's image (Alvaro 2013:150, Qian 
2012:online). References to (in)stability permeate China’s English-language media, 
including reports on events abroad. Stability has become ‘the overriding national 
imperative in the late 20th and early 21st centuries’ (Trevaskes et al. 2014:268). As 
China becomes more active internationally, weiwen has taken on an external form. 
China's interventionist role in several African countries, for instance, is a function of 
stability maintenance to protect its economic interests. The full list of framing 
categories is set out in Table 4-4. 
Table 4-4: Categories for framing comparison of British & Chinese news13 
Conflict* 
Does the story involve disagreement or accusations between parties 




Does the story mention financial losses, gains or costs, or the 
economic consequences of following or ignoring a course of action? 
Human interest* 
Is there a human angle to the coverage, does it show how 
individuals or groups are affected, or does it depict scenarios that 
might prompt outrage, sympathy, compassion or empathy? 
Responsibility* 
(cause) 
Does the report contain a suggestion that an individual, group or 
level of government is responsible for the issue or problem? 
Responsibility* 
(solution-oriented) 
Does the report indicate solutions or suggest that officials or 
government are capable of solving or easing the problem? 
Morality* 
Does the story bear a moral message or appear to tell viewers how 
to behave? 
Stability 
Is reference made to the stability (or lack of it) of a country, 
government or society, or fears or hopes about future stability? 
Harmony 
Is reference made to harmonious relations (actual or possible) 
between or among nations, ethnic groups or different sectors of 
society, or peaceful coexistence?  
 
                                                        
12 It is perhaps North European individualism that is the cultural exception. 
13 Asterisked categories are summaries of Semetko & Valkenburg’s frames. 
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4.5.5 Working with frames 
Although frame analysis was used experimentally to assess the two broadcasters' 
South Sudan coverage in May 2014 (in Chapter 7), this section reflects the more 
structured version of framing that was used in subsequent content analysis. Semetko 
& Valkenburg's frame analysis of Dutch national newspapers and television 
programmes contained 20 questions that could be answered with 'yes' or 'no' 
(2000:98), each relating to one of five news frames: they analysed the responses to 
these framing questions quantitatively through statistical procedures. The frame 
analysis in this thesis is quantitatively much simpler, and the responses are analysed 
qualitatively with reference to the media texts.  
While Matthes (2009:349), in his analysis of media framing studies, bemoaned 
the 'lack of operational precision, the descriptive focus of many analyses, neglect of 
visuals, and insufficient reporting of reliability', frame analysis is inherently 
subjective. Most framing is grounded in quantitative content analysis but there is also 
evidence in the literature of framing work that moves along the spectrum towards 
qualitative analysis. Taken to its fullest extent, this would point to rhetorical framing 
analysis – rhetoric being defined as 'the strategic use of communication, oral or 
written, to achieve specifiable goals' (Kuypers 2010:288). Such framing is completely 
subjective but derives rigour from the substantiation of assertions through examples 
from media texts. The frame analysis used in this thesis resides part-way along the 
qualitative-quantitative spectrum. A broad quantitative framing approach, using the 
simplified table adapted from Semetko & Valkenburg's work, produces initial 
indications of framing priorities that are tested and justified qualitatively in the texts.  
Sampling for the frame analysis was mainly employed after purposive 
selection of news events, in order to compare how the two broadcasters handled the 
same happenings at the same times. Four domestic Chinese news events (Chapters 5 
and 6) were treated in this way, along with Xi Jinping’s 2015 visit to Africa (Chapter 
7). A probability sample of African news was also analysed for frames. Coding was 
manual, using Excel spreadsheets cross-referenced with written notes: the latter paid 




Semi-structured interviews were carried out with journalists, managers and two 
scholars to clarify complex issues arising from the text-based analyses. The approach 
was qualitative and purposive: access to CCTV-News was partially limited. However, 
the relatively large number of interviews permitted synthesis of common lines of 
thought, if not exactly consensus, on important journalistic principles.  
4.6.1 Selection of interviewees 
The research involved a non-probability sample in which interviewees were chosen 
mostly because of their specific or expert roles. Morgan (2014:124) refers to this as 
purposive selection rather than sampling, in that sampling might wrongly imply a 
high degree of generalisability. This description also distances the technique from 
convenience sampling, as the researcher evaluated but decided not to approach a 
number of potential interviewees at both the BBC and CCTV.   
The 'snowball sampling' method was used subsequently at both CCTV-News 
and the BBC, in that the researcher acted on recommendations to acquire further 
interviewees. Snowball sampling is useful for reaching people who are otherwise 
difficult to locate, but its disadvantages include lack of researcher control over the 
sample and lack of knowledge about whether the sample accurately reflects the 
general population in the target community. In the case of CCTV-News, the researcher 
took almost three years to work her way through recommendations emanating from 
about ten separate sources, thereby lessening the chances of sample distortion. 
However, in such large organisations it would be unwise to assume that any tranche 
of opinion is necessarily completely representative. 
Formal interviews were conducted with 28 current or recent CCTV news staff, 
and conversations held with another three. There were more men than women in the 
CCTV group, but in other respects the interviewees were more evenly diverse – 
Chinese, African, Western; older and younger; reporters, foreign correspondents, 
production staff, presenters; in Beijing, in Nairobi or scattered elsewhere around the 
world14. No managers agreed to be interviewed at CCTV-News in Beijing, although 
those at CCTV Africa in Nairobi were willing to speak 'on the record'. The relatively 
                                                        
14 Statistics for the interviews are in Appendix 4B. 
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large number of interviewees for a subsidiary method was due mainly to CCTV 
Beijing’s unwillingness to co-operate formally with the project: contact was initially 
made with relatively junior staff and further interviews further up the structure came 
through chains of recommendations.  
Among the 19 interviewees at the BBC were managers, desk editors, 
producers, correspondents and other newsgathering staff, both in London and at 
overseas bureaux. They were of a number of different nationalities. There were more 
men than women in the BBC group, but their ages ranged widely and they were 
roughly representative of the sections in which they worked. Some of those 
interviewed have since left the BBC. 
4.6.2 Conduct of interviews and data generated 
The interviews were mostly conducted face-to-face in neutral locations and were 
recorded. In general the interviews lasted about an hour: one went on for more than 
three hours and included an unscheduled lunch. A handful took place on Skype, and 
two were via emailed questions and answers. Most participants elected to remain 
anonymous, and a few CCTV journalists did not want to be recorded, one of them 
citing lurid instances in which Chinese state officials' private utterances had been 
captured and spread on social media. A small number of interviews were therefore 
summarised in handwritten notes (a mixture of shorthand and longhand) and typed 
up as soon as possible thereafter.  
The interviews could generally be categorised as semi-structured in that a list 
of questions was always prepared, including generic queries for specific types of 
journalist. Semi-structured interviews are intended to allow a certain latitude to 
interviewees while ensuring that answers are to some extent comparable with other 
interviews (May 2011:135) and that a small degree of quantification in responses is 
therefore possible. In such interviews, the researcher can potentially skew the data 
by imposing a predetermined agenda on the discussion. In this project, however, 
some of the higher-profile interviewees led the discussion away from the prepared 
questions. This was enlightening in that it revealed what they particularly wanted to 
discuss, along the lines of May's 'focused interview' that stresses 'flexibility and the 
discovery of meaning' (2011:137) rather than any attempt to standardise responses. 
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The interviews were in general fully transcribed and then entered into the 
qualitative data analysis programme, NVivo. Each interview was open-coded, a 
process that allows unplanned clusters of responses to emerge along with grouped 
observations on core themes and questions. Individual tales are not discarded in this 
process, but it is through comparing responses that the social significance of any one 
of them can best be understood (May 2011:136). Efforts were also made to guard 
against journalistic interpretations of data, whereby the most eye-catching assertions 
might gain priority. 
4.7 Ethical considerations 
Despite the emphasis on content analysis in this research, human participation in the 
form of interviews and cross-editing was essential to triangulate the data. Ethical 
approval for the project was therefore sought and obtained from the University of 
Westminster in the manner outlined below. The position of the researcher as a 
former journalist, part of whose research took place in her former workplace, is also 
reflected on here, as befits the social constructivist epistemological approach. 
4.7.1 Participants 
Ethical approval was needed for the project because it was essential to adhere to 
standards that protected the participants and their identities and ensured that they 
gave informed consent for the collection of data from them (Clough & Nutbrown 
2012:187). The attitude of the researcher to the participants is best summed up by 
the classic medical principle of non-maleficence (Beauchamp & Childress 2001): in 
other words, 'do no harm' (Singer 2009:194).  
The standard procedure chosen for interviews was to confer anonymity on the 
participants unless otherwise agreed. There was wide variation in this. As outlined in 
section 4.6.6, several interviewees were reluctant not only to be named, but even to 
be recorded. A number of editors, senior managers and high-profile on-screen 
journalists in both organisations who were happy to be identified have been 
described here by their positions: no names have been used, even where permission 
was granted, for reasons of consistency. Interviewees were given the opportunity to 
discuss and define the level of anonymity with which they were comfortable – for 
example, whether specifications such as 'news editor' or 'programme producer' 
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would expose them within the context of their remarks. In some cases, only 'a 
journalist working for X' was deemed to suffice. Conversely, on several occasions the 
researcher decided to render interviewees anonymous for their own protection even 
though they had expressed willingness to be identified.   
Some of the cross-editors (see Chapter 8) waived their anonymity in order to 
meet socially and talk about the cross-editing experiment after it was finished. This 
meeting was the idea of one cross-editor, and all invitations and subsequent 
discussions were sent by email to BCC (blind copy) addresses. This meant that no 
cross-editor needed to be identified unless present, and no lasting connection could 
be made between participants purely through the use of data from this research. 
Every interviewee and cross-editor was given a combined participation 
information sheet and consent form, an example of which is shown in Appendix 4D. 
This outlined participants' rights, including the option to withdraw from the research 
or to withdraw their data where practicable. Some participants signed the form 
straight away and returned it to the researcher, who emailed them a copy for their 
records: others took it away and scanned and emailed a signed version to the 
researcher later.  Out of 49 people interviewed, 39 signed and returned the forms 
while the other 10 accepted the form and gave verbal consent.  
The digital age militates against participant anonymity in that the researcher’s 
social media activity could be mined by interested parties hoping to discover who 
contributed to the research. In this case, nothing publicly accessible would indicate 
which, if any, journalistic contacts played a role in the project. In any case, a sizeable 
number of people contacted in the course of the research were either not on social 
media or were not linked to the researcher. Details of the project were never 
discussed on social media in any way that could identify the participants. 
4.7.2 Position of the researcher 
The relativist position outlined in section 4.2.2 informs the conduct of the research as 
well as its theoretical foundation and design. While an experienced former broadcast 
news journalist must take extra care to be dispassionate, especially when dealing 
with former colleagues, inside knowledge of the profession has considerable 
advantages in terms of sensitivity to the complexities and nuances of what is being 
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researched (ibid.). For the findings to be considered reliable and valid, it is important 
not to conceal personal assumptions behind a facade of bogus impartiality.  
(B)ias comes not from having ethical and political positions – this is inevitable – 
but from not acknowledging them. Not only does such acknowledgement help to 
unmask any bias that is implicit in those views, but it also helps to provide a way 
of responding critically and sensitively to the research. (Griffiths 1998:133). 
For this particular comparative project, the researcher was, broadly speaking, an 
insider in BBC terms and an outsider at CCTV-News. She was therefore confronted 
simultaneously by two challenges neatly summed up by Aguilar in a single sentence 
(1981:23-24): '(T)he outsider must to some extent get into the natives' heads, skins 
or shoes, whereas the insider must get out of his or her own.' This involved 
attempting to reconcile emic and etic perspectives through reflexivity, i.e. the process 
of reflection (O'Reilly 2009:116). An emic or insider perspective describes a culture 
through its internal elements, whereas an etic approach looks at external structures 
and into a process from the outside (Fielding & Fielding 2015:576). An etic 
standpoint is often linked with quantitative data and emic with qualitative, with a 
combination of the two lending subtlety and interpretation to matters of fact.  
The emic-etic division here is blurred. The researcher had worked for BBC 
World News TV in its early days but had since spent many years working at World 
Service (radio) News – the same employer and division but different teams and (until 
2012-13) in different locations. She left the BBC in 2013. Furthermore, while CCTV-
News might seem a foreign concept in all senses, some of its staff and correspondents 
were Western and had previously worked for Western news organisations including 
the BBC.  As outlined in Chapter 3, CCTV-News had adopted a partly Anglo-American 
style of broadcasting that stood in sharp contrast to its Chinese-language news 
programmes but seemed very familiar to anyone schooled in British television 
grammar. The researcher may therefore, in this instance, be considered an 'insider-
outsider' occupying 'a space of paradox, ambiguity and ambivalence, as well as 
conjunction and disjunction' in relation to the research and its participants (Corbin 
Dwyer & Buckle 2009:60). 
Steps were taken to minimise bias in the research design, the research process 
and the analysis of data. The researcher attempted to counter any suspicions of pro-
BBC bias in the research design by including quantitative analysis in the multiple 
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methods used to acquire data, and by avoiding an immersive ethnographic 
approach15. However, the researcher's attempts to capitalise on her professional 
knowledge and contacts influenced two areas of the research design: the structure of 
the content analysis and the acquisition of interviewees and cross-editors. Access to 
some high-profile BBC journalists and managers was relatively unproblematic 
because of previous contact through work. Other interview targets, by contrast, were 
not known to the researcher and she was in no better position than she would have 
been as an outsider. The ethical consequences of interviewing former colleagues are 
explained later in this section.  
The design of the quantitative content analysis was heavily influenced by 
previous knowledge of the structure of BBC television news running-orders, and 
initial plans were to concentrate on reporter 'packages'. It was then discovered 
during piloting that CCTV-News bulletins contained a comparatively high proportion 
of video narrated by the studio presenter. To accommodate this, all news content 
(rather than just reporter items) was sampled and timed. In the frame analysis, the 
'bias alert' manifested itself in constant reflection about whether Western frames 
provided sufficient scope for interpretation of news from China. As outlined in 4.5.4, 
this resulted in the addition of two frames to an existing theoretical structure. 
Interviewing and dealing with participants known to the researcher has its 
advantages. Little time is wasted in persuading an interviewee to open up 
(McConnell-Henry et al. 2009:3) and rapport and trust have already been established 
(Griffiths 1998). An existing relationship permits continued contact, enabling the 
researcher to revisit themes if circumstances change and answer any questions. 
Having said this, keeping in touch with new contacts is also possible. Here, people 
from both news organisations who had already been interviewed occasionally 
volunteered further observations: some were re-interviewed as a result. 
Knowing research participants militates against the academic preference for 
detachment, in which interviewees are kept at 'some social and intellectual 
"distance"' to permit rigorous analysis of data (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007:90). 
Role confusion (McConnell-Henry et al. 2009:3) is also a potential hazard which 
                                                        
15
 The research included four days of programme observation at the BBC – two on world news and two 
on African news – but these were unrelated to the research questions, and served simply to clarify 
procedural and structural practices and act as a base for interviews. As Singer put it (2009:193): 'A few 
hours spent hanging out in a newsroom does not an ethnographic study make'. 
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manifested itself in two ways in this research. Firstly, the researcher had to curb her 
desire to chat, compare notes with and interrupt her interviewees, and remember 
that her role was to collect data. Preparing questions as part of the semi-structured 
interview approach helped here, as did listening back to recordings of early 
interviews. Secondly, the researcher had to evaluate occasional over-disclosure from 
participants (McConnell-Henry et al. ibid.:4) and discard comments that she believed 
they might later regret. Knowing that the researcher was a former broadcast 
journalist, some participants used the interview as a 'forum for venting' (McConnell-
Henry et al ibid.:7) about what they considered unprofessional practices. Here, 
however, the 'insider-outsider' perspective was helpful: participants often believed 
their complaints were specific to their organisations, but the researcher knew that – 
for example – mistakes with on-screen name-straps were inevitable in the constant 
turnover of 24-hour television news. 
In line with the semi-structured approach, the researcher also guarded against 
prejudiced questioning by asking at the end of interviews if participants would like to 
add observations that had not been covered. Some did, both at the BBC and at CCTV-
News. In all, the onus was on the researcher to reflect on her behaviour during 
interviews at all times and modify it where necessary. 
4.7.3 Data storage 
Recordings of the TV news bulletins being analysed were stored as digital video files: 
firstly, on the television's integral hard disk recorder or in folders on the researcher's 
home computer, and secondly, backed up onto DVD and kept in a locker on university 
premises. Interviews, where recorded, were kept as mp3 files on the researcher's 
home computer and periodically backed up onto DVD and stored in the university 
locker. Transcripts bore the date but not the name of the participant. Paper copies of 
signed participation consent forms were placed in a folder in the university locker. 
Care was taken not to transfer sensitive information onto USB storage devices. 
4.8 Conclusion 
The mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods outlined in this chapter is 
evident in every results chapter in this thesis. The fusion of critical realism and social 
constructivism necessitated a mixed methods approach in terms of both data-
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gathering and evaluation. The objective was not only triangulation but also richer 
description of news content. Much of this must remain interpretive in order to 
provide sufficient detail and nuance, but the quantitative content analysis supplies a 
substantial foundation of independently verifiable data. 
 
95 
5 China and its contexts: lunar new year and the Two Sessions 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter compares the overall 'look and feel' of CCTV-News and BBC World News 
TV in 2014 and 2016 and then, together with the following chapter, closely analyses 
four news events from 2014 and 2015. The aim was to provide answers to both RQ1 
and RQ2 in 4.1.2 by investigating how the channels compared in general, and how 
they covered China. Firstly, an overall impression of the news palettes of the two 
broadcasters was assembled through quantitative content analysis of five constructed 
weeks of output: for BBC World, this involved the World News and Impact 
programmes (the unit of analysis was the news story: n=423), and for CCTV-News, 
News Update and News Desk (n=543).1 While this provided a generally representative 
overview of material, there were not enough China stories in the BBC sample to 
enable any conclusions about China output to be drawn.  
A second, more focused tranche of output was therefore mined for news about 
China using frame analysis of two specific programmes, BBC World Newsday and 
CCTV News Hour, for 28 consecutive days from 16 February to 15 March 2015. The 
period included two events that loom large on Beijing's calendar every year: the 
Spring Festival or 春节 chunjie and the twin political meetings known as the Two 
Sessions or 两会 lianghui. The results of this analysis (BBC n=31, CCTV n=273) form 
the second half of this chapter: the low numbers on the BBC side and the inequality in 
coverage lend themselves to qualitative rather than overtly quantitative study. 
Chapter 6 then takes a very different tack, containing a frame analysis of two 
instances of unplanned, breaking news involving China: the Hong Kong protests of 
2014 and the sinking of a Yangtze cruise ship in 2015. Interviews with journalists 
elaborate on the issues raised. 
This does not claim to be an exhaustive study of the China news produced by 
the two organisations, given their large volume of output and in particular the spread 
of BBC material over television, radio and online. The absence of a news story here 
does not mean it was not covered elsewhere. However, a story's presence, and how it 
is framed, are key indicators of how journalists view the news agenda2. 
                                                        
1 See 4.4 for further programme detail. 
2 See 4.5.1. 
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For reasons of consistency, all the CCTV-News material in these two chapters 
was drawn from broadcasts from Beijing and not from the network hubs in Nairobi 
and Washington3. In the content analysis, the special administrative regions of Hong 
Kong and Macao are counted as part of China although they have separate country-
code identifiers in line with UN tabulation. Taiwan is not counted here as part of 
China and is not included in Chinese content analysis unless part of a report on cross-
Strait issues. 
5.2 China in the world 2014-16: quantitative content analysis 
Quantitative content analysis helps establish the positioning of CCTV-News as a 
global broadcaster: how regionally specific it is, and whether it offers an alternative 
palette of news to those of other international networks. Data from the five 
constructed weeks of output in 2014 and 2016 outlined in Chapter 44 was analysed to 
establish how BBC World News TV and CCTV-News matched up in their views of the 
world. 
5.2.1 World regions compared 
 
Figure 5-1 World regions as represented in the news output of Impact and World News (BBC World News 
TV) and News Update/News Desk (CCTV-News), 2014-16 
 
Over the period and programmes analysed (Figure 5-1), CCTV-News allotted a large 
share of its airtime to news from East Asia, principally China5. While the BBC's 
interest in East Asia grew between 2014 and 20166, its relative lack of East Asian 
news over the five constructed weeks studied here explains in part the rationale for 
Chinese media's 'going global' project. CCTV-News was not greatly interested in 
                                                        
3 The African output from Nairobi is covered separately in Chapter 7. 
4 A sample page of a quantitative analysis data sheet is shown in Appendix 5A. 
5 Percentages refer to the time devoted to each region rather than the number of news items. 
6 See Appendix 5B for full data from this analysis including separate figures for 2014 and 2016. 
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Europe in early 2014, but by 2016 its coverage of the region had grown to rival that of 
BBC World News as it reported on the EU’s attempts to deal with an influx of refugees, 
and on the run-up to Britain’s referendum on leaving the European Union. Both 
broadcasters gave much airtime to West Asia (the Middle East), but, while the BBC 
allocated more time than CCTV-News to the rest of Asia including Britain’s former 
colonies, CCTV paid little attention to ‘Belt and Road’ partner countries in central and 
south Asia. Two major Anglophone regions, the Americas and Oceania, hardly 
featured in this sample of CCTV's Beijing-based output, raising questions about the 
location of the target audience. 
5.2.2 World topics compared 
Figure 5-2 World topics as represented in the news output of Impact and World News (BBC World News TV) 
and News Update/News Desk (CCTV-News), 2014-16 
 
 
Figure 5-2 indicates close similarities between CCTV-News and BBC World News in 
the overall spread of topics covered over five constructed weeks7. The heavyweight 
sectors of security and politics accounted for about two-thirds of news output on 
CCTV-News and slightly less on BBC World News, but CCTV's 2016 coverage of these 
areas in particular was very similar to that of the BBC.8  CCTV covered more 
economics and less social news than the BBC, but in general the differences were not 
great, indicating that the two channels struck a similar tone. 
5.2.3 Neighbours, friends and BRICS 
This section deals with the extent to which story selection corresponded to the 
broadcasters’ main geographical locations and their home countries’ spheres of 
political influence. 
                                                        
7 Percentages refer to the time devoted to each cluster of topics rather than the number of news items. 
BBC figures reflect the first half-hours only of the Impact programme. 
8 Full breakdown of figures in Appendix 5C. 
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Figure 5-3 Britain's neighbours and friends as percentages of world news output over 5 constructed 
weeks on BBC World News TV and CCTV-News, 2014-16 
 
 
Figure 5-4 China's neighbours and friends as percentages of world news output over 5 constructed weeks 
on BBC World News TV and CCTV-News, 2014-16 
 
Figures 5-3 and 5-4 show that the BBC World News programmes studied contained 
marginally more news about the United States than about Britain and relatively little 
about Britain's European neighbours, while the CCTV-News bulletins represented 
China very strongly but gave little time to any other countries in the region.9  Indeed, 
Chinese stories took up one-third of the entire bulletin output, indicating that CCTV-
News was much keener to advance its portrayal of China in news terms than to shape 
any wider regional narrative. In terms of Britain's professed allies, BBC World News 
bulletins appeared to be oriented more towards the United States than to Europe, 
even though the programmes were not broadcast at prime US viewing time.10 CCTV-
News showed itself to be almost as interested in EU affairs as BBC World. The BBC’s 
                                                        
9 Full figures in Appendix 5D. 








































































proportion of coverage of East Asian countries, with the obvious exception of China, 
was only marginally lower than that of CCTV-News. 
Figure 5-5 The BRICS nations as percentages of world news output over 5 constructed weeks on BBC 
World News TV and CCTV-News, 2014-16 
 
Figure 5-5 indicates that CCTV-News did not appear to favour any alternative news 
agenda weighted towards emerging developing economies other than China. Interest 
in news from the other BRICS nations – Brazil, Russia, India and South Africa – was 
not pronounced on either channel. Brazil was hardly covered despite its hosting of 
the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games. Military action involving Russia on 
Ukrainian territory was treated as news about Ukraine and was not part of these 
calculations. 
Figure 5-6 indicates that CCTV-News saw China's north-east Asian neighbours 
– with none of whom it enjoys easy relations – predominantly in terms of security.11 
BBC World News, at greater geopolitical distance, supplied more variety except 
where the mono-narrative of North Korea was concerned. Coverage of the aftermath 
of the Sewol ferry disaster in South Korea in April 2014 had a big impact on overall 
coverage statistics on BBC World News but not on CCTV, suggesting a certain Chinese 
reticence on disaster stories. CCTV-News reacted very differently to the sinking of a 
river cruise ship in China the following year, as is explained in Chapter 6. 
                                                        




































Figure 5-6 How CCTV-News covered North Korea, South Korea and Japan over 5 constructed weeks 2014-
16 compared with BBC World News 
 
5.2.4 Branding and deployments 
Figure 5-7 Percentage of front-of-camera staff identified as British on the BBC and Chinese on CCTV-News 
over 5 constructed weeks, and the incidence of news items about the 'home' country on each channel 
 
The tension for broadcasters between wanting to be seen as global and representing 
an identifiable national brand was indicated by the range of nationalities of on-
camera journalists and where they were deployed. The data in Figure 5-7 suggest that 
British journalists, whether presenters or reporters, were much more in evidence in 
the BBC World News London-based output than were Chinese presenters and 
reporters on CCTV world news from Beijing, although CCTV-News broadcast a much 
higher percentage of news about China than BBC World News did about Britain.12 At 
first glance, this would appear to indicate a weaker national brand identity on CCTV-
                                                        
12 Averages from 5 constructed weeks of world news output. Breakdown of figures in Appendix 5F. 
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News than might be expected in the light of the Chinese authorities’ exhortation to 
their media to ‘go global’ and spread China's message abroad. 
Figure 5-8 Nationalities of journalists presenting, reporting or voicing the news from China for CCTV-News 
and from Britain for BBC World News TV over 5 constructed weeks, 2014-16 
 
Despite the multi-national character of the journalistic complement at CCTV-
News, as shown in Figure 5-8, its news about China was fronted overwhelmingly by 
Chinese journalists. Fewer than one in five of CCTV’s front-of-camera journalists in 
China in the five constructed weeks of content analysis (2014-16) were non-Chinese, 
and most of those were presenters13. It was very rare for any foreigner to report from 
China on Chinese affairs for CCTV-News. Outside China by contrast14, as Figure 5-9 
indicates, very few on-air CCTV-News journalists reporting from overseas locations 
were Chinese, whereas two-thirds of the BBC’s on-air global journalists filing from 
abroad were British. This was despite a ‘becoming more global’ initiative at the BBC 
which introduced many overseas bilingual reporters onto the English-language news 
programmes. The BBC's image projection remained constant in Britain and abroad, 
whereas that of CCTV-News varied widely depending on location. 
                                                        
13 Breakdown of figures in this paragraph in Appendix 5G. 

















































Figure 5-9 Nationalities of journalists presenting, reporting or voicing the news from the rest of the world 
[excluding Africa] for CCTV-News and BBC World News TV over 5 constructed weeks, 2014-16 
 
5.2.5 Speakers 
Figure 5-10 Who speaks in the news? Analysis of ‘sound-bites’ in the world news programmes of BBC 
World News TV and CCTV-News over 5 constructed weeks, 2014-2016 
 
Figure 5-10 shows that CCTV-News spoke to a far greater proportion of officials in the 
world news programmes studied than did BBC World News, although only a slightly 
lower proportion of members of the general public. The BBC's use of officials declined 
between 2014 and 201615: in 2016 the BBC programmes analysed here featured 
more ‘elite’ speakers than officials.16  
                                                        
15 Full breakdown of figures for the different periods of analysis are in Appendix 5H. 
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5.2.6 China in the world news 
The quantitative content analysis provided an outline of news priorities and 
delineated the 'look' and style of CCTV-News and BBC World News, thus answering 
some of the overt aspects of RQ1 (see 4.1.2). To answer the part of RQ2 that dealt 
with the channels’ coverage of China, an attempt was made to analyse the China news 
in the same five constructed weeks by topic. The quantitative results were 
remarkably similar and afforded no possibility to delve into differences of tone, 
framing or choice of sources17. Such details can be evaluated only through intensive 
qualitative comparative study. The rest of this chapter, therefore, concentrates on 
frame analysis18 of a sample of 28 consecutive days of both broadcasters' China news 
from two specific programmes.19 
5.3 Lunar new year 2015: frame analysis 
5.3.1 Overview 
Spring festival, or 春节 chunjie, held at the lunar new year, is an important event in 
China, several neighbouring countries and Chinese-speaking communities around the 
world. It is one of China's two major annual holidays or 'golden weeks' and is notable 
for two things: its celebration of traditions, and the millions of journeys across China 
by workers returning to family homes. In 2015 the Year of the Sheep, or perhaps 
Goat20, began on 19 February. This analysis covers the 10 days from the peak travel 
period on 16 February to the end of festivities on 25 February. 
CCTV News Hour covered the new year nearly seven times as much as BBC 
Newsday over the period studied, admittedly in a longer programme. Given the 
paucity of coverage, only two broad topics could be discerned on BBC Newsday: 
society, in particular the massive movements of population; and culture, or the new 
year events themselves. CCTV News Hour's material additionally touched on economy, 
politics and the environment. The frames used by the two broadcasters were 
remarkably similar. As Table 5-1 shows, human interest, economic consequences and 
harmony were the dominant frames for both broadcasters, along with the solution-
oriented attribution of responsibility frame. That notwithstanding, the general 
                                                        
17 See Appendix 5I for breakdown of figures. 
18 A full explanation of the method is in 4.5. 
19 Screenshots of sample pages from the content analysis data sheets are shown in Appendices 5J and K. 
20 Alternative translation of 羊. 
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intensity of frame evocation was much greater in the BBC's coverage than in CCTV's: 
for example, in BBC Newsday's coverage roughly 85% of news items contained the 
human interest frame compared with under 30% on CCTV News Hour. What bearing 
this had on the reporting of the new year by CCTV-News and BBC World News TV will 
be explored through the prism of four major frames: human interest, attribution of 
solution-oriented responsibility, economic consequences and harmony. 
Table 5-1 Lunar new year frames and percentage of news items in which they appeared (items can each 
contain more than one frame) 
Frame BBC Newsday CCTV News Hour 
Conflict 14.3 0 
Economic consequences 57.1 31.4 
Human interest 85.7 27.5 
Attribution of causal responsibility 0 3.9 
Attribution of solution-oriented responsibility 14.3 19.6 
Morality 14.3 7.8 
Stability 0 0 
Harmony 28.6 29.4 
5.3.2 The human interest frame 
Frame analysis of CCTV News Hour's coverage of the lunar new year indicated that, 
despite the festive subject-matter, Chinese reporters eschewed individual 'human 
interest' accounts of proceedings and presented a top-down view that served to 
convey official priorities. The CCTV narrative was in general depersonalised and, in a 
reversal of the Anglophone journalistic maxim, supported the principle of 'tell, don't 
show'. By contrast, BBC Newsday depicted new year as primarily a human interest 
event. A BBC correspondent reported from the middle of crowds at Beijing main 
railway station21 and a temple fair22 on what he termed 'the greatest human 
migration on the face of the planet'. He interviewed travellers and bystanders about 
their yearning for home and their hopes for the coming year.  
On CCTV News Hour, depersonalisation was conveyed through nominalisation: 
for example, 'the number of trips taken during the holiday period will reach about 2.8 
billion and train travel is the most popular choice'23. A CCTV reporter spoke of 
'passenger flow' being monitored at railway stations24. The absence of voices of the 
                                                        
21 Martin Patience, BBC Newsday, 18 February 2015. 
22 Martin Patience, BBC Newsday, 20 February 2015. 
23 CCTV presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 17 February 2015. 
24 Zhang Nini in Beijing, CCTV News Hour, 23 February 2015. 
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general public intensified the depersonalisation effect. While more than 57% of the 
BBC's new year news items featured opinions from Chinese people taking part in the 
festivities, the figure on CCTV-News was less than half of that. A light-show in Jiangxi 
province was said to be 'bringing joy and happiness'25, but CCTV neither identified 
nor showed the beneficiaries. A CCTV reporter at a Guangzhou market said he had 
'talked to many local residents' about the significance of the flowers on sale there, but 
he did not feature them in his coverage although several were standing near him 
filming him on their mobile phones26. CCTV News Hour deployed reporters to seven 
provinces and regions to tell China's spring festival story, while the sole China 
reporter on BBC Newsday remained in Beijing. However, despite CCTV's notional 
geographical advantage, almost half of the News Hour coverage was narrated by its 
Beijing studio presenter, further diluting the 'human interest' frame. 
In a departure from this trend, CCTV News Hour aired a video-montage of 
three individuals narrating their own journeys home for the holiday27. This was 
imaginatively shot and carefully edited to intercut their respective travels by plane, 
train and car, revealing their experiences and feelings en route. The report consisted 
of natural sound and subtitles and appeared to have come from CCTV's Mandarin 
news. Such items were regular features of the Mandarin output and it is unclear why 
News Hour – the flagship news programme of CCTV’s Anglophone channel – did not 
make greater use of them. 
5.3.3 The solution-oriented responsibility frame 
This frame was not much in evidence on BBC Newsday: it preferred to give the 
homeward migration a negative tinge, deeming it 'highly stressful' and 'the world's 
maddest dash', with 'the nation's transport system close to breaking point'.28 For 
CCTV News Hour, however, the solution-oriented responsibility frame denoted a 
mammoth logistical challenge successfully overcome. The CCTV view of the holiday 
was from the viewpoint of officials and the BBC's from the position of a participant.  
                                                        
25 Presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 18 February 2015. 
26 Wu Lei in Guangzhou, CCTV News Hour, 17 February 2015. 
27 CCTV News Hour, 18 February 2015. 
28 Martin Patience in Beijing, BBC Newsday, 18 February 2015. 
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CCTV-News's scripts were packed with figures: from the number of Taiwanese 
travellers arriving in Fuzhou29 to the overall number of holiday air passengers and 
their year-on-year percentage increase30, no statistic was left unenumerated. Even 
the potentially very human tale of student volunteers helping travellers at the main 
railway station in Taiyuan included the observation that in a ten-hour shift the 
volunteer team could assist more than 1,000 passengers a day.31 When snow closed 
some expressways as travellers returned to work32, the only voices heard on CCTV 
News Hour were those of officials, one of whom spoke of having 'activated a 
contingency plan'. The solution-oriented responsibility frame was also evident in 
coverage of Xi Jinping's pre-holiday 'domestic inspection tour' of Liangjiahe in 
Shaanxi province, where he was sent as a young man. According to CCTV News Hour, 
Xi promised – in a formulation devoid of human agency – to 'accelerate poverty 
elimination efforts and strengthen Party building'.33 The visual lionisation of Xi, with 
villagers shown scrambling to meet him, had the effect of strengthening the 
responsibility frame while yoking spring festival traditions to Party fealty. 
Also consistent with the solution-oriented responsibility frame on CCTV News 
Hour was coverage of problems successfully tackled. Uncivilised behaviour by 
Chinese tourists overseas during the holiday, such as spitting and talking loudly in 
public places, was attributed mainly to 'ignorance of local culture' that would be 
eradicated through education34. A 34% drop in firecracker sales and the introduction 
of environmentally-friendly incense at temples was deemed to have done much to 
address the extra spike in air pollution common during the holiday.35 By contrast, 
BBC Newsday showed footage of multiple firework displays in Beijing, commenting, 'It 
may be the Year of the Sheep but many residents have decided not to meekly follow 
that instruction.'36 
5.3.4 The economic consequences and harmony frames 
Both broadcasters reflected the mix of tradition and commercialisation in the festival 
by using the economic consequences and harmony frames. CCTV-News conveyed the 
                                                        
29 Presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 17 February 2015. 
30 Presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 25 February 2015. 
31 Hu Chao in Taiyuan, CCTV News Hour, 17 February 2015. 
32 Newsroom reporter, CCTV News Hour, 25 February 2015. 
33 Presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 17 February 2015. 
34 Newsroom reporter, CCTV News Hour, 19 February 2015. 
35 Presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 19 February 2015. 
36 Newsroom reporter, BBC Newsday, 19 February 2015. 
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idea of harmony more than its British rival, but it was in the economic consequences 
frame that differences were most apparent. The mouthpiece of the Chinese 
Communist Party saw commercialisation in either very factual or positive terms, 
whereas the broadcaster of a Western capitalist nation appeared more sceptical 
about its benefits. CCTV News Hour stuck to hard facts and managerial viewpoints, 
reporting that 5.19 million people were expected to spend the holiday overseas and 
discussing China's potential as a travel market37. A focal point of the CCTV report on 
overcrowding of the tourist site of Mount Emei in Sichuan was that all 4,000 parking 
spaces there were full.38 In a CCTV report from Hangzhou, an entrepreneur was said 
to have 'made great progress' by doubling his sales over the holiday period39. The 
entrepreneur's parcel courier spoke of working more than 14 hours a day, but this 
was presented as a fact enabling higher pay and service to others, rather than a 
complaint. On BBC Newsday, by contrast, a street vendor who had not been home for 
four years40 was shown saying he could not stop work over the holiday because he 
was not from a rich family. 
BBC Newsday's evocation of the harmony frame for Chinese New Year was 
brief, concentrating on the visual impact of the synchronised migration of millions of 
workers and the 'colour' afforded by their mass presence at holiday tourist 
attractions. CCTV News Hour delved more deeply into new year tradition and culture, 
covering rituals such as the making of the glutinous rice cake 糍粑 ciba in Hubei 
province41. The fifth day of the new year, the festival of 破五 po wu, was announced 
by CCTV as 'the birthday of the god of wealth'42. In a confluence with the economic 
consequences frame, this featured people praying 'not just to the god of wealth but to 
the shopping god as well.' For CCTV, harmony was also demonstrated through 
external validation. The United Nations secretary-general, Ban Ki-moon, was shown 
practising his Chinese calligraphy and sending a greeting in halting Chinese43, and 
world leaders were filmed extending good wishes to the Chinese people44. 
                                                        
37 Terrence Terashima in Tokyo, CCTV News Hour, 20 February 2015. 
38 Presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 22 February 2015. 
39 Ying Yiyuan in Hangzhou, CCTV News Hour, 22 February 2015. 
40 Martin Patience, BBC Newsday, 18 February 2015. 
41 Newsroom reporter, CCTV News Hour, 16 February 2015. 
42 Presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 23 February 2015. 
43 CCTV News Hour, 18 February 2015. 
44 CCTV News Hour, 18 and 20 February 2015. 
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5.4 The Two Sessions 2015: frame analysis 
5.4.1 Overview 
In national political terms, the term 两会 lianghui or 'Two Sessions' refers to the 
concurrent annual meetings in Beijing of China's top advisory body, the Chinese 
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), and its prime legislative body, the 
National People's Congress (NPC). In 2015 the Two Sessions took place between 3 
and 15 March. The CPPCC in particular is a national-level manifestation of a network 
of consultative elements under the umbrella of Communist Party rule, offering input 
into policy-making while having no powers of decision or veto (He & Thøgersen 
2010). The NPC, by contrast, has the power to make laws: it consists of nearly 3,000 
delegates who serve five-year terms in office. The NPC's annual meetings have been 
described by the BBC as ‘little more than a rubber stamp for Party decisions’ (BBC 
News 2012). This view was publicly challenged by CCTV-News’s chief reporter: ‘The 
old days, when all of the NPC deputies raised their hands and applauded to pass, are 
part of the history.’45   
CCTV News Hour ran 14 times as many news items as the BBC on the Two 
Sessions in this sample, producing nearly 6 hours of output compared with just 11 
minutes on the BBC. BBC Newsday summarised the agenda of the meetings as 
‘economic growth, the crackdown on corruption and an increase in military 
spending’46, while CCTV News Hour’s remit was much broader. The Chinese 
programme ran 14 lengthy reports branded as ‘Agenda in Action’, shot on location 
around China, linking the Two Sessions with pressing social issues: they are analysed 
separately in 5.4.5. CCTV-News also regularly featured discursive interviews 
conducted by a presenter-reporter, Tian Wei, studio spots with a political analyst, and 
regular updates from reporters at the Great Hall of the People. BBC Newsday used two 
correspondents in Beijing: CCTV News Hour sent 12 correspondents to 13 of China's 
provinces and regions. There was not enough BBC data on speakers to be meaningful, 
but on CCTV News Hour, 57% of the Two Sessions news items featured official voices 
and 12% those of the general public. 
                                                        
45 Han Bin, CCTV News Hour, 4 March 2015. 
46 Presenter script, BBC Newsday, 5 March 2015. 
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This indication of a top-down narrative on CCTV-News was borne out by the 
overall frame analysis of the Two Sessions in Table 5-2, which shows that solution-
oriented responsibility was by far the strongest frame evocation on the Chinese 
channel, and to a lesser extent also on the BBC. The following sections investigate this, 
along with the two broadcasters’ very different treatments of the stability and human 
interest frames. The section ends with analysis of CCTV’s ‘Agenda in Action’ reports. 
Table 5-2 Two Sessions frames and percentage of news items in which they appeared (items can each 
contain more than one frame) 
Frame BBC Newsday CCTV News Hour 
Conflict 33.3 17.1 
Economic consequences 22.2 19.4 
Human interest 22.2 9.3 
Attribution of causal responsibility 22.2 18.6 
Attribution of solution-oriented responsibility 44.4 76.0 
Morality 0 5.4 
Stability 44.4 10.1 
Harmony 11.1 13.2 
5.4.2 The solution-oriented responsibility frame 
BBC Newsday used this frame47 for two issues at the Two Sessions, the economy and 
corruption, both of which it saw as the government's task to solve. As an academic 
interviewee put it, 'the Prime Minister, that's his job, his responsibility about how to 
rebalance the economy’.48  For CCTV News Hour, the frame often also conveyed an 
uncritical expectation that the authorities would decide the best course of action. 
CCTV reported that a villager in Liaoning 'no longer needs to worry about her truck 
loaded with sweetcorn flipping over on the bumpy roads' because the government 
had decreed that roads be looked after locally.49  CCTV admitted that plans to raise 
the retirement age were 'stirring controversy' but put the onus on the government to 
harmonise the interests of different age-groups50, whereas BBC Newsday saw the 
measure as part of an initiative 'to ease pressure on the country's state pension fund' 
as the population aged.51 
Using the same frame, CCTV News Hour regarded the drive against corruption 
as a positive collective campaign by the party and the government. Its reporter 
                                                        
47 Details of the frame are in 4.5.3. 
48 BBC Newsday, 5 March 2015. 
49 CCTV News Hour, report from Liaoning by Guan Yang, 26 February 2015. 
50 Su Yuting, CCTV News Hour, 10 March 2015. 
51 Presenter script, BBC Newsday, 11 March 2015. 
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presented the expulsion of 39 NPC deputies in solution-oriented terms, as 'the 
Chinese Communist Party housecleaning itself'.52  On BBC Newsday the campaign was 
seen more negatively, as cover for a power grab by Xi Jinping. The BBC's China editor 
referred to it as a 'purge... billed as an anti-corruption campaign which covers almost 
everyone'.53 The National People's Congress, far from being a benevolent provider of 
solutions, was described in the same BBC report as a 'breeding ground for corruption', 
with pictures of opulent official limousines being auctioned off under the 'new 
normal' of austerity. Unlike CCTV, the BBC featured the voices of people outside 
official circles, one passer-by commenting that the system was 'corrupt, top to 
bottom'54. CCTV News Hour did, however, record the exasperation of CPPCC delegates 
whose carefully considered proposals were barely acknowledged by government 
bureaucrats.55 
The absence of the public's voice is perhaps logical where the solution-focused 
responsibility frame dominates. However, CCTV’s focus on officials also gave rise to 
bureaucratic language and circumlocutions that did little to aid viewers’ 
comprehension. After the outcry in Hong Kong over parallel trading by visitors from 
the Chinese mainland56, CCTV News Hour reported that the Commerce Minister 
'talked about a possibility of the individual visit scheme to the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region being tightened' without supplying further context.57 When 
'officialese' is married to an uncritical viewpoint, the news reporter serves as a mere 
conduit of information rather than an evaluator or analyst. A CCTV-News reporter 
said journalists ‘had a lot of questions' for ministers at a news conference, but she did 
not elaborate, indicating that these questions were considered unimportant.58 The 
favoured cutaway shots at news conferences were of journalists writing things down 
rather than asking questions. Exceptions to this type of reporting were to be found in 
the ‘Agenda in Action’ pieces analysed in 5.4.5, and occasionally in brief, direct 
question-and-answer encounters between CCTV presenter-reporter Tian Wei and 
business leaders. 
                                                        
52 Tian Wei, CCTV News Hour, 4 March 2015. 
53 Carrie Gracie, BBC Newsday, 6 March 2015. 
54 ibid. 
55 CPPCC delegate on CCTV News Hour, 14 March 2015. 
56 Visitors bought up goods in Hong Kong to re-sell in mainland China, provoking local complaints of 
shortages. 
57 Presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 7 March 2015. 
58 Ai Yang, CCTV News Hour, 6 March 2015. 
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Circumlocutions and a positive spin on CCTV-News had the effect of 
reinforcing the solution-focused responsibility frame. A CCTV reporter spoke of 
'strengthening the efforts against corruption [and] protecting the environment'59: on 
the BBC, by contrast, the talk was of ‘the crackdown on corruption’60 and 
‘environmental damage'61, reflecting negativity and the conflict frame. A report on 
women's rights quoted female representatives at the Two Sessions as saying that 
'women need to be given more of an opportunity to contribute to society'62 – a 
solution-focused frame rather than outright blame for those deemed to be holding 
women back. Scripts originating in the newsroom were often more uncritical than 
those on location. Occasionally  the Western style of the reporting jarred with the 
Chinese media’s obligation to be the ‘tongue and throat’ of the Party, such as when a 
CCTV presenter asked Tian Wei as she reported live from outside the Great Hall of the 
People63, 'What measure to encourage growth under the economic new normal 
impressed you the most?' 
5.4.3 The stability frame 
The two programmes diverged in their treatment of the stability frame. For CCTV 
News Hour stability was allied with harmony brought about by government policies, 
whereas BBC Newsday conveyed stability visually, as control exercised by an 
authoritarian state. On Newsday, this was often achieved through pictures selected by 
programme producers rather than in Beijing. A BBC correspondent, reporting from 
outside the Great Hall of the People, spoke about economic reforms and 
environmental worries under a 'float' of images overlaid by the production team that 
began with close-ups of marching Chinese soldiers against a background of Chinese 
national flags.64 Another brief item65, again compiled by the production team, used 
footage of soldiers in Tiananmen Square at dawn to illustrate a routine trail of the 
third day of the National People's Congress. Sometimes the use of the stability frame 
was deliberate, such as when the BBC’s China editor linked the fight against 
                                                        
59 Su Yuting, CCTV News Hour, 2 March 2015. 
60 Presenter script, BBC Newsday, 5 March 2015. 
61 Presenter script, BBC Newsday, 6 March 2015. 
62 Wu Guoxiu, CCTV News Hour, 7 March 2015. 
63 CCTV News Hour, 6 March 2015. 
64 Martin Patience, BBC Newsday, 5 March 2015. 
65 Presenter script, BBC Newsday, 8 March 2015. 
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corruption with the viability of the state.66 She concluded, under pictures of soldiers 
outside the Great Hall of the People: 'China's House of Cards: a high-stakes game.' 
CCTV News Hour linked the stability frame with harmony in reference to 
Xinjiang, where it adjudged the government capable of promoting inter-ethnic peace. 
On CCTV it was the Han majority rather than Uyghur or other minority ethnic groups 
who were seen to be in need of government action, with one item focusing on a move 
away from 'preferential policies for ethnic minorities'.67 Terrorism was presented 
several times as a 'challenge facing China'68 involving international groups such as 
Islamic State rather than possessing any domestic roots. One departure from this 
depiction of a unified state was the explicit mention by News Hour of a 'huge disparity 
in the education resources between rural and urban areas in China' which the 
government needed to address.69 
5.4.4 The human interest frame 
The absence of the human interest frame from much of the coverage of the Two 
Sessions by both broadcasters was striking. On BBC Newsday, the impression 
conveyed was that nothing engaging could be expected to come out of a diary item 
involving meetings whose delegates were not considered representative of the 
population: 'In the People’s Republic of China, the people are not invited.'70 The only 
BBC coverage that invoked the human interest frame was a spinoff feature, ‘pegged’ 
to the pollution debate at the Two Sessions, that dealt with the popularity and 
subsequent suppression of the environmental campaigning film, Under The Dome. An 
extract from the film in the BBC report featured a little Chinese girl admitting that, 
because of the polluted night sky, she had never seen the stars71.  
On CCTV News Hour, the tendency to compile barrages of statistics and broad-
brush treatments of national issues militated against any notion of human interest. 
CCTV’s summary of alleged corruption by officials72 was devoid of potential audience 
engagement, noting baldly that 'from 8 to 28' senior government officials had been 
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investigated along with more than 14,000 public servants, and 749 alleged fugitives 
from justice had been sent back to China. The revision of China's legislation law – a 
concept unknown to most potential overseas viewers and difficult to convey on 
television – was presented initially as a succession of 'talking heads'. When CCTV's 
political analyst mistakenly spoke of Xi Jinping's 'Three Comprehensives', the 
presenter corrected him immediately – 'Four Comprehensives' – without a flicker of a 
smile.73  A day later, by contrast, a report from Shenzhen74 provided a more practical 
illustration, noting that the law revision would end cavalier decision-making such as 
the sudden announcement of a licence-plate lottery for the city's car-buyers. The 
Shenzhen report was similar in tone to the special series for the Two Sessions entitled 
'Agenda in Action' which is analysed in the next section. 
5.4.5 CCTV’s Agenda in Action series 
The 'Agenda in Action' reports were a series of 14 short features by the experienced 
CCTV-News reporters Han Bin and Han Peng for the 2015 Two Sessions, mostly on 
location around China. They profiled a variety of individuals and set out their 
problems and choices, from scientific research to border security, from prosecuting 
corrupt officials to facing unemployment. Their aim was to investigate 'China's 
pressing issues and the impact of government policies on the people'75, and an 
introductory strapline exuded positive rhetoric: 'Building the Chinese Dream: Chinese 
Strive for Better Life Under New Normal'. However, as Table 5-3 shows, the framing 
was different from CCTV News Hour‘s general Two Sessions coverage. There were 
particular increases in the incidence of the conflict, human interest and attribution of 
causal responsibility frames, and the frame evocation in the Agenda in Action pieces 
was denser in every category.  
In general the Agenda in Action pieces sketched out two different social vistas: 
one of entrepreneurship and hope in a rapidly modernising China – sometimes 
illustrated by speeded-up video of cityscapes – and the other a bleak picture of social 
or environmental problems that had not (yet?) been overcome. The reports pulled 
few punches and led the narrative into areas that could be considered uncomfortable 
for the authorities. However, most of them held out at least the prospect of a solution. 
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This double purpose was evident in a report from a drug rehabilitation centre in 
Guizhou76 with a 'dismal rate of relapse'. The report detailed the suffering of a 
repeatedly relapsing drug addict, but also promoted a nationwide 'war on drugs'. On 
another day, the reporter wandered round the deserted streets of an Inner Mongolian 
city built for a boom that never came and talked to a redundant construction worker 
forced to sweep the streets to make ends meet77.  
Table 5-3 Agenda in Action frames and percentages, with overall CCTV lianghui frames for comparison 
Frame Agenda in Action reports CCTV lianghui average 
Conflict 57.1 17.1 
Economic consequences 42.9 19.4 
Human interest 57.1 9.3 
Causal responsibility 64.3 18.6 
Solution-oriented responsibility 85.7 76.0 
Morality 7.1 5.4 
Stability 14.3 10.1 
Harmony 14.3 13.2 
The conflict frame manifested itself in the struggles of Chinese individuals 
against what they saw as injustice – the street photographer in Hunan described as a 
'soldier on the battlefield in the fight against pollution'78, and the delegates and 
deputies who had voted against measures at previous Two Sessions79. The conflict 
frame was also portrayed as a peaceful pushback against Western influence and 
Western depiction of China as an aggressor. An example of this was when People's 
Liberation Army soldiers were filmed preparing for deployment with UN 
peacekeepers in South Sudan: 'a clear sign that the Chinese army is ready to go to the 
front line for world peace.' 80. 
The conflict frame was also present in retrospect, when a conflict was seen to 
have been resolved thanks to the efforts of the authorities. This was similar to the 
solution-oriented responsibility frame but with extra bite, as officials were seen to 
have been implicated in a serious problem: that this could be reported on CCTV is a 
sign of progress. Reporter Han Peng travelled to Inner Mongolia81 to report on the 
cause célèbre of a youth executed for a murder he did not commit, hearing from family 
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and witnesses that the youth had been tortured by the police and that, after the real 
killer was eventually caught, his parents were still blocked from petitioning for him to 
be cleared. The reporter concluded that 'the lesson for China of building stronger rule 
of law has been learned by the blood and tears of ordinary people'.  
The more muscular style of reporting in Agenda in Action also meant a higher 
incidence of the attribution of causal responsibility frame. The economic slowdown, 
referred to more charitably elsewhere as 'the new normal', was shown here to mean 
that 'a lot of Guangdong's migrant workers are unemployed and returning to the 
farms. This is likely to push them back into poverty.'82 An introduction to a 
subsequent Agenda in Action piece asserted that 'what's being called China's new 
normal could mean wages going unpaid and businesses shutting down'.83 
The human interest frame was prominent in Agenda in Action because each 
report focused on named individuals, such as the soldier Wang Yinhua standing guard 
against terrorism in Xinjiang, and Liu Ke the environmentalist photographer in Hunan. 
Personalisation of the Xinjiang reports meant that the human interest narrative was 
more noticeable than the references to stability. Abduany, a Uyghur trader, blamed 
the decline of his business on terrorism which he said meant that 'people from other 
ethnic groups do not want to visit Kashgar any more'84. Indeed, Uyghurs were 
portrayed throughout as those who suffered most from lack of ethnic harmony in 
Xinjiang.   
However wily and experienced the reporters, the Xinjiang features 
demonstrated the 'red lines' that demarcated what could and could not be said. In 
Han Peng's report from Kashgar, there was no mention of Uyghur opposition to the 
demolition of much of the old city's traditional housing stock: government and 
residents were said merely to 'have been co-investing in renovations' in which 
Uyghurs were paid to bring tourists into their homes85. In the report from Hainan 
about the problems for fishermen caused by the disputes in the South China Sea, the 
conflict and 'blame' frames reasserted themselves whenever China's neighbours were 
mentioned: an ancient log-book was produced as evidence of China's historical claim 
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to the waters, but the claim was not tested in any wider context86. 
The Agenda in Action series was billed as a 'link between the people and their 
representatives'87, which is consistent with the role of Chinese media under 
Communist Party rule. However, the final report in the series which summed up how 
people saw the government's reform policies did not attempt to present a rosy view. 
A factory worker, for example, was shown saying, 'the policies are something I can't 
feel and have failed to bring me real benefits.'88  The frame analysis demonstrates that 
the Agenda in Action series offered a more robust reporting style than CCTV News 
Hour‘s traditional fare: however, it should not be confused with the type of free 
investigative journalism that would have held the authorities fully to account. 
5.5 Contexts and observations 
News about China on BBC World Newsday and CCTV News Hour in the period studied 
was not confined to the lunar new year and the Two Sessions. Table 5-4 shows how 
the percentage allocation of China news by topic differed. For BBC Newsday, the 
colourful lunar new year festivities were more attractive than discussions at the Two 
Sessions, but neither ‘diary event’ was as important as the BBC’s own selection of 
China news. For CCTV News Hour, the Two Sessions were dominant. 
Table 5-4 Percentage distribution of China news, 16 February-15 March 2015 
 Lunar new year Two Sessions Other China news 
BBC Newsday 24.5 19.7 55.8 
CCTV News Hour 14.5 55.8 29.7 
CCTV’s general news about China was weighted towards economics and also 
covered society and crime, whereas the BBC’s general China news favoured conflict 
and security along with social issues. CCTV News Hour reflected the rapid growth in 
online trade and technical innovation in China through a series of reports on the rise 
of the e-commerce company Alibaba89 along with 'China Startup' features narrated by 
young entrepreneurs90. BBC Newsday‘s main business-related contribution, by 
contrast, reflected the wider issue of China's interaction with the world, in L'Oréal's 
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use of new technology to aid recruitment in Shanghai91. 
BBC Newsday‘s most prominent piece of reporting on China was an 
investigation into the child kidnap trade92, an undertaking consistent with the drive 
for 'original journalism' in BBC News. Correspondent Martin Patience recounted the 
scale of the operation, in which as many as 20,000 children were abducted in China 
every year, and a Chinese colleague posed as a buyer to contact a seller online. There 
was no such investigative journalism on CCTV News Hour, but the programme ran 
features illustrating current social problems: these included why Chinese couples 
were reluctant to have a second child despite the easing of restrictions,93 and 
prejudice against mixed marriages involving African migrants and Chinese residents 
in Guangzhou94. Both broadcasters covered unrest in Hong Kong about parallel 
trading, but did so differently:  BBC Newsday aired clashes involving police, protesters 
and pepper spray95, while CCTV News Hour showed police warnings against 
disruption of social order96. 
More contrasts in reporting were evident in coverage of the first anniversary 
of the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 with more than 150 Chinese 
people on board. CCTV News Hour did not report from China at all on the MH370 
aftermath apart from conveying the comments of its foreign minister Wang Yi97: it ran 
several items from reporters in Malaysia and Australia. The BBC covered the 
anniversary from Shanghai, where a correspondent visited a bereaved family 
'trapped in their grief' and reported relatives' accusations that the Chinese authorities 
had treated the plane's disappearance as a sensitive political problem rather than a 
national tragedy98. In other international news involving China, CCTV News Hour 
spent several minutes on China's assumption of the rotating presidency of the United 
Nations Security Council and its vision of a 'new form of international relations’99: 
there was no coverage of this on BBC Newsday. The first visit to China in 30 years by a 
member of the British royal family, however, was covered extensively by both 
channels. The attention paid by CCTV to Prince William’s visit indicated an attempt to 
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appeal to a Western audience through the use of safely non-political subject-matter. 
A series of CCTV features that had no equivalent on the BBC was News Hour‘s 
sequence of reports on foreigners 'living the China Dream'100. The subjects included a 
long-serving Indian journalist on the China Daily and the Filipino former CNN bureau 
chief who had spent more than four decades in Beijing. The features were generally 
highly complimentary towards China: the ex-CNN journalist, Jaime FlorCruz, 
observed that 'every small change in China is a hard-earned achievement'101 and the 
Indian writer Ravi Shankar praised the 'increasingly liberal' atmosphere102. The 
series appeared to have been made by CCTV's Mandarin journalists and re-versioned 
with a newsroom voice-over in English: the primarily Anglophone subjects of the 
series spoke in Chinese. 
Interviewed about their respective editorial agendas and their attitudes to 
'diary news' compared with chasing stories, a range of journalists from both the BBC 
and CCTV expressed frustration: the BBC because of the difficulties of gathering and 
explaining news about China to foreign audiences, and CCTV-News because of 
information control, organisational problems and what staff perceived as a lack of 
professionalism. For BBC interviewees, the relatively small number of China stories 
broadcast on TV in the periods studied here, as well as the aversion to the Two 
Sessions, could be ascribed to the non-televisual nature of the subject-matter. As the 
BBC's Asia bureaux chief put it, China represented the story of a country in change, or 
'process news as opposed to event news… That's very hard to compete with things 
that go bang in the Middle East.'103 A BBC correspondent took it further: 
In the West you obviously need a top line – so the president gives a speech, President 
Obama for example: he speaks English, he speaks clearly, he speaks in soundbites, 
they can all be played out. You have a speech by President Xi… the impact is lost in 
translation and then the points he makes are often done in a kind of non-direct 
fashion, which is part Chinese culture – but that doesn’t lend itself to news, because 
you’re guessing at the true intent of it. And yes, you can get correspondents to try and 
decipher what he’s really trying to say, but you can never say with any certainty. So 
that loses impact: so that affects coverage.104 
A BBC news editor said the appointment in 2014 of China editor Carrie Gracie, a 
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Mandarin speaker with long experience of reporting on China, had done much to 
broaden the agenda. However, the news editor pointed out that the BBC's best-
resourced TV news programme was the domestic 10pm bulletin, and many 
deployment decisions depended upon its funding. 
The 'Ten' is commissioning most of the features and they want… stories about China 
they can understand: stories that happen very quickly, stories where people’s rights 
are infringed because the system works differently there… They can’t understand 
long, slow, political, incremental stories. They don’t work very well on TV and they’re 
very difficult.105  
Despite this, interviewees were keen to rebut Chinese charges that BBC TV coverage 
on China over-emphasised human rights. Several journalists said the incidence of 
non-negative news about life in China on the BBC had risen in recent years. However, 
the BBC's Asia bureaux chief termed human rights 'a massive indicator of the political 
health of any country: how they treat people who don't agree' and defended repeated 
attempts to report from scenes of conflict or dissent such as Wenzhou or Xinjiang: 
Going to Xinjiang is expensive, it takes time, you get arrested, you sometimes come 
back with just a few frames. But if we don’t try, no-one does. We reckon there were 
300 to 350 people killed in the last 12 months, maybe up to 1,000. That is a proper 
insurgency…  If it wasn’t so difficult, we’d be there more often. 
Two factors, conflict and democracy, were seen by BBC interviewees as key in 
determining coverage. A news producer observed that a democratic worldview was 
implicit in every decision: 'Why do we think certain stories are stories? Because 
they’re a wrong, or an injustice, or whatever.'106 The editor of BBC World Service 
News affirmed that an emphasis on deviance made for better news: 
‘Town survives 20 years without riot, with no corruption’: OK, fine, put it in a 
souvenir brochure but it’s not a news story. ‘Town suffers riots because of corruption’: 
actually, that’s a story…  What news wants is things which are out of the ordinary... 
and which hold authority to account rather than tell authority they’re doing a good 
job.107 
 A range of CCTV-News journalists, interviewed for this research, were in no 
doubt that their channel would be judged on its news about China and found wanting. 
The domestic reporting team was seen as inadequate, both in numbers and quality, 
and its reports were adjudged to lack originality. Reporters themselves complained of 
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being short of time to craft stories because they usually had no producers and had to 
set up everything on their own. A senior journalist at CCTV-News said management 
'send us the junior-level reporters because they may think the reporter is the lowest 
level of worker of the whole production' and bemoaned the 'Cold War mentality that 
your Chinese stories can only be told by Chinese'108. Some interviewees said using 
foreigners to report on China would help raise professional standards, but this was 
not a universal attitude. A producer argued that it was 'not convenient' to have 
foreigners reporting on Chinese affairs because 'they cannot understand China or the 
way people do things.'109  
 The planners of daily coverage also came in for criticism for not responding to 
producers' requests for 'people stories'. What was frequently broadcast instead, in 
the words of a former CCTV producer, was 'a lot of explanatory journalism to convey 
the message… it's pretty much events-oriented.'110  The necessity of re-versioning 
material generated by CCTV's Mandarin news – described by one CCTV-News 
producer as a 'political task'111 – provoked mixed feelings. On one hand, it was seen as 
an opportunity for the channel to air well-resourced 'human stories' produced by the 
Mandarin channel, while on the other, vagueness in the scripts often caused 
translation problems. Lack of co-operation between newsrooms was said to have 
resulted in CCTV-News writers, given no information about the speakers in a 
Mandarin report, having to reverse-translate Western or Japanese names from 
Chinese video dopesheets. One producer said that, if translation questions remained 
unanswered,  
I can Google or find out whatever I can from online to see what’s really going on. 
Do you get Google? 
No. Using VPN.   
You use a VPN at work?  
Yeah.... it’s OK.112 
Problems also surfaced when CCTV-News, short of infrastructure itself, had to share 
technical facilities. 
In order for CCTV-News sometimes to get things done, they have to work closely with 
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Mandarin, which is working to different programmes such as [CCTV's prime national 
nightly news broadcast in Chinese] Xinwen Lianbo. So if in that context they’re being 
very careful about what’s being said and what kinds of stories they’re doing, it limits 
what CCTV-News can do.113 
 By far the biggest constraint mentioned by CCTV-News interviewees was 
constant information control that ran counter to their professional instincts. While 
this attenuated the political risks for managers, many staff wanted to do the best job 
they could in what they admitted were perilous circumstances. 
We’ve a lot of bosses, and they oversee what we’re doing. And if we want to be bold, 
and we want to get across some kind of line, it’s very dangerous… The directors of the 
channel and also the programme, they know what kind of news the boss would not 
like to see on the screen. So that’s what we call self-screening.114 
Nobody’s saying what you cannot do, but also nobody’s saying what you can do. Not 
doing anything is safe: doing something is dangerous. This is the system… How can 
you encourage all the journalists in the newsroom [who] want to do something 
dangerous? There’s only one way: under the banner of professionalism… We do not 
have that banner. 115 
Sometimes, the line of least resistance appeared inevitable. A CCTV-News journalist 
recalled Xi Jinping making a routine trip outside Beijing on the day Islamic State 
beheaded a British hostage. The journalist had admitted that there was 'no point' 
leading with the breaking news, Islamic State, as a senior colleague would have 
changed it to the Chinese president. On other occasions, however, there was room for 
manoeuvre. 
Sometimes we fight with the orders that come down to us. Most of the time we cannot 
make the changes we want, but three times out of 10 we can make a change.116 
The idea of an ad hoc, negotiated editorial line was borne out by other interviewees, 
who suggested that it could depend on who in authority was on shift. 
There are two deputy directors who have somewhat different attitudes towards what 
I would call edgy stories. And one will consistently say no, we’re not doing that, and 
the other will consistently say yes, let’s try that. Each of those deputy directors is 
effectively in control of the news for a week and then they switch, and you get two 
different bulletins.117 
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A long-serving foreign member of the editorial staff pointed out that change had come 
gradually at CCTV-News: the channel used to ignore foreign leaders' criticisms of 
China in its reporting, but would now broadcast them along with China's rebuttals.118 
Such incremental development was not enough for other interviewees. They argued 
that, somewhat paradoxically, only increased foreign participation in the channel 
could give China a professional voice in the TV Anglosphere. A Chinese interviewee 
made it clear that more international involvement did not mean adopting an Anglo-
American agenda, but rather improving technical standards along with professional 
benchmarks such as objectivity and ‘balance of reporting’.119 A foreign ex-employee 
said the inclusion of non-Chinese reporters had broader ramifications: 
I think the more foreigners they’ve brought into the system, the more they’ve become 
comfortable with the way other people report stories – and the more they do, and the 
more criticism that doesn’t come their way, they understand that they can broaden 
their reporting.120 
Those still working at CCTV-News, however, were less optimistic, perceiving a gulf 
between the recruitment of seasoned foreign journalists and that of young Chinese 
graduates who had often specialised in languages rather than journalism: 
The sad thing is that I see a lot of intelligent, keen young graduates, Chinese graduates 
coming in… and they spend their whole time translating, or copying-and-pasting from 
Xinhua and being discouraged from asking questions or chasing things further. So I 
will go to a writer and say, this is missing... Usually it’s ‘where’ or ‘when’… – the 
basics…. And they don’t know. The Chinese script will say ‘Xi Jinping meets Putin in 
Beijing’... And I will say to them, has he met him, or is he going to meet him this 
afternoon or tomorrow? And they say, I don’t know.121 
5.6 Conclusion 
The frame analysis indicates that CCTV News Hour contrived to crush the festive spirit 
of the 2015 lunar new year by means of an authoritarian, de-humanised editorial 
focus, while relieving the monotony of the Two Sessions through vibrant personal 
storytelling in its Agenda in Action feature series. Even Agenda in Action, however, 
could be said to resemble the sub-editing of the first rough draft of history rather 
than its creation. 'People stories' helped convey the urgent need for solutions to some 
of China's biggest problems and questioned to some extent how the authorities would 
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go about finding them, but they were in essence illustrations and did not break new 
ground. Agenda in Action apart, the Two Sessions coverage on CCTV News Hour, like 
that of the lunar new year, lacked frame density, an attribute betraying anaemic 
reporting that rarely made the transition from conduit of information to journalism. 
The Anglo-American look of much of CCTV News Hour‘s Two Sessions output could 
not conceal the station's mission to report on predictable and stage-managed 
proceedings. Having said this, the greater the distance between CCTV’s reporters and 
the Beijing newsroom, the less evidence there was of the state media narrative tail 
wagging the dog.  
The quantitative content analysis allowed much to be inferred about the view 
of Chinese officialdom and its message to the world, but far less about how China saw 
its place in any new global order or how it might interact with other cultures. While 
CCTV News Hour offered much more coverage of East Asia and less of the Americas 
than BBC World’s Newsday in the five constructed weeks of analysis, 'East Asia' on 
CCTV consisted mainly of China. Little interest was observed in the construction of 
any news narrative about the rise of developing countries such as the other members 
of the BRICS group. The global and Chinese news topics favoured by CCTV-News and 
BBC World News in the period of analysis were superficially similar, but this masked 
big differences in approach. This was particularly the case in news from China itself, 
where nearly all of CCTV-News's reporters were Chinese nationals. 
BBC World News did not consider the lunar new year or Two Sessions as news 
priorities and appeared content to mine received narrative seams while saving 
resources for more investigative forms of journalism elsewhere, such as the feature 
on the child kidnap trade. The Two Sessions in particular was emblematic of the 
difficulties encountered by foreign journalists when trying to extract a 'news line' 
from official Chinese pronouncements and convey it to audiences abroad. Editorial 
choices on BBC Newsday, like those on CCTV News Hour, were in any case influenced 
by more powerful and better resourced parts of their organisations which were 
following a domestic agenda. 
Away from set-pieces, the British and Chinese newsrooms’ journalistic 
priorities could be observed in less predictable settings. Two instances of breaking, 
developing news involving China allowed closer inspection of the channels’ attitudes 
to dramatic and prosaic footage, democracy and authority, constructivity and 
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criticism. The news events were the 2014 Hong Kong protests and the sinking of a 





6 China and its discontents: Hong Kong and the Yangtze 
6.1 Introduction 
Breaking news, as Lewis and Cushion (2009:305) point out, has 'quickly gone from 
being a possibility to a convention, one that defines our 24-hour news culture'. Events 
that arise unexpectedly and develop in unforeseen ways pose challenges to the triple 
purpose of 24-hour news channels: to provide an up-to-date news bulletin, to cover 
live news, and to provide some context and analysis (Lewis, Cushion & Thomas 
2005:461). The Hong Kong electoral protests of 2014 and the capsize of a cruise ship 
on the Yangtze river in June 2015 were both unforeseen and mostly unpredictable 
major news events. Their treatment by BBC World News TV and CCTV-News forms an 
analytical counterweight to the scheduled, 'diary' coverage of the lunar new year (春
节 chunjie) and Two Sessions (两会 lianghui) in the previous chapter. 
Both the Hong Kong protests and the Yangtze capsize were subjected to 
vigorous information control by the Chinese authorities although this did not, 
eventually, preclude copious reporting of either event. The comparative content 
analysis that follows is of a snapshot of news output on selected BBC World News and 
CCTV-News programmes, albeit in the case of Hong Kong one that covered 80 
consecutive days. Editorial turnover in 24-hour news is such that this cannot claim to 
be an exhaustive account of news treatment of either topic, especially with respect to 
the BBC whose material also covers radio and the internet. However, interviews with 
journalists involved in the coverage help explain the overall rationale behind both 
broadcasters' editorial decisions.  
6.2 The Hong Kong protests 
6.2.1 Background to the Hong Kong election reform protests 
From late September until mid-December 2014, thousands of people, sometimes 
many tens of thousands, demonstrated in and occupied key areas of Hong Kong, 
accusing China of imposing restrictions on promised electoral reform in the territory. 
The student-led action was in protest at the decision of the Chinese National People's 
Congress Standing Committee in August 2014 that a nominating committee must be 
set up to screen prospective candidates for Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special 
Autonomous Region in the territory's first elections by universal suffrage, scheduled 
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for 2017. Among the Standing Committee's stipulations were that any future Chief 
Executive be 'a person who loves the country and loves Hong Kong': after being 
'selected' by voters, as the statement put it, the prospective chief executive would 
'have to be appointed' by the government in Beijing (Xinhua 2014). 
Student class boycotts and demonstrations organised by two groups, 
Scholarism and the Hong Kong Federation of Students, began on 22 September 2014. 
When the pressure group, Occupy Central with Love and Peace, brought its own 
planned protest forward to 28 September, the actions merged into a single huge 
demonstration on Hong Kong island near Admiralty. Police teargassing of protesters – 
a rare occurrence – prompted more people to come onto the streets. Demonstrators 
congregated in two further areas, Mongkok and Causeway Bay. The three sites, 
including several main roads, remained barricaded and occupied by protesters for 
two-and-a-half months. The sole substantive attempt at talks between Hong Kong 
government representatives and student leaders, on 21 October, was inconclusive. 
The occupation, punctuated by sporadic clashes, persisted until police enforced court 
orders to clear the sites in December. 
6.2.2 Data and specific methods 
The analysis started on 28 September 2014, when police teargassed thousands of 
demonstrators. It finished on 16 December, the morning after the Hong Kong 
authorities declared the last street occupation over. One news programme a day was 
recorded on both channels and the Hong Kong content, if present, was subjected to 
quantitative content and frame analysis with the aid of video files1. The unit of 
analysis was the news story, n=287 (BBC n=120, CCTV n=167). Variables 
encompassed the format and location of coverage, categories of speakers in the news 
reports, nature of the pictures shown, and the quantitative part of the generic 
'framework of frames' outlined in Chapter 4. As this was a story that developed over 
time, the framing data were not only tabulated but also fed into graphs that plotted a 
5-day centred moving average of the daily incidence of each frame per broadcaster: 
these quantitative representations were then interpreted qualitatively.  
85% of the news coverage was recorded in the Hong Kong morning: the 
default programmes were the 30-minute BBC Newsday at 0000/0100 British time 
                                                        
1 See Appendix 6A for analysis sheet. 
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and CCTV News Update at 0200/0300 British time2. Occasionally, especially at the 
start of the protests when news moved quickly and story turnover was high, reports 
from later in the day were analysed instead so that key events were not missed. 10 
BBC global news staff and 13 from CCTV-News were interviewed: they included those 
who reported or produced from Hong Kong itself, as well as editorial staff at 
headquarters. 
6.2.3 Ofcom complaint against CCTV-News 
In 2015 the UK communications regulator Ofcom found CCTV-News in breach of its 
broadcasting code for having 'failed to preserve due impartiality' in its reporting of 
the Hong Kong protests (Ofcom 2015:38). Ofcom's investigation related to four news 
bulletins from 30 September to 3 October 2014, in which it ruled that CCTV-News had 
failed to give fair airtime to supporters of the Occupy protests. It dismissed CCTV's 
contention that the editorial balance of its output should be judged over a longer 
period. The Ofcom complaint is re-evaluated here in light of the extended data. 
6.2.4 Overview of the analysis 
In this analysis, even the term ‘Hong Kong protests’ was open to interpretation. CCTV 
interviewees assumed it meant the street demonstrations, whereas for BBC 
journalists it encompassed the wider battle over plans for electoral reform. Naming 
and framing were important. CCTV would refer to ‘protesters’ and ‘residents’ as 
though the two did not overlap: the BBC concentrated on the protest sites to such an 
extent that the views of non-demonstrators were rarely in evidence. The quantitative 
analysis shows that pictorial differences were not, in the long run, as great as might 
have been expected, but that the broadcasters diverged widely in their choice of 
speakers and frames. What was presented by one as a struggle for democracy was for 
the other (at least initially) a nuisance, a threat or simply a drain on the economy. 
Firstly, it is important to note how the coverage began. For CCTV-News, even 
reporting on the story was a challenge. 
6.2.4.1 Information control 
While most of this section deals with how the Hong Kong protests were treated by 
                                                        
2
 The protests straddled the switch from BST to GMT and exact times are shown in the references. 
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CCTV-News up until National Day on 1 October, it should be borne in mind that BBC 
World News TV showed little enthusiasm for the 'student democracy' story before the 
scenes of violence on 28 September. Two features setting up the student action ran on 
Newsday the previous week but, as one correspondent put it, 'basically before the 
teargassing there wasn't much interest at all... after that, everything changed. After 
the teargassing everybody came.'3 
Figure 6-1 Screenshots of Hong Kong coverage at 1300 BST 28 September 2014 on CCTV-News China24 
(left) and BBC World News (right) 
  
Analysis of output at 1300 BST on 28 September, early evening Hong Kong time 
(Figure 6-1), highlights the two broadcasters' differing reactions to the outbreak of 
violence. The BBC World News headlines started with the sound of a volley of teargas, 
pictures of teargas arcing over the crowd, and the declaration that 'Hong Kong's pro-
democracy protests have taken a violent turn'. A live interview showed the veteran 
democracy campaigner Martin Lee saying that things were 'going terribly wrong 
because Beijing is now in charge'. 1300 BST was also when CCTV's daily live news 
programme on China itself, China24, went to air. Hong Kong was not mentioned in the 
headlines. After about ten minutes, the programme reported the announcement by 
Hong Kong's chief executive CY Leung that new consultations would begin soon on 
electoral reform 'after a weekend of protests by activists calling for greater 
freedoms'4. There was no reference to teargas and there were no pictures of the 
protests. CY Leung was quoted as calling the main demonstration 'the unlawful 
occupation action by Occupy Central'. The position of the Chinese government was 
explained with graphics illustrating Beijing's declared backing for the Hong Kong 
government's stance on the proposed electoral reforms. At 2000 BST, CCTV News 
                                                        
3 Interview ref. BCFG49. 
4 This was one of two instances in this analysis in which a CCTV news script contained the word 
‘freedom(s)’ in the context of Hong Kong: the other concerned freedom of the press. The word was also 
used several times in CCTV’s output by third-party speakers including (in translation) a spokesman for 
the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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America omitted Hong Kong from its headlines and referred viewers to the 
forthcoming repeat broadcast of China24.   
By the following day, 29 September at 0400 BST, all mention of Hong Kong had 
disappeared from CCTV-News. At 2200 BST, CCTV America news carried a down-
bulletin reference to China opposing any foreign interference in the election process 
in Hong Kong. On 30 September, again, there was initially no coverage of Hong Kong: 
at 0400 BST CCTV-News ran copious coverage of China's leaders attending the 
inaugural Martyrs' Day ceremony. Hong Kong resurfaced in the 1600 BST News 
Update, in which the Occupy Central movement was said to have 'badly affected 
people's daily lives' by restricting trade and traffic. A Chinese foreign affairs ministry 
spokeswoman stated that people had 'rallied illegally and carried out Occupy Central 
activities', the nature of which was unexplained. This coverage was consistent with a 
propaganda directive leaked on 28 September (China Digital Times 2014). 
No footage of Occupy protesters or the street barricades they had erected was 
shown on CCTV-News until 3 October, nearly a week after the protests had made 
headlines in the West. By then, BBC World News TV had sent in two of its Beijing 
correspondents, and a BBC programme team had been broadcasting live from the 
main Hong Kong protest site for four days. While the coverage (as such) on CCTV-
News was consistent with that on other mainland Chinese outlets, the atmosphere 
among CCTV-News journalists was of exasperation that they were prevented from 
competing with Anglophone coverage elsewhere. 
Our hands are tied. Every news channel is doing that reporting: we can only sit and 
watch... We have a Hong Kong bureau and they are not allowed to do anything.5 
 
 We were told not to [cover Hong Kong]. We were not allowed to. It's not the chief 
editors who decide. There are always people in a higher position... We were quite 
frustrated, because it's a big thing and we like to send our reporters.6 
 
One of the Chinese anchors was sitting there with CNN on his laptop and a VPN7 on, 
with the speaker on in the newsroom, and it was all live coverage. They all knew 
about it, so what's the point in one of us standing up and saying, why aren't we 
covering this?8 
                                                        
5 Interview ref. CGPC22. 
6 Interview ref. CCPC09. 
7 VPN = Virtual Private Network: software enabling users to bypass Chinese internet restrictions. 
8 Interview ref. CGPG15. 
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A former CCTV-News journalist said the timing of the Hong Kong protests put 
the management in 'a very awkward position... The traditional editorial concern for 
Chinese media is that everything leading up to the national day holiday (1 October) is 
supposed to be stability, prosperity…  everything has to be harmonious, well in 
control.'9 Separate sources reported a heated debate in news meetings about how to 
cover the protests, and whether to send in an experienced international CCTV 
reporter normally based outside China, an idea that was eventually dropped. 
However, after National Day some on-the-ground coverage did begin, and this is 
evaluated in the following sections. 
6.2.5 Quantitative content analysis:  the Hong Kong coverage in figures 
6.2.5.1 Who tells the story? 
On-the-ground correspondents took control of more of the overall narrative in the 
BBC's Hong Kong reporting in this study than on CCTV-News. Reporter two-ways, cut 
stories and 'rants'10 from Hong Kong on the BBC made up 43.3% of all instances of 
coverage, compared with 32.9% on CCTV. At one time or another, all of the BBC's 
correspondents in China were involved in the coverage: four from mainland China 
and two from Hong Kong. A news presenter was twice sent from London to anchor 
live coverage. For CCTV-News, two Hong Kong-based correspondents were 
reinforced by rotating deployments of four reporters from mainland China.11 The 
CCTV-News studio presenter controlled more than 60% of the news items analysed – 
almost twice the percentage of the BBC – either through narration or by introducing 
clips of speakers. The British broadcaster, by contrast, relied on presenter-led 
interviews with analysts or protagonists for nearly 17% of its coverage, compared 
with less than 2% on CCTV.12 
6.2.5.2 Who gets to speak? 
It was in the categories of people whose voices were aired in clips, interviews or news 
reports that differences between the BBC and CCTV-News were most pronounced. As 
                                                        
9 Interview ref. CGPC13. 
10 Unscripted, informal recorded narration to camera: can be overlaid with other footage (‘painted 
rant’). 
11 Visa restrictions for mainland Chinese meant only short stays in Hong Kong were possible. 
12 One person was interviewed, in very similar terms, by both broadcasters: Victor Gao, the 
commentator and former English interpreter for China's erstwhile paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. 
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Figure 6-2 indicates, nearly half (48.5%) of CCTV-News reports, on average, 
contained a soundbite from an official – most often the Hong Kong Chief Executive C Y 
Leung, spokespeople from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs or high-ranking 
police. For the BBC such official voices featured in just over 14% of coverage, most of 
them officials from the Chinese and Hong Kong governments. The BBC ran clips of 
three other Hong Kong politicians, two of whom were pro-democracy and one pro-
Beijing. CCTV-News featured eight, who were all pro-Beijing.  
Figure 6-2 Percentage of Hong Kong news reports in which speakers appear 
 
In the category marked 'elite', which includes analysts, experts and business 
leaders, CCTV featured voices from the business community 23 times and the BBC 
just once. In the 'public' category – which includes both pro- and anti-Occupy 
protesters – the BBC broadcast twice as high a percentage of voices as CCTV (62.3% 
compared with 30.7%). Here there was the greatest polarisation. The BBC aired 43 
soundbites with Occupy protesters compared with 13 on CCTV, of whom three were 
students saying they refused to talk to CCTV. By contrast, CCTV included the voices of 
15 anti-Occupy demonstrators and the BBC just one. 
6.2.5.3 Who and what is on screen? 
Here there were big disparities, although not always where they were expected. 
CCTV-News aired pictures of business and government more often than the BBC (in 
21.6% and 34.1% of all news items respectively, to the BBC's 10% and 1.7%). The 































compared with CCTV's 38.3%. The BBC showed a higher proportion of clashes at the 
protests than CCTV – in more than a quarter (28.3%) of its news items, compared 
with CCTV’s 9%. More remarkable, however, was CCTV's fondness for showing 
images of barricades, mostly devoid of protesters. Barricades featured in almost 40% 
of CCTV's news items studied here: more than twice as often as on the BBC. Finally, 
although BBC correspondents were frequently pictured at the scene of the protests – 
nearly two-thirds of their pieces to camera were from protest sites – CCTV 
correspondents were there too. More than a quarter of CCTV pieces to camera were 
from the protests, and a similar number from the streets a short distance away. 
6.2.6 Frame analysis: how the Hong Kong protests were covered 
Table 6-1 Overall incidence of frames in the Hong Kong coverage per broadcast news item (% of news 
items in which a given frame was evoked): items can contain more than one frame 
FRAME BBC WORLD NEWS CCTV-NEWS 
Conflict 81.7 54.5 
Economic Consequences 3.3 25.7 
Human Interest 25.0 6.6 
Responsibility (causal) 37.5 54.5 
Responsibility (solution-oriented) 32.5 34.7 
Morality 5.0 10.8 
Stability 16.7 41.3 
Harmony 13.3 20.4 
Superficial similarities in the apportioning of frames on BBC World News and CCTV-
News, as shown in Table 6-1, are deceptive. While conflict, the attribution of causal 
and solution-oriented responsibility and, to a lesser extent, stability are the dominant 
frames in common, in virtually every instance the broadcasters put these frames 
around very different pictures. The two organisations also differed in the way the 
news frames were dispersed over time. As Figure 6-3 shows, for the BBC the conflict 
frame was consistently the most frequently employed way of shaping coverage. Only 
once did another frame – human interest – overtake it, and that was at a time of lesser 
editorial interest in Hong Kong several weeks into the protest. At CCTV-News, by 
contrast (Figure 6-4), different frames spiked at different stages of the Occupy 
campaign. The framing section of this chapter will follow CCTV’s moulding of the 
narrative and contrast it with the BBC’s – firstly, by examining the combination of the 
stability, harmony and economic consequences frames. 
133 
 
Figure 6-3  Frame incidences, BBC World News coverage: 5-day centred moving averages 
 
 
Figure 6-4  Frame incidences, CCTV-News coverage: 5-day centred moving averages 
 
6.2.6.1 Stability, harmony and economic consequences 
When CCTV-News belatedly began to cover the protests from Hong Kong itself, it 
initially employed a combination of the stability, harmony and economic 
consequences frames. The narrative was that of a united China in which the 
authorities acted in the population's best interests, using a core motivator – money – 
to argue why the Occupy protesters were wrong. However, the BBC was first to use 
the stability frame, albeit briefly and very differently (Figure 6-5), highlighting 
confusion and apprehension on the streets of Hong Kong as one of its former 
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correspondents noted ‘haunting similarities’ with the Tiananmen Square protests of 
1989 (Luard 2014).   
Figure 6-5 Stability frame incidence: 5-day centred moving averages 
 
The BBC's camera position on a bridge above the Admiralty protest site reinforced 
the impression of instability in Hong Kong while providing a televisual backdrop for 
live coverage of the student-led action. BBC correspondents and producers described 
the story as 'picture-led' and 'uniquely colourful, dynamic'.13 
You had tens of thousands of people out on the street, directly challenging Hong 
Kong's chief executive, his authority, and in turn the authority of Beijing. So it was 
people power versus the Party. It was an extraordinary campaign.14 
Among other intimations of instability, a BBC presenter spoke of a 'fear' that rubber 
bullets would be deployed15, and a correspondent commented, 'It feels like a 
dangerous moment: who's in charge?'16. Another, asked in a live interview about the 
chances of the protests spreading to mainland China, declared, 'That is the ultimate 
nightmare for China's leaders.'17.  In personal interviews, however, a BBC 
correspondent spoke of having played down similarities with Tiananmen 1989 
because ‘we’re not even in that same universe of reasoning at the moment’.18 Another 
said the rumour about rubber bullets 'didn't check out in the end... but certainly there 
                                                        
13 Interview refs. BGPB41 and BCFG47 respectively. 
14 Interview ref. BCFB50. 
15 BBC Newsday, 0100 BST, 29 September 2014. 
16 Carrie Gracie in Hong Kong, BBC Newsday, 0100 BST, 29 September 2014. 
17 Celia Hatton in Beijing, BBC Newsday, 0100 BST, 1 October 2014. 

































was that fear that there was going to be some kind of crackdown at some point.'19 The 
BBC continued to feature the main encampment as a visual backdrop throughout the 
11-week protest. Stability remained a theme, albeit subliminally. 
For CCTV-News, the stability frame was invoked positively on China's National 
Day in a reaffirmation of the power of the Chinese state. Hong Kong’s chief executive, 
C Y Leung, was shown attending a ceremony at which the Chinese and Hong Kong 
flags were raised prominently side by side20, combining the harmony and stability 
frames. The state narrative was strengthened by a People's Daily commentary21 that 
promised that Beijing would ‘firmly maintain Hong Kong's long-term prosperity and 
stability.' At this stage, CCTV-News was in the unedifying position of having to talk 
about the dangers that the protests posed for stability without showing specific 
footage to back this up, thus diluting the effectiveness of any information control. This 
resulted in references to 'clashes' and 'scuffles'22 illustrated by archive shots of 
peaceful Hong Kong street scenes and close-ups within an unidentified crowd. The 
lack of up-to-date footage meant that CCTV frequently resorted to graphics of 
People’s Daily commentaries to spell out the professed illegality of the protests. In an 
interview, the analyst Victor Gao23 pronounced, ‘Democracy without rule of law is 
false democracy and it will lead nowhere: it will lead to mob rule and chaos.'  The 
stability frame was prominent in CCTV-News coverage until the beginning of 
November, and in December as the protest camps were cleared. Much of the later 
framing can be attributed to sporadic clashes around the Occupy site in Mongkok, 
described on air by one CCTV reporter as 'a high-risk area, with people of opposing 
views becoming highly emotional and sometimes quarrelling with one another.'24 
Having framed its initial Hong Kong coverage in terms of stability, CCTV-News 
switched to highlighting economic consequences once on-the-ground reporters were 
allowed to take up the narrative. The first CCTV Hong Kong reporter package in this 
study, a round-up of traders' losses by Li Jiejun, came four days into the main protest. 
As she interviewed shopkeepers bemoaning the lack of business, she observed an 
                                                        
19 Interview ref. BCFG49. 
20 CCTV News Update, 0400 BST, 1 October 2014. 
21 CCTV-News, 1300 BST, 2 October 2014. 
22 CCTV-News, 1700 BST, 3 October 2014. 
23 CCTV-News, 1200 BST, 5 October 2014. 
24 Li Jiejun, CCTV-News, 1200 BST, 7 October 2014. 
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'ominous drop in the number of visitors here'25. Figure 6-6 shows the prominence of 
the economic consequences frame on CCTV-News in the first two weeks of the 
protests. It dropped away after about five weeks, while hardly registering at all on the 
BBC. On CCTV-News, managers, investors and traders were shown complaining about 
the falloff in business confidence and the reluctance of mainland Chinese to make 
their usual lucrative visits. One businessman26 was filmed exclaiming, 'The Occupy 
Central protesters are taking hostage the wage-earners and most residents in Hong 
Kong. Let's go to work. Otherwise we won't get paid.' A taxi driver linked the 
economy and stability27: 'Our revenue has been cut down to between 30 and 40%. If 
things go on like this, the whole region of Hong Kong will fall into disorder.'  
Figure 6-6 Economic consequences frame incidence: 5-day centred moving averages 
 
Chinese staff at CCTV-News, interviewed for this research, saw the coverage of 
economic losses as partial but better than nothing at all, and an improvement on 
previous official media silence in the face of unwelcome breaking news. One 
experienced journalist said the decision to focus on business and the disruption to 
normal life 'comes from the very top, then goes down, down. Compared with the 1989 
year, dealing with the [4 June] Incident28, we are more modern than that time.'29 
Another journalist thought the response was predictable.  
                                                        
25 Li Jiejun, CCTV-News, 1200 BST, 4 October 2014. 
26 CCTV-News, 1700 BST, 4 October 2014. 
27 CCTV-News, 1200 BST, 5 October 2014. 
28 Reference to the crushing of the Tiananmen protests. 


































They say that we should have a China voice in this thing... We weren't expecting more 
approaches to this topic, like what the students are really thinking... It's all true [the 
reporting]. The problem is, it's just part of the story. It's just one side of the story.30 
An international employee was less charitable. 
There was a period of about a week where we weren't allowed to talk about what the 
real issue was. Everybody was told: no shots of the protests, no shots of the 
occupations... I'd rather we didn't cover a story than cover it in a half-hearted, 
censored, stupid way that doesn't say anything.31 
Two BBC correspondents acknowledged that they had given little airtime to 
the angle of economic losses. One said ‘it takes a long time to seriously disrupt 
business in a place – I mean, it’s not an earthquake, and it seemed to me that travel 
was continuing: I didn’t really think it was quite serious.’32 The other said stories 
about how the protests affected normal life were ‘kind of domestic... I don’t think I 
could have got something like that on [screen] to be honest, until the very end when it 
was a sign of people being dissatisfied with the protest.’33 
Figure 6-7 Harmony frame incidence: 5-day centred moving averages 
 
 As indicated in Figure 6-7, the BBC's interest in the harmony frame, at least in 
this study, was primarily during the early days of the protests. BBC footage showed 
students helping one another and sharing supplies in the protest camps, their unity 
born of adversity. A BBC correspondent likened the students' actions to 'back in 
                                                        
30 Interview ref. CCPC09. 
31 Interview ref. CGPG15. 
32 Interview ref. BCFG47. 































Tiananmen in 1989 in the early days, [when] I was reading that there was a similar 
kind of behaviour there, taking care of each other.'34 
 CCTV-News employed the harmony frame more strongly and frequently, by 
building up a picture of benevolent authorities who listened to the people and acted 
in their interests with international support. It portrayed the Hong Kong government 
as promoting harmonious co-existence with mainland China, from which economic 
rewards would flow. CCTV-News quoted Hong Kong's financial secretary as appealing 
for unity because the region 'needs a stable and safe market environment'35. In the 
same programme, a Hong Kong government spokesperson was reported as saying 
that 'the door to dialogue' was always open. International commentators were shown 
advocating talks to resolve the crisis and linking Hong Kong's financial fortunes with 
peaceful relations with the Chinese mainland. They appeared somewhat arbitrarily 
chosen, including a representative of the education committee of the Russian Duma 
and a scholar from the University of Salvador36. Another CCTV interviewee, the 
British journalist and academic Martin Jacques, pointed out that 'Hong Kong under 
the British was never a democracy... It was the Chinese government that gave Hong 
Kong the opportunity of electing their chief executive by universal suffrage.'37 A few 
days later on CCTV-News, a Kenyan university lecturer and two Iranian political 
commentators averred that public order was 'not allowed to be disrupted in any 
country' and accused Western media of double standards in their reporting38. 
The focal point of the harmony narrative for CCTV-News was the session of 
talks on 21 October between Hong Kong government representatives and student 
protest leaders. The discussions were televised, and both CCTV-News and BBC World 
News showed parts of the live feed during their scheduled news programmes. On 
CCTV-News, the Hong Kong talks started as its Nairobi-based African news 
programme, Africa Live, went to air: its presenter introduced them by speaking of the 
need for 'a resumption of social order' in Hong Kong. The programme took the first 
12 minutes of the live feed39, which featured the main government representative, 
                                                        
34 Interview ref. BCFG49. 
35 CCTV-News, 1100 GMT, 5 October 2014. 
36 CCTV-News, 1600 GMT, 4 October 2014. 
37 CCTV-News, 1600 GMT, 3 October 2014. 
38 CCTV-News, 1100 GMT, 7 October 2014. 
39 CCTV Africa Live, 1000 GMT, 21 October 2014. 
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Carrie Lam.40 BBC World News deferred its live coverage for 20 minutes, as its 
programme led with breaking news of the sentencing of the South African Paralympic 
athlete Oscar Pistorius. BBC World News joined the Hong Kong live stream as a 
student representative was speaking, but carried it for just 90 seconds before cutting 
to analysis from its Hong Kong correspondent. 
6.2.6.2 Conflict and attribution of causal responsibility 
Conflict was the BBC's principal frame throughout the protests. Its main depiction 
was of young demonstrators battling an authoritarian government in the name of 
democracy. For CCTV-News, both conflict and causal responsibility frames were 
prominent. Initially it narrated rather than showed the protests and, in contrast to the 
BBC’s framing, CCTV attributed causal responsibility to the protesters for disrupting 
social order. As indicated in Figure 6-8, the spectre of Tiananmen had an early impact 
on the BBC’s conflict frame as well as its stability frame, while CCTV-News stayed 
away from the protests until after the national holiday. Thereafter, the two 
broadcasters’ conflict framing followed similar trajectories but with different targets. 
 Figure 6-8 Conflict frame incidence: 5-day centred moving averages 
 
The BBC’s choice of words and images reinforced the conflict frame. BBC 
scripts contained powerful oppositional pairings, such as the China editor's comment 
that on the day of national unity, 'disunity made its presence felt' in Hong Kong41. A 
                                                        
40 A student representative was shown speaking in a later broadcast, News Update, at 1100 GMT. 































BBC presenter in Hong Kong repeated verbatim the Occupy protesters' chanted 
message to C Y Leung: 'Ha toi, ha toi, ha toi (下臺) – resign resign resign.'42. The BBC's 
aerial views of the Admiralty protest showed the breadth and scale of opposition to 
the authorities. For the corporation, conflict enhanced reporters' 'pieces to camera': 
Carrie Gracie wandered through crowds of protesters as she spoke43, John Sudworth 
stood by police lines44, and the camera high above thousands of people at the 
Admiralty encampment zoomed in to show correspondent Martin Patience45. CCTV-
News reporters, by contrast, kept clear of the protest sites until mid-October. Even 
then, they were inclined to recount rather than show any conflict. 'Violent clashes' 
reported by CCTV's Zhu Dan in Mongkok46, for instance, were accompanied by 
pictures of relative calm. Conflict also influenced the BBC's studio backdrops behind 
its presenters, which frequently showed a montage including teargas even though 
police had not used teargas since the first day of the protests. CCTV-News restricted 
itself to backdrops of the Hong Kong and Chinese flags. 
In the early weeks of the protest, coverage of the police assault on the Occupy 
activist and social worker Ken Tsang Kin-chiu provided evidence that CCTV-News 
was not reporting freely on matters of conflict. Tsang was severely beaten by a group 
of police officers in Tamar Park during clashes with Occupy demonstrators near the 
Hong Kong government headquarters on 15 October. Seven policemen were 
eventually jailed for the beating, which was caught on camera by the local 
broadcaster TVB (Reuters 2017). Tsang was himself jailed briefly for assaulting police 
and resisting arrest (RTHK 2017). BBC World News led with 'allegations of police 
brutality' on the day of the assault47 and showed the TVB footage while noting 
'growing militancy' from protesters. The BBC returned to the story the following day, 
reporting protesters' anger at the beating and showing footage of Tsang's injuries48. 
CCTV-News reported clashes between protesters and police in the area and talked of 
'chaotic scenes' while not showing them: it did not refer to the beating of Ken Tsang49. 
The following day, CCTV reported that social workers had protested outside police 
                                                        
42 Babita Sharma, BBC World News, 1300 GMT, 30 September 2014. 
43 0000 GMT, 1 October 2014. 
44 0400 GMT, 13 October 2014. 
45 1300 GMT, 30 September 2014. 
46 0600 GMT, 18 October 2014. 
47 Report by John Sudworth in Hong Kong, 09 GMT, 15 October 2014. 
48 00 GMT, 16 October 2014. 
49 06 GMT, 15 October 2014. 
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headquarters, 'expressing dissatisfaction with excessive use of force by police during 
protests50.' No specific information was given and there was no mention of Tsang. 
In later weeks of the protest campaign, the two news organisations' framing of 
binary situations grew more similar, both demonstrating how conflict can 'make good 
TV'. When student protest leaders were stopped from flying to Beijing on 15 
November to put their grievances to Chinese officials, both the BBC and CCTV-News 
showed pictures of the gaggle of umbrella-flourishing Occupy supporters at the 
airport. The break-in at the Legislative Council by protesters on 19 November was 
again similarly covered by both broadcasters, including police warnings about 
disruption to public order. This time there appeared to be no bar on CCTV-News 
carrying strong images of protesters breaking into the building. The loosening of 
restrictions, according to a CCTV international employee, came when management  
realised it's not spreading to the mainland in any way, and that the protest has lost 
momentum... As it's gone on longer, Beijing's hand has been getting stronger, and 
they've become less scared about broadcasting everything that's going on. So now we 
talk [on air] quite openly about everything, including the student leaders trying to 
come to Beijing. We always put a pro-Beijing stance on it... but it's actually recently 
become quite balanced.51 
CCTV-News's first steps into on-the-ground conflict coverage were tentative, 
showing reporters standing by unattended barricades or at a distance from the 
protests. On 10 October, one CCTV correspondent52 recorded a ‘walk-and-talk’ 
through three protest sites, interviewing a seated student protester who said her 
parents did not know she was there. In contrast with the BBC's wide- or high-level 
pictures of protest sites, CCTV's images at this stage were tighter, restricted to mid-
shots and close-ups with little visible background: in the report in question, there was 
also a sudden overlay of generic Hong Kong footage as if it had been decided that the 
protesters had had enough screentime. A protester who had brought a bed to the 
demonstration – consistent with sequences that the BBC interpreted as 'colour' or 
'human interest' – was for CCTV part of the conflict frame: its report featured an anti-
Occupy resident saying, 'if everybody occupies the street with a bed, how do we live ?' 
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As CCTV-News stepped up its coverage from the protest sites, further 
differences in the handling of the conflict frame were evident. CCTV reporters 
gravitated towards Mongkok, the scene of frequent confrontations between 
protesters and police, whereas the BBC spent much of its airtime showing scenes 
from the generally less fractious protest encampment at Admiralty, through which at 
one point it depicted parents strolling while holding their toddler's hands53. The BBC 
termed Mongkok a 'flashpoint'54 where protesters had chosen to arm themselves 
with hard hats because 'a small minority' of demonstrators were intent on stirring up 
trouble. CCTV-News went further, declaring Mongkok 'on the verge of a riot'55. While 
not mentioning the BBC, a CCTV journalist interviewed about the Hong Kong 
coverage criticised 'most' Western TV channels for showing only police action against 
demonstrators, creating 'an impression to viewers that they were violently cracking 
down on a peaceful protest.'56 The journalist said the police had often stepped in to 
stop violence between rival protesters, 'but I did not see any of these being covered 
on Western media, and I think it was necessary to show on our channel the missing 
part of the story.' CCTV-News duly showed footage of police lines in the middle of 
crowds, and of protesters blocking a bus and forcing it to disgorge its passengers57.  
BBC World News's appetite for live pictures, breaking news and conflict-heavy 
incidents influenced its editorial perspective, while CCTV-News adopted a 
conservative approach to live broadcasts. The most prominent example of this was 
the aftermath of a night of clashes between police and Occupy protesters at Admiralty 
in the early hours of 1 December. BBC World News ran the feed from the Admiralty 
camera position from the beginning of the 0100 GMT Newsday edition as it reported 
on the 'large offensive' by police. The portentous use of live footage was vindicated 
when police entered the Admiralty camp in large numbers while the BBC was 
conducting a telephone interview with a student protester. The grammar of 24-hour 
television news dictated that, having happened upon the action, the BBC would find it 
difficult to cut away. The live footage and associated interviews filled the entire 30 
minutes, although the only news outcome appeared to be that police had cleared the 
re-erected barricades while not disturbing the main site. An hour later, for its part, 
CCTV-News reported in a correspondent two-way from its Hong Kong studio that 
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54 Report by Celia Hatton, 14 GMT, 19 October 2014. 
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56 Interview ref. CGFC09. 
57 Report by Han Peng, 0300 GMT, 19 October 2014. 
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3,000 police had been deployed in Admiralty 'for maintaining security'. There were 
no images from the morning's events.58  
CCTV-News frequently used its Hong Kong studio for live interviews with its 
reporters: in interviews, journalists said the studio was 'more stable' in technical 
terms than the streets. In November, however, it deployed internet-based video 
uplink equipment (TVUs) in Hong Kong and conducted live two-ways in Mongkok. 
CCTV's camera position was some distance from the action, and coverage erred on 
the side of safety. A typical instance was a live reporter interview overlaid by images 
flagged as 'live' even though they showed only traffic and some watchful police59.  
Figure 6-9 Causal responsibility frame incidence: 5-day centred moving averages 
 
 For the BBC, the triggers of the attribution of causal responsibility frame were 
acts of violence against Occupy demonstrators: the frame appeared after the police 
use of teargas at the beginning of the protests and returned when the authorities 
attempted to clear the Occupy sites (Figure 6-9). For CCTV-News, the causal 
responsibility frame was deployed in a more sustained fashion, particularly during 
the first half of the Occupy protests when the channel made much of official and local 
opposition. Interviews with government 'players' were absent from both 
broadcasters’ coverage, although the BBC said it had sought them repeatedly. The 
lack of opportunity to hold officials to account – the traditional Western journalistic 
use of the 'attribution of responsibility' frame – had a large bearing on the visual 
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weighting of the BBC's coverage. It did not appear to deter CCTV-News from giving 
airtime to the government view, for reasons that were as much to do with Chinese 
journalistic practice as with state media obligations. 
 To convey the viewpoint of the Hong Kong government, CCTV-News ran 
frequent stand-alone soundbites of C Y Leung and Carrie Lam terming the 
demonstrations 'illegal gatherings' and accusing student leaders of using the 
cancellation of talks as a way to draw more people into the protests. CCTV’s practice 
of using short clips of speakers (outlined in 6.2.5.1) provided viewers with basic facts 
but little else. The availability of little more than soundbites of officials frustrated the 
BBC's attempts to explain the motivation behind policy decisions and to challenge 
those who made them. CCTV-News did report Western misgivings about the handling 
of the protests when these could be countered by official Chinese Foreign Ministry 
statements – for example, when the United States voiced concern about the actions of 
Hong Kong police60. However, the channel's predilection for stand-alone clips also 
made it a conduit for unchallenged assertions and unsubstantiated hearsay, such as 
when a Hong Kong resident was shown alleging foreign funding of the Occupy 
campaign without any further context61. The lack of journalistic challenge in the 
causal responsibility frame was again evident when a CCTV-News reporter in Hong 
Kong quoted C Y Leung as saying the government had evidence of foreign 
involvement 'and it would be disclosed at an appropriate time. We'll be looking 
forward to that.'62. 
 BBC interviewees said the corporation had repeatedly requested interviews 
with Hong Kong and mainland Chinese government officials but, in the words of one 
senior journalist, 'it's not their style to do press... there's nothing in it for them, they 
don't think.'63 The difficulties for television news in particular were outlined by a BBC 
reporter: 'it's not as if Xi Jinping was coming in front of a podium every day to wag his 
finger at the students – and that was a big problem, because we had no visuals.'64 
Behind the scenes, we were talking to the Foreign Ministry, to anyone we could find in 
the government, saying, you have to speak, you know... Because they were criticising 
our coverage, and we were saying, well, put your point of view, because at the 
                                                        
60 CCTV-News, 0600 GMT 17 October 2014. 
61 CCTV-News, 0300 GMT 20 October 2014. 
62 Zhu Dan, CCTV-News, 0600 GMT 22 October 2014. 
63 Interview ref. BGPB38. 
64 Interview ref. BCFG47. 
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moment by not saying anything you're forcing us to interpret your actions. (News 
editor, BBC)65 
BBC producers were aware of the dangers of presenting visually unbalanced coverage: 
they said they had made efforts to book a politically broad range of interviewees, and 
to run Hong Kong and Chinese government statements as graphics. However, as one 
of them observed, any imbalance tended to be self-perpetuating: 'The more activists 
you have on, the less likely any government official is going to want to speak to you.'66 
The BBC's ambitions to investigate the impact of the protests in mainland China were 
frustrated when police physically barred its journalists from an artists' solidarity 
event on the edge of Beijing (Hatton 2014). This had the effect of switching the focus 
of the news item from democracy protests to another familiar theme: that of 
restrictions on foreign journalists. 
One facet of the causal responsibility frame that was mined much more by 
CCTV-News than BBC World News was opposition among the Hong Kong public to the 
Occupy protests. In addition to repeatedly carrying the voices of traders blaming the 
protesters for loss of business, CCTV-News reported in detail on the actions of the 
anti-Occupy movement spearheaded by the Alliance for Peace And Democracy. 
Typical of footage shown on CCTV-News in the early days of the protests were 
pictures of anti-Occupy demonstrators wearing blue ribbons to show their support 
for the authorities, taxi drivers accusing the students of ruining their business, and a 
shouting restaurateur with a family to feed67. CCTV frequently covered even small 
protests by the blue ribbon wearers, the majority of whom were middle-aged or 
elderly, quoting them as saying they were 'simply ordinary members of the public'68. 
They were captioned on CCTV-News as 'Hong Kong resident' and mostly spoke to the 
broadcaster in Mandarin.  
CCTV-News's range of reported viewpoints widened over the weeks, and its 
attribution of causal responsibility became more varied. In an oblique evocation of 
the frame during a 'two-way', a CCTV-News correspondent quoted student leader 
Alex Chow as saying that protesters had been 'eating a lot of pepper spray'.69 By late 
November, CCTV had softened the 'blame frame' against the protesters to such an 
                                                        
65 Interview ref. BGMG39. 
66 Interview ref. BGPB44. 
67 CCTV-News, 1600 GMT 6 October 2014. 
68 CCTV-News, 0200 GMT 12 October 2014. 
69 Han Peng on CCTV-News, 1000 GMT, 21 October 2014. 
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extent that it aired a clip of another protest leader, Lester Shum, vowing to stay on the 
streets until the last moment70. Even when causal responsibility was attributed to the 
Occupy protesters, room was occasionally made for broader narratives. When fire 
broke out behind an advertising hoarding at a protest site, CCTV-News reporter Han 
Peng was on hand to investigate whether protesters, by hindering access, were 
responsible for endangering lives71. This also provided an opportunity for the 
reporter to interview an Occupy protester who proclaimed, 'I pay more attention to 
the democracy, more than my life, because it's our future.'  
BBC World News, in this study, took far less notice than CCTV of the anti-
Occupy demonstrators and their accusations. As a BBC employee in Hong Kong put it, 
'the general consensus in town is that those people are paid... A lot of them tend to be 
the same people.'72 On air, the BBC acknowledged that some Hong Kongers were 
'starting to get irritated with some of these inconveniences'73 and referred to many 
residents as being 'furious about the disruption to their lives'74 , but such 
perspectives were relatively rare. Part of the reason was the BBC's concentration of 
coverage on the protest sites. In interviews, BBC staff insisted they were aware of the 
extent of anti-Occupy sentiment: a senior journalist said, 'I kept asking, why don't 
people go to the New Territories and ask them what they think?'75 The same 
journalist acknowledged, however, that 'there wasn't a big send' of staff to Hong Kong 
to serve the BBC's many outlets. Another BBC interviewee underlined the inherent 
risks to editorial balance in the use of powerful images of Occupy protesters: 'If you 
cut to an office where somebody is making the opposing point... I think it's human 
nature that you'll remember the protests and not the guy sitting in the office.'76 
6.2.6.3 Morality, human interest and solution-oriented responsibility 
The more episodic frames in this analysis also reveal some of the greatest differences 
between the two channels' reporting of the Hong Kong protests. As this section shows, 
the stances adopted in the morality frame fed through into the human interest frame, 
producing two completely different views of the Occupy campaign. 
                                                        
70 CCTV-News, 0300 GMT, 27 November 2014. 
71 CCTV-News, 0600 GMT, 17 October 2014. 
72 Interview ref. BCFG49. 
73 Juliana Liu on BBC World News, 1300 GMT, 10 October 2014. 
74 John Sudworth on BBC World News, 0000 GMT, 17 October 2014. 
75 Interview ref. BGPB38. 
76 Interview ref. BCFB50. 
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At the start of the Occupy demonstrations, their professed illegality was 
argued on CCTV-News through the prism of stability, with the implication that an 
absence of protest would make Hong Kong better, safer and more profitable for 
everyone. Later, however, the question turned into one of morality. The pronounced 
spike in CCTV's morality frame indicated in Figure 6-10 coincided with its repeated 
broadcasts of police warnings to citizens about how they should behave. Typical of 
these was CCTV’s airing of a media briefing at which a police spokesman 'stressed 
that Hong Kong is a society ruled by law and no-one can be above it, or use unlawful 
means to vent their discontent.'77. A CCTV correspondent in Mongkok commented 
that 'in some extreme cases... some fundamental values of democracy and national 
unity are beginning to be violated.'78.  
Figure 6-10 Morality frame incidence: 5-day centred moving averages 
 
There was no overt morality framing in the coverage of BBC World News, but 
several BBC interviewees saw nothing wrong with aligning themselves with 
supporters of democracy as it is understood in the West. As one producer put it, while 
emphasising that editors were striving for balanced coverage, 'Obviously our 
sympathies are with people fighting for democracy: you know, that's fine.'79 Indeed, 
BBC guidelines state that 'due impartiality' does not require 'detachment from 
fundamental democratic principles' (BBC Editorial Guidelines 2018). Gauging who in 
the Hong Kong debate might be more or less 'democratic' was a fine art. Interviewees 
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78 Report by Han Peng, 0200 GMT, 28 October 2014. 

































from both news organisations pointed out that China did not appear to have failed to 
deliver anything it had explicitly promised in negotiations with Britain on Hong Kong.  
But I think people probably came away with the impression [from BBC coverage] that, 
somehow, China was reneging on the agreement... And so it tends to get written into 
the whole kind of Tiananmen narrative – you know, squashing democracy. (Producer, 
BBC World News)80 
How a lack of 'detachment from fundamental democratic principles' may have 
affected the BBC's use of the human interest frame is analysed in the next section. 
Figure 6-11 Human interest frame incidence: 5-day centred moving averages 
 
The human interest frame, as indicated in Figure 6-11, was a major feature of BBC 
World News coverage while flatlining for CCTV-News after sporadic early 
appearances. The 'human interest' for the BBC was the protesters and specifically the 
students, while CCTV tapped into the emotions of inconvenienced traders and 
overworked police. There was little overlap between them. 
 For BBC World News, the effect of the consistent focus on student protesters 
was to eulogise their patience and orderliness. Demonstrators were described as 
'braving heavy rainstorms'81 and 'taking around refreshments. No wonder it's called 
the polite protest'82. The young protesters’ emotions were often gauged, such as when  
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a news presenter at Admiralty admitted, 'I have to say the mood here is low and 
energy levels are pretty flat.'83. A student protester interviewed before the Admiralty 
clearance was urged by a presenter, 'Do stay safe' 84. This did not stop the BBC from 
questioning the protesters repeatedly about whether they had achieved anything 
through their action, or about the viability of continued occupations. The BBC was 
certainly more critical of the demonstrators towards the end of the protests, pointing 
out the lack of central command 85 and splits in the movement over what to do in the 
face of the court injunctions86. But as one reporter put it, 
I think I would agree that the treatment was quite sympathetic... they were young, they 
were idealistic, they were very friendly... And I think it is difficult to be not sympathetic to 
young people wanting a say in how their city is governed – especially in the early days 
before there was a sense that they didn't really have a strategy.87 
Journalists at the BBC were impressed by what they saw as the 'creativity' behind the 
movement, leading to the airing of news features on the artistic outpouring prompted 
by the protest88 and the establishment of a makeshift photo-booth in which 
protesters could record their presence89. Both features included sequences set to 
music. The 'umbrella art' in the first feature was described by the correspondent as 
'testament to the freedom of expression this city enjoys', while protesters who 
stepped in front of the lens in the second feature were seen as recording 'one more 
small act of defiance – an act of courage.' 
CCTV-News deployed a human interest frame by reporting on the morale of 
the Hong Kong police and the stresses on commuters and traders. The channel 
focused on the changed lives of people such as Mr Huang the 56-year-old vegetable-
seller90 who was losing money because of disruption to his supplies. Correspondent 
Han Peng took a ride on a Hong Kong minibus91 and listened to its driver complain 
about traffic delays while commuters queued glumly for transport home. His 
colleague Zhu Dan talked to a student92 who disagreed with the protests and 
considered that there was 'pressure' on them to take part.  The police and the risks 
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86 BBC World News, 0100 GMT 25 November 2014. 
87 Interview ref. BCFG49. 
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they ran in doing their job were the subject of several CCTV news items, as the 
channel sought – in the words of one correspondent – to find out 'what professional 
duty means in the face of this chaos'93. The police were shown facing threats of 
assault and even death, and needing psychological counselling. CCTV's correspondent 
bent low at the Mongkok protest site to show the lines of helmets and batons that the 
police had placed on the ground as a sign of non-violence.  
Figure 6-12 Solution-oriented responsibility frame incidence: 5-day centred moving averages 
 
The frame denoting attribution of solution-oriented responsibility was seen to be 
episodically used by both broadcasters but, unlike other frames, in similar ways. The 
spikes in Figure 6-12 are consistent with points at which the two channels' reporters 
could see the authorities making attempts to bring the protests to an end. The general 
lack of an overt strategy and government statements were more of a problem for 
CCTV-News than for BBC World News TV. BBC journalists used interpretive 
journalism (Salgado et al. 2017) to fill the void, talking about 'widespread speculation 
that a crackdown [on protesters] could be on the way'94 or concluding that 'Beijing 
will be pretty satisfied with how the Hong Kong authorities have handled these 
protests'95. CCTV-News looked to the police rather than the government to resolve 
the crisis, and often ran daily police briefings at length. The Chinese broadcaster did 
not appear to make use of interpretive journalism, leaving the political ramifications 
of the protests unexplained. 
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6.2.7 Summary of the Hong Kong coverage 
The quantitative and frame analyses reveal contrasting views of events in Hong Kong 
and two almost completely different stories of the protests. The view gained from the 
output studied on BBC World News TV was that of virtuous, brave, albeit strategy-
free students leading a campaign for full democracy in the face of authoritarian 
control. On CCTV-News bulletins, an initial picture of economic and physical gridlock 
merged into one of messy and sporadically unstable demonstrations in support of 
untenable demands. The absence of context to the dispute was particularly manifest 
on CCTV-News, although it is unclear whether (self-)censorship or inexperience was 
more to blame. However, the intentions ascribed to the authorities on the BBC, while 
aiding understanding of the issues, did so through speculation and interpretation 
incompatible with Chinese journalistic practice. CCTV's correspondents were 
afforded more latitude as the protests went on, and the frames used in their reports 
fell more into alignment with those of the BBC, yet the frames were employed in very 
different ways. The style of CCTV-News may have become more Anglo-American, but 
the substance of its reporting was Chinese. 
 BBC journalists interviewed for this research were broadly satisfied that their 
coverage of Hong Kong had been fair: CCTV-News interviewees had more misgivings. 
A senior CCTV journalist described the Hong Kong coverage as the 'biggest failure of 
the year', saying inexperienced regional reporters were not capable of handling 
'sensitive issues' and had failed to convey China's perspective on the background: 
'They didn't touch the root of this crisis, which they should have done because they 
had all the resources.'96 A former member of the production team said there had been 
complaints from CCTV's Washington hub about the poor quality of the Hong Kong 
reporting.97 However, an international employee voiced surprise at the extent of the 
coverage: 'Five years ago I don't think we would have touched it... We'd just have 
been told, don't broadcast it.'98 Short-lived reporting restrictions, confirmed by 
several sources, could not account for the low number of CCTV interviews with 
Occupy protesters: one CCTV journalist sent to the region was insistent that there had 
been no ban99, and indeed several reports containing protesters' voices and 
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aspirations went to air. Self-censorship by CCTV correspondents could be responsible 
for the under-representation, but so too could the same kind of decision-making, 
linked to how journalists in different cultures perceive their roles, that had led BBC 
journalists to deprioritise interviews with anti-Occupy residents. 
 The Hong Kong protests were, for both broadcasters, something of a case apart. 
CCTV-News initially gave the Hong Kong protesters a wide berth whereas, weeks 
earlier, it had run wide-angle shots of angry protests in the Egyptian capital Cairo and 
in Ferguson in the United States. BBC World News, for its part, represented the Hong 
Kong protesters much more sympathetically than the Occupy London demonstrators 
of 2011-12 who said they were fighting for 'real global democracy' (BBC News 
2011b). A BBC interviewee said the London protesters had been 'seen as sort of 
anarchist outsiders, and not really that important and reflecting society as a whole'100. 
The BBC’s focus on the Hong Kong protesters suggested that it considered them 
representative of Hong Kong society. 
The lack of student protesters' voices in CCTV-News output at the beginning of 
October was decisive in the UK regulator Ofcom's ruling that it had failed to observe 
'due impartiality' by omitting 'significant' views on matters of public concern. In later 
weeks, protesters' voices were indeed heard on CCTV, but – given the marginalisation 
of those voices in the output, and as noted in Ofcom’s response to CCTV's comments – 
it is unlikely that broadening the timescale would have resulted in a different ruling. 
There was also an imbalance of voices represented in the BBC output analysed in this 
study: however, it is beyond this chapter’s remit to establish whether Ofcom would 
have considered a dearth of anti-Occupy voices 'significant' if it had regulated the 
corporation's journalism at the time. In the Hong Kong coverage, and possibly 
elsewhere too, the line between 'important' and 'unimportant' voices remains blurred, 
neither completely a matter of editorial judgement nor contingent on a specifically 
Chinese or Anglo-American view of the world. 
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6.3 The Yangtze cruise ship disaster 
6.3.1 The sinking of the Eastern Star 
At about 2130 Beijing time (1330 GMT) on 1 June 2015, the cruise ship 东方之星
Dongfang zhi Xing, the Eastern Star101, capsized in the Yangtze River102 near Jianli 
county in Hubei province on its way from Nanjing to Chongqing and sank in minutes 
during a storm. Of the 454 passengers and crew, 12 survived. They included the 
captain and chief engineer, who both left the ship shortly after it capsized. Most of the 
dead were elderly people who had been on a pleasure trip. The sinking was described 
at the time as China's deadliest peacetime shipping disaster (Kuo 2015). A 
government investigation later blamed it on freak weather abetted by poor decision-
making and lax supervision (Xinhua 2015a). 
6.3.2 Data and specific methods 
News of the capsize emerged on CCTV in Chinese shortly before 0300 Beijing time on 
2 June (2000 BST103 1 June). Xinhua news agency tweeted about it in English at 0452 
Beijing time (2152 BST). The news programmes compared here are the BBC's 
Newsday – the daily breakfast programme for Asian audiences – at 0000 BST, and the 
daily News Hour on CCTV-News 0500 BST. The programmes were analysed every day 
for eight days104, from shortly after the disaster until 9 June, when BBC Newsday 
stopped running daily coverage. 
The programmes were all transcribed and subjected to quantitative content 
and frame analysis with the aid of video files105. Variables encompassed the format 
and location of coverage, categories of speakers in the news reports, nature of the 
pictures shown, and the quantitative part of the generic 'framework of frames' 
outlined in Chapter 4. The unit of analysis was the news story (total n=90: BBC n=13, 
CCTV n=77). Coverage of the capsize on CCTV News Hour was seven times the length 
of that on BBC Newsday (BBC 17 minutes 53 seconds; CCTV 2 hours 6 minutes 19 
seconds) – much more unequal than for the Hong Kong protests. In order to clarify 
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relative emphases of frame incidence in coverage of the Yangtze sinking, a moving 
centred average of frame density – the average incidence of a frame per news item – 
was used instead of simply totalling news items per day as with Hong Kong. 
6.3.3 Overview of the analysis 
On the third day after the Eastern Star went down106, News Hour concluded with a 70-
second montage that summed up the general tenor of CCTV’s coverage. It showed 
computer-generated imagery (CGI) of the cruise ship keeling over in the storm, 
followed by footage of the Chinese premier Li Keqiang at the scene, the mobilisation 
of rescuers and divers around the stricken vessel, salvage ships moving into position, 
and news conferences at which details of the operation were provided. The final shot 
of the montage bore the text: ‘Search and rescue is STILL ONGOING’. The capital 
letters are CCTV's. The significance of this framing is elaborated upon by comparison 
with the BBC’s coverage. Firstly, results from the more general quantitative analysis 
show the differences in the two broadcasters' approaches. 
6.3.3.1 Information control 
While Chinese official media reacted to the outbreak of the Hong Kong protests 
through near-silence followed by the creation of a counter-narrative, first reports of 
the capsize of the Yangtze ferry appeared to be relatively prompt. One CCTV-News 
employee, interviewed soon after the sinking, suspected that news of the disaster had 
been held back for several hours107: later information, however, indicated that the 
delay was probably due to the speed with which the boat sank, meaning that the 
alarm was raised only after survivors swam ashore. Information control in the 
Yangtze capsize was in evidence during the rescue and salvage operation. Only 
journalists from Xinhua and CCTV were authorised to report on the disaster for the 
Chinese media, relatives of the missing were warned not to talk to the press, and 
police set up cordons near the scene in an attempt to deny access to foreign 
journalists (Beech 2015, Kuo 2015, Yap & Lin 2015). 
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6.3.4 Quantitative content analysis: Yangtze disaster coverage in figures 
6.3.4.1 Who tells the story? 
The BBC's reporters were the main narrators of the Yangtze capsize on Newsday. 
Reporter interviews and packages formed 46.2% of Newsday's instances of coverage 
of the sinking, compared with 28.6% on CCTV's News Hour. Each channel sent a 
reporting team to Jianli county in Hubei province: both were broadcasting from the 
riverbank by the second day after the disaster. CCTV's News Hour presenter led 
almost half (48.1%) of the programme's coverage, either by narrating footage out of 
vision or by introducing short clips of officials, emergency workers or experts. 
Newsday on the BBC chose this type of coverage less frequently (38.5%). CCTV also 
ran analytical interviews, weather forecasts and montages with music. 
Figure 6-13 Percentage of Yangtze news reports in which speakers appear 
 
6.3.4.2 Who gets to speak? 
CCTV's News Hour displayed a strong preference for official and other 'elite' voices, 
while BBC Newsday focused keenly on the general public, most of them relatives of 
the drowned (Figure 6-13). Neither broadcaster gave much space to the voices of 
politicians (represented in 7.7% of items on BBC Newsday and 6.5% on CCTV News 
Hour). Both featured speakers from the emergency services in about 15% of their 
items. CCTV News Hour also carried the voices of a string of other officials (13%), 
including maritime agents and DNA-testers, who were not featured on BBC Newsday. 
Also shown solely on CCTV News Hour were experts, analysts and academics (in 15.6% 
































programmes was in the attention they paid to survivors, victims' families and other 
members of the public caught up in the disaster. For BBC Newsday, their voices were 
present in 61.6% of all coverage (relatives alone making up 46.2%), while CCTV News 
Hour restricted them to 11.7% (and relatives just 1.3%). This reflected a wider 
tendency at CCTV to report events from an official perspective. 
6.3.4.3 Who and what is on screen? 
Images of survivors, relatives and government officials were present in a greater 
proportion of BBC Newsday's coverage than on CCTV News Hour. Survivors of the 
disaster and covered bodies of the victims were each shown in nearly a quarter of the 
BBC's news items (23.1%). The CCTV programme conveyed less emotional power: 
there were no shots of bodies in the period covered, and just 9.1% of news items 
contained footage of survivors. Relatives of the dead and missing were featured 
nearly four times as often on BBC Newsday (38.5%) as on CCTV News Hour (10.4%). 
6.3.5 Frame analysis: how the Yangtze disaster was covered 
Table 6-2 Overall incidence of frames in the Yangtze coverage per broadcast news item (% of news items 
in which a given frame was evoked) 
FRAME BBC WORLD NEWS CCTV-NEWS 
Conflict 46.2 3.9 
Economic Consequences 0 0 
Human Interest 76.9 24.7 
Responsibility (causal) 46.2 18.2 
Responsibility (solution-oriented) 53.8 80.5 
Morality 0 3.9 
Stability 15.4 0 
Harmony 7.7 5.2 
There were considerable differences between BBC Newsday and CCTV News Hour in 
their adoption of the dominant frames in this study – human interest, conflict, 
attribution of causal responsibility and attribution of responsibility for a solution. The 
figures in Table 6-2 represent the percentage of items on the BBC and CCTV 
programmes that contained a given frame, as outlined in the framework adapted 
from Semetko & Valkenburg's classification in Chapter 4.5.108 The frame of economic 
consequences was completely absent in both programmes, and there was low 
incidence of the morality and harmony frames. The stability frame was evoked in BBC 
Newsday but not in CCTV News Hour, as the BBC was alone in positing the dangers to 
                                                        
108 Items could contain multiple frames, or sometimes no frame at all, so figures do not add up to 100%. 
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the Chinese leadership of public anger arising from any missteps in handling the 
disaster. The following sections deal with the four dominant frames, showing how 
and when they surfaced, starting with the most frequently invoked frame in the BBC's 
Yangtze reporting. 
6.3.5.1 The human interest frame 
CCTV's News Hour programme went to air within a few hours of the capsize becoming 
known, and the visual framing of the lead item appeared to indicate that the 
programme would tell a very human and emotive story. Behind the presenter (Figure 
6-14) was a graphic backdrop of angry skies, choppy waters and sombre lettering 
reading 'Yangtze TRAGEDY' (the capital letters are CCTV's). Indeed, News Hour would 
use this image throughout the week's coverage. However, as the human interest 
frame density graph (Figure 6-15) indicates, CCTV's coverage was much less emotive 
than that of BBC Newsday. Even when both broadcasters invoked the human interest 
frame on the same day, it was clear that they were interested in different humans. 
Figure 6-14 Screenshot of 'Yangtze Tragedy' backdrop, CCTV News Hour, 2 June 2015 
 
































CCTV News Hour's coverage, in general, was marked by unnervingly dispassionate 
descriptions of the several hundred victims and the plight of their relatives. News 
Hour referred to the sinking of the Eastern Star as an 'incident' 21 times, compared 
with once on the BBC's Newsday (quoting a post on Weibo). CCTV was also wont to 
adopt procedural language, such as 'five capsize victims have been admitted to the 
hospital, including four males and one female'109, and to view survivors through their 
ailments: 'She'd been in the water for so long that her blood electrolyte levels were 
low and she had suffered muscle necrosis and hypokalaemia.'110.  Sometimes the 
detail on News Hour was graphic, such as when morticians spoke of restoring 
passengers' bloated bodies to a size that could fit into the coffins111.  
 Scriptwriters and reporters on CCTV News Hour employed other syntactic 
structures that served to de-personalise the victims of the Yangtze disaster. These 
included gerunds – 'Divers reported hearing banging coming from the inside [of the 
hull]'112 – and the passive voice: 'A body has been recovered'113.  The relatives' grief 
was frequently told but not shown, such as when News Hour interviewed a 
psychologist about the counselling offered to the families, rather than a relative or 
someone who had previously suffered similar trauma114. The dispassionate quality of 
the language was intensified by a barrage of figures delineating the effort the 
authorities were putting into the search. 'A total of more than 4,000 people have been 
mobilised and more than 130 ships, coastal patrol vessels and even fishing-boats are 
carrying out search and rescue missions. Over 200 divers are taking turns going 
under water. Five large salvage ships are at the scene.'115 
 It was, indeed, the rescue effort and its participants with which CCTV News 
Hour appeared to identify the most. Soldiers were commended for 'braving heavy 
rain and wind' to clear land for the salvage operation116 . However, their efforts – as 
chronicled on News Hour – paled in comparison with those of the army of divers who 
worked round the clock at the scene of the disaster. It was the divers who were 
                                                        
109 Presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 5 June 2015. 
110 Head of medical rescue team, speaking on CCTV News Hour, 4 June 2015. 
111 CCTV News Hour, 11 June 2015. 
112 Presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 2 June 2015. 
113 Presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 2 June 2015. 
114 CCTV News Hour, 6 June 2015. 
115 Presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 4 June 2015. 
116 Presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 5 June 2015. 
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shown in close-up with their ears pressed to the hull, listening for any sign of life117. A 
news report about two of the few survivors from the stricken vessel was told from the 
perspective of the diver who had rescued them: he was named and interviewed, 
whereas the survivors were referred to by their ages118. A commentary by Zou Yue 
from Jianli119 appeared to prioritise the salvage operation over the retrieval of 
victims' remains: 'When they tried... to push the cable through under the ship, they 
collected some dead bodies then, and they have to stop the whole process and collect 
the bodies, and after that they will proceed with the cable work again.' A CGI 
reconstruction of the sinking of the Eastern Star (Figure 6-16) was played several 
times during the week, its dramatic music and fake raindrops lending the disaster the 
appearance of an animated film and further depersonalising the coverage. 
Figure 6-16 CGI reconstruction of the sinking of the Eastern Star, CCTV News Hour, 4 June 2015 
 
BBC Newsday used more emotive language in general than CCTV News Hour, speaking 
of the 'agony' continuing for 'loved ones' of those missing120. However, empathy 
appeared to be evenly distributed between salvage teams and relatives. The BBC 
correspondent in Jianli referred to the 'grim and almost unimaginable task' of 
retrieving the passengers' bodies121 and, in the same report, intervened in the story 
by taking a couple through a police cordon to view the site of the disaster from which 
other passengers' relatives had been turned back. BBC Newsday followed Anglo-
American television norms by using close-ups of people's emotions wherever 
possible. The difference between the two broadcasters' frequent depiction of the 
relatives is made clear in the two screen-grabs in Figure 6-17, in which the BBC 
captured scenes of anger and desperation while CCTV framed relatives in long-shot or 
with their backs to camera. In the BBC footage, natural sound was used and 
                                                        
117 CCTV News Hour, 3 June 2015. 
118 CCTV News Hour, 4 June 2015. 
119 CCTV News Hour, 5 June 2015. 
120 Presenter script, BBC Newsday, 5 June 2015. 
121 News report from John Sudworth in Jianli, BBC Newsday, 5 June 2015. 
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intensified the emotions, while in CCTV's coverage on News Hour, relatives were 
frequently shown with no natural sound. 
Figure 6-17 Screenshots of relatives of the Yangtze disappeared: BBC Newsday, 4 June 2015 [left] and CCTV 
News Hour, 6 June 2015 [right] 
  
Unexplained so far in this account of the human interest frame is a significant 
aberration in CCTV News Hour's coverage: a report from Shanghai by Lin Nan on the 
day after the disaster, focusing on 'desperate, anxious and angry' relatives122.  Her 
report contained a 15-second shot of a distraught man kneeling and wailing – with no 
sound – at the tour company's offices, with no reference to him in the script: another 
sequence showed a relative sitting on the floor, rocking backwards and forwards in 
grief. Such scenes were not repeated on News Hour during the period studied. 
6.3.5.2 The conflict frame 
Figure 6-18 Conflict frame density (avg. incidence per news item), 5-day centred moving averages 
 
As Figure 6-18 indicates, the conflict frame did not surface frequently in CCTV News 
Hour's coverage, but it made up a major element of BBC Newsday's view of the 
Yangtze capsize, especially on the third and fourth days after the disaster. This was 
                                                        




























when the BBC acquired footage of relatives raging at the police and demanding 
answers about the sinking. CCTV News Hour's sole contribution to the conflict frame 
was its depiction of the rescue and salvage efforts as a battle against the weather. 
The conflict frame also surfaced on BBC Newsday as a struggle between 
journalists and the authorities for the freedom to report, and between families and 
the authorities for access and information about the capsize. The BBC's Martin 
Patience complained in a recorded item of being 'hassled by the authorities' as he 
sought to cover flower-laying by the relatives, and the hand of an official covered the 
camera lens123. Elsewhere, his colleague John Sudworth intervened to take a bereaved 
couple at their request to the disaster site through a police checkpoint from which 
others had been turned back124. 
6.3.5.3 The attribution of causal responsibility frame 
Figure 6-19 Attribution of causal responsibility frame density (avg. incidence per news item): 5-day 
centred moving averages 
 
Evocation of the 'blame frame' was linked with attempts to find out what had caused 
the Eastern Star to sink. As indicated in Figure 6-19, neither BBC Newsday nor CCTV 
News Hour made any immediate attempt at finger-pointing, but instances of the 
causal responsibility frame mounted on the BBC by the fourth day after the sinking. 
Initially, these featured angry relatives blaming the government for not giving them 
information: gradually, however, the BBC also began to reflect wider public disquiet: 
'How is it that... a select few managed to grab lifejackets and be rescued, but no alarm 
was raised for hours after that ship sank?'125 CCTV, by contrast, gave attribution of 
                                                        
123 News report by Martin Patience in Jianli, BBC Newsday, 6 June 2015. 
124 News report by John Sudworth in Jianli, BBC Newsday, 5 June 2015. 





























causal responsibility the occasional nod but appeared content for its reporters not to 
pre-empt the conclusions of the official inquiry. The news presenter asked one 
obliquely critical question of a maritime expert that did not receive a direct answer: 
'Is it normal, actually, for the captain to be among the first batch of the survivors 
being rescued?'126 The first directly critical voice raised on News Hour was that of a 
Chinese former ship's captain127, who pointed out in a live interview that the stricken 
vessel had drifted for ten minutes before it sank and that, therefore, there had been 
time to evacuate and raise the alarm. Zou Yue, reporting from Jianli, said of the 
investigators: 'They cannot decide whether it is a natural disaster or if there was [sic] 
human errors involved or even there should be any charges against the captain and 
the chief engineer'128. In both instances, the studio presenter in Beijing wrapped up 
the item without further questions. 
6.3.5.4 The attribution of solution-oriented responsibility frame 
Figure 6-20 Attribution of solution-oriented responsibility frame density (avg. incidence per news item): 
5-day centred moving averages 
 
Notable in the divergence of the two lines of frame density in Figure 6-20 is the 
intensity and persistence of this frame on CCTV News Hour. CCTV's unwavering focus 
was the search, rescue and salvage operation. The script was emotionless and factual, 
even when the images shown were those of rescued passengers and exhausted divers. 
CCTV did not speculate about the outcome of the operation, but set out in great detail 
the authorities' plans to raise the stricken cruiser. These were prioritised in its 
running-orders over any 'people-oriented' reports such as the condition of the 
                                                        
126 Presenter interview question, CCTV News Hour, 3 June 2015. 
127 Interview with You Chuanyi, CCTV News Hour, 4 June 2015. 




























survivors or the plight of the relatives. CCTV's reporter in Jianli referred to options for 
the salvage work from the officials' perspective, as 'Plan A' and 'Plan B'129. Officials 
were seen to be in charge at all times – from the Chinese premier, Li Keqiang, 
directing recovery efforts from the riverbank, to soundbites about the process of DNA 
testing. News Hour spoke of the transport minister 'presiding' over the memorial 
service130.  Even local people were depicted as contributing to a solution by operating 
'citizen taxis' for the relatives131. A survivor interviewed by CCTV in hospital 
explained that he was getting better every day132 – a forward-looking, uncritical 
narrative – rather than how it had felt to be in the water.  Relatives of the dead were 
shown offering DNA samples rather than complaining about any lack of information. 
BBC Newsday's use of the solution-oriented responsibility frame fell away after 
the initial stages of rescue and salvage work. Its early coverage of the search for 
survivors used a soundbite from the transport minister and pictures of Li Keqiang to 
illustrate the authorities' strategy for dealing with the sinking: however, it paired this 
with the interpretive observation that the government would 'be aware of the 
dangers if its response is perceived as inadequate or slow'133. The BBC's reporter in 
Jianli acknowledged the extent of the recovery efforts while making the likely 
negative outcome clear: 'All along the banks of the river we can see emergency 
personnel... wearing the white forensic suits – and there's of course no need to spell 
out the significance of that'.134  A rescued tour guide shown speaking on BBC Newsday, 
in contrast to survivors on CCTV News Hour, spoke retrospectively, about his 
frightening escape from the upturned ship135. 
6.3.5.5 Combination of news frames 
The graphs in Figure 6-21, showing how each broadcaster reflected the four major 
news frames over the first eight days of coverage of the Yangtze disaster, tell two very 
different stories. There was a strong initial showing on BBC Newsday for the human 
interest and solution-oriented responsibility frames, illustrating the battle for lives in 
the immediate aftermath of the sinking. The human element remained a prime frame 
                                                        
129 2-way with Tang Bo in Jianli, CCTV News Hour, 3 June 2015. 
130 Headline, CCTV News Hour, 7 June 2015. 
131 Newsroom report, CCTV News Hour, 6 June 2015. 
132 Survivor Zhang Hui, featured in newsroom report on CCTV News Hour, 7 June 2015. 
133 News report by John Sudworth in Jianli, BBC Newsday, 3 June 2015. 
134 News report by John Sudworth in Jianli, BBC Newsday, 4 June 2015. 
135
 Clip of Jiang Geng on BBC Newsday, 8 June 2015. 
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for the BBC throughout, but the solution-oriented responsibility frame fell away as 
the conflict and causal responsibility frames gained in intensity. Questions mounted 
about how the ship capsized, and families of the victims sought information and 
answers. For CCTV's News Hour, the solution-oriented responsibility frame is the 
dominant frame by far throughout the eight days of this study. The sole focus of the 
news reports is on the authorities doing their utmost to bring about as successful an 
outcome as possible. The conflict frame hardly registers. 
Figure 6-21 BBC Newsday (top) and CCTV News Hour (bottom) combined frame density charts: 5-day 
centred moving averages 
 
 
6.3.5.6 Other editorial comparisons 
Editorial decision-making at CCTV News Hour did not appear to be influenced by the 
strength of the pictures or any human factor, in contrast to BBC Newsday's output. 
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the salvage team – were not used prominently by CCTV136. Also buried deep in a 
running-order was a CCTV interview with a diver about how he rescued a man: 'As 
soon as I entered the air-pocket in the cabin, I saw the trapped victim. It was pitch 
dark inside, with just him inside the cabin and nobody else'137. Material introducing a 
critical element, if present, was likewise positioned towards the end of the CCTV News 
Hour running-orders. One report compiled in the Beijing newsroom, possibly a re-
versioning of material from the Mandarin channel, contained telling soundbites from 
maritime officers about the lack of distress signal and automatic alarm on the ship, 
yet this was the final item in the Yangtze sequence138. It is not clear whether the 
reluctance to lead with the most striking pictures or stories was because of 
programme editors' inexperience or because of a perceived expectation that the elite, 
official, solution-oriented view of proceedings was the one that had to be conveyed. It 
should also be set against CCTV’s fondness for CGI animations in pictorial summaries 
set to music: such ‘melodramatic animations’ (Lo & Cheng 2017) can either lend the 
impression of immediacy or detract from credibility, depending on the viewer. 
6.3.6 Summary of the Yangtze coverage 
The quantitative content and frame analysis paint a picture of an elite-dominant, 
solution-focused narrative to the sinking of the Eastern Star on CCTV's News Hour, 
compared with an emotive, conflict-centred, critical retrospective appraisal on the 
BBC's Newsday.  These stances fed into polarised reporting styles – the BBC's 
providing facts but then leaning towards interpretive journalism, CCTV's clinically 
and selectively fact-heavy. Interpretive reporting by the BBC sometimes took the 
form of speculation about the consequences of events (Salgado et al. 2017:53) – that 
hopes 'must be fading' of more survivors, that the government 'will be aware of the 
dangers'139. CCTV's barrage of facts about the rescue effort and its repeated blaming 
of the weather for delays in salvage work may have reflected anxiety in the Chinese 
leadership lest the public adjudge it not to be doing enough after the disaster. The 
Eastern Star sank at what has become an extremely sensitive time of year for the 
Chinese authorities: the lead-up to the anniversary of the bloody military suppression 
of the Tiananmen Square protests on 4 June 1989. As outlined in Chapter 2, the 
                                                        
136 CCTV News Hour, 5 June 2015. 
137 Diver Guan Dong, interviewed in CCTV newsroom report on News Hour, 3 June 2015. 
138 CCTV News Hour, 7 June 2015. 
139 Report by John Sudworth in Jianli, BBC Newsday, 3 June 2015. 
166 
 
authorities believe that public opinion must be guided (yulun daoxiang 舆论导向), if 
not directly controlled (yulun jiandu 舆论监督), to preserve social stability. 
The practice of packing the narrative with facts was challenged by two CCTV-
News employees in Beijing. One of them argued that the output of CCTV-News would 
benefit from a more human perspective: 'I don’t know why the Chinese way of news 
is always start from the general picture and tell people figures and general things... 
It’s just a lazy way of reporting.'140 Another accused colleagues of uncritical 
acceptance of state news agency assertions, especially at the time that the survivors 
figure was revised downwards from 14 to 12. 'They just sit there and they say, 
"Xinhua said it. We’ve got to say it"… We just jump when Xinhua jumps. We can have a 
reporter there or not, but we’ve got to say basically what the script is.'141  
A CCTV-News journalist confirmed the veracity of leaked official instructions 
to news outlets to ‘increase positive propaganda on humanitarianism’ (China Digital 
Times 2015), but said the English programme team had tried to get round the lack of 
focus on the emotions of the bereaved.  
We were told not to write stories about the relatives... What we did was to let Zou Yue 
[in Jianli] talk about the family members without any pictures on the screen, using 
straps. I think he has mentioned in the live cross that it’s just natural that people will 
feel sad... What Zou Yue did, that was great. [Younger reporters] will just easily follow 
what the authorities say, and they don’t have that much insight. So it really matters 
who is doing the reporting. If it’s Zou Yue or Yang Rui they can go to both sides of the 
story, but they can handle it delicately. They know how far they can go, and they can 
project more balanced and objective reports.142 
The BBC, for its part, could be viewed as playing into a negativity frame, making 
conflict and polarisation a big part of its account of the disaster. The pitting of the 
relatives against the authorities, and the journalists against the authorities, was 
completely absent from CCTV's coverage. 
It is not clear how much weight can be put on the syntactic and semantic 
differences in the news texts: CCTV reporters and presenters were, after all, speaking 
in a foreign language. Still unexplained, however, is the aberrant narrative of the 
CCTV-News report from Shanghai on the day after the sinking, the sole feature on 
                                                        
140 Interview ref. CCPC09. 
141 Interview ref. CGPG15. 
142
 Interview ref. CCPC09 
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News Hour to convey the desperation of the relatives. Was this down to a slow 
institutional response, as if Link's ‘anaconda in the chandelier’ (2002) had gone to 
sleep? The reporter, Lin Nan, was still working for the channel two years later. 
However, this report aside, CCTV News Hour‘s coverage of the Yangtze sinking in this 
study did not resemble Anglo-American broadcast journalism even as its presenters 
and reporters appeared to strive to emulate it. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This study of coverage of the Hong Kong protests and Yangtze ship disaster, along 
with that of the ‘diary stories’ in Chapter 5, reveals that journalism at both BBC World 
News and CCTV-News was influenced by a host of cultural, political and 
organisational factors.  For BBC World News, the existence of pictures and their cost 
were key in decisions on what to cover: once reporters were assigned, the journalistic 
instinct was either to hold power to account or – in the absence of official access – to 
look at stories from the perspective of those challenging or questioning that power. 
For CCTV-News, pictures played little role in determining coverage: the editorial line 
was mainly from the perspective of those in power or people who supported them.  
 Only the more experienced CCTV-News reporters were observed to work 
outside these norms, introducing some dissenting voices and occasionally standing at 
more of a critical distance from government policy. For the BBC, Chinese government 
policy on its own was rarely news, and – in this sample of coverage at least – the BBC 
did not fund reporting trips along the lines of CCTV's ‘Agenda in Action’143 that would 
have illustrated the consequences of political decisions. BBC interviewees described 
the lack of an economic angle in their Hong Kong protest coverage as editorial choice, 
while Western and some Chinese interviewees at CCTV-News saw the initial failure to 
put Occupy protesters on air as censorship. These judgements may well have been 
accurate, but both decisions also reflected the prevailing view of the protests in the 
governments of their respective countries. 
 CCTV-News attempted, after some hesitation, to shape public opinion on 
unwelcome news about China rather than ignore it, even though it was thereby 
imposing a narrative on events just as Beijing has long accused Western media of 
doing.  However, on Hong Kong, if not the Yangtze sinking, CCTV's 'narrative' seemed 
                                                        
143 See Chapter 5. 
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reactive rather than agenda-setting. The initial lack of reporting of the Hong Kong 
protests by CCTV-News indicated that it was pulled into covering them only because 
of the need to be seen to compete with dominant Anglo-American news channels. In 
frame analysis terms, CCTV's treatment of Hong Kong and the Yangtze disaster was 
clearly at variance with that of BBC World News, but the inconsistency in CCTV's 
framing of the Hong Kong protests also suggested inconsistent guidance on which 
'line' to take in the reporting. This can be contrasted with CCTV's confident use of the 
solution-oriented attribution of responsibility frame in its coverage of the Yangtze 
sinking, and the ubiquity of the same frame (along with that of economic 
consequences) in its coverage of the lunar new year and Two Sessions. In those 
instances, the role of state media was clear and the messages of government policy 
could be transmitted. Only in the case of Hong Kong was CCTV-News – and possibly, 
by extension, the Chinese leadership – truly out of its comfort zone. 
Only when the top Chinese leadership will realise the importance of making 
professional news, and how skilfully and smartly we can set the news agendas, will [it] 
help to improve China’s images and influence. And then the real changes [at CCTV-
News] will happen. But now, I think the top leadership’s focus is the stability of the 
country. (Senior journalist, CCTV-News)144 
The only reason for CCTV-News to exist is to give the world the China story. It can 
only be credible if it’s telling the truth about China. (Former senior CCTV-News 
production team member)145 
How CCTV-News represents events in China is, however, only one part of the 'China 
story': another is how it conveys China's view of and dealings with the outside world. 
Chapter 7 addresses the latter perspective through an analysis of news output away 
from Beijing, at CCTV Africa in Nairobi. 
 
                                                        
144 Interview ref. CCFC07. 
145 Interview ref. CGPG10. 
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7 China’s news for Africa: experiment or expedient? 
7.1 Introduction 
7.1.1 Overview 
Analysis of CCTV-News output from Beijing alone cannot fully reveal the nature of the 
Chinese broadcaster's Anglophone journalism. Chapter 3 explained how CCTV 
America, based in Washington, delivers an anodyne Anglo-American-style version of 
world news events where they do not directly involve China. In Africa, however, 
China's business, developmental and security interests are everywhere. If CCTV-News 
from Beijing can be seen as how China wishes to display itself to the outside world, 
CCTV Africa's news from Nairobi may provide insights into how this part of the 
outside world appears to China, and how China sees its relationship with it.  
 Analysis of CCTV's news from Africa, again compared with that of BBC World 
News, along with interviews with managers and journalists, reveals how the Nairobi 
newsroom is trying to reshape the international ‘Africa agenda’. This analysis permits 
evaluation of whether CCTV's African news should be categorised as journalism, 
propaganda or public diplomacy, whether the reporting is different from CCTV’s news 
about China, and to what extent it diverges from Anglo-American journalistic 
principles. This includes investigation into whether it has Chinese or African 
characteristics, and indeed whether these are similar: this might indicate that it is the 
Anglo-American style of journalism that is the exception and that it has become the 
norm only through cultural domination. 
7.1.2 CCTV Africa Live and BBC Focus on Africa TV 
By mid-2017, more than five years after their launch, CCTV's Africa Live and BBC 
World News TV's Focus on Africa1 were still the only specialist daily Anglophone 
African TV news programmes produced by international broadcasters. Among rival 
stations, Al Jazeera English and CNN maintained African news web pages and ran 
individual or weekly strands of African TV programming, while no distinct African 
output at all was scheduled on the Japanese international channel NHK World.2 As 
                                                        
1 The BBC World News programme bears the same name as its long-running World Service radio 
counterpart: references to ‘Focus on Africa’ in this chapter are all to the television programme. 
2 Anglophone African broadcasters themselves have made a patchy impression on the pan-African 
news market: the South African 24-hour news channel eNCA closed its African news bulletin in 2014 
and cut associated staff. TVC-News Africa, in Nigeria, closed after 5 years in 2017 in order to re-focus 
on Nigeria itself. Pan-African Television, based in Ghana, has been attracting viewers and an online 
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explained in Chapter 3, the BBC and CCTV had good reason to aim for such a strong 
African presence. Quite apart from British and Chinese historical engagement with 
African nations, China's national and commercial interests in Africa gave the 
continent's news greater relevance at home and abroad, while the BBC sought to 
capitalise on its substantial African radio and internet audience. However, by 
providing distinct coverage of Africa, both channels indicated that it was to some 
extent a deviation or exception from their editorial norms: Al Jazeera English, for 
instance, kept Africa within its mainstream output. 
 Both broadcasters' African reporting in the two programmes studied here was 
intended to challenge existing expectations of what constitutes news and to build less 
overwhelmingly negative African news agendas. As CCTV Africa's main presenter put 
it:3 'Africa is not just flood-hit all the time; Africa is not hopeless all the time.' 
Interviews revealed a coincidence of editorial approach. 
You have to report on [the bombings and killings]. But after that, you must have your 
editorial policy... I tell our reporters: next time, go to Somalia, not just focus on the 
bombing, the killing, but focus on the beautiful side of Somalia... And their economy 
now is also returning to normal. Some countries, especially Turkey, invest heavily in 
Somalia. (Managing editor, CCTV Africa, ref. CAMC35) 
You would get to a time about maybe the anniversary of the Rwandan genocide and 
what would be on the table for you would be to remind people what the genocide was 
like 20 years ago. That was 20 years ago. People want to hear about what's been 
happening today, how Rwanda has transformed itself from that history into having a 
6.7% growth economy… People want to move on. (African journalist, BBC Focus on 
Africa, ref. BAFA54) 
CCTV Africa went to air in January 2012 promising fresh stories and a 'global 
perspective of a continent on the rise',4 with African nations benefiting from China’s 
development. 
China Dream is very simple – the dream is to have a better life. So African Dream is 
the same. Because a lot of African countries are still not very strong: they are 
developing.... Now, China is stronger than before, so now is our responsibility to help 
the people who once helped China. (Managing editor, CCTV Africa, ref. CAMC35) 
                                                                                                                                                                        
following with its remit of 'intelligent programming... for the contemporary African' (Pan-African TV, 
n.d.) 
3 Personal interview (ref. CAFA27). All CCTV Africa interviews were carried out face to face in 2016. 
4 CCTV Africa channel trailer, 2014. 
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 CCTV's pushback against negativity was echoed five months later when the BBC 
launched its own African TV news programme, Focus on Africa, with a remit to reflect 
'the Africa of today [which] is... dynamic, it's modern, it's enterprising and exciting'.5  
It’s about people in Africa having ideas, creating music, films, fashion, businesses... 
whereas from the outside world I believe we see Africa as a destroyer of wealth, 
which is an absurdity and going against evidence. (Editor, BBC Focus on Africa, ref. 
BAMG55) 
Editorial regionalisation at both the BBC and CCTV Africa (see Chapter 3) was 
reflected in primarily African front-of-camera staffing and to a great extent in 
production too. While CCTV's expansion included a broadcasting centre in Nairobi 
and regional recruitment, BBC Focus on Africa‘s less generously funded operation was 
steered and presented from London with input from BBC bureaux and reporters 
around Africa. 
7.1.3 Dates and data 
Two programmes were mined for comparative data: the 1700 GMT hour-long edition 
of CCTV's Africa Live, and the BBC’s half-hour Focus on Africa, broadcast at 1730 GMT. 
Discrete business and sports slots were disregarded. Africa Live was half an hour long 
at weekends, when Focus on Africa was not shown. 
The five constructed weeks of African news output in 2014 and 2016, on 
which the quantitative content and frame analyses were based, were drawn from the 
same dates as the world news programmes analysed in Chapter 56. The unit of 
analysis was the news story (BBC Focus on Africa n=243, CCTV Africa Live n=452). In 
addition, three African news events were subjected to opportunistic sampling: the 
flare-up in the conflict in South Sudan in May 2014; the east African trip by the US 
president Barack Obama in July 2015; and the visit of the Chinese president Xi Jinping 
for the summit of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FoCAC) in December 2015. 
Interviews were carried out in London in 2014 and 2015, and Nairobi in 2016, with 
managers and journalists (BBC n=4, CCTV n=9). The South Sudan analysis provided 
the impetus for later framing work, while the visits by the Chinese and American 
leaders fed into the wider geopolitical context in which the programmes were 
operating. 
                                                        
5 Focus on Africa programme trailer, 2012. 
6 Sample quantitative data-sheet in Appendix 7A. 
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7.2 Reshaping the international agenda on Africa 
The commitment by the African programmes to provide a perspective on African 
news that was distinct from the international norm manifested itself in different ways. 
This section compares CCTV Africa Live with BBC World's Focus on Africa in terms of 
their visual and editorial branding, the emerging theory of constructive journalism as 
applied to African output, and how constructive or positive reporting influenced the 
ways in which the story of South Sudan could be told. 
7.2.1 Beyond the brand 
Analysing the provenance of the journalists was more than simply acknowledging 
window-dressing by two essentially non-African broadcasters. Staff argued that it 
was through the contribution of the perspectives of Africans that their news was 
made credible, and was seen by African audiences to be credible. 
I often find that when I go to the afternoon [international] editorial meeting for World 
[News TV], and we [African programme producers] join in and we put forward our 
stories and the angle of the story as well, there’s quite a lot of puzzled faces there. So 
to try to explain to them why that story’s important and why they [should] think it’s 
important is quite a job. (Producer, BBC Focus on Africa, ref. BAPB53) 
It would be easy just to pick what our colleagues in Beijing or Washington have 
covered.  But every day we have our own two-and-a-half hours to fill with content 
from the continent. We… feel that we have a platform through which we can provide 
an alternative voice, and especially an African voice, on base. (News editor, CCTV 
Africa Live, ref. CAPA33) 
It was not possible to determine how many members of the two production teams 
were African7, but in front of the camera CCTV used no Chinese journalists to present 
the Africa Live programmes analysed here, and the only British presenter on Focus on 
Africa was British-African8. Differences were more pronounced when it came to 
reporters: about 30% of the BBC’s were British whereas only 4% on CCTV Africa Live 
were Chinese. At the BBC, much of this could be attributed to cost-cutting and the 
centralisation of newsgathering deployments, but there was much resistance to 
'parachute journalism' at Focus on Africa. 
                                                        
7 Both production teams included non-Africans on the days of the researcher’s visits. 
8 For figures see Appendix 7B. 
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Africans now realise that locals can tell our own story. I don't need someone to live in 
my country for two weeks and become a Nigeria expert. I've lived in [Britain] for 10 
years, worked in a news organisation, and no-one's ever called on me to tell them 
what goes on in Westminster. (Journalist, BBC Focus on Africa, ref. BAFA54) 
With presenters and reporters combined (Figure 7-1), the vast majority of on-air 
journalists on CCTV Africa Live in 2016 were African and just 3% were Chinese, 
compared with more than 20% British on the BBC’s African news programme.9 
Entrusting African journalists with its news from Nairobi represented a leap of faith 
by CCTV, which had ensured that Chinese journalists kept hold of its message from 
Beijing (see Figure 5-8).  
Figure 7-1 Nationalities of journalists presenting, reporting or voicing the African news, 2014-16: ‘home’ = 
British on BBC Focus on Africa or Chinese on CCTV Africa Live 
 
The two broadcasters both put African journalists in front of the camera wherever 
possible, but used their reporters very differently. Africa Live‘s news featured CCTV’s 
reporters in Africa in more than 62% of output on average in the periods studied, 
compared with Focus on Africa‘s 38% (see Figure 7-2).10  This was partly because the 
BBC's Focus on Africa was more discursive and included many studio interviews. 
However, CCTV Africa Live also used its reporters almost twice as often on average as 
CCTV-News from Beijing, where the studio presenter was sole narrator for a 
significant proportion of the news. Again, this demonstrated the organisation’s trust 
in the African reporters. 
                                                        
9 For figures see Appendix 7C. 
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Figure 7-2 Who tells the story? Percentage of news on BBC Focus on Africa and CCTV Africa Live narrated 
by reporters (rather than by presenters or through interviews), 5 constructed weeks, 2014-16 
 
7.2.2 Positive news and ‘constructive’ journalism 
The concept of constructive journalism outlined in Chapter 2 was seen by some 
scholars in China as a possible blueprint for Chinese media in Africa (Zhang 2014:8), 
delivering a counterweight to the random, superficial and recurring template of bad 
news from Africa (Franks 2010:75) for which Anglo-American news outlets have 
been criticised within the academy (Bunce 2015:42; French 2015). Gagliardone 
(2013:35) and Zhang (2013:79) have also advanced the notion that CCTV might be 
testing new ways of reporting away from the watchful eye of Beijing. The chapter 
examines these ideas in a comparative context, investigates the journalistic credibility 
of the concept and of its application, and seeks to distinguish constructive journalism 
from ‘positive news’. 
7.2.3 The case of South Sudan 
How the BBC and CCTV reported on the conflict in South Sudan illustrated some of 
the differences outlined above. Civil war broke out in 2013, two years after South 
Sudan gained independence from Sudan. Several years of fighting between factions 
led by President Salva Kiir and his sacked deputy Riek Machar killed tens of 
thousands of people and displaced at least one-fifth of the population. The conflict 
made up 30% of CCTV Africa Live‘s news output in the January 2014 analysis period – 
more than three times the percentage on BBC Focus on Africa11. This trend was 
backed up by subsequent tranches of content analysis (Figure 7-3), and prompted 
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closer inspection of how the two channels reported on South Sudan. A reporting trip 
by a veteran BBC Africa correspondent between 30 April and 8 May 2014 provided an 
opportunity for a data-rich comparison of coverage.  
Figure 7-3 Coverage of South Sudan on the two African news programmes as a percentage of their total 
news output 
  
The period of analysis encompassed ferocious gun battles in the oil hub of Bentiu, 
visits by the American Secretary of State, John Kerry, and the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, and rare talks between South Sudan’s president and 
rebel leader which eventually gave rise to a precarious ceasefire deal. The two 
broadcasters framed these events in very different ways: the BBC witnessed the 
South Sudanese conflict from the battlefield and relayed images of human suffering 
from refugee camps, while CCTV focused on peace negotiations, prioritising the 
hoped-for outcome. In framing terms, CCTV concentrated on aims for a restoration of 
stability and the responsibility for finding a solution, while most of the BBC’s 
coverage was framed as conflict, human interest and attribution of blame. 
The BBC’s main visiting correspondent in South Sudan covered the action at 
close quarters, much of it from the UN compound near the front line at Bentiu. Bullets 
whizzed over his head as government and rebel forces traded fire: the correspondent 
crouched in a trench in bullet-proof vest and helmet, addressing the camera directly 
as the battle raged.12 The two opposing factions were depicted mainly as fighters 
brandishing guns. The pictures were strong, including the burial of a little girl killed 
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in crossfire and rebel troops engaged in a victory chant.13 Even a refugee camp was 
depicted as a place of conflict, its inmates cooped up for too long and turning on one 
another.14 The correspondent described President Kiir and Riek Machar as 'one half 
of South Sudan’s problem… the other half of the problem'.15  A departure from this 
conflict frame was a report from the towns of Renk and Malakal by one of the BBC’s 
bilingual African reporters, which dealt with the economic consequences of the 
fighting.16 The pictures in this report were striking, not for what they contained but 
for the way that they dealt with absence of people, trade and life, as a UN official 
toured a desolate but once-thriving area that he had known well. 
CCTV Africa, for its part, focused on possible solutions to the crisis – meetings 
involving mediators and leaders from the two sides at African Union headquarters in 
Addis Ababa – and no CCTV correspondent was seen in body armour. Conflict footage 
was used sparingly, and there were no pictures of the battle for Bentiu. CCTV covered 
John Kerry’s visit by running clips of him speaking without further elaboration, while 
remarking on China’s 'leading role in attempting to broker a peace'.17  The emphasis 
throughout was on how to restore stability to South Sudan. Face-to-face talks, 
according to CCTV’s correspondent in Addis Ababa, 'could not come at a better 
time'.18 The only rebels who were interviewed belonged to the delegation at the 
peace talks in Ethiopia, where the pictures were of lines of sober, besuited men. A 
mediator was interviewed on the possible formation of a transitional 
administration.19. A rare 'human interest' report depicted South Sudanese artists 
engaged in nation-building, 'sharing differences of culture… and ideas'.20  
CCTV's stability narrative was reflected on the ground in 2015, when China 
deployed peacekeeping troops to South Sudan – the first time it had sent a full 
infantry battalion to join a United Nations peacekeeping mission (Xinhua 2015b, 
UNMISS 2015). The civil war had sharply cut oil production in the volatile new 
country, where the China National Petroleum Corporation was the largest energy 
                                                        
13 Report by Alastair Leithead from Bentiu, BBC World News 6 May 2014. 
14 Report by Alastair Leithead from Juba, BBC World News 2 May 2014. 
15 Report by Alastair Leithead from Juba, BBC World News 30 April 2014. 
16 Report by Emmanuel Igunza from Renk and Malakal, BBC World News 2 May 2014. 
17 Report by Girum Chala from Addis Ababa, CCTV Africa Live 1 May 2014. 
18 Report by Girum Chala from Addis Ababa, CCTV Africa Live 8 May 2014. 
19 Seyoum Mesfin of IGAD, in report by Girum Chala from Addis Ababa, CCTV Africa Live 4 May 2014. 
20 Report from Nairobi by Susan Mwongeli, CCTV-News 1 May 2014. 
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company (Patey, 2014; Gridneff, 2015). The extent and tenor of CCTV's coverage 
should not automatically be seen as politically or economically determined: South 
Sudan's troubles were newsworthy in anyone’s terms.  
7.3 Africa as seen by British and Chinese TV news 
7.3.1 African regions compared  
As Figure 7-4 shows, East Africa was the most-covered region in both programmes, 
occupying more than 30% of news output. However, CCTV’s initial overwhelming 
focus on East Africa in 2014 – aligned, consciously or not, with China’s trade interests 
in the region – had subsided by 2016 so that East Africa had virtually the same share 
of total output as on the BBC. This was commensurate with CCTV Africa’s recruitment 
of several senior journalists from eNCA in South Africa, who rebalanced the 
previously overwhelmingly Kenyan editorial presence. 
Figure 7-4 African regions as represented in the news output of BBC Focus on Africa and CCTV Africa Live: 
averages from 5 constructed weeks, 2014-16 
 
A focus on the political turmoil in Egypt and Libya led CCTV Africa Live to feature 
much more North African news than BBC Focus on Africa. CCTV Africa Live's North 
Africa items made up nearly 20% of news output compared with just over 8% on the 
BBC, although the BBC programme’s remit was in any case to focus on sub-Saharan 
Africa. West African news was the preserve of Focus on Africa in 2014, but by 2016 
Africa Live was broadcasting a similar amount. This can partly be ascribed to CCTV's 
coverage of the latter stages of the Ebola crisis, in which China provided high-profile 
medical help. North Africa apart, the geographic make-up of the two programmes' 
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output in 2016 was very similar, unlike in 2014.21  Both broadcasters gave Southern 
Africa a much greater share of their output in 2016 than in 2014, averaging around 
10% apiece. 
7.3.2 African topics compared 
Figure 7-5 Topics as represented in the news output of BBC Focus on Africa and CCTV Africa Live: averages 
from 5 constructed weeks, 2014-16 
 
 
The range of topics covered on CCTV Africa Live (Figure 7-5) was weighted far more 
towards security, conflict and politics than the subject-matter of BBC Focus on Africa, 
averaging 69% of output for the two categories compared with the BBC's 52%22. The 
Chinese broadcaster was not as interested in social issues as the BBC programme. 
However, CCTV Africa Live‘s agenda in 2016 was more aligned with the BBC’s than in 
2014, with less time spent on security and politics, and more cultural or offbeat news. 
7.3.3 Frame analysis of three major topics 
The difference in perspective between CCTV and the BBC on South Sudan inspired a 
broader investigation of their reporting of other African news. Frame analysis was 
conducted on the three most prominent topics in the content analysis of the two 
broadcasters’ African programmes from May and June 2014. This was intended to 
reveal how solution-focused their reporting might be, pointing towards either 
'constructive journalism' (see 2.5.1) or simply positive news. While both broadcasters 
had indicated a desire to move away from any blanket depiction of a suffering 
continent, two of the three topics analysed were essentially grim. The three were 
                                                        
21 Figures for individual periods of analysis in Appendix 7F. Percentages refer to the time devoted to 
each region over 5 constructed weeks rather than the number of news items. 
22 Figures for individual periods of analysis in Appendix 7G. Percentages refer to the time devoted to 
each topic-block over 5 constructed weeks rather than the number of news items. 
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insurgency (Boko Haram in west Africa and Al-Shabab in the east), the elections in 
Malawi, and the problems of African migration and refugees. Coverage on BBC Focus 
on Africa (n=19) and CCTV Africa Live (n=32) was examined for presence of the eight 
frames outlined in 4.5.4. The small sample produced specific rather than 
generalisable results but with a sharpened focus through same-day comparison, 
representing what Esser (2013:115) would categorise as intensive rather than 
extensive comparative study. The data gathered23, shown in Table 7-1, are explained 
in the next three sections. 
Table 7-1 Frame incidence in 2014 analysis of African news programmes: figures denote percentage of 
news items in which a given frame appears. Each item can contain more than one frame 
Frames 
Insurgency Elections Migration Totals 
BBC CCTV BBC CCTV BBC CCTV BBC CCTV 
Conflict 73 39 100 75 25 30 68 41 
Economic consequences 0 6 25 25 25 60 11 25 
Human interest 36 44 50 0 50 100 42 56 
Attrib of causal responsibility 55 22 50 75 25 10 47 25 
Attrib of solution responsibility 55 78 50 100 25 20 47 63 
Morality 0 0 25 0 25 0 11 0 
Stability 46 39 0 25 25 50 32 41 
Harmony 9 33 25 25 0 30 11 31 
7.3.3.1 Framing insurgency: Boko Haram and Al-Shabab 
In west Africa, bomb attacks in the central Nigerian city of Jos and several north-
eastern villages from mid-May to early June 2014 were blamed on the Islamist 
militants of Boko Haram, as the authorities deliberated on how to rescue 200 
schoolgirls kidnapped by the group. In east Africa, the focus was on multiple killings 
on Kenya’s coast in mid-June 2014: the Somali Islamist group Al-Shabab said it had 
carried out the attacks, while the government insisted local political networks were 
to blame. The BBC's African news programme scored more highly on the conflict and 
'blame' frames than CCTV's Africa Live: the Chinese broadcaster favoured the 
solution-focused responsibility frame, although the BBC percentage figure for this 
category was also relatively high. 
BBC Focus on Africa framed the insurgencies as conflict, in the sense of a 
straightforward fight between the authorities and the militants, almost twice as 
frequently as CCTV’s Africa Live. The BBC repeatedly asked, ‘Is the (Nigerian) 
government losing the battle against Boko Haram?’24 and ran reports and interviews 
                                                        
23 Raw figures in Appendix 7H. 
24 Peter Okwoche in Focus on Africa, BBC World News, 21 May 2014. 
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questioning the authorities’ competence to handle the insurgency25. In Kenya, the 
BBC asked a government spokesman why Kenyans should believe President 
Kenyatta’s safety assurances, ‘considering he’s made previous statements on 
enhanced security and the attacks have continued’26. CCTV ran President Kenyatta’s 
statement denying Al-Shabab’s involvement without challenge: in the same report, it 
reflected more controversial issues from a distance, saying, ‘critics have again 
questioned Kenya’s ability to keep its people safe’27.   
While the BBC highlighted governments’ inaction just as often as it credited 
them with offering solutions, CCTV made the intervention of the authorities a focal 
point of its coverage. In Nigeria, CCTV asserted that ‘everyone wanted to know the 
official reaction’28; ‘everyone is waiting to… get the side of the government’29.  A local 
man, shown on CCTV, asked the government to ‘work hard’ and rescue Nigerians 
from the insurgency30. The stability frame was invoked more often by the BBC than 
CCTV in covering the insurgencies because of BBC reporters’ repeated questioning of 
people’s safety. However, CCTV availed itself of the harmony narrative by featuring 
the international help offered to Nigeria to free the kidnapped girls31. CCTV said this 
help was 'led' by China: in fact President Jonathan had also accepted help from the US, 
Britain and France and none of them was deemed to be heading any joint operation. 
(Faul 2014, Information Nigeria 2014). According to CCTV, President Jonathan was 
also ‘turning to his neighbours to help combat Boko Haram’32, and Ghanaian people 
were seen supporting pleas for the Nigerian government to act33. 
The two broadcasters’ catchlines for the insurgency in west Africa were 
strikingly different but both were derived from Western constructs. On 21 May, CCTV 
Africa Live’s headline on a suspected Boko Haram massacre carried a strapline 
reading, ‘Nigeria’s War On Terror’. BBC Focus on Africa’s studio backdrop bore the 
phrase, ‘The Enemy Within’. Both terms arise from othering processes, but enemies 
or an enemy (from) within are reminiscent of McCarthyite and Thatcherite 
                                                        
25 Focus on Africa, BBC World News, 15 May, 21 May and 5 June 2014. 
26 Emmanuel Igunza in Focus on Africa, BBC World News, 17 June 2014. 
27 Jane Kiyo in Africa Live, CCTV News, 17 June 2014. 
28 Deji Badmus in Africa Live, CCTV News, 15 May 2014. 
29 Kofa Mrenje in Africa Live, CCTV News, 2 June 2014. 
30 Africa Live, CCTV News, 21 May 2014. 
31 Africa Live, CCTV News, 15 May 2014. 
32 Jane Kiyo in Africa Live, CCTV News, 21 May 2014. 
33 Africa Live, CCTV News, 21 May 2014. 
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accusations of Cold War subversion and indicate a much more intractable ideological 
conflict than that denoted by the binary, impersonal ‘War on Terror’. The phrase may 
have been appropriated by President Jonathan, but its language and cultural 
background were those of George Bush and Tony Blair, not of either China or Africa. 
Deployment of reporters affected the strength of the frame. The BBC’s use of 
the conflict and human interest narratives in Nigeria was strengthened visually by the 
footage of its correspondent picking his way across the devastated site of a bombing 
in Jos34. By contrast, CCTV’s reporter recounted second-hand details of the bombing 
from a camera position outside his office hundreds of kilometres away35. However, on 
17 June in East Africa, both broadcasters reported from the scene of massacres near 
Lamu in Kenya initially blamed on Al-Shabab: here, the strength of the frame was 
determined by the running-orders. For the BBC, the human interest frame was 
paramount and the programme opened with the strongest images – those of 
frightened villagers in Mpeketoni36 – followed by a dissection of President Kenyatta’s 
reaction to the killings. CCTV conversely gave priority to authority, showing the much 
less televisual statement by the president before running its correspondent’s report 
from Mpeketoni in which he spoke to worried survivors amid smouldering rubble37. 
Three days later the two broadcasters chose to highlight opposing interpretations of 
security in coastal Kenya. The BBC grilled a government spokesman on the adequacy 
of security precautions and featured a Kenyan citizen who had written to the 
government to say he did not feel safe38: CCTV reported again from Mpeketoni on the 
increased, if belated, security presence and said the town was ‘slowly coming back to 
life’39 (Nagila, 2014b). 
7.3.3.2 Framing elections: the presidential contest in Malawi 
The tension between traditional Western adversarial framing of a contest and a more 
constructive account of a country's problems was demonstrated in reporting of the 
2014 presidential election in Malawi by the two broadcasters' African news 
programmes. CCTV's Africa Live and BBC Focus on Africa both portrayed the election 
overwhelmingly in terms of conflict, although CCTV abandoned the conflict frame 
                                                        
34 Gabriel Gatehouse in Focus on Africa, BBC World News, 21 May 2014. 
35 Deji Badmus in Africa Live, CCTV News, 21 May 2014. 
36 Anne Soy, Focus on Africa, BBC World News, 17 June 2014. 
37 Robert Nagila, Africa Live, CCTV News, 17 June 2014. 
38 Focus on Africa, BBC World News, 20 June 2014. 
39 Robert Nagila, Africa Live, CCTV News, 20 June 2014. 
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once the new president had taken office. CCTV's reports contained the solution-
oriented responsibility frame twice as often as the BBC's.  
The conflict frame was dominant in the two programmes' views of both the 
contested outcome of the Malawian presidential poll and the ensuing legal battles 
over a recount. The BBC’s Focus on Africa interviewed people waiting for hours to 
vote (‘Does that make you angry?’ – ‘Yes, we are very angry’40) and referred to ‘court 
case after court case’ about the tally41. CCTV’s Africa Live spoke of an electoral process 
in ‘disarray’42 and featured complaints of voting irregularities43. However, it also 
devoted much time to the Malawi Electoral Commission’s justification of its actions44. 
After the new president, Peter Mutharika, was finally installed, the accusations and 
conflict frame on CCTV fell away. President Mutharika was ‘tasked with reviving the 
economy and uniting Malawians’45, and a supporter interviewed at the inauguration 
said people were prepared to ‘wait patiently’ for progress46. The BBC’s reporter at the 
ceremony, by contrast, spoke of a ‘messy and disputed outcome’ to the elections, 
‘riddled with accusations of foul play and rigging’, although she also mentioned 
President Mutharika’s promises to revive Malawi’s fortunes47. 
7.3.3.3 Framing displacement: migration within and from Africa 
It was in their portrayal of migration and refugees that the two broadcasters' African 
programmes diverged most widely, but here, the depictions ran counter to 
expectations. It was the Chinese broadcaster that made more use of Western news 
agency footage, often resulting in the type of broad-brush depictions of suffering from 
which both programmes had stated their intent to distance themselves. In framing 
terms, conflict took a back seat in both Africa Live and Focus on Africa, while CCTV laid 
emphasis on the economic consequences of migration. 
The two programmes covered the same news only once, on 20 June, World 
Refugee Day. The BBC’s Focus on Africa briefly summarised overall refugee figures 
before dealing at length with how displaced people could be integrated into other 
                                                        
40 Nomsa Maseko, Focus on Africa, BBC World News, 21 May 2014. 
41 Nomsa Maseko, Focus on Africa, BBC World News, 27 May 2014. 
42 Carol Oyola, Africa Live, CCTV News, 27 May 2014. 
43 Africa Live, CCTV News, 21 May, 27 May, 30 May 2014. 
44 Africa Live, CCTV News, 21 May, 27 May 2014. 
45 CCTV Africa Live, 2 June 2014. 
46 Jane Kiyo, Africa Live, CCTV News, 2 June 2014. 
47 Nomsa Maseko, BBC Focus on Africa, 2 June 2014. 
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African societies, focusing on individuals through the frames of human interest and 
economic consequences. CCTV’s Africa Live, by contrast, interpreted the human 
interest frame mostly through a macro lens. It highlighted the scale of the refugee 
crisis and dwelt on basic survival needs, illustrating this with wide-shots of families 
standing in desolate camps and close-ups of malnourished children having their limbs 
measured. CCTV returned to the angle of human suffering on other days, featuring the 
threat of starvation and disease in South Sudan48 and the refugee exodus from the 
Central African Republic49. Its reporting style was distant, involving footage narrated 
from headquarters in Nairobi or the United Nations. On migration, the BBC was close 
to the action, its correspondent accompanying a Mediterranean coastguard patrol to 
track Africans’ dangerous boat journeys to Europe50. A similar story on CCTV was 
covered from European Union headquarters in Brussels using agency footage of a 
Mediterranean rescue51. Its strapline was non-African: ‘Europe struggles with 
migrants influx’. 
The divergence in the two broadcasters’ framing of migration and 
displacement coincided with CCTV’s disproportionate use of non-original footage. 
While CCTV’s Africa Live made use of stock images of refugee camps and United 
Nations appeals, the BBC’s Focus on Africa – admittedly with less airtime to fill – 
eschewed routine news agency coverage. This was, according to its editor, in line with 
the recently reiterated emphasis on original journalism in the light of steep budget 
cuts.  
7.3.3.4 Decoding the framing results 
The African frame analysis indicated a top-level divergence in the priorities of the 
BBC and CCTV African news programmes, with the BBC cleaving to the conflict frame 
as its default way of viewing the news, and CCTV to the attribution of solution-
oriented responsibility. Having taken this into account, however, the frames in the 
two broadcasters' African news programmes were otherwise more alike than their 
framing of the Chinese news in the previous chapters. More notable still were the 
internal differences – in other words, how each broadcaster's framing of African news 
                                                        
48 Nick Harper, Susan Mwongeli and Wazir Khamsin on CCTV Africa Live, 21 May, 27 May and 5 June 
2014 respectively. 
49 Maria Galang and Carol Oyola on CCTV Africa Live, 27 May and 2 June 2014 respectively. 
50 Quentin Sommerville, BBC Focus on Africa, 30 May 2014. 
51 Jack Barton, CCTV Africa Live, 20 June 2014. 
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differed from that of its own Chinese news as previously analysed. While the subjects 
covered in Africa and China were diverse and cannot be compared scientifically, 
persistent tendencies in the use of frames allow some conclusions to be drawn.  
The solution-oriented attribution of responsibility frame was as prominent in 
CCTV's African news as it had been in its Chinese news. However, in CCTV Africa Live 
there were also strong manifestations of the conflict and human interest frames, 
which were lacking in CCTV’s Beijing coverage. The stability and harmony frames 
were also stronger in CCTV's African coverage: as Brautigam has observed (2009), 
China sees economic development as the key to ending conflict and instability. For the 
BBC, the conflict and causal responsibility frames were more in evidence in its African 
than its Chinese news, which might surprise those critics who accuse the BBC’s China 
correspondents of constantly targeting the Beijing authorities for blame. Stability and 
solution-oriented responsibility also showed up in the frame analysis of the BBC's 
African news. 
The analysis of CCTV Africa Live‘s output revealed a tension between the drive 
for a more upbeat solution-oriented framing of the news and the Anglo-American-
inspired, conflict-based training of many of the broadcaster’s African journalists. 
CCTV managers’ reactions to editorial leanings towards conflict (in the sense of 
binary oppositions rather than wars) and the causal responsibility frame indicated 
that they regarded critical stances as lacking impartiality and even as taking the 
opposition’s side. CCTV Africa’s Chinese deputy managing editor said that when CCTV 
first employed African journalists, their training had jarred with the Chinese 
approach: ‘We encouraged them to take a more objective look [at] the issues... try to 
do all the angles, not just to interview what the opposition say.’52 His implication was 
that non-Chinese journalism training betrayed a bias in favour of any opposition to 
the status quo. 
CCTV’s African news availed itself more often of the stability frame than did 
the BBC’s Focus on Africa TV. This indicated a consonance of interest in stability by 
two areas of the world, China and Africa, which had more recent memories of 
turbulent times than the West. The drive for stability was underlined by CCTV Africa’s 
managing editor.  
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 Interview ref. CAMC29. 
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If we always criticise the government and help the people to do some radical things, 
like overthrow the government, it’s not a help to the people. Libya is the example. 
Everybody now, including President Obama, regrets what he has done in Libya. Why? 
Because in the past it was a normal country – but now it’s not a country, it’s a 
morgue... Now you can see government, even a bad government, is better than that.53 
The frame analysis of migration revealed a paradox in that CCTV-News, through 
uncritical use of Western news agency footage, appeared at times to be perpetuating 
the very framing patterns it had committed itself to avoiding. This was noticeable in 
CCTV Africa news items generated in the Nairobi newsroom rather than in the field: 
they often reflected the priorities of western-founded global institutions, depicting 
African peoples as passive, collective sufferers and recipients of aid. CCTV may have 
resorted to agency footage because of the sheer volume of material needed to fill an 
hour-long programme, with its ambitions outstripping its ability to deliver original 
coverage. Nonetheless, reliance on agency pictures inevitably means a loss of control 
of the news agenda (Paterson 2011), unevenness of tone because of information 
gleaned from agency ‘dope-sheets’, and constraints on alternative news flows. 
7.4 China-Africa reporting 
7.4.1 Routine coverage 
Given the scale of China's interests in Africa, it was remarkable how little routine 
coverage there was of China and Chinese people in African news on either CCTV or 
the BBC in the period studied. Table 7-2 records all mentions of China in the five 
constructed weeks of content analysis from 2014 and 2016: once China news from 
outside Africa was discounted, China-Africa stories on CCTV Africa Live amounted to 
less than 5% of news output. On BBC Focus on Africa the percentage was even smaller 
– an average of 1.2% of coverage during this study. Questioned about this, the 
programme’s editor insisted 'we do a lot of China in Africa'54: in practice, this often 
took the form of themed series of features to accompany scheduled events such as Xi 
Jinping’s 2015 Africa trip (7.4.2), none of which occurred during the constructed 
weeks of content analysis. 
                                                        
53
 Interview ref. CAMC35. 
54
 Interview ref. BAMG55. 
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Table 7-2 Numbers of China news stories and percentages of news about China in Africa in 5 constructed 
weeks of the two news programmes (3 in 2014 and 2 in 2016) 
 
Indeed, in the three constructed weeks of output in 2014, BBC Focus on Africa ran 
nothing specifically about China in Africa, although it did show a report from Hong 
Kong on the authorities burning a stockpile of illegal ivory55. On CCTV Africa Live, by 
contrast, the China-Africa subject-matter was overwhelmingly about politics and 
security, with China depicted as the facilitator of better lives for African people. 
Through the eyes of CCTV, China nudged South Sudan's warring factions towards 
mediation56, helped the hunt for the kidnapped Chibok girls in Nigeria57 and 
supported a security drive in Kenya after insurgent attacks58. Away from politics, 
Ethiopian wushu masters were shown returning from their training in Chinese 
temples to help 'build a better society' at home59. In all these cases, CCTV Africa 
tapped into the solution-oriented responsibility and harmony frames, offering a 
vision of a brighter future shaped by China or the Africans whom China had trained.  
In the two constructed weeks of output in 2016, BBC Focus on Africa ran no 
news items specifically about China in Africa. It mentioned China's African 
involvement three times, none of them in a constructive light. Two items referred to 
the impact of China's economic slowdown on African mining in general60 and 
Zambian copper prices in particular61, and the third touched on the need for 
aggressive penalties against the rhino horn trade fuelled by demand from China and 
other Asian countries62. In this period, BBC Focus on Africa showed nothing of China's 
political or military involvement in Africa. The focus on CCTV's Africa Live, on the 
other hand, was very much on politics and security. The predominant footage was of 
                                                        
55 Juliana Liu, BBC Focus on Africa, 15 May 2014. 
56 CCTV Africa Live: presenter script 15 January 2014, Girum Chala reports 24 January & 7 June 2014, 
interview with Chinese ambassador 23 June 2014. 
57 Jane Kiyo, CCTV Africa Live, 15 May 2014. 
58 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, CCTV Africa Live, 17 June 2014. 
59 Girum Chala, CCTV Africa Live, 2 June 2014. 
60 Studio interview, BBC Focus on Africa, 9 February 2016. 
61 Matthew Davies, BBC Focus on Africa, 12 February 2016. 
62 Studio interview, BBC Focus on Africa, 10 March 2016. 
2014 2016 Total 2014 2016 Total
China stories 1 3 4 10 21 31
Of which nonAfrican 1 0 1 0 12 12
Net total 0 3 3 10 9 19
Overall story count 151 92 243 255 197 452
ChinaAfrica % 0 3.26 1.23 3.92 4.57 4.20
BBC Focus on Africa TV CCTV Africa Live
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politicians and meetings, much of it involving the foreign minister Wang Yi's four-
nation Africa tour63. China's medical expertise was also highlighted in a re-versioning 
of a CCTV Mandarin report on a Chinese-built Ebola hospital in Sierra Leone64 that, 
with the epidemic abating, was being transformed back into a general hospital. The 
African hospital director, who had studied in China, was interviewed in Chinese along 
with the head of a Chinese technical team tasked with upgrading the Sierra Leoneans' 
medical expertise. Another CCTV report that broadened the agenda while 
perpetuating solution-focused themes was a feature about Tanzanian universities 
introducing courses in Chinese65. 
During the period surveyed in 2016, CCTV Africa Live contained numerous 
reports from Beijing about the Two Sessions political meetings which had no 
particular relevance to Africa – a source of frustration for several CCTV-Africa 
interviewees. On 7 March 2016, Africa Live‘s lead was a report on the economy in the 
Chinese province of Heilongjiang.  Absent from the CCTV content surveyed here was 
news of the actions, both positive and negative, of individual Chinese citizens and 
businesspeople in Africa. Africa Live did feature the seizure of elephant tusks packed 
for export from Kenya to an undisclosed destination66 but did not mention Chinese 
involvement in the trade in endangered animal parts or how it might be halted.  
You see some Chinese buying ivory. We also criticise this and we condemn this... But 
that is a minority of the people... Of course, we come here not to report on Chinese. 
Our aim is to report Africa. (Managing editor, CCTV Africa, interview ref. CAMC35) 
A CCTV producer confirmed that the Nairobi newsroom kept its distance from any 
problems involving Chinese nationals in Africa: in output terms, this meant running 
‘whatever CCTV Beijing is doing or whatever Xinhua is doing.'67 Another journalist 
said anything that reflected poorly on Africa-China relations 'certainly wouldn't be 
given prominence and might not be treated at all'.68 
                                                        
63 CCTV Africa Live: presenter script 31 January & 6 February, Kofa Mrenje report 3 February 2016. 
64 Maria Galang, CCTV Africa Live, 1 March 2016. 
65Leslie Mirungu, CCTV Africa Live, 3 February 2016. 
66Liao Liang, CCTV Africa Live, 5 June 2014. 
67 Interview ref. CAPA34. 
68 Interview ref. CAFG28. 
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7.4.2 Xi Jinping’s southern Africa trip, December 2015 
Xi Jinping's 5-day visit to southern Africa, primarily for the summit of the Forum on 
China-Africa Co-operation (FoCAC) in Johannesburg, provided a rare content-rich 
chance to compare the two broadcasters' China-Africa narratives. The Chinese 
president's tour predictably dominated CCTV's Africa Live, while the BBC's Focus on 
Africa TV used his trip as a 'peg' for pre-shot features that explored China's broader 
interactions with various African nations. Content analysed from each broadcaster's 
daily evening programme of African news amounted to 2 hours of coverage on CCTV, 
including live speeches, and 16 minutes on BBC Focus on Africa, which was not on air 
at the weekend.69 Interview material apart, 60% of Focus on Africa‘s coverage of the 
Xi tour consisted of features located far from the political action, with the other 40% 
taken up with what BBC editors are wont to describe as 'pictures of men and women 
in suits'. CCTV Africa Live‘s 'suit' coverage, focusing on the political proceedings 
themselves, amounted to 83% of the Xi Jinping material, with just 17% made up of 
related features. 
Focus on Africa ignored President Xi's first stop, a visit to Zimbabwe, although 
it was covered elsewhere on the BBC. On CCTV Africa Live, by contrast, the Zimbabwe 
trip was the subject of five reports on 1 December alone, all by the Harare 
correspondent Farai Mwakutuya. CCTV set the tone of the reporting with the 
strapline, 'Hand in Hand', evoking the image of China and Zimbabwe striding together 
down the path to development. In CCTV's reports, however, it was clear that China's 
hand was that of a parent, not an equal. China was depicted as instrumental in the 
improvement of Zimbabwe's education and training through Chinese architects and 
builders helping to put up schools, Chinese technological assistance and the launch of 
a Shona-to-Chinese dictionary. In upbeat reporting, Zimbabweans declared 
themselves excited by the Chinese president's visit and looked forward to the deals to 
be signed. Zimbabwe's financial and economic problems were redesignated as 
'challenges' from which the country was recovering. Zimbabwe's 'favourable climate' 
had made it a leading tourist destination, according to CCTV's correspondent,70 and 
the people could 'afford to smile in the sun and look to the future with optimism.' 
Interviewed about CCTV’s Zimbabwe coverage, one of the African news editors said 
                                                        
69 The world news bulletin that replaced Focus on Africa on 5 December 2015 contained no FoCAC 
news. 
70 Farai Mwakutuya, CCTV Africa Live, 1 December 2015. 
189 
 
he found it 'very refreshing' to see the other side of 'some places [that] we have 
basically dismissed as basket-cases or just dictatorships'.71 
President Xi's 4-day stay in South Africa, incorporating the FoCAC summit, 
provided a clear illustration of the way the two broadcasters' China-Africa narratives 
diverged. CCTV Africa Live‘s reporters concentrated mainly on the FoCAC proceedings 
and the politicians, with a handful of sidebar items that appeared to be aimed at 
Chinese rather than African viewers. Conversely, apart from the centrepiece of the 
summit – the trebling of China's financial commitment to Africa – BBC Focus on Africa 
devoted most programme time to a series of non-diary features (BBC News website 
2015b) that explored broad China-in-Africa themes such as security, investment and 
integration. Pictures of political arrivals, meetings and speeches in South Africa were 
harvested from news agencies by the British broadcaster and confined to short 
presenter-narrated segments. 
CCTV Africa's output reflected a dual narrative, depicting China as Africa's 
benefactor while simultaneously sidestepping any criticism of China's strategies on 
the continent by concentrating on the hopes of African peoples. The two narratives 
fused in a top-down view of the summit, in which gatherings of politicians spoke of 
abstract concepts such as 'deepening interactions'72 and the leaders of China and 
South Africa spoke unmediated and at length. Africa Live on 2 December 2015 
contained 14 minutes of live statements by Presidents Xi and Zuma. On 5 December, 
speeches lasting several minutes by the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi and 
President Xi Jinping each took the form of a one-shot close-up of the politician's face, 
giving the impression that a cutaway would have been considered disrespectful. 
However, CCTV's African reporters were on occasions less than nuanced. One 
correspondent said many African countries were struggling as China’s slowing 
economy had left them 'in a bit of a slump'.73 A scholar interviewed on Africa Live 
pointed out that China was determining the FoCAC agenda and that this was not 
healthy for a 'true partnership'.74  
BBC Focus on Africa interpreted Xi Jinping's funding announcements more 
critically than CCTV. What was billed generally by the Chinese broadcaster as an 
                                                        
71 Interview ref. CAPA33. The word ‘we’ is understood here to mean Africans, rather than CCTV itself. 
72 Yolisa Njamela in Pretoria, CCTV Africa Live, 3 December 2015. 
73 Sumitra Nydoo in Johannesburg, CCTV Africa Live, 2 December 2015. 
74 Interview by Sumitra Nydoo for CCTV Africa Live, 4 December 2015. 
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opportunity was for the BBC a challenge and a potential problem. A BBC 
correspondent pointed out that African leaders were under pressure to provide jobs, 
and that China was seeking a high return on its investment to offset slower growth 
back home.75  
The two channels' China-Africa feature items conveyed very different 
impressions of China but depicted the African elements of the relationship in a similar 
light. CCTV Africa Live portrayed China as benefactor and bearer of culture in 
environments in which Africans appeared devoid of agency. A report on Sino-South 
African co-operation in the running of a home for troubled adolescents in Cape Town 
underlined the notion that Chinese residents in South Africa were not just there to 
make money but were also keen to play a role in society.76 A similar theme showed 
Chinese and South African jazz musicians playing together at a Chinese cultural 
exhibition, with the Chinese jazz pianist Luo Ning speaking of spreading Chinese 
culture among Africans.77 He was named and interviewed while his African colleagues 
were not. Further north, reporter Su Yuting compiled a feature from the Kruger 
National Park on 'what China's role in promoting wildlife conservation means to 
those relying on tourism'.78 There, she interviewed the Chinese actor Wang Baoqiang 
about conservation, indicating the depth of China’s involvement, but did not refer to 
Chinese consumption of endangered animal parts or other involvement in the illegal 
wildlife trade. 
The BBC features by correspondent Karen Allen were not made specifically for 
Focus on Africa: they were cross-platform and commissioned to cater to the needs of a 
variety of BBC outlets. As with the reports on CCTV Africa Live, the BBC packages 
concentrated on China's actions, which had the effect of pushing Africans and their 
views into the background. Details that showed China or individual Chinese people in 
a good light were often combined with critical generalisations about China's broader 
role in Africa. In South Sudan, the BBC filmed Chinese peacekeepers interacting with 
refugees and 'winning hearts and minds':79 later in the same feature, the 
correspondent noted China's 'wider strategic interests across the whole of Africa' as 
                                                        
75 Karen Allen in Johannesburg, BBC Focus on Africa, 4 December 2015. 
76 Rene del Carme in Cape Town, CCTV Africa Live, 2 December 2015. 
77 Rene del Carme in Cape Town, CCTV Africa Live, 4 December 2015. 
78 Su Yuting, CCTV Africa Live, 3 December 2015. 
79 Karen Allen, BBC Focus on Africa, 2 December 2015. 
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African children were pictured behind a close-up of a Chinese soldier's gun. A feature 
from Zambia, about a Chinese teenager growing up in Africa, told a story of a young 
generation 'keen to build bridges and integrate': the English-speaking girl was shown 
playing guitar with a Zambian friend and guzheng for her Chinese-speaking parents.80 
The same feature, however, mentioned 'tens of thousands' of Chinese in Zambia who 
were often accused of unfair work practices and resource-stripping.  
7.5 Still the superpowers' proxy battleground? 
The promotion of China's interactions with African nations and peoples raised 
questions about whether it was also CCTV Africa’s task to disparage the involvement 
of the West in the continent's affairs – potentially a return to Cold War-era reporting 
of Africa through the prism of external superpower conflict (Franks 2013:162). 
Indeed, analysing CCTV's African programmes shortly after their launch, Zhang 
(2013:99) found that they contained numerous negative reports about the United 
States and criticism of Western policies. As Africa Live bedded in, however, its view of 
the West became more nuanced while Chinese interests surfaced in coverage not 
directly involving China.81 This section looks at two instances in which the Africa 
narratives of CCTV and the BBC diverged on Western interests or Western-supported 
institutions: firstly, President Obama's Africa visit in 2015 and secondly, coverage in 
early 2016 of the International Criminal Court in the Hague. 
7.5.1 Barack Obama’s east Africa trip, July 2015 
The US president, Barack Obama, visited Kenya and Ethiopia in July 2015, a trip that 
included a speech at the African Union in Addis Ababa. Coverage on BBC Focus on 
Africa82 and CCTV Africa Live from 23 to 28 July 2015 was analysed (64 minutes on 
the BBC and 73 on CCTV).  Most BBC and CCTV journalists reporting on Obama's 
arrival in Nairobi were Kenyan and saw the cultural significance of the visit in almost 
identical terms. According to the BBC, because his father was Kenyan, Kenyans 'feel 
                                                        
80 Karen Allen, BBC Focus on Africa, 4 December 2015. 
81 Omissions from African coverage related to Chinese foreign policy are mentioned in 7.6.3. 
82 At the weekend, the 1700 BST World News bulletin was recorded instead. 
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that [Obama] belongs to them',83 while CCTV observed that 'here in Kenya at least he 
is considered one of theirs'.84 
That, however, was where the similarities in the coverage ended. Even before 
the president's arrival, CCTV professed itself much less thrilled than the BBC by the 
prospect of the visit. The BBC reported 'a lot of excitement' in Kenya85 and the BBC’s 
Kenyan studio presenter in London said she 'could not help but get excited' at seeing 
the president's plane land.86 CCTV Africa Live initially ran a special 'Obama in Africa' 
sting and mentioned the 'Obama-mania' of the visit,87 but its report observed that 
some Kenyans were 'less pleased' because of the prospect of 'a difficult weekend of 
sealed roads and heavy security'. A subsequent Africa Live headline proclaimed, 
'Nairobi in lockdown'.88  
Even with African reporters, coverage on Africa Live and Focus on Africa TV 
often appeared to be constructed as a power-game contrasting US and Chinese 
actions in Africa, with Kenya and Ethiopia representing the playing-field. A CCTV 
reporter recalled that Obama famously snubbed President Kenyatta in 2013 because 
of the prospect of charges against him at the International Criminal Court89, since 
when Kenyatta had 'made very powerful allies elsewhere' – a remark accompanied by 
footage of Chinese leaders. The BBC pointed out that Obama would address the 
African Union in a building constructed with Chinese money and would 'travel along 
Chinese-built roads'.90 CCTV acknowledged that the US was one of the AU’s main 
funders, but also observed that the Americans were 'playing catch-up' to China, 
whose influence on the continent was growing.91 Both broadcasters conveyed the 
argument that boosting African economies would weaken the lure of insurgent 
groups – security and terrorism being common concerns of China and the US. 
                                                        
83 Anne Soy on BBC Focus on Africa, 24 July 2015. 
84 Robert Nagila on CCTV Africa Live, 26 July 2015. 
85 Anne Soy on BBC Focus on Africa, 23 July 2015. 
86 Sophie Ikenye, BBC Focus on Africa, 24 July 2015. 
87 Clementine Logan, CCTV Africa Live, 23 July 2015. 
88 CCTV Africa Live, 24 July 2015. 
89 Robert Nagila, CCTV Africa Live, 24 July 2015. 
90 Jon Sopel in his interview with President Obama, BBC Focus on Africa, 24 July 2015. 
91 Jane Kiyo, CCTV Africa Live, 27 July 2015. 
193 
 
However, CCTV Africa voiced reservations about 'whether the US can refrain from 
imposing its values' on the continent.92  
Gay rights were a major point of contention between President Obama and his 
African hosts, with the US president publicly re-stating his opposition to 
discrimination. BBC Focus on Africa reported less thoroughly on this than CCTV Africa 
Live, although it was mentioned in a BBC interview with Obama in Washington.93 In 
Nairobi, the BBC's Kenyan reporter Anne Soy referred to it during a live two-way as 
'the gay issue' – African rather than standard BBC English parlance.94 CCTV Africa, for 
its part, conveyed Africans' irritation at US involvement: a pastor was filmed 
preaching tolerance but saying 'the debate cannot be led by Western thinkers: the 
debate has to be an African solution'.95 CCTV also interviewed a Kenyan government 
adviser who said it would be wrong for Obama 'to lecture Kenyans on gay-ism as an 
issue of rights'.96 
BBC Focus on Africa gave a relatively complimentary account of Obama's 
speech to the AU, dwelling on the cheers, applause and laughter that greeted his 
observations about leaders who did not want to step down.97 On CCTV, the day’s first 
edition of Africa Live led with a trail of Obama’s 'historic address'98. The programme 
ended before Obama spoke. However, in the next edition of Africa Live seven hours 
later, Obama's speech was not even headlined. It was not covered until 20 minutes 
into the programme, and the presenter narration and clip of the president speaking 
lasted just over two minutes. Questioned about this perceived change in editorial 
priorities, a CCTV Africa producer said Chinese managers in Nairobi had told the 
output team, 'we’re doing too much: scale it back.' The producer observed: 'and this is 
obviously instructions from Beijing.'99 
Human rights were prominent in the BBC's Ethiopian coverage, and Obama's 
exhortation to Ethiopia to improve its human rights record led the BBC's report on 
                                                        
92 Girum Chala, CCTV Africa Live, 28 July 2015. 
93 Interview with President Obama as above. 
94 BBC World News 1800 BST, 25 July 2015. 
95 Kathryn Ogunde, CCTV Africa Live, 23 July 2015. 
96 CCTV Africa Live, 23 July 2015. 
97 Alastair Leithead, BBC Focus on Africa, 28 July 2015. 
98  CCTV Africa Live, 1100 BST, 28  July 2015. 
99  Interview ref. CAPA34. 
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his arrival.100 The BBC programme included Ethiopia's argument that it was still a 
'fledgling democracy', but the studio presenter repeatedly pressed the Ethiopian 
ambassador to London on the work on human rights that was still to be done. CCTV 
Africa Live, for its part, stressed the economic and investment angles of Obama's 
Ethiopia visit, although reporter Jane Kiyo observed that questions remained about 
the lack of press freedom and democratic space.101 
7.5.2 The International Criminal Court, January-March 2016 
The International Criminal Court, which came into being in 2002 to try the world's 
most serious crimes, has always been a contested institution, and this was borne out 
in the framing of reports on the Court by the African programmes of CCTV and the 
BBC. Most west European nations, including Britain, signed up to the ICC: African 
countries make up more than a quarter of the 120-plus signatories. However, China 
and the United States, along with India, opposed the statute leading to its creation. 
Although the US did eventually sign up to the ICC under President Clinton, it 
withdrew again under President Bush. Russia withdrew in 2016. The ICC steps in 
when a nation's courts cannot or will not bring a prosecution themselves. The Court's 
increasing focus on cases involving African leaders led to accusations within the 
continent that they were being unfairly targeted: Burundi's withdrawal from the 
statute took effect in 2017, South Africa has stated its intention to leave, and the 
African Union has supported the idea of a mass withdrawal. 
In the two constructed weeks of output analysed in early 2016, CCTV Africa 
Live covered Africa's contacts with the International Criminal Court on four occasions 
and BBC Focus on Africa on three. The conflict and causal responsibility frames were 
prominent in both broadcasters' coverage, as might be expected from the strained 
relations between African nations and the ICC. However, CCTV alone used the 
solution-oriented responsibility frame, indicating occasions on which a more 
constructive or conciliatory approach might be productive.   
The most striking difference between the BBC and CCTV accounts came in the 
ICC case against the Kenyan vice-president William Ruto. He was charged with crimes 
against humanity linked with post-election violence. When judges ruled key 
                                                        
100 BBC Focus on Africa, 27 July 2015. 
101 CCTV Africa Live, 27 July 2015. 
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prosecution witness testimony inadmissible on 12 February 2016, the BBC Focus on 
Africa presenter described it as a 'major blow for the prosecution' and asked its 
reporter in The Hague if prosecutors could appeal. CCTV Africa Live nosed the report 
on a Kenyan viewpoint, asserting that Ruto had 'won a major reprieve' in the case. 
In the programmes analysed, BBC Focus on Africa did not cover the Kenyan-led 
attempt to persuade other African Union states to withdraw collectively from the ICC. 
CCTV Africa Live ran a lengthy excerpt of a speech by the Kenyan president Uhuru 
Kenyatta102 in which he complained that the ICC's actions were distracting African 
leaders from essential conflict mediation, and appealing for impunity for heads of 
state. These included Sudan's president, Omar al-Bashir, an ally of China and the 
subject of an ICC arrest warrant. In Kenyatta's address, as highlighted by CCTV, the 
attempt to push the Court to acknowledge leaders' impunity was presented as an 
'effort to reform the ICC' rather than as head-on confrontation. A CCTV correspondent 
again offered an African – or perhaps Chinese – rather than institutional perspective, 
commenting that a collective withdrawal from the ICC would be 'a big, big boost' for 
the Kenyan and Sudanese leaders whom the Court had pursued.103 
Both broadcasters also covered cases at the ICC involving Ivory Coast and Mali. 
Here, the men in the dock were, respectively, a witness in the war crimes trial of the 
former Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo (3 February) and a Malian Islamist charged 
with the destruction of monuments in Timbuktu (1 March). CCTV Africa Live and BBC 
Focus on Africa framed the stories in terms of attribution of causal responsibility. 
Britain has no historical attachment to either Ivory Coast or Mali, both former French 
colonies, but China has a continuing interest in their stability having taken part in 
peacekeeping missions there (Council on Foreign Relations 2017). Here, CCTV took a 
step back from its scepticism about the ICC, its reporter observing that the Mali case 
might show that it can ‘also be used to protect Africa's cultural heritage'.104  The 
Ivorian and Malian cases, unlike those involving African leaders, did not portray a 
conflict between Africans and a Western-imposed system.  
                                                        
102 CCTV Africa Live, 31 January 2016. 
103 Robert Nagila, CCTV Africa Live, 31 January 2016. 
104 Elena Kasas, CCTV Africa Live, 1 March 2016. 
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7.6 Decoding the reporting 
7.6.1 Constructive or positive reporting? 
In interviews, journalists at both CCTV Africa and the BBC’s African programme said 
they were consciously practising a more forward-looking type of reporting, even – 
sometimes especially – on potentially negative topics.  
We are always looking at solutions... If you concentrate all the time on, ‘oh, hundreds 
of people have died in Guinea from Ebola and they’re not doing this this this,’ it's 
depressing those people. Seriously! You’re depressing the entire continent. Whereas if 
you say, 'actually, it is not all doom: Nigeria got it right, Senegal got it right', and then 
maybe the Guineans will be like, 'oh, what did they do? – let us follow, let’s see what 
they did that we can borrow from'. (Presenter, CCTV Africa: ref CAFA27) 
We were looking for those stories about how people dealt with [Ebola] and 
triumphed – people who in spite of major challenges were helping other people, 
stories about research and what's been done to improve the situation. So it's not just 
about, oh, what’s the death count – of course we’ll have that, but it's not hugely on 
that. (Bilingual reporter, BBC: ref BAFA52) 
The two broadcasters differed on what to call such reporting. Few of the CCTV 
interviewees had heard of the concept of constructive journalism. Even once it was 
defined for them, most of them chose to characterise CCTV's stance as 'positive 
reporting' with a focus on positive outcomes. This had implications for the editorial 
agenda. To cover potentially negative news, according to one interviewee, journalists 
at CCTV Africa had to be 'a little clever and a little bit creative... like if you want to do a 
story on corruption, you’re going to focus on a successful anti-corruption 
programme.'105 
Those working on Focus on Africa did not see the programme's forward-
looking agenda as inconsistent with the BBC's routine journalistic practices. The 
Nairobi bilingual reporter quoted above described it as 'a balance: but I think there’s 
that realisation that in the past, Western media has been hugely negative [on Africa], 
maybe not deliberately.’ For the programme's editor:  
If some days there are exciting stories showing that Africa is rising, so be it. My 
objective is not to be positive or negative; it’s to be more comprehensive than the 
traditional coverage can be.106 
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It was notable that the BBC editor saw even forward-looking situations such as 
mediation and diplomacy through a critical lens, speaking of 'challenging the people 
who create conflicts' through interviews and holding politicians to account. 
7.6.2 Using the African reporters  
The lack of a critical journalistic stance in CCTV Africa’s definition of ‘positive 
reporting’ was matched by the distance it put between its reporters and much of its 
breaking news. As Figure 7-6 shows, on more than 55% of occasions on which BBC 
Focus on Africa reporters were deployed, they produced an original film shot on 
location in line with their management's drive for more original journalism (Harding 
2014). This was compared with 37% on CCTV Africa Live107. A similar number of 
CCTV Africa news reports were constructed from a variety of sources such as a 'piece 
to camera' at or near the reporter’s base, one or more interview clips and 'filler' or 
library pictures. Such reporting methods allow for a quick response but hamper 
originality of approach. In similar vein, nearly a quarter of CCTV Africa Live‘s news 
reports were compiled in the Nairobi newsroom, primarily from Anglo-American 
news agency footage, compared with less than 9% on average on its BBC rival.  
Figure 7-6 How close to the story? Percentages of BBC Focus on Africa and CCTV Africa Live story narration 
on location, from a base in a capital city, or from headquarters: 5 constructed weeks, 2014-16 
 
Nor did CCTV Africa Live’s choice of interlocutors indicate a radically different agenda 
from its BBC rival. As shown in Figure 7-7, CCTV Africa Live spoke to more people of 
all categories, per news item, than BBC Focus on Africa – officials, non-official 'elites' 
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and the public.108 This was partly because the BBC regularly ran longer discursive 
interviews, whereas CCTV had more reporter pieces containing brief soundbites. 
However, official and elite voices dominated more on CCTV's African news than on its 
BBC rival, although both displayed the attributes of a 'dialogue of elites'. 
Figure 7-7 Who speaks in the African news? Analysis of 'sound-bites' over 5 constructed weeks of output of 
BBC Focus on Africa and CCTV Africa Live, 2014-16 
 
Overall CCTV Africa Live featured the voices of nearly twice the percentage of officials 
used on BBC Focus on Africa, although it is noteworthy that in early 2016 CCTV’s ‘elite’ 
category of speakers was marginally bigger than the ‘official’ category for the first 
time. In all, however, the impression from the quantitative analysis of CCTV Africa’s 
routine news reporting was of elite-centric, mainly unoriginal offerings – a far cry 
from its ambitious ‘pegless’ news features from Africa’s least-covered countries. 
7.6.3 Information control 
CCTV Africa’s Chinese managers said ‘very little’ editorial control of their output 
emanated from CCTV headquarters in Beijing, and that all scripts were approved in 
Nairobi. Several China-based CCTV journalists agreed that censorship of the Nairobi 
operation was slight compared with that in Beijing, and that it enjoyed considerable 
autonomy: one former producer described CCTV Africa as ‘more obedient’ to Beijing 
than the Washington hub because – unlike in the US operation – management did not 
feel particularly awed by journalists’ expertise109. However, Nairobi newsroom staff 
said local management would occasionally alter running-orders at the last minute and 
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remove stories from the output.110 The decision not to cover the visit of Pope Francis 
to three African countries in 2015 was a source of particular disappointment among 
African interviewees at CCTV. 
We understand that it means nothing to China but it means something to our African 
viewers. He was right here in Kenya. They didn’t send anyone to it: nothing. (African 
journalist, CCTV: ref: CAFA30)111 
Reporters and correspondents at CCTV Africa, in interviews for this research, 
appeared to feel much less constrained editorially than their newsroom-based 
colleagues, although some of those in the newsroom appeared prepared to make 
editorial compromises in exchange for the opportunities offered by CCTV.  
I’ve certainly done many stories that have come out making various African 
governments not look great.  In that sense I feel comfortable about it... Had I felt like I 
had to self-censor every time I did a story, there’s no way I would have stayed. 
(Journalist, CCTV Africa: ref CAFG28) 
I’d have still been the same me, doing the same work, had I been working for CNN, Al 
Jazeera, BBC. (Former correspondent, CCTV Africa: ref CAFA32) 
I think we do some amazing stuff. And I’m going to choose to focus on that rather than 
the restrictions because I think that as time goes by, and we do great coverage on 
non-controversial stories, we’ll be allowed to... there’ll be a little bit more freedom. 
(African journalist, CCTV Africa: ref CAPA34) 
A former senior international member of the production team in Beijing said there 
was ‘no tension’ at CCTV headquarters about what the Nairobi hub was doing because 
it was basically what was wanted.112 However, the journalist observed that the 
coverage of China in Africa risked being the channel’s undoing: 
I think that CCTV-Africa will really suffer long-term unless it gets better at being more 
honest about the different ways China’s involvement in Africa is actually seen in Africa...  
What Nairobi are tending to do is avoid the story as much as possible. (Ref. CGPG10). 
7.7 Conclusion 
The results of the comparative quantitative content analysis and the qualitative case 
studies suggested that the two African programmes, while superficially visually alike, 
                                                        
110 This is not completely unknown at the BBC, but most editorial interventions by BBC management 
are at daily programme meetings rather than with minutes to air. 
111 Pál Nyíri (2017:111) writes that Chinese journalists in Africa were not banned from reporting on 
religion but that they did not dare touch it for fear of offending someone. 
112
 Interview ref. CGPG10. 
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had different conceptions of how to refashion their news for a rising continent. BBC 
Focus on Africa retained the critical, sometimes negative focus that is characteristic of 
Anglo-American reporting, even as it sought to portray Africa as a place of hope and 
innovation, while CCTV Africa Live was open about its efforts to inject an 
unremittingly ‘positive’ element into its coverage. Both networks ran numerous 
examples of news-feature material that gave a less negative view of African countries 
than that for which Western networks are routinely criticised. It was in their 
treatment of 'hard news' – wars, elections, displacement and diplomacy – that they 
differed the most, and especially in their coverage of China’s actions in Africa. BBC 
Focus on Africa constantly sought out a critical element in solution-based coverage as 
if it felt the need to legitimise uplifting journalism through 'balance', whereas CCTV 
Africa Live sometimes swerved around inconvenient events or people in order to 
maintain a positive message. A CCTV Africa presenter acknowledged when 
interviewed that Chinese media were 'not going to go out of our way to criticise'113, 
and it was certainly a more supportive and less judgemental way of reporting on 
developing nations than that for which Anglo-American journalism is known. Just as 
CCTV Africa Live halted criticism of Peter Mutharika once he was installed as 
president of Malawi, it showed itself at numerous other times to be much more 
deferential towards officials than BBC Focus on Africa.  
CCTV Africa Live‘s focus on solution-oriented responsibility often involved a 
more 'stand-back' style of reporting than that of BBC Focus on Africa. CCTV Africa 
managers insisted that they encouraged staff to pursue 'action' footage – an assertion 
backed up by a CCTV journalist in Nairobi – but a news editor countered that in 
practice many of CCTV's freelance correspondents around Africa114 were too busy to 
provide a bespoke narrative, while some others were reluctant to stray too far from 
their bureaux115. This raised the possibility that the 'positive' nature of CCTV's 
Africa's journalism was amplified inadvertently by its frequent inability to report 
breaking news from the scene, where facts are much less likely to fit a predetermined 
narrative. 
                                                        
113 Interview ref. CAFA27. 
114 A handful of reporters can be deployed from the Nairobi newsroom across the continent, but most 
CCTV Africa correspondents are freelance and many also work for other networks. 
115 Interview ref. CAPA33. 
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CCTV Africa Live‘s tendency to report mediation rather than conflict gave it a 
less arresting visual style but did promote a view of Africans seeking their own 
solutions. However, those Africans were always the leaders: the 'suit-to-suit' visuals 
also had the effect of rendering real situations abstract and leaving out the voices of 
the peoples of Africa themselves. A more upbeat and thematically varied portrayal of 
Africa was offered by the BBC’s Focus on Africa, as illustrated by its broader agenda 
and search for offbeat or cultural news. However, the gulf between the BBC 
programme and CCTV Africa Live in this respect had narrowed by 2016, possibly as a 
result of CCTV’s broader recruitment of and trust in African journalists. 
CCTV's 'Africa rising' narrative – readily acknowledged by its staff – was 
accompanied and sometimes obliterated by its 'China rising' narrative. The 
exaggeratedly positive emphasis on China in Africa appeared to reflect Beijing's 
international strategy to improve perceptions of China and Chinese people on the 
continent. As with its coverage of African issues, however, the Chinese narrative was 
top-down, based on political dialogue and messages rather than people. In pushing 
'positive' Chinese stories, CCTV Africa appeared to be evoking the equivalent of 
linguist George Lakoff's elephant (Gagliardone 2013:35), reminding its likely 
audience of the negative perceptions surrounding Chinese state media in general. 
Non-political stories about China in Africa that would have distanced CCTV from its 
elephant, such as the BBC's feature about the Chinese teenager growing up in Zambia, 
were not in evidence, despite the co-siting of CCTV's English and Mandarin 
newsrooms in Nairobi that would theoretically give journalists access to a network of 
personal Chinese contacts. 
Viewers and rivals may increasingly look to CCTV Africa to tackle questions 
about the conduct and security of Chinese citizens abroad as China expands its 
involvement in Africa, and to examine China’s policies and economic ties with the 
continent. Beijing’s avowed non-interference in other countries’ affairs has enabled 
its official media to take a non-confrontational approach on many issues outside its 
immediate neighbourhood. This policy is becoming strained as China’s global power 
grows. The recent opening of a Chinese military base in Djibouti to co-ordinate 
peacekeeping and naval operations (Le Belzic 2016, Neethling 2017) was 
confirmation of an increasingly assertive and interventionist foreign policy which 
may yet prompt changes of approach in China’s official foreign news reporting.  
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BBC Focus on Africa suffered occasionally from an unevenness of tone as a 
result of running central newsgathering commissions that were designed for UK and 
global audiences rather than African viewers. Such dilution of purpose was also 
occasionally evident on CCTV Africa Live, which was wont to fall back on stereotypes 
of western coverage in its depiction of refugees in camps, reliance on broad-brush 
statistics or references to a ‘war on terror’.  The use of news agency pictures to cover 
displacement and migration, along with infrequent deployment of reporters to 
breaking news outside Kenya, had the effect of allowing international rivals to dictate 
the visual agenda. 
Geopolitics and elites still mattered in terms of Africa-China affairs as far as 
these two international broadcasters were concerned. The large number of Africans 
working for the BBC and CCTV output had freshened their image, but the primary 
impression was of interests determined from outside Africa. Emerging from CCTV 
Africa Live‘s reporting, however, was a narrative that took no account of Western 
framing. Instead, it reflected Chinese and African interests as seen from Beijing: 
prosperity, stability, harmony and the African Dream. As international broadcasters 
scrambled to Africanise their coverage, CCTV Africa certainly appeared to be testing 
an alternative voice, but had yet to reveal a consistent strategy or a fully distinctive 
way of reporting the news. 
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8 Cross-editing: journalists in China and Britain swap scripts 
8.1 Cross-editing explained 
If quantitative content analysis explains which news is transmitted, if framing tells us 
how it is conveyed and interviews reveal why it turned out as it did, then cross-
editing answers the questions about news that scholars did not know they had in the 
first place. Cross-editing is an original method, devised for this research but 
potentially much more widely applicable. It deals with the 'unknown unknowns' of 
news production1: the shifts of emphasis and lexical choices that a news editor reacts 
to out of instinct born of experience. The principle of comparative analysis is retained, 
but this method shifts the focus from the macro (institutional) and meso (routine) 
levels to the micro level of the individual journalists who adjudicate on the news. 
Cross-editing, in this research, happened when experienced Anglophone newsdesk 
editors trained by the BBC and CCTV-News edited the news scripts of their rival as if 
for broadcast on their own channel. The results yield subtle but telling insights into 
how news cultures differ. 
Cross-editing appears as a separate chapter because it took nearly two years 
of the PhD to make contact with CCTV-News journalists who were willing to take part, 
and to prepare and process the annotated scripts2. The exercise was therefore of 
necessity limited in scope, but its conclusions offered enough that was distinctive to 
warrant its inclusion here. It is hoped that it will provide the springboard for further 
research. 
8.1.1 The genesis of the cross-edit 
When the author of this chapter was a young broadcast journalist, desk editors were 
the most feared people in the newsroom. News copy that had been laboured over by 
an inexperienced writer would return from the editor's desk scarred by crossings-out 
and corrections. It was a constant process of 'revise and resubmit', but in minutes 
rather than weeks. Nowadays desk editors are more pressed for time: the novice can 
only watch, wince and learn. 
                                                        
1 'Unknown unknowns' was coined by the US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld while attempting to 
evade journalists' questions about Iraq's weapons in 2002: he said it meant 'things we don't know we 
don't know'. 
2 Because of the researcher's previous BBC career, BBC volunteers were much easier to organise. 
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Out of this apparently Sisyphean endeavour the idea of cross-editing was born. 
No-one has internalised an organisation's embedded news values more thoroughly 
than the desk editor who evaluates the scripts that are prepared for transmission. 
Published style-guides cannot keep pace with the stream of editorial decisions made 
on a news desk. Scholars who investigate the composition of news through content 
analysis are doing so from outside the process and have access only to what is 
broadcast, not to what is queried, changed or left out.  
After a piloting exercise, a small number of volunteers drawn from the BBC's 
global newsroom and Chinese state media's English-language CCTV-News were given 
a selection of their rivals' news scripts from two separate events, transcribed as 
broadcast, and were asked to annotate them as they saw fit. The scripts could be 
accepted for putative broadcast in their own output, amended or rejected. The 
organisations themselves were not involved: the results are personal to these cross-
editors. The exercise demonstrated consensus on certain professional standards as 
well as wide variations in what was deemed journalistically or politically acceptable. 
Gatekeeping is part of a cross-editor's remit, but cross-editing reveals much 
more about how words are used and the shaping of the news. 'Mr Gates' has ended 
his shift and taken away his pile of rejected stories: enter 'Ms and Mr Cross'. 
8.1.2 What cross-editing does 
Cross-editing in this research bears no relation to the video editing technique of 
cross-cutting between scenes. It comes from visualising media texts from two news 
cultures as two distinct piles of published news scripts: the researcher passes each 
pile across a figurative table for the opposite news culture to re-edit, and observes the 
outcome. A news item that is cross-edited can meet one of three fates at the hands of 
rival editors. It may survive more or less intact, having been deemed fit for broadcast 
on the rival channel. It may suffer a substantial rewrite and emerge in a mutated form. 
It may equally be rejected as completely unsuitable for broadcast. 
Cross-editing therefore seeks to replicate the tasks of a news desk editor who 
is checking a news story prepared for broadcast by another journalist. Every editor 
looks for clarity, accuracy (linguistic and factual) and a story that is of the requisite 
length. Every editor is under pressure to ensure that these standards are met by the 
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programme deadline. To these already subjective tasks are added still finer 
judgements.  Does the item contain everything it should, considering where and for 
whom it is broadcast? Does it tell a story that will, in the editor's estimation, resonate 
with the audience? Is it written in a style that is consistent with the rest of the output? 
Underlying differences and commonalities are thus revealed. While style-guides 
provide ideal scenarios, cross-editing deals with material as broadcast, permitting 
journalistic insight into human interpretation of organisational guidelines from 
within and without. 
8.1.3 Cross-editing, gatekeeping and other relevant theory 
The power of editorial choice has preoccupied scholars since Lippmann (1922:192) 
wrote of the 'whole series of selections' before a newspaper can be printed – which 
news items, in which order, at what length, with what prominence – a process that is 
essentially subjective. However, neither Lippmann nor White’s 'Mr Gates' (1950:384), 
the eponymous emblem of the study of gatekeeping, dwelt on the acceptance or 
rejection of single words or the fine-tuning of phrases. As is explained here, Ms and 
Mr Cross are dealing less with what topics are chosen, and more with how they are 
treated. 
'Mr Gates' is the fictitious name given to an American newspaper sub-editor 
who, in White's much-cited study, rejects about 90% of the news agency copy that 
comes across his desk: his is therefore a key role in the shaping of his newspaper's 
editorial content. White's gatekeeper admits that he prefers stories that are 'slanted 
to conform to our editorial policies' (1950:390), a remark indicative of an outmoded 
prêt-à-publier view of news copy3. Mr Gates' equivalent in a broadcast newsroom was, 
until the early 1990s, the copy taster: that job disappeared once all newsroom 
journalists were able to access news agency material through their computers. 
Broadcast desk-editors nowadays assume a dual function: like Mr Gates, they must 
decide what, out of an array of material drawn from agency copy, original reports by 
staff, press releases, social media 'leads' and so on, will feature in their output. Unlike 
Mr Gates, they are also the arbiters of the precise forms of words to be used: most of 
these words have been written by other journalists and are submitted to them for 
final editing. Cross-editing does not conform with the original ‘in or out’ binary of 
                                                        
3 Editors nowadays, under competition to be ‘original’, are more likely to utilise agency copy or video 
as only part of a report which may have a different focus from that copy. 
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gatekeeping in that it deals with topics that two news organisations have both already 
covered. Reese & Ballinger (2001:647) varied the gatekeeping literature by 
introducing the idea of framing and structure, but this is not the main issue in cross-
editing either: the new method deals with journalists’ wider, possibly cultural, sense 
of what is relevant and should be included in a bulletin of news. 
Heinderyckx & Vos (2016:32) support the idea that social and cultural factors 
are part of gatekeeping theory just as much as the act of gatekeeping itself, in that 
these factors influence journalists’ reactions. They say gatekeeping is in transition in 
the digital era (ibid.:30) because it evolved in the 'old media world' when editors 
‘made choices and audiences simply lived quietly with those choices': now, extended 
gatekeeping also deals in ‘clickbait’ and ‘buzz’ to drive the audience to the brand. In 
reality the old, ‘legacy’ media world has not disappeared: it runs alongside and 
intertwines with the responsive, reactive digital world, especially in broadcast news. 
Without its planning and editing, important events would go unreported. 
Gatekeeping has dealt with how news turns out the way it does, and what kind 
of news will connect with an audience. Cross-editing is more to do with establishing 
what journalists from a particular organisation feel 'sits right' with their style, and 
then tracking back to see from where that 'style' springs. The focus of cross-editing is 
less on the selection criteria applied by the journalist, and more on the culture that 
informs their script alterations: from there, the degree of cultural specificity of 
journalism(s) can be ascertained. 
A second landmark study of the construction of news through the views and 
routines of media workers, Breed’s analysis of social control in the newsroom (1955), 
touches on cross-editing by foregrounding the editing process itself. Breed 
investigates how news organisations ‘socialise’ their journalists into a uniform 
writing and thinking style, and finds that reporters are taught which phrases to omit 
through editors’ repeated correction of their work: they learn policy 'by osmosis' 
(ibid.:328). He sees professionalism as providing a means of subverting 
organisational policy and providing more unbiased journalism, implying that 
correspondents will produce the truth if they are left to their own devices. This 
argument does not take account of how such pursuit of the truth is funded or 
supported, if not by the news organisations themselves. It also implies that editors – 
unlike correspondents - cannot exercise professionalism. 
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The taxonomies of news values outlined in Chapter 2 (Galtung & Ruge 1965, 
Harcup & O'Neill 2001 & 2017) are useful for describing how journalists choose their 
overall stories, but they do not explain the very human processes of selecting or 
correcting the words in a news script. Gans (1979:40) comes closer to the scrutiny 
afforded by cross-editing in his discussion of mostly intangible values in news that 
can be inferred from 'what actors and activities are reported or ignored, and in how 
they are described'. Similarly oblique are some of the characteristics of Western 
political journalism isolated by de Vreese et al. (2017) such as 'interpretive 
journalism' and personalisation. Perrin (2016:167-9), by contrast, uses progression 
analysis to track how and why journalists alter their scripts during the production 
process – a technique that concentrates on an individual script and 'the individual's 
cognitive and manifest processes of writing'. All of the above attributes are evaluated 
externally by scholars whereas cross-editing is performed by the actors in the news 
production process, thereby closing any gap between academic understanding of a 
journalist's role and the job itself. 
8.1.4 Related comparative methods 
Comparison with other news cultures has the effect of challenging familiar structures 
through juxtaposition (Esser, 2013). This technique is built into cross-editing through 
its very nature. Cross-editing is influenced by several qualitative methods which are 
close to editorial decision-making. These are comparative experimental textual 
analysis, reconstruction interviews and trans-editing. 
Comparative experimental textual analysis provides the multimodal 
framework through which cross-editing is performed. It can be seen in Lynch's work 
(2007) on an academic course about peace journalism, in which he constructs, 
transcribes and story-boards two fictitious and differently-framed versions of a 
television news report about conflict for students to analyse. Lynch and McGoldrick 
(2010) take this research design further, envisaging playing two reconstructed 
versions of a news report – one as broadcast, the other reframed as 'peace journalism' 
– to a group of participants and recording their responses in questionnaires. 
Reconstruction interviews analyse editorial thought processes that are not 
readily articulated. Reich (2011) conducted face-to-face interviews with journalists to 
take them back through how they had evaluated the sources they had used in their 
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work, seeing source credibility as 'hardly observable because it is of an abstract, 
evasive and fragmented nature' (23). Reich did not analyse sources that the 
journalists discarded (33), whereas the cross-editing method covers both inclusions 
and exclusions. 
Trans-editing, defined by Stetting (1990) as the area between translating and 
editing, bears closer similarities to cross-editing in that the process results in the 
production of a new media text. Cheesman and Nohl (2011) investigate how 
journalist-translators rework radio news texts from English into four other languages. 
They conclude that while the overall 'melody' of the trans-edited narrative is constant 
(217), there are variations in its 'orchestration' (230) – that is, the context that their 
particular audiences need in order to make sense of the story. Chen (2009:204) 
unpicks the textual manipulation that takes place during trans-editing and detects 
two main processes: gatekeeping, through which information is filtered by the trans-
editor, and adaptation, in which the narrative is re-contextualised for its new 
audience. Trans-editing differs from cross-editing in that a trans-edited text is 
destined for different audiences in a different language. The cross-editing in this 
study is (in theory, at least) destined for similar audiences in the same language: it is 
also multi-modal in that attention is paid to what is seen as well as heard.  
Although focus groups made up of journalists might appear to bear similarities 
to cross-editing, it should be borne in mind that most editing at a news desk is carried 
out alone and is not subjected to 'pack' judgement. Furthermore, the power of the 
image when played to a focus group makes this method unsuitable for close 
examination of individual words in news scripts. 
8.1.5 Subsidiary research questions 
As cross-editing was an experimental method and an adjunct to the main research, two 
subsidiary research questions were formulated for it.  
SRQ1: What kinds of similarities and differences in editorial decision-making are revealed 
through the cross-editing process? 





8.2 Assembling the cross-edit 
8.2.1 Newsroom cultures and the final pair of eyes 
Every broadcasting newsroom contains numerous gatekeepers. A planning editor, a 
correspondent or reporter, a news intake co-ordinator, a newsroom editor, a 
programme editor, a producer and a writer will all have input into the shaping of 
news – the range of events to be covered, the type of coverage, the order of 
importance, the style, the choice of participants and words. The cross-editor, in this 
exercise, is the person who sees the version of the story that is intended for broadcast: 
he or she may well be the last person to approve it before it goes to air.  
Despite the institutional differences between national and state broadcasters, 
newsroom routines at the BBC and CCTV-News had many points in common. Both 
broadcasters had programme teams in which one person was in charge of compiling 
the running-order, with more senior editorial figures maintaining an overview of 
programme content. In both organisations, managerial-level editorial personnel took 
part in regular meetings and determined the overall thrust of coverage. At CCTV-
News, there was additional ideological oversight in the form of veteran Chinese 
political editors (返聘 fanpin, or retired and re-hired employees, referred to by staff 
as 老师 laoshi, the informal honorific for senior personnel) who inspected every 
script. They did not look at video footage. For the purposes of this experiment CCTV-
News cross-editors acted as their own political editors, although several remarked 
that, in a real situation, this would make little difference because the reporters would 
have censored themselves. Chief editors at CCTV-News, while not seated with the 
production teams, were editorially involved in every programme, whereas at the BBC 
it was rarer for senior personnel to intervene in minute-by-minute journalistic 
decisions. 
8.2.2 Building the groups 
The cross-editors were approached as individuals: some were former colleagues, 
while others were contacted through the 'snowball effect' of chains of 
recommendations. They were all current or very recent employees of CCTV-News 
(English) and the BBC’s global-facing news outlets who routinely performed editing 
and sub-editing tasks on their respective news desks. They evaluated incoming 
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material, including the work of other journalists, and determined its fitness for 
broadcast, changing wording or seeking clarification where appropriate. All are 
rendered anonymous here. The two news organisations themselves were not 
involved, and the results are personal to these cross-editors. The experiment is 
intended to represent a small-scale comparative snapshot of the wider journalism 
cultures in which they operate. Private email addresses were used in all 
communication about the cross-editing so that the journalists would not be distracted 
from their work. 
Table 8-1 Numbers and nationalities of cross-editors 
 Pilot crossedit Main crossedit 
 BBC CCTV BBC CCTV 
British male for BBC 4 - 4 - 
British female for BBC 2 - 1 - 
Chinese male for CCTV - - - 1 
Chinese female for CCTV - - - 3 
Foreign4 male 1 - 1 1 
Foreign female - - - - 
As can be seen from Table 8-1, the cross-editors were mainly journalists from 
each broadcaster's 'home nation' with minority foreign participation: this reflected 
the international character of their respective newsrooms. All non-native English 
speakers were of high linguistic proficiency. The BBC cross-editors were generally 
somewhat older than their CCTV counterparts: the BBC ages ranged from late 30s to 
early 50s, while CCTV's were from mid-20s to mid-40s. Again, this was broadly 
representative of their newsrooms and the CCTV editors were by no means 
inexperienced. The group for the pilot project, involving only BBC journalists, took 
several months to put together. 10 people were sent scripts, but three did not return 
them because of competing demands on their time. Six declared themselves willing to 
undertake the full project. It took two years to locate and secure the services of the 
five CCTV-trained journalists: even then, one member was replaced at a late stage.  
The cross-editors were each emailed a transcript of a news item from the rival 
broadcaster and were asked if it could hypothetically be put on air in their own 
organisation's news output as it stood or with minor amendments. Were there 
problems with the item and should it be returned, equally hypothetically, to the 
writer with a request for more information or input? Finally, should the item be 
                                                        
4 ‘Foreign’ in this context means other than British for the BBC, and other than Chinese for CCTV. 
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'spiked' – ruled unfit for theoretical broadcast (on the opposing channel) altogether? 
The cross-editors were asked to annotate the script as they saw fit, either by changing 
the editorial content or by adding comments, and to email it back. For the purposes of 
illustration, cross-edits that did not display tracked changes are reconstructed here to 
show where the edits were made. 
The cross-editors were aware of the provenance of their scripts: it would have 
been impractical, and for video impossible, to hide the identity of the channel from 
which the news came. This may have influenced their expectations of the content. 
However, all cross-editors approached their task with genuine professional interest 
in how 'the other side' put together its news. 
8.2.3 Piloting the method 
The aim of the pilot was to test the running of the method, and it was important not to 
exhaust goodwill. A small number of BBC-trained desk editors agreed to cross-edit a 
news bulletin drawn at random from recorded CCTV-News output: the 30-minute 
News Update at 1500 GMT on 17 June 2014. Half of the stories in this bulletin covered 
China or Chinese interests: the other half represented non-China world news. 
8.2.3.1 The mechanics of the exercise 
The CCTV programme was transcribed, as broadcast, by the researcher with spoken 
text on the right-hand side of the page and a summary of visual information on the 
left: it was divided into individual reports and sent out to the cross-editors within a 
week of transmission. Each editor received a transcript of either one or two news 
items. The cross-editors were asked to accept, reject, edit or ask for amendments to 
the scripts as would be necessary if the items were considered for inclusion in their 
own news output. 
Some cross-editors consulted CCTV's video archive of the programme or 
looked at what the BBC had done on that day: others edited from the transcript alone. 
This replicates the situation in a live newsroom, in which editors would mostly but 
not always be aware of the available pictures and the output of rival broadcasters. 
The cross-editors were given free rein in the way they edited: some chose to rewrite 
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the item completely, while others allowed as much of the original as possible to stand. 
10 of the 13 news scripts that were sent out were cross-edited and returned5. 
8.2.3.2 Outcome of the pilot  
The most frequent problem identified by the cross-editors in the pilot exercise was 
not incompatible ideology but bad writing. One cross-editor (BX5) observed that a 
reference to 'June 22nd, when Japan's Diet ends' sounded more like economies with 
sushi than the close of a parliamentary session. Four of the scripts were adjudged to 
lack context, while two more were labelled dull or bland. Despite these reservations, 
six of the 10 scripts passed muster with the BBC editors after minor amendments.  
Figure 8-1 BBC pilot cross-edit of CCTV-News story on China-Vietnam 
Original CCTV-News version BBC cross-editor’s version 
[PRES] Well Chinese state councillor Yang Jiechi 
is set to meet with senior Vietnamese officials 
in Hanoi, the capital city, on Wednesday.  
During the two-day visit, 
[PRES] China’s most senior foreign affairs 
representative, state councillor Yang Jiechi, is 
to begin talks in Vietnam today, at a time when 
relations between the two countries are at 
their lowest point for several years. 
[PRES OOV] Yang Jiechi is expected to meet 
with Vietnamese deputy prime minister Pham 
Binh Minh during an annual bilateral event.  
Issues on the agenda include recent tensions 
on South China Sea. Well this visit will be the 
highest-level meeting between the two 
governments since Vietnam’s provocative 
actions around a Chinese oil-rig triggered a 
spat last month. Yang told his counterpart in 
Vietnam in a phone-call in that Vietnam should 
stop harassing China’s drilling operations in 
early May. Yang will also meet with the general 
secretary of the communist party of Vietnam, 
Nguyen Phu Trong, and the prime minister, 
Nguyen Tan Dung. 
[PRES OOV] China’s deployment of an oilrig 
into waters claimed by Vietnam last month has 
provoked weeks of clashes between the two 
sides’ coastguard ships in the South China Sea. 
// The talks, in the Vietnamese capital Hanoi, 
are part of a regular series of meetings but will 
be the first occasion for the two countries 
leaderships to exchange views directly since 
the crisis began. // Mr Yang is due to meet 
Vietnam’s top political leadership including 
prime minister Nguyen Tan Dung and 
communist party general secretary Nguyen Phu 
Trong. 
 
Two CCTV news items about Vietnam and the South China Sea were 
considered hypothetically unbroadcastable on the BBC in their current form because 
of serious differences in perspective. The China-Vietnam meeting (Figure 8-1) was 
completely rewritten by the cross-editor (BX6), whose version is shown alongside the 
original. 6 The most fundamental change was in the attribution of blame. CCTV's 
assertion that 'Vietnam's provocative actions around a Chinese oil-rig triggered' the 
                                                        
5 Full list of items in Appendix 8A. Gaps in numbering indicate news items that were not returned. 
6 For ease of comparison, the two versions have been re-rendered here side by side. The original 
format of the cross-editor’s submission is in Appendix 8B. 
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crisis was altered by the BBC cross-editor to read, 'China's deployment of an oilrig 
into waters claimed by Vietnam... provoked weeks of clashes.' The cross-editor also 
removed the telephone lecture delivered by Yang Jiechi to his Vietnamese 
counterpart, and added context to a title that might otherwise have proved 
impenetrable for the non-Chinese viewer by explaining that the state councillor was 
China's 'most senior foreign affairs representative'. Finally, the order in which the 
Vietnamese officials were mentioned was reversed: in CCTV's news story, the 
Communist Party general secretary came first, whereas the BBC put the prime 
minister in the lead. Although the BBC cross-editor's version stated that the waters 
were disputed, neither this nor the CCTV original supplied both sides of the 
immediate cause of the spat. 
Figure 8-2 Extract from BBC pilot cross-edit of CCTV-News story on South China Sea 
 
Another South China Sea item, a CCTV report about documentation of China's 
territorial claims, was also heavily cross-edited (Figure 8-2). The BBC cross-editor 
(BX6) believed its positioning near the top of the CCTV running-order was 'clearly 
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propaganda', as was its representation of China's claims as fact. In the South Atlantic 
as in the South China Sea, one country's territorial claims are another's assertions of 
sovereignty, and the cross-editor asserted that the item was 'unbroadcastable' unless 
it was amended to include other viewpoints. However, the cross-editor's comments 
make it clear that China's retrieval of historical documents to bolster its claims was a 
significant news point, and that the report could have made more of the documents 
and their provenance. In other words, the contention was that CCTV-News had some 
highly original material and had under-sold it because of the need to repeat state 
rhetoric.  Small but important changes by the cross-editor included amending 
'historical evidence of Chinese sovereignty over the islands' to read 'historical 
evidence to try and prove Chinese sovereignty over the islands.' 
Apart from the South China Sea items, nothing in the CCTV-News agenda 
appeared to cause the BBC cross-editors great concern. Indeed, one of them (BX7) 
remarked on the similarity between a cross-edited CCTV item and a BBC report that 
had run on another day. Hardly a word of the scripts produced by CCTV's native 
Anglophone reporters was changed. 
8.2.4 Choosing the news for the main cross-edit 
It was established in the piloting that news items directly involving China or Chinese 
interests exercised London-based cross-editors the most. A clash of reporting 
standards or news values on broader world issues was less apparent. For the full 
study, it was therefore decided to concentrate on two news events that corresponded 
to these findings: the Hong Kong protests of late 2014 (see 6.2.1 for background), in 
which both Britain and China had a stake, and the Islamist attacks in Paris in January 
2015, which had global relevance but in which neither country was directly involved. 
In the Paris attacks between 7 and 9 January 2015, 17 people were killed in a 
string of gun attacks and sieges by Islamist militants. Three of the dead were police 
officers. The three assailants were also killed. The most notable attack was at the 
offices of the satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, which had published a series of 
cartoons lampooning the Prophet Muhammad. The attacks precipitated France's most 
severe security crisis in decades and prompted nationwide unity rallies, but were 
surpassed in scale by Islamist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 which killed 130 
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people. In order not to confuse these two events, the January attacks will be referred 
to here as the Charlie Hebdo killings. 
Two separate news broadcasts per organisation were chosen at random from 
available recorded coverage of each of the events. For Hong Kong, 2 and 17 October 
2014 were picked, and for the Charlie Hebdo attacks, the long-format daily 0400 GMT 
CCTV News Hour was paired with BBC output from the previous afternoon, on 8-9 and 
13-14 January 2015. Each cross-editor was assigned a single day's scripts. This meant 
that most scripts were cross-edited by two people. The cross-editors were allowed to 
annotate the scripts however they liked. However, this time amendments purely on 
style grounds were not included in the analysis, and video files of the broadcasts were 
made available to the cross-editors. 
8.3 The Hong Kong cross-edit 
8.3.1 Emotion and speculation  
Both groups of cross-editors removed or replaced wording that they considered 
emotive, but the BBC editors also inserted emotive words into the CCTV news scripts. 
The BBC cross-editors objected primarily to adjectives such as ‘ominous’ in 'an 
ominous drop in visitors'7 but strengthened others, preferring 'negative' to 'serious': 
they also added impact to verbs governing reported speech, for example replacing 
'said' with the much stronger 'accused'8. CCTV cross-editors toned down BBC nouns 
and verbs, turning 'fight' into 'persist' and 'front line' into 'standoff'9. They deleted 
'occupation' [site] from the BBC transcript and replaced 'riot gear' with 'partial 
protective gear'10. CCTV editors also reacted more conservatively to pictures 
accompanying the reports, recommending that protesters' tents and canopies not be 
shown and that close-ups be avoided. 
Both groups of editors expressed distaste for what they regarded as 
speculation, editorialising or over-dramatising. Two BBC cross-editors (BX1, BX6) 
removed CCTV references to the likelihood of the protests affecting tourism or retail 
sales, while another objected to the phrase, 'tensions remain high'11. One CCTV cross-
                                                        
7 Li Jiejun, CCTV News Update, 1600 GMT, 2 October 2014. 
8 Presenter script, CCTV News Update, 1600 GMT, 2 October 2014. 
9 Carrie Gracie, BBC World News, 2000 GMT, 2 October 2014. 
10 Juliana Liu, BBC Newsday, 0000 GMT, 17 October 2014. 
11 Presenter script, CCTV News Update, 1600 GMT, 2 October 2014. 
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editor (CX3) deleted a BBC reporter's description of the protesters' decision-making 
as 'democracy in action'12: Figure 8-3 gives more details of CX3’s treatment of a BBC 
news report13. 
Figure 8-3 Extract from CCTV cross-editor's markup of Carrie Gracie's BBC news report, 2 October 2014. 
The crossings-out and the comments in red are by the CCTV cross-editor. 
 
Another CCTV cross-editor (CX4) removed a BBC reporter's conjecture that 
Hong Kong’s chief executive, C Y Leung, had refused to answer a question because 
'clearly... there were plans for Mongkok to be cleared'14. CX4 observed that some 
CCTV employees would view this as subjective and biased. Two CCTV cross-editors 
(CX2, CX3) deleted separate references in BBC scripts to the police taking delivery of 
rubber bullets. 
                                                        
12 Carrie Gracie, BBC World News, 2000 GMT, 2 October 2014. 
13 Full cross-edit of the BBC report appears in Appendix 8C. 
14 Juliana Liu, BBC Newsday, 0000 GMT, 17 October 2014. 
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8.3.2 The shadow of Tiananmen 
Events at Tiananmen Square a generation ago manifested themselves in the changes 
made by the cross-editors to how the Hong Kong demonstrators were described. BBC 
editors added the adjectives 'democracy' and 'pro-democracy' to CCTV scripts: BX6, 
for example, twice inserted 'pro-democracy' into CCTV's references to 'Occupy 
Central'15. Conversely, 'pro-democracy' was deleted from BBC scripts by all of the 
CCTV cross-editors who encountered it, along with references to 'democracy activists' 
(CX2) and Hong Kong as a source of 'dissension and separatism' (CX3). 'Protesters' 
was the preferred CCTV description: CX3 remarked that Beijing would regard them 
simply as troublemakers. 'Students' appeared in a CCTV script in early October16 
when the young instigators of the demonstrations were indeed the focus of the 
coverage: however, the CCTV editors cut 'students' out of BBC scripts wherever they 
occurred, removing any parallels – however implicit – between Hong Kong 2014 and 
Beijing 198917. 
8.3.3 Harmony and conflict 
The BBC cross-editors were observed to dislike the foregrounding of harmony and 
co-operation in the CCTV reports. One BBC editor (BX1) completely rewrote the 
script for foreign minister Wang Yi's visit to the US (see Figure 8-4), moving 
references to co-operation and trust from the beginning to near the end. Another 
editor (BX6) deleted the sentence in the CCTV script, '[Wang Yi] highlighted the many 
fields with co-operation potential between the two sides'18. CCTV editors, for their 
part, showed distaste for the conflict frame, deleting a BBC description of C Y Leung 
as 'the man [the protesters] want to resign' although this was a statement of fact19. 
One CCTV editor (CX2) also deleted the BBC's reference in the same bulletin to 'plans 
to vet candidates' and replaced it with 'reform plans'. However, CCTV cross-editors 
availed themselves of the conflict frame when it showed the authorities' strength: the 
observation in the above BBC programme that C Y Leung had 'failed to bow' to 
protesters' demands was changed by CX3 to show that he had 'refused to yield'. 
 
                                                        
15 CCTV News Update, 1600 GMT 2 October 2014. 
16 CCTV News Update, 1600 GMT 2 October 2014. 
17 For example, CX4 on BBC Newsday, 0000 GMT 17 October 2014. 
18 Newsroom reporter, CCTV News Update, 1600 GMT 2 October 2014. 
19 Presenter script, BBC World News, 2000 GMT 2 October 2014. 
218 
 
Figure 8-4 BBC cross-edit of report on Wang Yi's US visit, CCTV News Update 1500 GMT 2 October 2014 
(reformatted to show the two versions alongside each other) 
 
Each side pointed out omissions in rival scripts that it felt impinged on 
editorial balance. Three BBC cross-editors (BX1, BX4, BX6) argued for the inclusion of 
sound-bites of Western politicians in CCTV reports to match those of Chinese 
government officials. In two of these three instances it was not clear that such sound-
bites existed, and it appeared that the BBC editors were requesting that they be found 
as a show of balance rather than for their potential merit or importance. In similar 
vein, BX6 remarked that a CCTV report on Hong Kong retailers20 needed 'comment 
from… pro-democracy shop owners'. 
                                                        
20
 Li Jiejun, CCTV News Update, 1600 GMT, 2 October 2014. 
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On the CCTV side, cross-editor CX3 requested the insertion of a sound-bite 
from an old man who had rounded angrily on protesters but whose voice had not 
been used in a BBC report21. Another CCTV editor (CX2) requested the inclusion of a 
comment from C Y Leung and information about scuffles between students and police, 
which were absent from BBC coverage22. 
CCTV and BBC cross-editors queried broader editorial decisions taken by their 
competitors. A CCTV editor (CX3) described as a 'bad question' a BBC interviewer's 
comparison of 'traditional, autocratic, hard-line China and… the image of modernity 
and economic flow' that Hong Kong wanted to show the world23, saying it would be 
better to ask how Beijing and Hong Kong could work together on political reform in 
Hong Kong. On the BBC side, two cross-editors (BX4, BX7) had serious reservations 
about a CCTV account of a fire near one of the Hong Kong protest sites and the 
reported difficulties experienced by fire crews in accessing and tackling it24. BX7 
argued that the fire was 'not news' and that its only purpose was to show that 
protests endangered lives. Both editors were scathing about a professor featured in 
the report who argued that safety was more important than democracy. Cross-editor 
BX4 remarked, 'The tone and content of the reporting is objective, but there is only 
one voice in favour of protest in this sequence and it is challenged. The majority of 
voices in this piece are anti-protest, and they are not challenged.' 
8.3.4 Additions, obliterations and leaving well alone 
One section of CCTV's news coverage was left unchanged by two BBC cross-editors. 
This was part of a live interview with a CCTV correspondent in Washington25 in 
which he mentioned that the 'situation in Hong Kong' had been overshadowing the 
Chinese foreign minister's visit. CCTV cross-editors found it more difficult to put 
down their figurative red pens. One of them (CX2) remarked on having cut 
inappropriate parts from a BBC script, after which 'not much [was] left to make a 
package'. 
Both groups of editors added information to their respective scripts: the BBC 
additions tended to qualify or attribute, as in ‘some Hong Kong residents’ expressing 
                                                        
21
 Carrie Gracie, BBC World News, 2000 GMT, 2 October 2014. 
22
 Presenter script, BBC World News, 2000 GMT 2 October 2014. 
23
 BBC World News, 2000 GMT 2 October 2014. 
24 Han Peng, CCTV News Update, 0600 GMT 17 October 2014. 
25 Nathan King, CCTV News Update, 1600 GMT 2 October 2014. 
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support for the government, or C Y Leung praising the police ‘for showing what he 
called the utmost restraint’26. The CCTV cross-editors added factual detail, such as the 
composition of the Hong Kong government team that was to meet student leaders, 
which was not mentioned in the BBC story27. The BBC cross-editors complained 
about a lack of background in the CCTV scripts. 'There is no mention about what the 
protesters want,' wrote BX7, 'that it is a conflict with China ultimately, of Chinese 
approval of candidates for Hong Kong's election… One gets the impression that for no 
reason at all people block roads in Hong Kong… endanger lives in doing so – and that 
'no society can tolerate these illegal activities'… We don't get a clue what these 
protests are about.'   
Two cross-editors engaged in a literal interpretation of their craft by crossing 
out entire news items, deeming them unsuitable for broadcast. On the BBC side, BX6 
deleted a 72-second newsreader script on CCTV that reproduced the Hong Kong 
authorities' denunciation of the protests28, while for CCTV CX4 completely obliterated 
a BBC news feature about the transformation of the umbrella into a street art motif29.  
The CCTV cross-editor remarked that the topic would be 'off limits' on the Chinese 
channel even though CCTV-News had broadcast material about street art during the 
Egyptian revolution: 'Of course, it is different when it is happening in your own 
country.' 
8.4 The Charlie Hebdo cross-edit 
8.4.1 The limits of leaving things alone 
The salient feature of the Charlie Hebdo cross-edit was how often the editors left their 
rivals' scripts unchanged. BBC cross-editors allowed references in CCTV scripts to 'terror' 
and 'murder' to stand, along with a description of Charlie Hebdo's decision to publish 
again the following week as a 'demonstration of defiance'30. One minor style-related 
change was made to a CCTV report on the funerals in Jerusalem of the French Jews killed 
in Paris31, and there was a single BBC cross-editor’s amendment (BX2) to a CCTV report 
                                                        
26 Presenter script, CCTV News Update, 1600 GMT 2 October 2014. 
27 BBC World News, 2000 GMT 2 October 2014. 
28 CCTV News Update, 1600 GMT 2 October 2014. 
29 John Sudworth, BBC Newsday, 0000 GMT 17 October 2014. 
30 Presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 0400 GMT 14 January 2015. 
31 Stephanie Freid, CCTV News Hour, 0400 GMT 14 January 2015. 
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requiring similar delicacy of judgement: the integration of France's Muslim citizens 
(Figure 8-5).  
Figure 8-5 Reconstructed BBC cross-edit of Kate Parkinson report for CCTV News Hour, 0400 GMT 14 
January 2015 
 
CCTV cross-editors, likewise, had relatively few queries about the BBC news 
scripts, commenting that they could not see that their own channel would treat much 
of the coverage very differently. The exceptions to this were references to freedom of 
speech in the BBC output. One CCTV cross-editor (CX5) pointed out that a sound-bite 
from a lobbyist on counter-extremism, terming freedom of speech 'one of the most 
fundamental pillars that allows democracy to tick' would not be included on CCTV-
News, commenting, '[CCTV] may focus more on the impact of Islam[ic] extremism and 
foreign immigration on France'. Yet the same cross-editor allowed two other 
references to freedom of speech in the same report to stand (see Figure 8-6). 
8.4.2 'Terrorist' and emotive language 
There was universal inconsistency among cross-editors and original writers in their 
treatment of the word 'terrorist'. The BBC style guide says 'terrorist' is not banned, 
but should be used consistently across outlets if at all: it recommends the use of more 
specific words for perpetrators such as bomber, attacker, insurgent or militant (BBC 
Academy 2016). 'Terrorist' did not feature in the overall CCTV-News style guide 
(CCTV-News 2011) but appeared in a CCTV-News Washington handbook (CCTV-
News 2012:7), which stated: 'Except where quoting a news source the word 
222 
 
'terrorist' should be avoided'. Just like the BBC, CCTV prefers more specific terms 
such as suicide bomber or hijacker. 
Figure 8-6 Extract from CCTV cross-edit of Jon Brain report, BBC Impact, 1300 GMT 8 January 2015 
 
In practice, however, 'terrorist' appeared to be a malleable concept. Two 
instances of 'terrorist' in BBC reports on 8 January 2015 were not removed by a CCTV 
cross-editor, and a BBC cross-editor also passed a CCTV script that spoke of 
condolences from President Xi Jinping for 'Wednesday's terrorist attack in Paris'32. 
However, another BBC cross-editor (BX2) removed instances of 'terror' and 'terrorist' 
wherever they were found, replacing them with 'attack' and 'militant'. 
BBC cross-editors removed several other words that they saw as emotive, such 
as 'brutal' and 'murders': one editor (BX3) thought there were 'too many adjectives' 
in the CCTV scripts. On the other side, CCTV cross-editors appeared not to think that 
the BBC treatment of the Charlie Hebdo attack had been overplayed. CX5 wrote 
approvingly of an 'excellent arrangement' at the end of a BBC programme in which a 
montage of the photographs and names of those killed was overlaid with mournful 
classical music33. 
8.4.3 Context and social responsibility 
Here, as with Hong Kong, BBC cross-editors spotted a lack of context in the CCTV-
News scripts. They complained that the 'kosher supermarket attack' was mentioned 
                                                        
32 Presenter script, CCTV News Hour, 0400 GMT 9 January 2015. 
33 End montage, BBC Impact, 1300 GMT 8 January 2015. 
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without further elaboration, and that no-one had explained what Charlie Hebdo had 
published that was offensive enough to result in the killing of 12 journalists. One BBC 
cross-editor (BX3) asked why CCTV did not say the gunmen were Muslim and of 
Algerian descent, wondering if viewers were expected to discern this from their 
names alone. On the CCTV side, editor CX5 rewrote a BBC sequence on the manhunt 
for the killers34 as a chronological sequence of events, rather than starting with the 
latest incident. 
Figure 8-7 Excerpt from CCTV cross-edit of news report by Christian Fraser on BBC Impact, 1300 GMT 8 
January 2015. 
 
An aspect of the coverage picked out by a CCTV cross-editor and not replicated on the 
BBC side was that of the social responsibility of the media. Editor CX5 remarked that 
a sound-bite of the French prime minister in a BBC package, appealing to journalists 
not to jeopardise the investigation through their reporting, could also be run as a text 
alert to the media at the foot of the screen (Figure 8-7). 
8.5 Discussion of findings 
8.5.1 Similarities 
The cross-editing process revealed both similarities and differences between British 
and Chinese journalists. While the editorial jousting in the Hong Kong cross-edit 
might have been expected, there was an intriguing degree of consensus on how to tell 
the story of the Charlie Hebdo attack. The ‘othering’ by the BBC and CCTV of those 
who posed a threat to the established order – the perpetrators of the Paris shootings 
– could have been discerned through conventional textual analysis. However, what 
was also evident here was that the cross-editors of the Charlie Hebdo attack were 
                                                        
34 Presenter script, BBC Impact, 1300 GMT 8 January 2015. 
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essentially working with the same toolkit of values. CCTV cross-editors had little 
overall difficulty with the BBC line, and BBC editors accepted much of the CCTV 
output, because verbally and visually they told the same story: one of solidarity and 
exclusion, vigils and moral panic. When Dencik unpicked journalistic practices at BBC 
World News several years ago and concluded that they were derived from ‘an 
understanding of news that adheres to a social order as dictated by the most 
dominant institutions of power’ (2013:132), she could equally have been talking in 
this instance about CCTV-News. In the Charlie Hebdo cross-edit, the two broadcasters 
were shown to be similar in viewing political Islam as something that, essentially, had 
come from 'outside' rather than representing a facet of their own societies. 
The scripts from CCTV's overseas correspondents may have been acceptable 
to the BBC cross-editors because those correspondents were native Anglophones. The 
dearth of edits also implicitly confirmed the absence of a distinctively Chinese 
position on Charlie Hebdo at CCTV-News, in contrast with other official Chinese news 
outlets35. The comparison between the broad consensus on the Charlie Hebdo cross-
edit and the painstaking nit-picking over the Hong Kong scripts indicates that some 
issues were perceived as ideological battlegrounds by CCTV-News and others were 
either conceded or simply ignored. This does not mean that the BBC has no ideology: 
it, too, is operating within a defined social system that constrains its claims to 
complete impartiality (Hall 2013/1982). However, the editorial vacuum at CCTV-
News on Charlie Hebdo meant that it was swept up in the moral panic (Davies 
2009:142) that engulfed Western reporting of the attacks, sacrificing its aims of 
providing an alternative viewpoint on world affairs. 
8.5.2 Differences 
Differences in sensitivity to vocabulary were highlighted by the cross-editing of the 
scripts for the Hong Kong protests. ‘Students’, ‘democracy’  and ‘pro-democracy’ were 
unswervingly excised by CCTV editors from the BBC scripts and added by BBC editors 
to the CCTV stories. The BBC's explanation of the initial stages of the demonstrations 
had employed the terminology of Tiananmen Square in 1989. This drew on the 
                                                        
35 A Xinhua news agency commentary in English on 12 January 2015, for example, was entitled ‘Press 
freedom has its limits’. While condemning the killings, it observed, ‘It is important to show respect for 
the differences of other peoples’ religious beliefs and cultures for the sake of peaceful coexistence in 
the world, rather than exercising unlimited, unprincipled satire, insult and press freedom without 
considering other peoples’ feelings.’ 
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stability of narrative forms (Gurevitch et al. 1991:207) and the concept of collective 
memory (Berkowitz & Liu 2016:74) in its attempt to make sense of an event by 
parallels with what had gone before. Writing just after the Hong Kong action began, 
former BBC Beijing correspondent Tim Luard (2014) pinpointed ‘haunting 
similarities’ with Tiananmen 1989 and underlined the significance of the involvement 
of students, which tapped into a history of youth protest in China going back to the 
early 20th century (Ash 2014). The cross-edit makes clear how the language used by 
the BBC had unacceptable resonance for Chinese state media. The unanimity in the 
CCTV cross-editors’ actions may derive from the relative youth of many CCTV-News 
employees (in comparison with the veteran editors who oversee their work). Their 
knowledge of June 1989 would not have been first-hand, meaning little variation in 
views. Conventional textual analysis would have covered the BBC's use of 
terminology sensitive in China, but it would have been much more difficult to 
establish its absence – through choice or self-censorship – in the CCTV reports 
without seeing the reaction of CCTV cross-editors to the BBC scripts.  
The cross-edit also confirmed differences in the preference of news frames, 
principally whether conflict is pointed up through aggressive and descriptive 
vocabulary or whether harmony and consonance are preferred. A leaning towards 
harmony in news stories corresponds to the supportive attitude to authority 
demonstrated by Chinese state media, which in linguistic terms appeared simply dull 
to BBC cross-editors. China's English-language media are not as shackled by Party-
specific ideological phrases, or 提法tifa, as their Mandarin counterparts (Alvaro 
2013:150-151). Nonetheless, BBC cross-editors picked out ideologically loaded 
language because they felt it jarred in an Anglophone context, indicating the 
clumsiness of China's external propaganda work (Shambaugh 2013:267-8). The 
identification with authority displayed by CCTV-News brought with it a notion of 
social responsibility missing from the BBC reports. This was shown most clearly in a 
CCTV cross-editor's suggestion that a French government warning against 
irresponsible reporting of the Paris attacks be publicised more widely. As this was 
present in the cross-editor's mind rather than in the script, it would not have been 
uncovered through conventional textual analysis. 
Another facet of the news reporting highlighted by BBC cross-editors through 
its absence was the amount of context needed for a news story compared with what 
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was actually supplied. Providing context in a fast-moving news environment demands 
keen editorial judgement. Two CCTV items that might have been considered tricky in 
this respect – on Muslims in France and funerals in Jerusalem – satisfied the BBC 
editors: both reports were by experienced native Anglophone journalists. The lack of 
context in CCTV’s Chinese stories, presented mainly by Chinese journalists, was much 
more of a problem for the BBC editors. This may indicate that CCTV-News feared 
alienating an overseas audience through politicised background, or simply that it had 
a bureaucratic editorial process in which no-one wished to be held accountable for 
formulating a definitive point of view on sensitive topics. 
8.5.3 Findings unique to the cross-editing process 
Specific insights included the treatment of the word ‘terrorist’ in the Charlie Hebdo 
cross-edit, which was inconsistent on the BBC side but used confidently throughout 
by cross-editors from CCTV-News despite a recommendation in the style-guide that 
more specific words be employed. ‘Terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ are, however, commonly 
seen in Chinese media, including in news of attacks within China itself. Of particular 
interest to a BBC cross-editor was CCTV's failure to explain that the Charlie Hebdo 
attackers were Muslim and of Algerian descent, as if the channel expected viewers to 
infer this from their names. There are parallels here with Chinese media's general 
aversion to mentioning the ethnicity of its own citizens, especially the Muslim Uyghur 
minority, if they are involved in or suspected of attacks in China: the listing of their 
names, which look very different from those of the Han majority, is deemed to suffice. 
It could be argued that this is another manifestation of the principle of social 
responsibility in Chinese media: the wish not to inflame tensions by highlighting 
ethnic divisions in the population. Paradoxically, such editorial omissions reinforce 
those same divisions by projecting a homogeneous national view that is inevitably 
that of the majority group. 
The cross-edits performed by the CCTV editors indicated that, for them, there 
was a distinction between editorialising, which they considered unprofessional, and 
acting as state media, which they deemed unavoidable. The changes made by BBC 
cross-editors, however, were all performed – in their view – in the name of 
journalistic standards. Each saw bias in the other's news, but the CCTV editors' 
comments on the BBC scripts were about the subjectivity of individual reporters 
whereas the BBC editors saw ideology dictating the entire content of some CCTV 
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scripts. Occasionally the BBC comments on the CCTV news scripts revealed what they 
considered to be accidental journalistic potential: for example, the report on the fire 
near the Hong Kong barricades contained a rare CCTV interview with a protester. 
Conversely, a BBC cross-editor’s questioning of the absence of ‘pro-democracy shop-
owners’ in CCTV's coverage of the Hong Kong protests exposed questions about the 
nature of true balance in reporting that are the subject of current debate. 
Like their BBC counterparts, the CCTV cross-editors displayed a confidence of 
judgement born of experience: their handling of their rival's scripts on Hong Kong 
indicated that they knew exactly what should be in their own output. This confidence 
appeared to derive from self-policing typical of what Link (2002) famously described 
as ‘the anaconda in the chandelier’: he likened the Chinese authorities to a giant 
coiled snake whose very presence causes everyone to moderate their behaviour. 
None of the amendments made so readily by CCTV cross-editors to the BBC's Hong 
Kong scripts featured in the CCTV-News style-books: any guidance at an institutional 
level was undocumented. CCTV cross-editor CX4 commented that editing would ‘vary 
depending on which laoshi [was] on and what the prevailing mood [was].’ In the 
Charlie Hebdo cross-edit, the Chinese cross-editors had a different problem: how to 
edit without an anaconda in situ. The confidence of their Hong Kong edit was no 
longer on display, and they appeared in general to shy away from taking a distinctive 
editorial line. That Chinese state media strictures have been shown through empirical 
work to be so manipulable, transient and partial may be the single most important 
result of the cross-editing experiment. 
8.6 Conclusion 
Cross-editing is, by definition, carried out in a comparative context, but it does far 
more than flag up similarities and differences at the point of decision-making. As 
demonstrated in this chapter, it shows what is rejected or amended, and highlights 
omissions and absences from a script along with salient points to which cross-editors 
unexpectedly do not object.  Cross-editors are not forced to comment on the changes 
they make to a script, but any remarks provide additional insight into their 
motivation. 
Some of the conclusions reached by cross-editors may be similar to those 
arrived at by independent researchers who conduct other forms of textual analysis. 
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However, cross-editing reveals the view from inside rather than outside the editorial 
process, and therefore helps triangulate results from more conventional evaluation of 
content. The technique is, furthermore, useful in revealing different interpretations of 
a single word, or how one side may recoil from what it considers ideologically or 
emotionally loaded vocabulary.  It does, however, have its limits – notably, the 
inability to distinguish between edits prompted by individual thought and by social 
conditioning. Even the overtly 'socially responsible' suggestion by the CCTV cross-
editor in 8.4.3, for example, could have been prompted by years of instructions from 
the Chinese state propaganda department not to 'hype' certain news developments.  
Media companies are becoming increasingly international in both audience 
reach and staffing. Thanks to the digitisation of communication, the raw materials of 
newsgathering are now available to more people than ever before. It is therefore of 
fundamental importance to establish, not just which news items are covered, but how 
they are covered around the globe, whether essential parts of the story are left out, 
and by whom. In the welter of individually curated content online, media literacy is 
key but news consumers are not news professionals. Cross-editing provides a way of 
employing journalists' own experience and linguistic or political sensitivity to pull 




9 Partial journalism for a ‘partial power’? 
9.1 The purpose of the discussion chapter 
Look where Al-Jazeera was successful: because they took a different stance. 
There’s only so much room at this table of global television... There’s no point 
us trying to follow CNN – we’re never going to catch up. And they [CCTV-News 
producers] stand there gawping at it like it’s God. They even photograph the 
straps [on screen] and take them back to their desks... And I’ve told them to 
stop doing it. I’ve said, what do you think we’re here for? 
(International employee, CCTV-News: ref CGPG15) 
What did CCTV-News think it was 'here for'? The employee’s doubt goes to the central 
questions of the research. This final chapter shows how the findings contribute to 
understanding of the commonalities and differences between Chinese English-
language television journalism and that produced in the Anglosphere. It draws on the 
comparative content analysis to establish how journalistically credible the narratives 
are, with particular reference to China and Africa news. It distinguishes between 
attempts at truth-telling, the promotion of Chinese 'soft power' and the conveying of 
propaganda. It also posits an overall model of the degree of information control 
discerned in CCTV-News output – whether through censorship, self-censorship or 
other limitations on public debate.  
 Journalists’ power of selection does not necessarily make all news ‘artifice’, as 
Nick Davies observes in the introduction to this thesis: it also opens up the possibility 
of seeing events from a variety of perspectives. By producing news in English, CCTV 
has an opportunity to communicate a Chinese version of the world.  If – through poor 
journalism, partial reporting or simply reproducing Anglo-American narratives – it 
fails to provide a credible and distinctive view of events, it is not only China that loses. 
News consumers in the Anglosphere, too, miss a chance to step outside their own 
terms of reference and hold their societies’ dominant values up to the light. 
 The first section of this discussion chapter draws together the results of the 
comparative quantitative content and generic frame analyses, along with qualitative 
data from interviews and the cross-editing. It then maps them to established 
communication theories discussed in Chapter 2, extended where necessary to take 
Chinese state media parlance into account, to establish where differences between 
CCTV-News and BBC World News were most pronounced, why and to what effect. 
Points of interest include the extent of the transferability of Anglo-American 
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professional journalistic values, and what Chinese journalists are striving for when 
they talk about professionalism. Outcomes specific to the analyses of China and Africa 
news are also discussed. The chapter concludes by adjudicating on whether the 
product of CCTV's Anglophone news in the period studied fell into the Anglo-
American conception of journalism – or whether, to extend Shambaugh's definition 
(2013) of China as a 'partial power', the channel was producing 'partial journalism' in 
both senses of the phrase. 
9.2 What the frame analysis reveals about the news  
Table 9-11 brings together all the coverage by BBC World News and CCTV-News that 
was the subject of generic frame analysis in the preceding chapters.  
 
Table 9-1 Overview of frame analysis: prominent averages in yellow, prominent frames for individual 
events in blue2 
 
 
The Chinese broadcaster's top frames overall were, firstly, the attribution of solution-
oriented responsibility and, secondly, harmony. This is consistent with Hearns-
Branaman's contention (2015) that Chinese state media are set up to 'manufacture 
harmony' to help perpetuate Communist Party rule. In the content analysis for this 
research project, CCTV-News – in most instances – promoted 'harmony' by 
underlining how the authorities solved society's problems. The BBC World News 
                                                        
1 Full figures in Appendix 9A. 
2
 Figures are for percentages of stories analysed in which a given frame appeared: stories can contain 
more than one frame. 
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coverage analysed here, by contrast, emphasised a preference for the conflict, human 
interest and responsibility frames (both causal and solution-oriented) and, to a lesser 
extent, economic consequences. This is broadly consistent with Semetko & 
Valkenburg’s findings about framing in European political news (2000) that laid 
down characteristics of Western journalistic frames. Further investigation into the 
polarisation of the framing, explained below, underlines the differences in the way 
the two channels understand ‘news’ and, in some instances, casts doubt on the ability 
of either to reflect events with detachment. 
9.2.1 Conflict, economic consequences and the 'blame frame' 
Table 9-2 Grouped and averaged frame incidence derived from Table 9-1. Most frequently evoked frames 
in blue: second most frequently in turquoise.3 
 
Grouping the story categories from Table 9-1 where their framing coincides, as in 
Table 9-2, makes the disparity in frame evocation between the broadcasters even 
clearer. The strong focus of BBC World News on frames of conflict and economic 
consequences shows that journalists there often presented news in binary terms. 
Under this mindset 'truth is violence, reality is war, news is conflict' (Hartley 
2000:40). Binary discourse (Coe et al. 2004:235) is derived in part from a 
monotheistic cultural background, in this case Christianity and its preoccupation with 
‘good versus evil’. Africa's woes were seen from the battlefield or the refugee camp 
rather than the mediation table: the Hong Kong electoral dispute pitted idealistic 
protesters against unyielding authorities: China stood in opposition to Africa as a 
giant whose economic slowdown was bad for Africa's economies too. Aalberg, de 
Vreese & Strömbäck, in their categorisation of political news in Western democracies, 
describe this framing as a 'strategic game' (2017:33) in which depictions of binary 
                                                        
3 Figures are for percentages of stories analysed in which a given frame appeared: stories can contain 
more than one frame. 
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oppositions take precedence over actual issues. 
Use of such oppositional framing at CCTV-News was rarer overall, occurring only 
where a threat to China’s socio-economic system was perceived. In both subject-areas 
in which it was detected in this research – the Hong Kong protests and African 
security and politics – China had a strong interest in the stability of the societies in 
question. In both areas, with China enmeshed in global financial structures, framing 
included the economic consequences of events. When the Hong Kong protests began, 
CCTV-News joined the fray in defence of the market by deploying the 'economic 
consequences' frame. However, its use of the oppositional frames of conflict and 
causal responsibility persisted long after the economic angle was dropped, when 
social stability was still in question and the authorities apportioned blame for the 
continued unrest.    
At both news channels, as can be seen, the choice of frames meant that parts of the 
narrative were omitted. The BBC appeared to be engaged in simplification and 
polarisation, possibly in pursuit of clarity and drama, while CCTV's more sparing use 
of the oppositional frames demonstrated its sensitivity to both the market and to any 
suggestion of regime instability.  
9.2.2 Stability, harmony and solution-oriented news  
The stability and harmony framing in CCTV's English news output – present to a 
much greater degree than on BBC World News4 – suggested that Chinese cultural 
proclivities and China's domestic policy priorities (outlined in 4.5.4) had a strong 
influence on the international channel. The harmony frame was particularly 
pronounced in CCTV's depiction of China-Africa relations, and the similarly upbeat 
solution-oriented responsibility frame in its reporting of the political Two Sessions 
and the sinking of the Yangtze cruise ship. This framing produced largely uncritical 
reproductions of government standpoints, in precisely those areas in which the 
Chinese authorities could be said to be most desirous of a positive or unchallenged 
outcome. The consequent idealistic, prescriptive view of China for the outside world 
mostly represented propaganda and public diplomacy rather than journalism. 
                                                        
4 See Table 9-2. 
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This relative lack of negativity in CCTV-News reporting, however, did not 
necessarily denote the absence of good journalism. Chinese and African journalists 
and managers at CCTV explained that they considered hostile questioning and 
destructive framing unhelpful and that they would rather elicit information from 
which others could learn. One CCTV interviewee regarded a critical journalistic stance 
as akin to taking the opposition’s side. Some of this attitude was consistent with the 
China findings of the Worlds of Journalism project led by Thomas Hanitzsch (Zhou & 
Zhou 2016:2) – that most Chinese journalists wanted to support government policy 
and nearly half thought it important to depict political leaders positively. The gulf 
between CCTV-News and BBC World News on this point appeared to spring from a 
fundamental cultural difference. Esser, Engesser, Matthes & Berganza (2017:78-9) 
see British journalism as being particularly susceptible to negativity, in part at least 
because of its critical 'watchdog' orientation. 
9.2.3 Human interest 
The human interest frame was never pre-eminent in CCTV’s English news output – 
the lack of personalisation representing another break with the attributes of political 
journalism in democracies as outlined by de Vreese et al. (2017). Personalisation was 
prominent only in CCTV's reporting on African affairs, and in the correspondent-
driven Agenda in Action series of reports on China's policies. The only humans 
otherwise deemed to be of interest were Politburo members despite a short-lived 
edict by Xi Jinping, covering this period, that the doings of politicians be given less 
airtime (de Burgh 2017:92-3). In general CCTV-News appeared to portray potentially 
human events – such as the Yangtze sinking or the rush home at lunar new year – as 
logistical challenges for officialdom. It is unclear if this was an intentional emphasis or 
simply poor work by inexperienced news-writers. 
9.3 Professional values in the news 
In interviews, CCTV-News journalists spoke almost wistfully about acquiring the 
'professional journalistic values' demonstrated by their Western rivals – by which 
they often meant slick production and smooth storytelling rather than the deeper 
principles for which the BBC and others would like to be admired. This section covers 
fundamental variables such as timeliness, social responsibility and the distance 
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between the journalist and the story, and also sums up how CCTV-News dealt with 
visuals in comparison with BBC World News. 
9.3.1 Interpretive journalism, bias and impartiality 
The original method of cross-editing, developed in the course of this research 
(Chapter 8), laid bare CCTV journalists' distaste for what they saw as BBC 
editorialising – corresponding to what Salgado et al. (2017:52) define as interpretive 
journalism. This was revealed as a major difference between BBC and CCTV-News 
editorial styles. British television reportage is adjudged to be particularly prone to 
news narratives that go beyond description and into analysis with a strong 
journalistic voice (ibid.:53 & 62).  
 Examples of interpretive journalism surfaced in BBC output on the Hong Kong 
protests. CCTV cross-editors took a dim view of what they deemed to be bias, such as 
when a BBC correspondent extrapolated C Y Leung's likely thinking from his public 
remarks. The CCTV editor concerned blamed subjectivity and a lack of 
professionalism by the individual journalist stemming from a cavalier attitude to facts. 
According to Chinese socialist theory, 'truthfulness is the lifeline of journalism' and 
'the source of news is fact' (Guo 2012:28-29) even if this means selective fact. The 
BBC could argue that it was trying to help explain the story to a foreign audience: 
there was no similar attempt by CCTV-News to provide context or direction although 
its audience was assumed to be foreign too. 
BBC cross-editors, for their part, were quick to point out where CCTV-News 
lacked impartiality, but this was not contested by the CCTV journalists interviewed 
for this research. It was clear to all of them where they were free to make their own 
editorial judgements and where toeing the state media line meant changing their 
preferred narrative. The CCTV interviewees insisted that they told the truth, if 
occasionally only part of it. This was not strictly accurate: BBC cross-editors caught a 
CCTV reference to ‘historical evidence of Chinese sovereignty' over islands in the 
South China Sea whose past is in fact internationally contested. However, the BBC's 
drive for impartiality in the cross-edit also led it into the realms of false equivalence 
in which a BBC editor felt a CCTV report on angry traders during the Hong Kong 
protest needed a comment from a 'pro-Occupy shop owner' to provide balance. This 
has wider relevance: the BBC has only recently been castigated for false balance in a 
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climate change debate (Horton, 2017), and the tactic of binary juxtaposition as a way 
of serving up impartiality has been adjudged in a recent study to throttle broader 
conversation on major issues (Wahl-Jorgensen et al. 2017:782). 
9.3.2 Dialogue of elites 
‘Men and women in suits’ were regarded by BBC editors as non-televisual but CCTV-
News had no such reservations. The voices of officials and other elite were heard far 
more often on the CCTV news programmes analysed here than on BBC World News 
TV. However, the percentage of 'general public' voices on BBC World News in the 
period studied was nearly as low as on CCTV. The British broadcaster, too, 
represented a platform for a dialogue of elites. 
 The assumption that the elite are worth listening to is a Western journalistic 
tenet of newsworthiness (Bednarek & Caple 2014:150) but the preponderance of 
elite voices in both BBC and CCTV-News output is better explained through the third 
filter of Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model (1988:2). This sees the media 
relying primarily on government, business and expert sources in order to defend and 
perpetuate the agenda of the ruling establishment. The similarities in the sourcing 
filters of British and Chinese media are aligned with Hearns-Branaman's comparative 
findings on media in China and the United States (2015:81): the result in both cases is 
an establishment bias, but one which is much more evident on CCTV because the 
voices of authority in China sing in unison. 
 CCTV-News certainly gravitated to officialdom even in 'people stories' such as 
the rush home at lunar new year, but it is not clear if this demonstrated an absence of 
trust in the public to voice their own stories or a lack of training in journalistic 
storytelling techniques. In general, however, the unremittingly official perspective 
turned CCTV's news reports into a simple top-down conduit of information devoid of 
Anglo-American-style journalistic critical evaluation. In state media terms, this 
demonstrated China's use of the outmoded 'silver bullet' message transmission model 
(Lee 2016:109) that does not go down well with foreign audiences who have access 
to multiple sources of information. 
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9.3.3 Social responsibility 
The cross-edit provided empirical evidence of a fundamental difference in Chinese 
journalists' views of their role compared with those at BBC World News – that of the 
social responsibility of the media. A key intervention here was a Chinese cross-
editor's suggestion that an appeal to the media not to jeopardise an investigation 
through their reporting be run as an on-screen strapline to alert other journalists. De 
Burgh (2017:87-88) has found it a norm of official Chinese media that drama is 
damped down and information withheld if this is considered better for society. Such 
conditioning may originate in propaganda department directives that frequently ask 
journalists not to 'hype' an event lest it cause alarm – the opposite of Anglo-American 
journalists' training in accentuating the deviant and the controversial. The BBC's 
description of a potential escalation of the Hong Kong protests5 as 'the ultimate 
nightmare for China's leaders' – even though this had not yet come about – was an 
example, in Chinese eyes, of how a situation could be exacerbated through the media. 
9.3.4 Timeliness and ‘newsiness’ 
In the digital age, the cachet of timeliness for an international news service is not 
what it once was: however quickly a story is brought to air, Twitter (or Weibo) will 
have been faster if not as well sourced. Comparability in terms of 'newsiness' is a 
more informative measure, as journalists monitor rival channels' output – unless of 
course an expected item fails to appear at all.6 
 Quantitative content analysis revealed that the geographical weighting of 
CCTV-News output was very much towards East Asia – and specifically China – 
hinting that the channel was carving out a distinctive niche for itself. However, China 
news apart, the topics chosen by CCTV-News and BBC World News were more alike 
in 2016 than they had been in 2014. CCTV-News focused more on security and 
politics than BBC World News but gave airtime to very similar international stories. 
This is not astonishing, as CCTV-News subscribed to the major Western news agency 
feeds in addition to Xinhua, but it denotes little drive for a distinctive narrative. The 
palette of news delivered by CCTV's English output broadened in 2016 to include 
more offbeat and social items, possibly because of greater input from the expanded 
                                                        
5 Chapter 6, section 6.2.6.1. 
6 For which see 9.6.2. 
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Washington network centre and the recruitment in general of more international 
staff – again denoting a trend towards homogenisation of agendas with other 
channels. 
9.3.5 The tyranny of pictures 
The availability of video was shown in content analysis and interviews to influence 
editorial decisions in different ways at BBC World News and CCTV-News. For the BBC 
pictures were deemed essential for propelling the narrative: for CCTV they ticked 
political boxes but were seen to have little bearing on editorial placement. Use of 
pictures by CCTV-News was often weakest in the very places where it was most 
desirous of setting an agenda: in its political news about China. This may have 
maximised editorial control over the message, but at the expense of the visual impact 
to which international audiences are accustomed.    
 The BBC's use of pictures was consistent, reflecting the way Anglo-American 
television news has come to embrace the 'storytelling' narrative form (Shoemaker & 
Reese 2014:175) amid sharpening commercial pressure. However, the picture 
imperative also led – by omission – to a lack of BBC coverage of government 
viewpoints during the Hong Kong crisis.7 BBC journalists explained the difficulty of 
telling Chinese stories that did not have dramatic pictures. It is noteworthy that, as 
shown in the quantitative content analysis, the BBC’s appetite for US domestic 
political news remained undiminished despite the lack of ‘interesting’ footage.  
 On CCTV-News, pictures seemed to confuse rather than set the editorial tone. 
This was possibly in part because, as one CCTV interviewee made clear, the Mandarin 
news does not deal in 'storytelling' and editorial decisions are not made on the 
strength of pictures. On the English side, this meant that strong CCTV-News features 
were not headlined, and any competitive advantage from them was lost. CCTV 
interviewees described the difficulty of serving two ‘masters’, meaning that they were 
expected to incorporate video from the CCTV Mandarin output into the English news 
while also reflecting what was being shown on Anglo-American channels. Several 
journalists referred to the Mandarin material as 'political' or lacking editorial 
justification. They did not see material replicating the output of Western rivals in the 
same way, although much of it came from news agencies such as AP, potentially 
                                                        
7 This was not helped by the reluctance of officials to speak to the BBC in any case. 
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reproducing the very Western selections of news that CCTV's English stream was set 
up to avoid. Anglo-American agency feeds, allied with Anglo-American reporters, 
made CCTV's English coverage of the 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris virtually 
indistinguishable from the BBC's, as indicated in the cross-editing chapter, and at 
variance with the editorial line of other parts of Chinese state media. 
9.4 China coverage compared 
The results of the quantitative content analysis vindicated China's overseas media 
expansion where they demonstrated a shortfall in China coverage on the BBC. The 
BBC World News programmes in this study carried less China news than expected, 
except when there was a big event or conference that legitimised expensively-shot 
features. In the BBC African news in this analysis, China-in-Africa implications were 
hardly mentioned outside set-piece meetings such as the FoCAC summit. The paucity 
of China news in the BBC World News sample meant that easily reportable items 
about dissent or disasters skewed the image of China on that channel towards 
negativity, even when the BBC as a whole hosted broader and more nuanced 
coverage – often by the same journalists – on other platforms such as World Service 
radio or News Online. A key factor here is the difficulty of 'selling' complex stories 
about a distant culture to non-specialist news editors in London. The researcher 
herself can remember how long it took to persuade a World Service news editor to 
accept a story about the flight of a Chinese police chief to a US consulate that 
precipitated the downfall of the Politburo high-flier, Bo Xilai.  
The China depicted by CCTV-News, as revealed by the quantitative content 
analysis, was a successful but lonely one. The channel covered Chinese news 
unremittingly and at length in this sample, but mostly in isolation. Nation and subject 
analysis revealed that it did not appear interested in focusing on China's neighbours 
or trade partners except at set-piece meetings at which China – through hosting or 
economic power – held the upper hand. China's greatest asset, its people, were 
marginalised as officialdom took centre stage. Most of the information disseminated 
here could be categorised not as Anglo-American-style journalism but as positive 
reporting or public diplomacy. Critical focus in the news programmes was mostly 
confined to retrospective depictions of problem-solving in the Agenda in Action series 
during the political Two Sessions. 
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9.4.1 The Hong Kong exception 
Coverage of the Hong Kong protests was something of an exception for CCTV-News in 
that they represented a negative event (from the perspective of the Chinese 
authorities) which the state broadcaster's English channel was obliged, through the 
pressure of international competition, to cover. What resulted from the comparative 
news content analysis at CCTV-News and BBC World News were accounts of two 
almost completely separate scenarios, each claiming to represent the 'story'. 
The dominant frames used here by CCTV-News and directed against the 
protesters, conflict and blame (responsibility for causing a problem), represented a 
deviation from the channel's general focus on solutions and harmony. The CCTV-
News coverage had no pretensions to impartiality at the start of the protests, with the 
channel assuming the role of state mouthpiece, but content analysis showed that this 
changed over time, with protesters and their views gradually accorded some space. 
The reason for the change cannot be proved: it is possible that the pressure of 
international competition forced management's hand, but equally possible that the 
authorities gradually ceased to see the protests as a threat to regime stability and 
were content to allow broader reporting. 
BBC World News's dominant frames were also conflict and blame, but they 
reflected negative views of the authorities rather than the protesters. This was 
consistent with the liberal-democratic tendency to give the benefit of the doubt to 
street protests if they are against an authoritarian system. The BBC was not observed 
in this analysis to have tackled the views of anti-Occupy local people with any 
seriousness. When the Hong Kong reporting is viewed through Hallin's spheres of 
political discourse (1986:117), it can be seen that for CCTV-News the protesters 
began in the Sphere of Deviance, in which their voices were deemed unworthy of 
being heard, and moved gradually towards (but not into) the Sphere of Legitimate 
Controversy where journalistic objectivity resides. BBC coverage, by contrast, placed 
the protesters just beyond the Sphere of Legitimate Controversy inside the Sphere of 
Consensus, in line with the corporation's commitment to what it sees as 'fundamental 
democratic principles' (BBC, 2017). This placement required the BBC to adjudicate on 
where true democracy lay – with institutions and their contested electoral practices, 
or on the streets – calling into question its ability to provide truly impartial 
information. The BBC's sympathetic treatment of the protesters may also spring from 
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Western assumptions about the inherent superiority of democracy, whereas the 
Chinese Communist Party has seen (limited) democracy as a way to help its own 
system work better rather than a weapon against it (Pieke 2016:47). 
9.4.2 Red lines and small acts of journalism 
The figurative red lines around news about China or Chinese affairs in state media are 
well documented: at CCTV-News, as in the Mandarin media, China stories were 
subject to an exceptional level of information control. In the Hong Kong protests 
content analysis here, however, the positioning of the red line was shown to vary over 
time as the authorities' objectives and rhetoric altered. It was not possible to map the 
variation in framing to the existence of propaganda directives as few of these were 
leaked, but the changes in framing emphasis outlined in Chapter 6, Figure 6-4 were 
consistent with the authorities' switching of tactics as the crisis unfolded. This may 
have denoted government uncertainty about the best way to handle the protests: it 
certainly illustrated the difficulties faced by Chinese journalists trying to gauge what 
could be reported at any given time. The Hong Kong uncertainty can be contrasted 
with CCTV’s uniform framing response to the Yangtze sinking (Chapter 6, Figure 6-
21), where the government's strategy of public reassurance and operational planning 
never wavered. 
This research turned up several examples of reporting that were at variance 
with the 'underlying journalist-versus-censor dichotomy' (Dai, 2013:6) to which 
Chinese journalism is often reduced in Western eyes. The CCTV-News journalists who 
interviewed anti-government protesters in Hong Kong, who showed the raw grief of 
relatives of those who drowned in the Yangtze capsize, or who critically evaluated 
China's economic problems at the Two Sessions, were not committing 'small acts of 
resistance' to an authoritarian state as highlighted in a book of the same name 
(Crawshaw & Jackson 2010). They were working inside the state system, committing 
what could be termed 'small acts of journalism', pushing their red lines as far as it 
was practicable to go. 
It is not necessarily true to say that these CCTV-News journalists were 
'dancing in shackles' (He, 2008:76) in order to serve the twin gods of modern China, 
the Party and the market: CCTV-News generated no advertising revenue. What was at 
issue, according to one interviewee, was a fundamental, professional wish to report 
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accurately and as comprehensively as possible. This was not without risk: several 
times in interviews, CCTV journalists used the word 'dangerous' when talking of 
pushing the editorial line. All the correspondents who were seen to attempt this were 
Chinese: the situation never arose for their foreign counterparts covering non-
Chinese news. According to one interviewee, 'some of the bravest and best journalists 
in the system are Chinese'.8 
9.4.3 Investigative reporting 
The lack of investigative reporting in the news programmes of CCTV-News, as evident 
in the Agenda in Action series during the political Two Sessions, should be viewed not 
as a professional failing but as a product of journalism's role in the Chinese social 
system. The Central Discipline Inspection Commission of the Communist Party, or 纪
委 jiwei, rather than the media, is the vehicle for holding power (and therefore the 
Party) to account. It steered the professed anti-corruption campaign against 'tigers 
and flies', with journalists expected simply to recount its results. For as long as 
Chinese journalism has a Party role, this practice is unlikely to change.  
 More contested, perhaps, is the impact of such a reporting style, as 
communicated through CCTV’s Nairobi newsroom, on the institutions of developing 
African nations, especially those lacking independent forms of scrutiny. While CCTV 
Africa recruited many journalists schooled in Western traditions, some spoke of 
having aligned themselves with Chinese state media practice. The main presenter of 
CCTV’s African output, a Kenyan journalist, reported seeing the media 'in a different 
light. It doesn't always have to be confrontational. I don’t always have to go into 
interviews trying to belittle you, trying to criticise you.'9  Whether a less accusatory 
reporting style leaves a potentially dangerous gap in accountability or represents a 
legitimate alternative form of journalism will be dealt with in the next section. 
9.5 The Africa comparison 
Is CCTV's Africa reporting different from that of BBC World News? – not as much as 
was expected. The two broadcasters' seemingly unconnected decisions in 2012 to 
launch daily programmes driven by African journalists helped shift the international 
news agenda on Africa away from unremitting gloom. The combination of China's 
                                                        
8 Interview ref. CGPG10. 
9 Interview ref. CAFA27. 
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money and high-profile African recruitment brought CCTV closer to its rivals in terms 
of editorial standards and framing than was the case with its news from Beijing. CCTV 
also appeared unfazed by association with 'positive reporting' as a facilitator of 
African development and a means of delivering Chinese public diplomacy. 
9.5.1 Great minds? 
At first sight the two broadcasters appeared to differ in their framing of African news, 
with the BBC cleaving to the conflict frame and CCTV to the attribution of solution-
oriented responsibility and harmony. That apart, however, their treatment of events 
in Africa not involving China was very similar, with both broadcasters attempting to 
include upbeat reporting while also covering wars and famines. The coincidence of 
approach showed that CCTV's attempt to construct a different narrative for Africa had 
tapped into a general desire among international news organisations to rebalance the 
portrayal of developing countries. 
9.5.2 Constructive journalism and ‘positive news’ 
CCTV's use of the solution-oriented responsibility and harmony frames in its African 
news reporting (including China-in-Africa happenings) indicated that it could be 
using either ‘positive news’ or ‘constructive journalism’, as both produce forward-
looking narratives in which tensions have been or will be resolved. However, CCTV’s 
use of the approach of constructive journalism – focusing on a problem to stimulate 
discussion of a solution (Zhang Y. 2014:8) – was relatively low, because in many 
instances either there was no problem or a solution had already been found. This, 
backed up by interviews with CCTV Africa journalists, confirmed earlier research 
indicating that much of CCTV Africa's effort went into producing 'positive news' 
(Gagliardone 2013) or, at least, positive where China's role in Africa was concerned 
(Zhang X. 2013). Since then, the growing Chinese involvement in Africa has given 
CCTV's Nairobi operation more reason to convey a message of 'China helping Africa' 
rather than simply criticise the West’s actions on the continent. It follows that CCTV 
Africa's news was closer to public diplomacy or propaganda than to journalistic 
norms in the Anglosphere that demand critical reflection. Zhang (Y.)'s notion of 
constructive journalism as a technique for Chinese media in Africa (op.cit.) therefore 
did not apply. CCTV Africa's framing of this type of news appeared little different from 
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CCTV Beijing's framing of most news about China (see Table 2), and not a special 
technique for African audiences.  
 Nonetheless, as noted above, CCTV did not shy away from covering conflicts in 
Africa: in fact, despite its willingness to embrace 'positive news', a greater proportion 
of CCTV's news output on Africa Live concerned wars, stability and politics than on its 
BBC rival, Focus on Africa TV.  CCTV managers acknowledged that it was not possible 
to depict all African news in positive terms and that they often looked to other, 
'softer' parts of the output to balance the bitter narratives of the news belt. It is 
difficult to see how constructive journalism could have helped CCTV Africa here in 
any case, as the approach lends itself better to feature material than to breaking 
stories. The function of such detailed conflict and stability coverage in Africa on CCTV 
may be to apprise Chinese investors of the merits of doing business there, again 
suggesting that the news output is an arm of state policy rather than solely serving a 
journalistic purpose. 
9.6 Information control 
Is information control the telling difference between the broadcasters? To a certain 
extent it is: the Marxist vision of the media serving the people is interpreted by the 
Chinese state as the media promoting the views of the Communist Party, with 
concomitant intervention in the functions of journalism. There are two qualifications 
to this: firstly, the extent of such restrictions on CCTV-News journalists has been 
shown in this research to vary according to their location, their degree of experience 
and the subject-matter of their reports. Secondly, BBC journalism is also affected by 
information control, whether subconsciously via 'groupthink' or through the very 
structures of news storytelling, and contains ideological presumptions about the 
primacy of Western conceptions of democracy and human rights. 
9.6.1 The Trojan dragon’s Achilles heel 
CCTV-News's policy of adapting editorial preferences and reporting styles to suit 
different target markets has served only to highlight its difficulties in explaining 
China in its news output. The degree of information control implicit in CCTV's China 
news – whether through outright directives, state media preferences or self-
censorship – is the channel's Achilles heel, robbing it of an editorial consistency that 
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would give it both credibility and a 'brand identity'. The same channel, as the content 
analysis shows, can produce reports from northern Iraq or Buenos Aires that are 
indistinguishable in quality and content from those of its rivals, and in the next 
instant ask a guest 'what impressed you the most?' about a speech by the Chinese 
premier10. 
By drawing qualitatively on the results of the content analysis and interviews, 
it is possible to construct a diagram (Figure 9-1) of perceptions of information control 
and self-censorship at CCTV-News in the period studied. In terms of the x-axis, 
censorship is clearly in evidence when the subject-matter is China or close strategic 
interests, such as Chinese actions in Africa or China's relations with Japan: matters of 
lesser geopolitical importance are afforded greater editorial licence. The diagram 
broadens, but is on similar lines to, Madrid-Morales' emerging hierarchy of 
information control in CCTV's African news (2016: presentation slide). It is also 
consonant with Jirik's 'reportability curve' (2016:3541), which plotted the chances of 
a story being covered by CCTV-News according to its sensitivity and distance from 
central power.  
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KEY: 
 No editorial negotiation possible (e.g. directives) 
 Highly restricted editorial space but occasionally room for discussion 
   Restricted editorial space 
   Less restricted editorial space 
   Fewer editorial limitations  
   Relatively unrestricted editorial space 
   Role not known 
                                                        
10 CCTV News Hour, 0400 GMT 5 March 2015. 
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It is on the y-axis, which stratifies flexibility in interpretation of restrictions 
according to a person's role in the news machine, that this diagram differs from 
previous research. The qualitative work indicates here that the correspondent in the 
field has greater potential to test and bend the range of permissible reporting than 
either management or editors in the newsroom. This assertion is supported by the 
work of Shoemaker and Reese (2014:84): looking primarily at the Anglosphere, they 
consider editors to have internalised journalistic norms and to be 'less apt to 
succumb to bias than reporters, who may get wrapped up in a story...'. It is, 
paradoxically, precisely the act of being enveloped in a story that can suggest to a 
correspondent ways of sidestepping over-cautious editorial constraints – but only if 
that correspondent knows where to tread, and how softly. Such deviations are not 
driven by principle: they are ‘improvised and situated’ (Pan & Lu 2003:215). This 
weakens the position of Chinese journalists, whom De Burgh11 sees fluctuating 
uneasily between their Party role and their perceptions of ‘Western’ journalism, 
without a professional theory of their own. 
CCTV-News scripts from reporters on location in China (for example, in 
Agenda in Action) were observed to be closer to established Western norms in 
framing terms than those written in the Beijing newsroom – for example, with 
heightened evocation of the conflict, 'blame' and human interest frames. These 
reports contrasted with the state-ordained, overwhelmingly harmonious framing 
back at base where editors could check every line of script. In the CCTV Africa 
newsroom, editors and planners were observed to have a freer rein than in Beijing 
until they approached any of the 'red lines' of coverage, although this might have 
been because they appeared to self-censor less. In general, however, interviews often 
revealed planners and newsdesk editors to be editorially more conservative than 
experienced reporters.  
In another twist for the channel's Achilles heel, the regionalisation of 
information control made a unified identity for CCTV's three network centres – 
Beijing, Nairobi and Washington – even more difficult to attain. News output from 
Washington, neutral and lacking critical bite (Xie & Boyd-Barrett 2015:72-73), dwelt 
mostly in the three columns on the right of the diagram with as little Chinese political 
news as possible. The output from Nairobi, by contrast, was derived almost 
                                                        
11 Personal communication, 2018. 
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exclusively from the two left-hand columns – either African news or China-in-Africa 
news – with much more ideological heft and implicit control, sometimes mixed with a 
forward-looking narrative. The Beijing newsroom, for its part, resembled a pick-and-
mix of values, combining world news packages – many inherited from the 
Washington output – with upbeat African reports from Nairobi, plus its own 
carefully-controlled China narrative. 
Does this variation in micro-level narratives and practices influence the meso-
level routines or macro-level direction of CCTV-News? The answer is: probably only 
slightly. The ‘small acts of journalism’ committed by experienced Chinese reporters 
are unlikely to be widely replicated, as many of their colleagues either lack 
experience or are in non-output roles. CCTV-News journalists include Communist 
Party members (CGTN 2017b) who are unlikely to generate output that might 
jeopardise the system. The ‘professionalism’ that CCTV-News’s Chinese journalists 
say they want to learn from Anglo-American colleagues does not – as far as can be 
gauged from the interviews – include negativity, conflict or muck-raking. It is seen 
primarily in terms of slick production values and similarity of ‘look’ with 
international rivals: these values can easily move from micro to meso, from 
individuals to routines (Shoemaker & Reese 2014:9), without troubling the 
organisational or social structure. Collaboration between nationalities has brought 
benefits to CCTV-News, but interviewees who said their news values had changed 
while working there were African, not Chinese: in other words, the trend was 
towards alignment with Chinese preferences. It is instructive, in this context, to recall 
that China hosts training programmes for dozens of journalists from Africa and other 
parts of the developing world every year (China Daily 2016). 
It is not possible to construct a similar information control diagram for BBC 
World News without more content analysis of news about Britain, especially as the 
'pinch point' of political pressure on the BBC usually has its roots in domestic current 
affairs programmes.12 However, the declared pre-eminence of democratic values in 
BBC World News output indicates that Hallin's Spheres of Influence are an adequate 
measure of what is, essentially, a consistent message across geopolitical regions. 
                                                        
12
 The Iraq dossier affair of 2003 that precipitated the resignation of the BBC's director-general began 
on Today, for example, and the programme on the Northern Ireland conflict banned in 1985, Real Lives: 
at the Edge of the Union, was a documentary. 
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9.6.2 Filling in (most of) the blanks 
The content analysis showed that CCTV's English bulletins no longer routinely 
ignored major news or views that were contrary to those of the Chinese leadership, 
such as the Hong Kong protests or the utterances of the Japanese prime minister. This 
advance on the channel's early days suggested increased self-confidence: it is also 
possible that commercial pressure, in the form of comparison with rival international 
channels, had forced less one-sided sourcing practices and led to a loosening of 
restrictions. However, in the case of Hong Kong in particular, information was 
sometimes delayed or appeared briefly and then disappeared, reportedly in this 
instance while the editorial line was debated. Some events remained unreported, 
such as the police teargassing of protesters in Hong Kong or the high-profile visit of 
the Pope to Kenya, providing evidence of the primacy of China's official line over local 
editorial decisions.  
 While CCTV-News journalists acknowledged that these omissions were 
political, BBC interviewees insisted that their reasons for not covering certain 
elements of stories were editorial. However, on closer questioning this sometimes 
turned out not to be the case: lack of resources or time, or the strength of pictures 
elsewhere, were mentioned as reasons for not covering the South Sudan mediation 
and the workers inconvenienced by the Hong Kong protests. In both instances, the 
elements of greatest conflict were preserved and those indicating consonance or 
nuance were thrown away. It is easy to conclude that political interference damaged 
the credibility of CCTV-News internationally, but it should also be acknowledged that 
preferences for strong pictures and a simple narrative greatly influenced what BBC 
World News had to say. 
9.6.3 ‘Chineseness’ and CCTV’s English news 
The quantitative content analysis and classification of on-air journalists showed that 
CCTV-News had moved a long way from established Chinese journalism practice in 
terms of appearance, staffing and reporting styles with the aim of appealing to 
international viewers. However, CCTV-News did not heed a US expert’s advice to 
capitalise on its uniqueness by concentrating on explaining China. If anything, it went 
in the opposite direction by pouring resources into news reporting from other areas 
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of the world. This – as highlighted in the cross-editing chapter – yielded journalism 
that often appeared indistinguishable from that on other international stations. 
 Having said this, CCTV-News was not an ‘international’ channel in the sense of 
one that mixed staff of various nationalities across its output. The quantitative 
content analysis and interviews showed that it was highly regionalised: the 
managerial layer was overwhelmingly Chinese, Africans provided the bulk of the 
CCTV Africa staffing, and Chinese news was reported almost solely by Chinese 
correspondents. In many industrialised countries, CCTV-News preferred to capitalise 
on Western newsgathering cuts and buy up experienced Western, mainly Anglo-
American, journalists. Such correspondents interviewed for this research reported 
little pressure on them to tailor their reporting to a Chinese 'agenda', indicating that 
by using them CCTV was replicating existing Anglo-American narratives. Use of 
Western news agency footage everywhere apart from in Chinese news exacerbated 
this trend. BBC World News, in contrast, had a more even representation of British 
versus other-global staff throughout its operation, except in Africa where – as at CCTV 
Africa – the operation was glocalised. Over recent years, some journalists from 
outside China have assumed managerial or 'expert' functions at CCTV-News, 
particularly in Washington. However, as Jirik points out, foreigners never acceded to 
the highest levels of decision-making (2016:3542), and a Chinese journalist stressed 
that CCTV America’s ability to effect change across CCTV-News as a whole had its 
limits:13 
[Washington] DC staff... may think they may change the colour, they may think they 
may change the format, they may change the news agenda setting, but no. One 
instruction coming from the headquarters will completely change their practice... 
Only the Chinese staff in power, Chinese leaders in position, will make the final 
decision. 
9.7 Partiality and professionalism 
Has the death knell sounded for impartiality? In an age in which the global 
information blender disgorges 'content' from all sides, transparency and media 
literacy may help the citizen far more than blind trust in a flawed principle ever did. 
The final section of this chapter situates CCTV's English news output in relation to 
Anglo-American principles of journalism and the vision of one of CCTV’s most senior 
                                                        
13 Interview ref. CCFC07. 
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executives, sums up the findings from the research, and considers where Chinese 
media's 'going out' project is heading. 
9.7.1 The comparison and the vision 
Can the news output of CCTV-News between 2014 and 2016 be described as 
'journalism' as it is known in the Anglosphere? It has been demonstrated here 
empirically that CCTV's English news was an opportunistic cocktail of propaganda, 
public diplomacy, positive news, a limited amount of constructive journalism and 
Anglo-American-style reporting, depending on target audience and political need. 
This may have suited Beijing's domestic political purposes, but it did not demonstrate 
the consistency and distinctiveness required to develop trust. Anglo-American 
broadcasters also tailor their output to their target audiences but – as demonstrated 
here with the BBC – they employ a more uniform editorial approach.  
 CCTV-News offered a change in tone and viewpoint from BBC World News on 
a range of issues, through its framing of events or its news values, or (less attractively) 
because of political imperatives that entailed omitting key facts. CCTV's attempts to 
move away from Western-style negativity in news did not result in journalism as 
known in the Anglosphere when events intersected with Chinese state interests, 
notably in the channel's general China reporting and when documenting Chinese 
actions in Africa. However, in other Africa reporting there was a real attempt at 
crafting new angles that placed CCTV in the vanguard of attempts by international 
news organisations to change the external image of developing nations. Nonetheless, 
it was hard to detect more than occasional flourishes of 'constructive journalism' in 
CCTV's African or indeed China reporting: much of it was summed up by CCTV staff as 
'positive' news. The drive for an alternative perspective was inconsistent: in world 
news in which China was not directly involved or strategically implicated, there was 
little attempt to craft a different agenda. 
 Questioned in 2018 by de Burgh about the editorial variations in CCTV’s three 
Anglophone broadcast centres14, Sun Yusheng, deputy controller of CCTV, said each 
station would respond to its local audience ‘in a way appropriate to the locality’.  
However, he proclaimed uniform principles for CCTV’s English news in the post-truth 
era (hou zhenxiang shidai, 后真相时代): journalists should stick to the truth and 
                                                        
14 As yet unpublished interview. 
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provide ‘a clear-headed perspective and a Chinese one to boot’. CCTV’s initial aim for 
its external-facing output was to broadcast Chinese interpretations and analysis 
rather than expand – yet – into a global rival to existing international media. Rather 
than have them deal in ‘entertainment dressed as information’, he insisted that 
journalists ‘consider the consequences of their work’, and aim for a ‘worthwhile 
conclusion’ to their efforts. It was not clear if this was an endorsement of constructive 
journalism or a reflection of positive reporting and journalists’ social responsibility. 
Despite the reservations of his own staff voiced in this research, Sun did not think 
foreign viewers were put off by CCTV’s lack of critical focus on China’s leaders: ‘Few 
people in the world expect their own media to pour dirt on their own country and its 
government so they will not be surprised if we forbear from doing so.’ He saw CCTV 
as distinct from RT, describing the Russian broadcaster as ‘very biased’ and a 
‘propaganda outfit’. 
9.7.2 Research findings 
Specific areas in which this research broke new ground or expanded on current 
literature are as follows. 
Methodological:  
- the pioneering method of cross-editing, which makes manifest the 
subconscious editorial decisions that go unnoticed in conventional process or 
content analysis. 
- in frame analysis, the expansion of Semetko & Valkenburg's generic 
'framework of frames' (2000) to include harmony and stability, both key 
themes in Chinese political rhetoric. 
Editorial:  
- demonstration of the Chinese aversion to interpretive journalism through 
content analysis and cross-editing. 
- demonstration of the Chinese notion of social responsibility of the media 
through cross-editing. 
- demonstration of the Chinese journalistic aversion to negativity and blame 
through frame analysis. 
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- demonstration of the consonances between CCTV-News and BBC World News 
in their coverage of and editorial reaction to international news, through 
cross-editing. 
- the incorporation of Jirik's (2016) and Madrid-Morales' (2016) diagrams of 
political sensitivity and reporting at CCTV-News into a new chart that, through 
interviews and content analysis, also stratified information control by 
professional function. 
- extension of the CCTV Africa content analysis of Zhang (X. 2013) over a longer 
period with similar sampling methods, broadly supporting her conclusions. 
- testing, through content analysis, and qualified rejection of Zhang (Y. 2014)'s 
hypothesis that 'constructive journalism' was the best way to describe Chinese 
media's work in Africa. 
- demonstration through content analysis, interviews and cross-editing of how 
the BBC's practice of 'impartiality' differs from the ideal, including the 
positioning of its Hong Kong coverage according to Hallin's Spheres of 
Influence. 
Strategic: 
- vindication of Chinese media's 'going-out' project through comparative 
content analysis in terms of the balance of China and East Asia coverage. 
- provision of empirical data on percentages of foreign or Chinese front-of-
camera journalists through content analysis. 
The author's previous professional experience in 24-hour broadcast news meant that 
it was possible to pinpoint, and therefore discard, certain failings at CCTV-News that 
could safely be attributed simply to inexperience and the relative youth of the 
channel. However, a background involving the launch of a global television news 
channel has made the significance of certain other results unclear. One example of 
this is CCTV-News's lack of responsiveness to good pictures, which could either be 
down to inexperience or to an institutional insistence on telling a story regardless of – 
or despite – the illustration. Former colleagues at BBC World Service Television News, 
who tried and failed to make this work, would remember such instances well. 
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9.7.3 The meaning of the message 
What CCTV-News offered between 2014 and 2016 was – in both senses of the 
adjective – partial journalism. As China built alternative global and regional 
institutions in a 'Great Rejuvenation' (Chen & Hodzi 2017:5) that aimed to place it at 
the centre of a reimagined world order, it appeared also to be attempting to invent an 
alternative way of 'doing journalism' or 'doing news'. The strategy succeeded only in 
part. Positive reporting, conformity with the party line and an emphasis on social 
responsibility (Li & Chitty 2017:7) are the watchwords of today's Chinese state model 
of journalistic professionalism: only the last of these is likely to engage people in the 
democratic world, although that world is admittedly shrinking. Chinese media will 
not generate 'soft power' when they are employed to promote a Communist Party-
based challenge to the Western developmental model (Lee 2016:115) even if some of 
China's ideas inspire authoritarian developing countries. CCTV's commitment to 
reporting on and from Africa may allow Chinese and African journalists to learn from 
one another over time. However, state journalism in China will always be subordinate 
to the Party's need to maintain stability, perhaps increasingly so in the social media 
age. 
 The symbolic power of the media to name things, tell stories and define reality 
(Meikle 2009:68) has become – as far as Chinese media's 'going-out' project is 
concerned – a symbolic millstone. This is especially the case with news bulletins, 
whose traditionally concise format and overt sourcing make gaps in the provision of 
information more noticeable than on talk shows or in documentaries. Jirik 
(2016:3540) contends that a 'huge field of news' is available to CCTV's English 
programmes once Beijing's interdictions are set aside. That notwithstanding, it is on 
the reporting of China and political news in particular that the channel is judged, 
albeit mainly in countries whose media's pretensions to impartiality can themselves 
be questioned. For example, although the BBC's professional reporting practices in 
the field are admired around the world, it too chooses its topics from a narrow range 
of public debate. The Corporation does not serve the Party but it is part of the 
Establishment: indeed, over recent decades, a steady trickle of correspondents, 
producers and editors have decamped from the BBC to work for the main political 
parties. Several BBC interviewees admitted that a liberal-democratic viewpoint 
coloured the organisation's editorial decision-making, and the corporation’s editorial 
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guidelines do not require detachment from ‘fundamental democratic principles’ (BBC 
2017).  
 Having set out in pursuit of an international Anglophone media presence and 
greater global influence, CCTV's English service has adopted general principles of 
journalism rather than public diplomacy in certain areas of its news output. Some of 
this journalism is indistinguishable from that produced in the Anglosphere. Other 
parts of it – particularly in Africa – reflect an outlook that is not culturally Anglo-
American and which is characterised by an aversion to binary depictions, a focus on 
solutions and an attitude of social responsibility. This alternative stance, whether 
culturally Chinese, African or something else, serves only to throw into sharper relief 
CCTV's overall journalistic failings in its English news, particularly its partial 
reporting on Chinese politics. By expanding overseas and recruiting large numbers of 
non-Chinese staff, CCTV has created its own internal pressures to reform its 
journalism and distance itself from the notion that state media must exclusively 
represent the 'tongue and throat' of the Communist Party. The challenge for CCTV's 
Anglophone journalists is how to claw back some distance from the type of bald 
propaganda that alienates overseas viewers, even as Xi Jinping consolidates his 
control of the Chinese state.  
In a multi-channel environment, CCTV's English news could certainly work 
with, rather than attempt to hide, the 'state media' tag. Steps towards journalistic 
professionalism and editorial consistency could include transparency about the 
channel's obligation to put the Chinese state's point of view and a drive to ensure that 
CCTV is first with official Chinese news, while at the same time reporting multiple 
viewpoints on contentious issues including those in China. Across-the-board 
application of professional journalistic standards would reduce basic mistakes that 
stem from sloppiness and inexperience. However, editors cannot proceed with speed 
and confidence if they are hostage to political micro-management. What is needed is a 
leap of faith by the Chinese authorities and a reformulation of the role of journalists in 
China's external-facing media. Journalists who are trusted rather than used as blunt 
propaganda weapons are more likely to be believed by an audience. While CCTV’s 
English news will always represent an establishment view, it could contribute more 
to a rebalancing of global media that would acknowledge China's rise.  
I 
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Appendix 4D: participant information sheet and consent form 
Three versions of this form were used: (1) agreement to an interview, (2) agreement to participate in 
both interviews and cross-editing, and (3) agreement to an interview with updated dates for 2016. The 
combined interview/cross-edit document, based on a generic form produced by the University of 
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Appendix 5D: Neighbours, friends and BRICS countries as share of world news output on CCTV-News and 
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Appendix 7A Sample quantitative content analysis data-sheet, CCTV Africa Live, 2016 
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Appendix 8A Pilot cross-edit running-order: CCTV News Update, 1500 GMT 17 June 2014 
 
 










Appendix 8C Full CCTV cross-edit of BBC China editor Carrie Gracie’s Hong Kong report, 2 October 2014 
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